Chap 1^st

We seem clearly to be led by the Instincts of Nature to Think That there is Somthing ἐφ' ἡμῖν In Nostra Potestate, In our own Power (tho’ Dependently upon God Almighty) and that we are not all together, Passive in our Actings, nor Determined by Inevitable Necessity, in what soever we do. Because we Praise & Dispraise, Commend & Blame men, for their Actings, much otherwise, then we do, Inanimate Beings or Brute Animales. When we Blame or Commend a Clock or Automaton, we do it so, as not Imputeing to that Automaton, its Beings the cause of its own moving well or ill, Agreeabley or Disagreeable to the end it was designed for; this being ascribed by vs only to ye Artificor; But when we Blame a Man, for any wicked Actions; as for taking a way anothers man’s Life, either by Perjurys or by willfull murther; wee blame Him, not only as doing otherwise then Ought to have been done but also then he Might have done, & that it was possible for him to haue avoided, it. So that it was Himself the cause of the Evill thereof. We do not Impute the Evill of all Men’s Wicked Actions, to God the Creater and maker of them; after the same manner, as we do the Faults of a Clock, or watch, wholy to the Watchmaker. All men’s words at least, Free God from the blame <2r> of wicked Actions Pronouncing ὁ θεος ἀνάιτιος, God is Causeless & Guiltless of ; them, and we cast the blame of them wholy on the men them selves, as Principles of Action; & the True causes of the Morall DDefects of them So also do we Blame, Men’s Acting Vitiously & Immorally; in another Sense, then we Blame, a Halting, or a Stumbling Horse; or then we Blame, the Naturall & Necessaary Infirmities of men themselvs; when uncontracted by Vice{s}, For in this case, we so Blame the Infirmites, as to Pitty the Men themselves, looking upon them as Unfortunate; but not as Faulty; But we blame Mens Vices, with a Displeasure against the Persons themselves.

The same sense of Nature’s Instincts appears yett more plainly, from men’s Blaming, Accusing, & Condemning, them Selves, for their own Actions, when done either Rashly Inconsideratly & imprudently to their own private disadvantage, or else Immorally & Vitiously, and agaist the Dictat of Honesty. In which latter <3r> case, Men have an Inward sense of Guilt, (besides shame,) Remorse of Conscience, with Horror, Confutions & Astonishment. And they Repent of these their Actions, afterward, with a kind of selfe Detestation, & somtimes not without Exercising Revenge upon themselves, as being a peece of Iustice Due. No man Accuses or Condemns himselfe, nor looks upon himselfe as Guilty, for having had a Favour, the stone, or the Goute when uncontracted by Vice, And if all Humane Actions were necessary, men would be said no more to Repent of them, then of Diseases, or that they were not born Princes, or Heirs to a thousand pounds ayear.

Lastly, we have also a sense of Retributive Punitive Vindicative Iustice, as not A meer Phancy but a Thing Really Existing in Nature, when Punishments are Inflected upon malefactors for their Vnjust and Illegal Actions Past, by Civill Magistrats in Perticular Common Wealths For tho’ it be true, that these Civill Punishments do in part look Forwards to Prevent the like for the Future, by Terrifying others from doing the same, or to hinder those malefactors <4r> themselves; from Doing the like Mischief Again by cutting them off by Death, as we kill Noxious Animals, woolfes & Vipers, & Serpents & mad Dogs, yet is it not true, that this is all, the meaning of them, and that they have no Retrospect to thes Actions Past; As A being satisfaction to the Ecquitable Nature of Rationall Beings, when they see wicked Men who have both Abused & Debased themselves, & also Acted Injuriously to others, to haue Disgrace & Pain, for their Reward But mens naturall Instincts do more strongly suggest to them A Notion of Vindicative Iustice, in the supream Governer of this Great Mundain Republick, God Almighty; in Inflicting Punishments upon Notorious Wicked Persons, even here in this Life, tho’ somtimes but slowly, as Plutrack has observed, But Beside which this, the Generalyty of mankind have allways had a Strong Presage of Punishments to be Inflected by the Deitye, after Death, And the Scripture <5r> assure us that there is a Solemn Day of Iudgment appointed in which God will Conspicuously Palpably, & Notoriously render to every one accordding to to his Works or Actions Parts And that those Punishments in Hell after death in Hell; will Respect only the Future, and are no otherwise designed, then as Iatricall or Medicinall, in order to the Curing or Recovering of the Diseased Souls, as some haue Imagined, (from whence they inferr that there can be no Eternall Punishments) is neither Agreeable to Scripture, nor sound reason. But if all Actions, be necessary there seems to be no more Reason, why there should be a Day of Iudgment appointed, to Punish men for Murthers & Adultery, InIustice Intemporence; then for Agues and Fevours, Palsies & Lethargies

Hence is it that Morallists looking upon men’s Free & Voluntary Actions, as Blameworthy in a Peculiar sense {hence} called the <6r> evill of them, malum Culpæ, An Evill of Fault, in way of Distinction from those other Necessary Evills which are without Fault, that is, of which the Doer himselfe, was not properly the cause . Concerning which Cicero thus, Hoc tibi persuade nihil homine pertimiscendum, præter Culpam. i.e. that No Evill is to be feared by a man comparably to the Evill of . According to that Stoicall Doctrine, that the Truest and Greatest of Goods & Evills of Rationall Beings, consist ἐν τοῖς προαἰρετταοῖς, or ἐνατοῖς ἐφ' ἡμῖν, in their own Free-willed Actions, or Things in their own Power —

I conclude therefore

Wherfore according both to the Genuin Instincts of Nature, rightly interpreted; and the Tenour of The Christian , Religion, we are to Conclude, that there is something ἐφ' ἡμῖν in our own Power, & that Absolute Necessity dos not Reign over all Human Actions, but that there is something of Contingent      Liberty in them. This being an Article of Christ. Faith That God hath appointed a day in which he will Iudge the world, & Render Rewards & Punish <5v> ments to men for their Actions Past in this Life, Good & Evill, Glory Hon & P. he every man that hath done well but Tribulation & Anguish ev Soul of man that hath done Evill — We cannot Possibly maintain the Iustice of God in this, If all mens Actions be Necess. eith in their own Nature, or by Divine Decrees & Influx. That is we cannot Possibly maintain the Truth of Christianity, without a Liberty from Necessity —

Chap. 2.

Notwithstanding which , there haue not Wanted Some, in all Ages, who haue Contended, that there is no such thing as Liberum Arbitrium, Nothing in our own Power, no Contingent Liberty in Human Actions, but whatsoeuer is done by men was Absolutely, & Vnavoidably Necessary.

And this vpon Two Different Grounds; First Becaus according to some, this Contingent Liberty, is πραγμα ανύπαρατον or ανυποτατον, a Thing both Vnintelligible, & Impossible to Exist in Nature. Secondly, Becaus, tho there be such a Thing Possible, & actually existing; < insertion from p6v > < insertion ends > × < insertion from p6v > × yet in the Exercice therof Peculiar onely to God-Almight, So that he is the Onely Self determining being, and the Actions of all Creatures were by His Decrees from all Eternity made Necessary. < insertion ends >

The Reasons alledged why, there should be no such Thing in Nature, Existing any where, as a Contingent Liberty or Freewill, <8r> are chiefly such as these. First becaus Nothing can Moove itself, but Quicquid Movetur, movetur ab Alio — {illeg} mooveth Necessarily Secondy Becaus, tho it should be Granted, that there is something Self-Active, and or mooving from itselfe,, yet nothing can Change itself, nor Act vpon itself, or Determin its own Action — Since the same thing cannot be both Agent, & Patient at once. Indifferent Pomponatius, Thirdly Becaus ουδέν αναίτιον, nothing can Come to Pass without A Cause; Or whatsoever is Done or produced, had a Sufficient Cause, and Antecedent — and as Hobs Adds Every Sufficient Cause is a Necessary Cause Fourthly, Becaus All Volition is Determined by the Reason of Good, or the Appearance of the Greater Good; Now the Appearances & Reasons of Good, are in the Vnderstanding, and therfor not Arbitrary but Necessary, Wherf all Volitions must be Necessariy. 4^th Becaus; that is {was} Indifferent in Itselfe, is Indifferent can never to Etern Determine itself —, but will stand Indifferent for ever without motion volition, action either way

Lastly Hobs sopisticall Argument — Necessity of every Disjunctive Proposition —

From these & such like Grounds, Haue many of the Ancients Concluded, That there is a Chain of Causes, from Eternity to Eternity, Every Link wherof is Necessarily Connected, both with that, which went before, and that which followes after. According to that in Ennius Vtinam ne in Nemore Petio Securibus Cæsa, cecidisset Abiegna ad Terram Trabes: (To which Cicero addes, Licuit vel altius; Vtinam ne in Petio nata vlla vnquam esset Arbor. Etiam suprà; Vtinam ne esset Mons Vllus Petius. Similiterque superiora repetentens regredi in Infinitum licet.) Neve inde Navis inchoandæ Exordium — Cepisset — (Quorsum hæc Præterita? Quia sequitur illud) Nam nunquam Hera errans mea, domo efferet pedem Medea, animo ægræ, amore sævo sæucia — Tho this (as the same Cicero observeth), is onely this Chain or Series, of Causes, sine Quid^que Non. For tho there were never so many Ships ready at hand in Medææ’s <8v> Time, yet was there therefore no Necessity That she should Commit herself to Sea or to be Transported in any one of them —       But M^r Hobs Carys the busines much further; when hee Dogmatizes in this manner (p. 237.) That there is no One Action, how Casuall soever it seem, to the Causing wherof, Concurr not whatsoever is Rerum Natura — Which, he saith Truly, is a Great Paradox; and which depends vpon many Antecedent Speculations, therfore — are necessary So that According to him Every Action doth not Onely depend vpon on Single Chaine but is Implexed & intangled with Infinite Chaines —

But the Reasons assigned, Why tho there be such a Thing as Contingent Liberty in Nature; yet the Exercize therof, must needs be Peculiar to the Deity — are Commonly such as these First Because to suppose any Creature Determin itself, is to make it Independent vpon its Creator, which is Contradictious to the Idea of God — From whence it will follow that then must He be the Sole Determiner of all Actions in the Vnivers, & indeed properly the Onely Actor Secondly Becaus if there be Contingent Liberty, in any Creaturely Agents, there Could be no Divine Prescience of — of Them such Future Events × < insertion from p9v > × 3^dly — Nevertheles if it sh. be supposed that is a Præscience not withst. {Contr^y} of mens wills, yet this Præscience itself will Consequently inferr Necessity — < insertion ends > Thirdly becaus if any Lib. of will as to morall things — this will be a Ground of Pelagianism, a Denying the Necessity of Divine Grace being taken away by this so much Cried vp Αυτεξουσιον, Selfpower, or Freewill. Lastly it seems Absurd &; Vniust too, that men should be Damned to all Eternity, for a Contingent Turn of their        own will — This takes away the Reasons of it, men may as well be Damned & for what they were Necessitated to by Divine Decrees

Ch. 3.

If there were nothing ἐφ' ἡμῖν, in our own Power no ἀυτεξούσιον, or Sui-Potestas, No Self Power no Contingent Liberty of Acting, but every thing whatsoever Acted necessaryally; Then upon suppossition that God Almighty should after the Conflagration of this Earth, put the whole Fraim of this World again, exactly in the very same Postare, that it was in, at the Begining of this Mundain Revolution; And make another Adam & another Eve, perfectly like the former, without the least Difference either of Body or Mind, and They Propagateing or multiplying in successive Generations; it should continue or runn out, such another Period of time as this World had lasted before; seven thousands years or more; Then would every thing, every motion and Action in it, be the ; that had been in the Former Periodick Revolution , without the least difference or Variation Another such like Cain & Abell; another Enock and Another Noah; Another Abraham Isaac & Iacob <12r> Another Moses, another Pythegoras another Socretas, another Iesus Christ, another Pontius Pilot & another Caiphas; Another every thing and Another every Person, exactly the same, & wearing all the same Cloths, dwelling all in the same or like houses, sitting upon the same stools, making all the same motions; writing all the same Books, speaking all the same Words & doing all the same Actions over again —

This was the Doctrine of the Stoicks that there had been & should be Infinite such Worlds, or Mundane Periods & Circuits, from Eternity to Eternity exactly alike to one another, They supposing God Almighty himself , to be a necessary Agent, too, and, therfore that after the severall Conflagations, he must needs put things in the very same Posture He had before And then all acting necessarily there must be all along the same or like men doing all the same things exactly

Celsus who for the most part Personates a Platonist, having vented this Stoickall Dogma; the learned Origen Animadverteth upon him after this manner. Lib. 4. p. 208 I know not why Celsus writing against us Christian should think it necessary to Assert this Stoickall Dogma, that has not so much as a Seeming or Probable Demonstration If from the Beginning to the End (or rather without Begin. or End, there should be allway the same Periods, or Circuits, of mortall things, and that of necessaty in certain opointed Revolutions; all things that have been, Are, & shall Be, should be the very same Again repeatedly. From whence it will follow that of necessaty, Socretes shall allwayes be a bout to Phylosophize & to be accused for holding new Gods and Corupting of the youth; And Anitus and Melitus always about to bear wittness against Him; & the Senate of Areopagus about to Condemn him to drink Poyson, <14r> And After the same manner, (saith the same Origen) will it be necessary that according to apointed Revolutions Phalaris should allways be about to Tyrannize and the Pherean Alexander to act the same crueltyes, & men condemned to Phalliris’s Bull, allways about to Rore, × Likewise According to this Hypothesis of Celsus (that this Period of mortall things from the begining to the end shall be repeated the same, over again; infinitely, and with allways the same things, of necessaty will be past, and Present, & to Come, without End Moses should allwayes, in every Revolution, lead the Childerns of Isarell out of Ægipt throw the Red Sea, and Iesus being born <15r> again & again should do the same thing, which He had not once; but Infinite times done before; And all the same Christians allso should be in appointed times, Infinitly. and Celsus should write this very same Book against Christians, which had written × Ten thousands times before. × < insertion from p14v > × which if it be admitted, I know not How any Liberty of will can be defended, or how there should be any Place left for Praise or Dispraise. Now < insertion ends > Now Celsus asserteth , such Periodicall Revolutions of Mortall things, Onely; wherin of necessaty the same that have been, are, & shall be in this world; should have been here to fore; and shall be again Infinitly, But the Stoicks generally maintain such Periodicall Revolutions of Immortall things too; or at least of those which they accounte Gods. For after the Vniversall Conflagration which hath been Infinitly, & shall be again Infinitly, all things without exception, according to them, run Round in the same order from the begining to the end; all the same Gods as well as well as the <16r> same men doing the same things. Nevertheless to lessen the Obsurdity hereof, these Stoicks indeed pretend, that they shall not be all Numerically the same, but ἀπαρραλλάχτους, exactly alike in every thing. So that not the same numericall Socrates shall be again, but one in all things exactly like to Socrates, who shall marry one in all things exactly alike to the Xantippe and shall be accused by two Persons, in all things alike to Anistus & Melitus, But I understand not this (sayth Origen) how since the World is allwayes Numerically the same, and not another exactly alike to another; the things in it, should not be Numerically the same too, & not exactly alike only

But the Case will be the same should we suppose two Numerically Distinct Worlds made by God Almighty at the same or Contemporary time; exactly alike <17r> to one another two Adam’s, & two Eves Indistinguishably the same; both in Soul & body, multiplying themselves by Propogation for severall thousands of years. If there was no such things as Contingent Liberty in nature they must needs all along at the same time, make the same motions, speak the same Words, Write the same books, all as exactly alike to one another, as the motions of the Image in a glass are to the body without it. –

Now if we can not think this to be possible; but that, two such worlds were being made in all things Perfectly alike, and the First Parents men & women in them, Perfectly alike too; yet in process of time there would grow a Great Dissimmilitude & Diversity between them ; < insertion from p16v > but tho this Divinity were never so little, yet must it needs be granted < insertion ends > be granted that there is a Contingent liberty, and that men have something in their own Power, adde something of their own So that they can change themselves & determine themselves, and all things are not linked & tied together in A fatall, Adamantin{e} Chain of Causes –

Chap. 4.

Now that this is not True. Quod Cuncta Necesse, Intestinum habeant, or That nothing in Rerum natura can possibly Act otherwise then it Suffer’s, or is Acted upon by But that on the Contrary there is some Contingent liberty in nature, and that men & other Rationall Creatures Can add or cast in somthing of their own, to turn the scales , when Even may I think sufficiently appear From hence. Because it cannot be denyed but that there are & may be many Cases in which severall objects propounded to our choice at the same time, are so Equall or exactly alike as that there cannot possibly be any reason or motive in the understanding to det necessaryly to determine the choice to one of them, rather then another of them. As for example suppose one man should <19r> offer to another, twenty guiney Peeces of Gold, or Golden Balls or silver Globulites so exactly a like, in Bigness Figure & Colour, weight, as that he could discern no manner difference between them. to make true {illeg} of one & no mor{e} Adde also that these Guineys, or Golden Balls may be so placed Circulerly as to be Equidistant every from the Choosers hand. Now it cannot be doubted, but that in this Case, Any man would certainly Choose one, and not stand in suspence or Demurre ; because he Could not tell which to prefer or choose before Another.×

But being necessytated by no motive or Reason anticedent, to choose this, rather then that, must Determine himselfe Contingently or Fortuitoesly, or co{nvers}ly it being all one to him which he took Nor could there be any knowledge ex causis before hand, which of these would certainly be taken. But if yo will say there was some sudden necessaryity Determinating in this Case then should the tryall be made an hundred times over & over again, or by a hundred severall Persons; the{n} no reason why not allso all others needs take the same guiney, & every time, that is either the First or second or third &c. of them. as they ly in order from the Right or Left hand.

From hence alone it appears that Rationall Beings or Humane souls can Act further then they suffer, extend thems. furth. then Necessary Nature or that they can Actively change themselves & determine themselves Contingently or fortuitously; when they are not necessaryly determined by Causes anticedent, Here is therefore a great difference betweeen Corporeall & Incorporeall things Bodyes that cannot move themselves, <20r> Can never Act further then they suffer and therfore if causes of motions or impultions made upon them be of equall force or strengh they cannot move at all neither one way nor t’other. If two equall scales in a ballance have equall weights put into them; they will rest to Eternitye and neither of them be able to move up or down But rationall Beings and Humane Souls standing in an Equipoiz as to motives & Reasons, & having the Scales equa-pondreunt, from the weight of the Objects themselves without them will not perpetually of {neer} wayes thus hang in suspence, but may themselves can add or cast in some grains, into one Scale rather then the other to make it that Prepondrat, so that the determination here will be Contingent <21r> or loose and not necessaryly linked with what went before; Here therf. be a sufficient cause & is {but} not necessary, here is be somthing changing if selfe or acting upon it selfe A Thing which tho Indifferent as to Reason yet can determining itselfe, & take away that Passive Indiff.

But it cannot be denied by any Theist, but that this Liberty at least, must be acknowledged to belong to God Allmighty — There being many Things in the Frame & Constitution of the world, for which no reason could possibly be given, why they should of necessity so as they are & not Otherwise & therf. must be determind by his Arbitrary will & Pleasure. As for Example, The world being supposed not to be Infinite, there could not be any Necessity in the Thing itself, why it should be Iust so Bigge as it is, & not an Inch, nor a Haires-breadth Bigger or Lesser — There could be no Necessity, why the Number of the starres should be either Even or Odd, wheras one of them must needs be, & is, so as it seemed good to him, to appoint. So like <22r> wise Christianity assureth vs, that God hath appointed a day, in which He will iudge the world.— of which our Sav. Mark 13. 32 But of that day & hour knoweth no man, no not the Angels which are in Heaven, neither the Sonn, but the Father — In which words it is Implyed, that this is a thing Determined by the Arbitrary Good will and Pleas. of God the Father — There being no necessity in the Nature of the thing itself, why it should be iust at such a Precise time, & not an Hour nor a moment sooner or Later — Nay it is commonly Con{cer}ed, that this whole Created world, with all the Things in it, having no Necessary Existence, but Precarious, but both might not haue been; and again is Destroyable, was made by the Arbitrary Will & Pleas. of God, according to that. Apoc. 4. 11. Thou Lord hast Created all things & for thy Pleasure they are & were Created — × < insertion from p21v > The Creation being not a Natvrall, & Necessary Emanation, as the Word & Son, is from the Father, but a Free & Selfdetermined Emanation, it being as it were but the λογοι προφορικοι if God All. He spake the word and they were made— < insertion ends >

But this Arbitrary & Contingent Liberty of the <23r> Deity, is caried on much too farr, by those who extende it to the Necessitating of all Creaturely Actions & Volitions, by a Divine Predetermination of Every thing, with a Consequent irresistible Influence; and to the Reprobating of farr the Greatest Part of mankind, by absolute Decrees from Eternity & without any Respect to their own Actions, Also the Future execution therof by Damning of then for what they were Necessitated Vnavoidably to do — by G. Al. himself

Tis indeed an Absurd Saying of some that Deum Tenetur ad Optimum; God is Bound to do the Best. for God hath no Law but the Perfection of his own Nature; nevertheles it may be well concluded that God can Act Nothing contrary to the same Law of his own Perfections, that is, can do nothing either Foolishly or Vniustly. And therfore it may be Piously Beleeved, that when he did Create the world, He made the Whole, after the Best manner that (All things Considered), it Could be have been made in — And Consequently that as he can not be liable to any Blame, for making the whole wors then it might haue been; So neither is he to be such Praise & Commendat{illeg} as men are, for Doing Better, when he might haue done wors ×

Ch. 5

But this Contingent liberty of self-Determination which we have heitheto spoken off, ( called by some of the Greek Philosophers Epeleustick liberty) when there is a Perfect Equallity in objects, & a meer fortuitous self-determination, is not that αυτεξουσιον, that Liberum Arbitrium, which is the Foundation of Prayse or disprayse, Commendation or Blame. For when Two Objects perfectly Equall & exactly alike, are propounded to a man’s choise, as Two Eggs, or Two Guineys, or two Golden Balls, of equall bigness and weight, & value, he cannot be iustly blamed by any other or for choosing Himself one of them, rather then another. And the case must needs be the same in all other objects of choise that have a Perfect equallyty of Good in them <25r> Or are Means equally Tending & conducing to the same End. There can be no just Blame or Disprayses, But onely where, the objects, being in themselvs Really Unequall, the one Better, the orther Worse, a man refuseth the Better, & chooseth the Worse As in the Difference between the Dictate of Honesty or Conscience, and the suggestion of the Lower Appetites inclining either to Sensuall Pleasure, or Private Vtilitye, he that resisting those Lower & Worser Inclinations, firmly adheireth to the Better Principle or Dictate{s} of Honesty & Vertue, hath in all Ages & Places of the world been accounted ἐπαίνετος Praiseworthy, as being κρεὶττων εἁυτῶ Superior to him selfe or a Self-Conqueror. But he that yeildeth up himsefe as Vanquishd or succumbeth under, the Lower Affections, called the Law of the members, in opposition to that superior <26r> Dictate of Honesty or Law of the mind; accounted Blameworthy as being ησσων ἑαυτῷ Inferior to himself, or Conquered by his worser Part, Now that there is such an ἀυτεξούσιον, as this too, such a Liberty or will (where there is an Inequallyty in the objects) of determineing onesselfes Better or Worse, and so of deserving Commendation or Blame; (tho it be not rightly taken by some for an Absolute Perfection, (as will be {etreiv}ed else where,) is undeniably evident both from the Comon Notions of mankind; and from the Sense of Conscience in all men, Accuseing, Nor Excusing them.

Nevertheless it must be granted, that there is no small Difficulty in the explaining of this Phænomion, rightly; so as to as clierly to make it out & Vindicate the same from all exceptions made agaist it, Espicially since the Vulgar Phsychology or the now generally <27r> Received way of Philosophising, concerning the soul, doth either quite Baffle and Betray that Liberty of Will, or else render it Absurd & Ridiculous or Monstrous

For the Vulgarly Received Phsychology runns thus. That in the Rationall Soul, there are two Facultyes, Understanding and Will, which Understanding hath nothing of Will in it, and Will nothing of Understanding in it, And to these two Facultyes are Attributed the Actions of Intellection and Volition; the Understanding (say they) Understandeth, & the Will Willeth.

But then followes A Bivium wherein those Philosophers are divided, For First many of them suppose this Understanding, to be the Beginner & First Mover of all Actions. For this reason Because Ignoti nulla Cupido, there can be no desire nor no Will of that which is unknown. and Secondly they Conclude that the Understanding Acteth necessaryly <28r> upon it’s severall Objects without anything of Will, to determine either, its exercise or Specification of them, (which Necessity some call a strain of Thoughts) Because the Will being blind therfor cannot determine the Understanding either to Exercise or Specification of Object. Thirdly that the Understanding judgeth necessaryly, of all things, not only as to the Truth or Falshood of Speculative things but also as to Eligibility of Practicalls, what is to be Done, or not Done . Lastly that the Blind Faculty of Will allways necessaryly follows{,} the Last Practicall judgment of the necessary understanding.

But others there are who , in order to the salving of this Phænomina of Liberty of Will think it necessary to suppose; that first of all <29r> the Will thô Blind, yett dos determines the Understanding both to exercise; & specification, of Object: And then that the Understanding being necessary in its Iudgments; doth onely Propound to the Blind Will, what he thinks ought to be done, or his Last Practicall judgment in the case; & no more, only to Allure, & Invite the Will theruntoo, But that this Sovereigne Queen or Empiress of the Soul, the Blind Will, still Remaineth as Free and Indifferent; to do or Not to This or That, as i the understanding had given no judgment at all in the Case and doth at last Fortuitously determine it self without respect to the same either way Which is this meaning, of that definition of Liberty of Will commonly given That Voluntas Positis omnibus ad agendum requisitis, potest agere vel non agere that the Will after all things Put, the last Dictate or judgment of the <30r> of the Understanding it self therin Included, is yett Free & absolutely Indifferent both as to Exercise, & to specification, and dos determine it selfe Fortuitously is Doer Not, To This or That There being no other way as these men conceve to salve the Liberty of the Will but this onely.

Chap. 6.

But, I say, if this Physchology be true, then either, can there be no Liberty at all, no Freedom from Necessity, or else no other, then such as is Absurd & Ridiculous, or monstrous. For First if the Blind Will do allway necessarily follow, A necessary Dictate of the Understanding, antecedent then must all Volitions & Actions needs be Necessary. That Pretence which some here make, to salve Liberty of Will, notwithstanding ; from the Amplitude of the Understanding, as having a larger Scope & Prospect before it then Phansicies & Hormæ, each wherof is determined <31r> to One, signifying nothing at all; so long as the Understanding, in its Apprehentions, & Iudgments; concerning the difference of those Obiects acts altogether Necessaryly. But wheras some others of these Philosophers, who contend that the Will must therfore of Necessity, follow the Last Dictate or Practicall judgment of the Necessary vnderstanding, because it is in it selfe a Blind Faculty, do nevertheless, ( in order to the maintaining Liberty,) assert, that this Blind Faculty of Will, doth First of all, Move & Determine the Understanding, both as to it’s Eexercise & Objects,: This is a manifest Contradiction, In itself ; Besides they are here forced to runn Round in an endless Circle; They maintaining that the Will can will nothing, but as Represented to it first by the Understanding, (since otherwise it must Will it knew not what.,) and again that the Understanding cannot Acte about this or that but <32r> as it is moved & determined therunto by the Will, So that there must be, both, an Action of the Understanding, going before every Act of the Will, and also an Act of the Will, going before every Act of the Understanding., which is further Contradictious & Impossible

But if the Blind Will, do not necesserily follow × < insertion from p31v > × not onely at first Fortuitously determ the vnderst both to Exerciz & Object, but also after all is Don, remains Indifferent to follow the Last Dictat of it or not – < insertion ends > the Last Dictate & Practicall Iudgment , of the Necessary Vnderstanding, but still Remains Indifferent, & dos Fortuitously Determins it selfe, either in complience with the same, or otherwise; then will Liberty of Will; be meer Irrationallyty & madness itself, Acting;, or determining all Human Actions. Nor is this all, but that which ^willeth in every Man, will Perpetually, Will not onely it Knowes not why but also it knowes not what. Then is all Consideration & Deliberation of the mind, all Councell & Advice from others, all Exhortation & Perswasion, nay the Faculty of Reason and Understanding it selfe in a man alltogether Useless, and to no Purposse at all. Then can there be no Habitts either of Uertue or Uice, that fluttering <33r> Uncertainty & Fortuitous Indifferency which is supposed to be Essentiall to this blind Will, being vtterly Uncapable of either Nor after all, could the Hypothesis Salv the Phænomen of Commendation & Blame, Reward & Punishment for no praise Commendation or Blame, could belong to Men for their free Willed Actions, neither, since when they did well, they Acted but Fortuitously, & temerariously; & by chance, and when they did Ill their Wills did but vti iure suo, use their own Naturall Right, and Essentiall Privelidge, or Property of Acting {illeg} as it happen’th or any way without Reason × Lastly as for this scholastick Deffinition of Free Will; viz. That it is, after all things put, besides the Uolition it self, even the Last practicall Iudgment, in the Soul too, an Indifferency of Doing, or not doing; or of doing This or That. This is an Upstart thing. which the Antient Peripatet. as Alexander & others were vunacquainted with there Account therof being {t}hi{s} That αὐτοῖς περιεγῶσι the same things being Circumstant the same Impressions being made upon Men from without, all that they are Passive to, being the same, yet they may notwithstanding Act differently — <34r> The last Practicall Iudgement, also as according to these being That which as Men are not meerly Pasive to; so is it really, the same thing, with the βόυλυσις, the will, or volition +

<35r> Ch. 7.

But this Scholastick Philosophy is manifestly Absurd, and meer Scholastick Iargon. For to attribute the Art of Intellection and Preception, to the Faculty of Understanding action & Volition to the Faculty of will, or to say, that it is the Understanding that Understandeth, and the Will that Willeth, This is all one, as if one should say, That the Faculty of walking walketh, & the Faculty of Speaking Speaketh or that the Musickall Faculty, Playeth a Lesson upon the Lute, or sings this or that tune.

Moreover, since it is generally agreed upon, by all Philosophers that Actiones sunt suppositorum, whatsoever Acts is a subsistent Thing, Therfore by this kind of Language are those two Facultys of Understanding & Will, made to be Two Supposita, two subsistent things, two Agents and two Persons in the Soul Agreeable to which are those Formes of Speech commonly used by Scholasticks <36r> That the Understanding Propoundeth to the Will and the {illeg} Represents to the will or Allures and Invites, the Will, & the Will either Follows the Understanding, or els Refuses to Complye with its Dictates, Exerciseing its own Liberty Whence is that Inextricable confusion, & unintelligible nonsence; Of the Wills, both First Moving the Understanding, & also the Understandings, First Moveing the Will, ; & this in an Infinite and endless Circuite. So that this Faculty of Will must needs be supposed to move Understandingly; or knowingly of what it doth; And that Faculty of Understanding; to Moove willingly, or not without Will. Whereas to Intilect as such, or as a Faculty, belongs nothing, but meer Intellection or Preception, without anything of Will; & to Will, as such or a Faculty, nothing, but meer Uolition, without anything of Intellection

But all this while, it is Really the Man or the Soul, that Understand{t}{h} & the man or Soul that Willeth As it is the Man that Walks & the man that Speaks or Talks & the Musitian that playes a Lesson on the Lute. So that it is One & the Same Subsistent, Thing, one and the Same Soul, that both Understandeth & Willeth, one & the same Agent only, that Acteth Diversly. And thus may it well be Conceived, that one and the same Reasonable Soul in us, may both Will Understandly, or knowingly of what it Wills; & Understand or Think of this or that Object, Willingly.

It is not Denyed, but that the Rationall Soul, is πολυδύναμος, hath many Powers or Facultys in it, that is, that it can & doth display it self, in severall kind of Energies, {illeg} being one & the same. × < insertion from p037v > × As the same Aire or breath in a Pneumatick Instrument passing throw severall pipes makes severall Notes < insertion ends > But there is a certain order or method, that may be conceived wherin the Souls putt it’s self forth; in those its severall opperations, and Affections; of which I shall proceed to Treat in the next place

Ch. 8^th —

It is a very materiall Question, which Aristotle starteth τὶ τὸ πρώτως κινοῦν, What is that, that first moveth in the Soul, & setteth all the other wheels on worke, that is, What is that vitall Power or Energuy: which the Soul First displayeth it Self In, and which in order of Nature Preceeds all its other Powers it implying them, or setting them on Work, × < insertion from p37v > First therfore I say the Outw Obj. of Corpor- Sense, are not the Onely Beginning & First Moovers or Causes of all Cogitations in vs, as the Epicurians & Hobbians, & Atheists suppose — who indeed make all Cogitation to be nothing but Locall motions in the Braine: these being intercurrent they onely occasionally raising variety of Cogitations — But. there is a Thred of Life allwayes spinning out, and a Living Spring or Fountain of Cogitation in the Soul itself — Now < insertion ends > Divers of the Scholasticks as we said before tell us, that it is no other then an Indifferent Blind Will, which first moveth, the Understanding and causeth Deliberation, and yet after th{is}, if it Blindly chooseth , & determineth all Humane Actions Wheras if there were then any such Faculty of the Soul, as a Blind Will ( which is impossible) Knowledge; must of necessaty goe before it, to Represent things to it and to hold a Torch to light it, show it, its way, and And this must come after it {or} must follow, it as its guide, < insertion from p37v > Wheras if the First Moover be Perfectly Blind, then must it moove to it Knowes not what & it knows not why. — Mo{orover} it is not Concevable that meer Indetermination & Indifferency should be the First Moover of all Action – Be{sides} which {Necesary} Na{tur} must be the Beginner & be the Spring of all Action – < insertion ends > Therfore <39r> Wherfore Knowledge and Understanding, Councell and & Reason & Deliberation seeme to bid mens fairest for that First Moover in the Soul, and that which leads the Vanguard. Nevertheless, it is certain that neither the Speculative nor Deliberating Understanding doth allway Act in in vs, of itself & Necessaryly; & vninterruptedly but we are Sensible that our minds are Employed & set awork by somthing else; That we Apply them both in Contemplation and Deliberation to this or that Object, and call them off continueth or stop at Pleasure; as much as we open and shut our eyes and by mooving our Eyes Determine our sight to this or that object of sight. < insertion from p38v > Were our Souls in a Constant Gaze, or Study, alwayes Spinning out, a Necessary Thred or Series, of vninterrupted Concatenate Thoughts; Then could we never haue any Presence of mind, no Attention to Busines; {accns} occurs thinking always thinking of something els, or having our {illeg} wits & running out a woolgathering; and so be Totally Inept for Action. Or, could we do nothing at all but after after proper Studied deliberation, then should it be in a Puzle, at a stand Dem{urre} & Fumble along time before we could Act or Will any thing × < insertion ends > Aristotle self Determines that βουλὴ, Counsill, can not be the first moving Princeple in the Soul because then we must Consider, to Consider, to Consider, Infinitely Again the Princeple of all Actions and therfore Intellection it self is, Ends, & Good. <40r> Every thing Acting for the sake of Some End & Good And concerning Ends, the same Aristotle hath rightly observed, that they are οὐκ ἀυθάιρετα, ἀλλὰ φῦναι δεῖ, that they are not chosen, studed out or devised by vs but exist in Nature, & Preventively obtrude themselves upon us.

Wherfore we conclude that they τὸ πρωτως κινοῦν, That which First mooveth in us & is the Spring & Princeple of all Deliberation Action can be no other, then a Constant, Restless, Uninterrupted Desire or love of Good; as such Happyness. This is an ever-Bubbleing Fountain in the Centre of the Soul, , An Elatir or Spring of Motion, both A Primum & Perpetuum mobile In vs, The first wheel that sets all the other wheels in motion x, And an Everlasting & Incessant-Moover

<41r> God, an Absolutely Perfect Being, is not this Love of Indigent Desire, but a love of overflowing Fullnes & Redundancy, communicating itself. But imperfect Beings, as Human Souls, especially Lapsed, by reason of the Penia which is in them, are in Continuall Inquests, Restles Desire, {& search} alwayes Pursuing a Sent of God before them, & Hunting after it. There are Severall things which haue a Face & Meen or Alluring, Shew, & Promising aspect of Good to vs.. As Pleasure, Ioy, & Ease, in opposition to Pain & Sorrow, and Disquiet Labour and Turmoil, Abundance Plenty & sufficiency of all things in Opposition, to Poverty, straitnes, scantines & Penury & . Power not onely as it can Remoov want, & command Plenty, & supply Pleasures But also in the {verie} Great Sense of The Thing itself Honour, worship & Veneration, in opposition to Evills Disgrace Contempt, & Scorn. Praise Commendation & Applaus, in opposition to Censure of oth Ignominy & Infamy — Clarity and Celebrity in opposite to Private in Obscurity — & Liv. in Corners Præcellency over others, Superiority, Victory, & Success In opposition to being worsted or Foyled, left behind outdone & Disappointed < insertion from p40v > < insertion ends > <42r> Security in opposition to Anxiety & Fear of Loosing what we haue, Pulchritude in opposition to & ^vglines & Deformity Knowlidge & Truth, in opposition to the Evill Ignorance {or} or or Folly, and Error, Since no man, would willingly be Foolish, nor man would Err, — or be Mistaken × × × × < insertion from p41v > or loosing the Prize Liberty in Opposition to Restraint Bondage Servility, to be subject to Commands and Prohibitions < insertion ends > But above all these & such like things; the Soul of man hath in it μάντευμα τι, a certain Vaticination, Præsage, Sent, & Odour of One Summum Bonum, One Supreme Highest Good, transcending all others; without which , they will be all Ineffectuall as to Complete Happines, & Signify nothing., a Certain Philosophers Stone, that can turn all into Gold. —

Now this Love & Desire of Good as Good in Generall, & of Happines traversing the Soul continually, & , act{u}ating & Provoking it continually, is not a meer Passion or Harme; but a setled Rooted Principle, & the very Sours & Fountain & Centre of Life – – It is necessary & <43r> Nature in vs & which is {illeg}{state} and allways continues the same in Equall Quantity As Cartesius supposes the same Quantity of Motion to be perpetually conserved in the Vnivers, tho not alike in al the same Bodies, but or being transferred & passing from One to Other & so more or lesse, Here & There. So is there the same Stock of this Love & Desire of Good, allwayes alive & working in the Soul, by Necessity of Nature, & agitating it, tho by mens Will & Choice; it may be Diversly dispensed out & Placed vpon Different Objects, more and lesse – –

But There are Many Other Powers & Energies of the Soul, that are & Necessary, Nature in vs too, as besides that Lowest Of the Plastick Life, Subject to no Command not over Will — Its Vitall Sympathy with the Body, displaying itself in the Perceptions of the outward Senses, & of bodily Pleasure & Plain – – the Soul as willing hath no Imperium over, tho it haue a Despotick & vndisputed Power — the Locomotive in the Members & Members of the Body <44r> Then to Phancy or Imagination Suddain Passions & Hormæ & Commotions called Concupiscible, Irascible, whose First Assaults Prevent our Will, intended by Nature, as spurres to Action, & the Quickness of Life, which els without them would grow Dull and Languid & sometimes as it were fall asleep Above all these is the Dictat of Honesty, commonly called the Dictate of Conscience — which often majestically controlling them Clashes with the Former this is {Necess Nat too}, Here the Hegemonik sometime ioyns its assest{s} the Better One, & sometimes takes Part with the worser against it — Lastly the Vnderstand. both Speculative vnderstanding, about or the Soul as considering the Truth & Falsehood, of these & the Practicall considering their Good & Evill, or What is to be Done & Not Done, both of them inferring consequences of Premisses in way of Discursive Reason — The {eter} Perceptions of which are all Naturall & Necessary Subject to No command of will tho both the Exerciz, & their specification of obiects be Determinable by Ourselves × < insertion from p43v > × These are Natur {too} come vpon vs vnawares Invades vs, & surprize vs with their suddain Force, & we haue no Absolute Despotick {illeg}a{k} vndisputed Power over thy notwithstanding which, the Hegemonick of the Soul may by Conatuses & Endeavors acquire more & more power over Them < insertion ends >

Ch. 9^th.

The next great Grand Enquiry, is, What is The τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν the Ruleing, Governing, Commanding, Determining, Principle in us. For here, or nowhere, els is to be found the τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν & the τὸ ἀυτεξούσιον, Sui-Potestas, Self Power or such a Liberty of Will, as wherby Men deserve Praise or Dispraise Commendation or Blame This Hegemonack of the Soul is a thing that was much taken notice of by the Greek Philosophers after Aristotle, and to this, is ascribed by them, the Originall of those morall Evells, that deserve Blame and Punishment Thus the Learned Origen, p. 207. το ἑκαστου ηγεμονικὸν, ἄιτιον τὴς ὑποστάσης ἐν ἀυτῷ κακίας ἐστὶν, ἥτίς ἐστι τὸ κακὸν, καὶ ἄλλο οὐδὲν, ὡς πρὸς ἁκριβῆ λόγον, καθ ἡμὰς ἑστι κακόν. ἀλλ' οἰδα, τὸν λόγον δεόμ{ε}νον πολλῆς ἐξεργασία{ς} καὶ κατασκευῆς — where the τὸ ἑκάτου ηγεμονικὸν, is Rendred by Gelenius, Sua cuique Ratio, every mans own Reason, as if this were the thing Wher by he is the Cause of Morall Evell, He takeing it for granted, that Origens Hegemonick, in every Man, is Reason; Which is a thing comonly supposed to be Naturall and necessary in its Perception, wheras Necessary Nature can be no Foundation for Blame and Punishment, <46r> And if morall Evell were to be Imputed wholy to necessary Nature, then must That and the blame of it needs be Imputed to God Himself as the Cause therof. Wheras Origen’s design, here and els where, is to Free both God & Nature from the Blame of morall Evells & cast it vpon Men themselves, as being Somthing, besides Necessary Nature; Loose, and at their own disposall, and therfore αρχαί πραξεων Principles of Action, And Thus according to Origen, Every Man’s own Hegemonick, or that which Rules or Commands, in his Soul; is the onely Cause of Morall , Evill Vice, or Wickedness which is truly Evell, as also are the Actions that proceed from it And in stricktnes or exactness, of Philosophy, (saith He) there is nothing els Evell ; to a man; that is, nothing besides the Evell of sin & Fault, But I know (saith He) that this is a matter of great subtlety and nicety, and therfore it it would be an Opporous thing to Explain it &c and require longer ambages

Now The Heard of Modern Philosophers and Theologers, who Zealously maintaind this Phænominom of Liberum Arbiterum or Free Will, Think ther is no other way to do it, but onely to make an Indifferent & Blind Will fortuitously Determining it selfe <47r> to be both the First Mover, & the Hegemonick, or Ruleing Principle in the Soul too. Nevertheless they themselves acknowledge that ther is so much of necessary nature even in this Blind & fortuitous Will; that it is notwithstanding allway Determined to Good, or some Appearence of it and can never Possibley choose Evell when represented to it by the vnderst as wholy such. But within that Latitude and Compass of Apparent Good, in the vnderstanding, the Will to them is free to determine it selfe, to either greater or Lesser, & so to any of the Lowest Degrees and appearences, therof Nay tho’ a thing have never so much more of Good then Evell appearing in it, yett the least glimps of Good glimmering in it, ; is enough for The Blind Will to Exercise it’s Lordly and Unaccountable Freedom or Liberty; in preferring it before, such another good as hath not any the least shadow of Evell apprehended in it. And when Any great End is Proposed, and upon Deliberation concerning Means, it Clearly appears to the vnders. that there is one means which it used cannot fail but reach and Attain to It; but Another which is onely not <48r> Impossible to to do it but hath ten thousand to One oddes against it; In they say) it is the Perfection of the Blind Indifferent Will to be able to determine it indifferently & Fortuitously that way as well as the other.

But as it is very Absurd to make Active Indifference & Blindly & Fortuitousnesly determining itself that is Active Irrationally, & Nonsense, to be the Hegemonick & Ruleing Principle in every Man; And as it is indeed Impossible, there should be any such thing in Nature, as a Blind Faculty of Will which dos nothing els but will Acting temerarrously or Fortuitously; where there are different degrees of Good & Evell in the Objects; such as shall be perfectly Indifferent, to never so much Greater or lesser Good; A Will that is nothing else but Will, meer Impetus Force, and Activite, without anything of Light; or vnderstanding; A will which acts both it know’s not why or wherfore, & even it know’s not what; So could not such a Blind Indifferent & Fortuitous Will, Ruling, salve the Phænominan of <49r> Morall Good & Evell, of Comendation Blame Because this being supposed, to be the Perfection of the will’s own Nature, and a man’s assentiall Liberty & Privilege to act thus, there can be no Fault nor Blame in him for his exercizing the same, & acting according to his Nature. No Nature being Sinne

Wherefore it cannot be suppossed that the Hegemonick or Ruling Principle in a man, is vtterly Devoid of all Light and Perception or Understanding. Notwithstanding which , In Peccable Beings, Reason, Understanding, & Knowledge, as such, or as Necessary Nature, cannot be the only Hegemonick or Ruleing Principle Because Reason as such, can never Acte Vnreasonably; Understanding as such, and cleare Preceptions, can never Err; There is no such thing as False, Knowledge, nor Erroneous Vnderstanding nor can Sinne ever be the Resulte of Reason, Understanding, Cleare Preceptions, & Knowledge any More then Error <50r> Nor is Error any more from God, and the Necessary nature of Understanding; then Sinne is. But the Hegemonick of Created Souls, may Err & Iudge falsly, & Sinne. Moreover we know by Certain experience, that Speculation or Deliberation, about Particular things, is determined by our selves, both as to Objects & exercise; we can call it off from one thing & Imploy it or set it awork upon another, and we can surcease Suspend & stop it the exercize of it (when we please) too, diverting our selves into Action. From whence it is plain, that there is somthing in us Superior , therunto, some thing more Vniversall, & Comprehensive & yett withall more simple; which is Hegemonick to it, & doth manage & determine the same. —

< insertion from p50v > Ch. 10^th < insertion ends > Ch. 10

I say, therfore, that the Τὸ Ἡγεμονικὸν in Every man, & indeed that which is Properly We Ourselves (we rather Having those other things of Necessary Nature, then Beeing them) is the Soule as Comprehending It Selfe; All Concerns & Interests, its Abilities, and Capacities, and Holding it selfe as it were Redoubled vpon itsel{f} as it were in it’s own hand: Having a Power of Intending or Exerting it selfe more or less, In Consideration, & Deliberation; In Resisting the Lower appetites that oppose Reason both of vtility & & Honesty, In Self-Recollection & Attention, & Vigilant Circumspection or Standing vpon our Guard; In Purposes & Resolutions; In Diligence in Carying on Steady Designs & Active, Endeavours; This In order, to Self-Improvement, & the Self Promoting of it’s own good, the Fixing & Conserving it self in the same Tho’ by accident, & by Abuse; ; it often proves, a Self-Empairing Power, the Originall of Sinne Vice, & Wickednes; wherby Men become to themselve, the Iust & Causes of their own Evill, Blame, Punishment, & Misery < insertion from p50v > < insertion ends > Wherfore this, Hegemonicon allways Determins the Passive Capabilitye of mens Nature one way or other,, either for Better or for Worse; And has a Selfe-forming <52r> and Self-Framing Power, by which every man is Self-made, into what He Is: And accordingly deserves either Praise or Dispraise; Reward or Punishment

Now I say in the first Place; that A mans Soul as Hegemonicall, over itself having a Power, of Intending & Exerting itself, more or less, in Consideration, & Deliberation when different Objects or Ends are Propounded or medi{ane}s to His Choice, that are in themselves really Better and Worse; may upon slight Consideration and Immature Deliberations, (He Attending to some appearance of Good in one of them, without taking notice of the Evells attending it) Choose & Prefer, that which is Really Worse, before the Better, so as to deserve Blame therby , But this, not because, It had by Nature an Equall Indifferency & freedom to a Greater or lesser Good; which is Absurd; or because It had a Naturall Liberty of Will either to follow or not follow, his its own last Practicall Iudgment which is all one as to say, a Liberty to follow or not follow or not follow its own Volition For vpon both those suppositions there would haue been no such thing as Fault nor Blame <53r> there also to follow, the Person supposed the Greater apparent Good, at this time, & not at all {sin} {da}s{h} with {sin} & his Last Practicall Iudgment neither. But because He might Have made a ^{Better Iudgment}, then now he did, had he more Intensely Considered, & more Marturely Deliberated which that it did not was its own Fault. Now to say, that a man hath not this Power over himself, to Consider & Deliberate & Consult, more or lesse; is to Contradict common Experience, and Inward Sense. And to deny, that a man is blameworthy for Temerity, in acting in any thing of moment, Without Due & full Deliberation & so choosing the Worser, is Absurd. But if A man haue this Power over himself, to Consider & Deliberate more or less; then is He not always Determind thereto, by any Antecedent Causes; Necessaryly These Two things being Inconsistent & Contradictious. And Consequently there was something of Contingency in the Choic

From what has been declared, it appears that Tho’ Perception be Nature or Necessary Understanding in us, yett for all that, wee are not meerly Passive to our owne Practicall Iudgments, and to the Appearences of Good, but Contribute something of our Owne to them, to make them such as they are <54r> Because these may be very Different, accordingly as wee do more or Less Intensly Consider or Deliberate, which is a thing ἐφ' ἡμῖν in our owne Power. A man who dos but slightly Consider, may hastily Choose, that as Better, which upon more Serious and Leasurly Consideration, he would Iudge should be refused as what is much the Worser. The same motives & Reasons Propounded, have not allwayes the same Force & Efficacy upon Different Persons, nor yet upon the Same Person neither at severall times; but More or Less as they are differently Apprehended; or more or less Attended to, Pondered or Considered, which we are not meerly Passive to, but determined by ourselves

Besides which , it is Certain, that in our Practicall Iudgments, wee often Extend our selves or Assents, further, then our Understanding, as Necessary Nature, goes; that is, further then our Clear & Distinct Conceptions. For when upon a Slighter Consideration we are somtimes become Doubtfull Which of two or more <55r> things should be Preferred not Clearly discerning at that time any greater Eligibilyty in one then Another of them, tho in reality there were much Difference. Wee are not herevpon necessitated to Arrest & Stop & Suspend Action, but may, & often do Proceed to making a Iudgment in the Case, one way or other, stochastically or Conjecturally (which itself is not without some Contingency neither) and so go forward to Action.

It hath seemed very strange to some, what Cartetius, hath written: That It is not the Understanding, but the Will that Iudgeth,; & that this is the cause of Error as well as of Sinne. And indeed this may well seem strange, according to that Notion, which men commonly have of Will, as a meer Blind Faculty But it is most Certain, that even in Speculative things, about Truth & Falshood as well as Practicall the Hegemonick of the Soul (which is the Soul & selfe-Comprehensive) and having the Conduct & Managment of it self in its own hand,) doth Somtimes Extend <56r> it self further in way of Assent, then the necessary Understanding; goes, or beyond Cleer & Distinct Perception. That is, when we have no Cleer & distinct Conception of The Truth of a Proposition, (which is the knowledge, of it, and can never be False), we may not withstanding, Extend our further and Iudge stochastically, that is , this way or that way Concerning it, & that somtime with a great deal of Confidence & Assurance too And this is undoubtedly the Originall of all Error in speculative things also, which cannot be Imputed to Necessary Nature in us without casting the Blame of them upon God The Maker of it. The Understanding, as necessary nature, in us, or Cleer Distinct Conception, can never Erre, because there cannot Possibly be any Cleer Conception of Falshood, in Eternall things, as Geometry and Metaphysicks. Cleer Conceptibility <57r> is the Essence of Truth, and Cleer distinct Conception, is knowledge, which can never be Fals Wherefore if we did always suspend our Assents, when we had no Cleer Distinct Conceptions of the Connection, between the Predicate and Subject of a Proposition, we should never Erre. But we do often Opine & Iudge stochastically, concerning Truth & Falshood even in speculative things, beyound our cleer conceptions, & certain knowledge × < insertion from p56v > × That of Aristotle, ἡ κακία φθαρτικὴ τῶν ἀρχῶν, and the common Opinion, that Interest & vitious Inclinations – Bribe the Iudgment, Showes that the Iudging Power in vs is not the understanding as Necess. Nat. in vs. For then it could not bribed or Corrupted & swayed < insertion ends > And indeed The Necessary vnderstanding that is our cleer Conception & knowledge, going so little way, there is need & use of this Stochasticall Iudging & Opineing beyound it concerning Truth & Falshood, going further & beyond it, in Humane Life, Our Actions & Uolitions depending much upon our speculative Opinions, Concerning the Truth & Falshood of things. × < insertion from p56v > × The weaknes of Hum. vnderst is such That There are very few things which thy do so Certainly know, as that no manner of Doubt may by Raised in stro{ng} minds agst. Either by Sophisiticall Arguments or Bigottree in Religion – < insertion ends > Hence is it, that Divine Faith is so much Commended to us in the Gospel, which is Undoubtedly an Assent to things beyound Cleer Conception & Certain Necessary knowledge <58r> The Beleif of the Existence of a God of the naturall Immortallity of the Soul, & Consequently of Rewards & Punishments after this Life, are things which the Generally of Mankind, have no cleer Conception nor Demonstrative Sience of; & yet they are highly necessary to be Beleived, in order to a morally Vertuos & Good Life And it was truly & wisely said by Plato, that πιστις, & ὀρθαὶ δὸξαι Faith & true opinions, are things no less usefull & effectuall in Life, then Certain Science & Demonstrations. Nevertheless it cannot be denied, but that by the Rash & vncautious use of this Power of the Hegemonick, in our Souls, of Extending its Assent further then our cleer Conceptions & beyound our Understanding as necessary Nature in us, we frequently fall into Many Errors. Which Errors are <59r> therfore no more to be Imputed to God, then our Sinns are they being not, from necessary nature, as made by Him, butt from the Ill Conduct or Managment of our Selves, & the abuse of that αυτεξουσιον or Sui-Potestas, that Larger Power which He we haue over our selves, given for necessary uses & Purposes; extending our Assents and Iudgments beyound our cleer Conception Understanding, or knowledge; without sufficient grounds: And there may be very sufficient grounds, somtime to Beleive beyound Knowledge, as well as beyound sense And yett notwithstanding is this Divine Faith A Vertue or Grace

Chap. 11^th.

Again in that Contest betwext the Dictate of Honesty or of Conscience, and the Suggestion of the Lower Appetites, urging & Impelling to a Present Good of Pleasure or Profit. I say in this Contest, there is no necessary Understanding interposing & <60r> {caring}{a} to umpires between that dos unavoidably & irresitibly Determine one way or other; But the matter wholy depends upon the Souls Hegemonickk or Power ouer it self, it’s exerting it self with more or less Force and Viggor, in Resisting these Lower Affections or hindring the Gratifications of them; according to Which the Issue or Event of Action will be determined. But this is not in One single Battle or Combat onely, but commonly a long Lasting or Continued warr Colluctation, betwext the Higher and the Lower Principle in which there are many Uicissitudes, Reciprocasions, & Alternations upward & downward, as in the scales of a Pair of Ballences, before there come to be a Perfect Conquest on either side or Fixsation & settling of the Soul either in the Better or the Worse Dureing which Strugling & Colluctation, was that pronounced the Good that I would do I do not, the Evell that I would not do, that do I. And then according to the Issue of this Inte{s}ti{ve} War will men either Receive praise from God <61r> or deserve Blame and Punishment from him. Glory & Honour to him that doth well, but tribulation & anguish to every soul that doeth Evell And I haue fought a Good Fight, and now there is layd vp, for me a Crown Life. And that we haue a Power More & Lesse Exert ourselvs, in to Resist the Lower Inclinations, or hinder the Gratifications of them, & to Comply with the Dictate of Conscience or Honesty, being not wholy determined therin by Necessary Causes Antecedent , but having something at least of it ἐφ' ἡμῖν, In our own Power, Every mans own Conscience, bears witnes to, in Accusing & Condemning him, when ever he does amisse. Wheras it is plain, that if we be determined by Necessity of Nature here, then is there no thing in our own Power, nor can we be Blame-worthy or Deserv Punishment +

Morerover we are certain by Internall Sense, that our Souls as Comprehending themselves <62r> and Hegemonicall, or having a Ruling Power over themselves, can Exert themselves more or Lesse, in self-Recollection, self-Attention, Heedfullnes & Animadvertence, In Vigilant Circumspection, In fortifying themselves in Firmnes of Purpose & < insertion from p61v > × In Carying on & Pursuing steady Designs of Life < insertion ends > Resolution beforehand, in Exciting Endeavors, in Activity & Diligence of Execution, Now when men are commended for Diliigence, Industriousnes, Studious Endeavors, Firmnes & steadnes of Resolution in Good, Vigilant circumspection, And Blame for the Contrary, viz. Negligence, Remisnes, Supinenes Vnaffection, Carelesnes, &c. These things are imputed to the men thmselvs as the Cause of th{em} & as not being determind by Necessary Causes as m{ens} motions are not as the Motion of a watch or Clock are

Ch. 12

But besides Internall Sense, & Comm Notions, the same thing is Confirmed — by the Scriptures, not onely Apocryphall, but Canonicall. The Genuine sense of the Ancient Iewish Church herin, appeareth from this of Iesus the Son of Sirach c. 15. 11. Say not, it is thro the Lord that I fell away. For thou oughtest not to do the things that he hateth. Say not thou he hath Caused me to Erre, for he hath no need of the Sinfull man. The Lord hateth all Abomination, & they that fear God love it not. Himself made man from The Beginning & left him in the hand of his Counsell + If thou wilt to keep the Commandments &c. He hath set Fire & water before thee stretch forth thy hand vnto whether thou wilt. Before man is Life & Death, & whether him liketh shall be given him. Which latter Passage seems to Refer to that of Moses Deut. 30. See I haue set before thee this day Life & Good Death & Evill. In that I command thee to Love the Lord thy God, to walk in his wayes, & keep his Commandments <64r> I call Heaven & Earth to Record this day against you, That I haue set before you Life & death Blessing & Cursing. Therfore Choose Life, that thou & thy seed may live. Hereby Leaving man in the hand of his own Consell, is plainly asserted an ἀυτεξους. or Sui-Potestas, a Power of Determining Himself. towards the Better or the worse. Life or Death + With which Agreeth Salom. hims. Prov. 16. 22. He that Ruleth his own Spirit is more Mighty, then he that taketh a City. He that is κρεισσων Εἁυτῷ superior to hims. Or a Conqu. over his Inter Pass. Irascible & Concupiscible. This implies A kind of Duplicity in the Human soul, one that which is Ruled, Another that which Ruleth Or the Soule to be as it were Reduplicated vpon Itself and so Hegemonicall Over itself; Having A Power to Intend itself more or Less in Resisting the Lower Appetites, which cannot be without something of Contingecy or Non-Necessity. Were the Souls Necessarily & Essentially Good: or Impeccable — He would be above this Self-Power — were He nothing but Lust Appetite & Horme, He would be Below it <65r> Now He is in a middle state of Perfection betwixt both. He hath some Power to keep vnder his Body, & bodily Lusts Rom 1 Cor. 9. 27. To Mortify his Members that are vpon the Earth Coloss. 3. 5 — To Gird vp the Loines of His mind 1 Pet. 1. 23. To Adde something to hims. 2 Pet. 1. 11. Adde to your Faith Vertue Knowledge To Improve. those Talents which he hath Receved from God; and to Return to him; his own, with Vsury — Matth 24. To Purge hims 2. Tim. 2. 21 If a man Purge himself from these he shall be a vessell of honour, To cleanse ourselv from Filthynes of flesh & spirit — 2 Cor. 7. 1. To keep himself Pure — 1 Tim. 5. 22 To keep himself vnspotted of the world Iam. 1. 27. To keep ourselvs in the Love of God Iude. 21 To keep hims. that that wicked one Touch him not 1 Ioh. 5. 18. — To Overcome Apoc. 2. 3. — In these Places it is plain that the Soul of man hath a <66r> Reciprocall Energy vpon itself, Or of Acting vpon itself — So that it is not meerly Passive to that which it Receves from God — A Power of Being a Coworker with God of keeping Of Improoving itself further & further — And of keeping & Conserving himself in Good — All which cannot be without Non-Necessity — or Contingency.

Ch. 13

This Faculty of αυτεξους or Sui-Potestas, or Power over ourselves, which belongs to the Hegemonicon of the Soule, or the Soul as Reduplicated vpon itself, and self-comprehensive, whereby it can Act upon itself, Intrud & Exert itself more or Less; & by Reason therof Iudge & Will, & Act differently. Is Intended by God & Nature for Good, as a Self-Promoting Self-improoving Power, <67r> in Good, & also a self-Conserving Power in the same — Whereby men Praise of God, and their Persons bee Iustified & sins Pardond thro the Merits, & true Propit. Sacrifice haue a Reward Graciously bestowed vpon them by God, Even A Crown of Life. Notwithstanding which by Accident, & by the Abuse of it, it Prooves that, whereby Men also come to be, vnto themselvs the Causes, of their own Sin of Guilt, Blame, & Punishment — The Objects of Gods Vindicative Iustice, that which will especially be displayed, in that great Day of Iudgment, which is to come The Iustice of which day of Judgment to Punish men for the Past Actions of their wicked Lives can no otherwise be Defended Then by Asserting — Such an Hegemonicon in the Soul as wherby it has a Power over itself; or a Freedom from Necessity

Chap. 14^th —

To be Essentially & Immutably Good & wise, much a Greater Perfection, then to be so by Contingent Freewill —

It appeares from what I have declared that this Liberum Arbitrium or Free Will, which is properly an ἀυτεξούσιον or Sui-Potestas, a Power over ones selfe, either of Intending or Remitting, & Consequently of determining our Selves Better or Worse; which is the Foundation of Commandation or Blame, Praise, or Dispraise & the Object of Retributive Iustice, Remunarative or Indicative, Rewarding or Punishing; Is not a Pure Perfection, (as many boasted it to be;) But hath a Mixture of Imperfection in it. So that it cannot belong to God, or a Perfect Being + It a Being, to have a self-Intending & Self-Remitting Power a selfe-Improveing & Selfe-Impairing Power, , A selfe- Advancing & self-Depressing; to deserve Praise Commandation & Reward on the one hand <69r> (it being observed by Aristotle that it dos not so properly belong to God επαινεῖσθαι as μακαρίζεασθαι much less to deserve Blame & Punishment. But to be Mutable or Changable, in way of Diminution,; Lapsable or Peckable is an Essentiall Property of a Rationall Creature: — Imperfect Being; Moreover A Perfect Being, cannot have any such Power of Streching its’ Iudgment, beyound Certain knowledge, or of eeking out, the Defect or Understanding, and Supplying or lengthtening it out, by Faith & Probable Opinion. A Perfect Being can neither be More nor Less in Intention or being a Pure Act, can haue no such thing as self-Recollection but it is Immutable or Unchangable Goodness Wisdom vigilant Circumspection, or Diligence in Execution Undefectable. × × ×

< insertion from p68v > × × × Arius and his followers maintaining the Logos the Word & Sonne of God by which allthings were Made, to be a Creature, did Consentaneously there unto Assert, that He was Indewed with this kind of Liberum Arbitrum, whereby He was mutable Lapsable & Peckable, + But the Nicene Fathers Defending the true God-Head or Divinity of the Logos, Decreed on the Contrary; that being not Lapsable nor Peckable He was not Indewed with that Liberum Arbitrum, which is an Essentiall Property of every Rationall or Intelligent Creature. Accordingly as Origen had before declared that the Logos being Essentially Wise {where had} could therfore never Degenerate in to Folly, And the Holy-Ghost being Essentially Holy, {nes} {illeg} {illeg} could not degenerate into Unholyness, & so neither of them could have to haue that Liberum Arbitrum, which is the Originall of Lapsability & Peckability. And thus S^t Ierom, solus Deus peccere non potest, Cætera quia Lib. Arbitrio prodita sunt, p{o}ssunt in Vtrumque Partem se flectere. < insertion ends >

But some there are who Perswade themselves, that the Perfection of the Deity Consisteth in being Indifferent to all things, alltogether undetermined by any Anticedent motives or Reasons of Goodness, Wisdom, or Truth <70r> And its selfe to be the sole Determiner of all, these by an Indifferent, Arbitrary, Contingent and Fortuitous Will; And This is that monstrous and Prodigious Idea or Portraiture of God, which Carthesius hath drawn out, in his MetiPhysicks That there is Nulla Ratio Veri aut Boni, in Nature, Anticedent, to his Will. So that according to him; God is both Good, & Wise by Will, and not by any Nature, He being nothing but Blind Indifferent & Fortuitous Will, Omnipotent And all Divine Perfections are swallowed up into Will, That a Triangle hath three Angles, equall to two right Angles,; that Equalls added to Equalls, make Equalls,; or that two & two, are not Foure, according to him and otherwise then because they were made such; by an Arbitrary decree of God Almighty Wheras according to Scripture God is a Nature of Infinite Love, Goodness, or Benignity Displaying it selfe, according to Infinite and Perfect Wisdom, & Govern Rat. Creat. in Righteousnes & this is <71r> Liberty of the Deity so that it consisteth not in Infinite Indifferencye Blindy & Arbitraryly Determining all things. There is a nature of Goodness and a Nature of Wisdom, Anticedent to the Will of God which is the Rule & Measure of it. But this Hypothesis of Carthesius alike overthrows all Morallity & Sience at once making Truth & Falshood as well as the morall differences of Good & Evell, meer Arbitrary things, Will & not Nature thereby also destroyes all Faith and Trust or Confidence in God, as well as the Certainty of Christian Religion.

Upon this ground or Principle of God having an Arbitrary Contingent Free Will to all-things, did some of the Arian Party endeavour to overthrow the Divinity of the Sonne or Word, Because God must needs Begett Him Unwillingly unless He Begott Him, by an Arbitrary Contingent Free Will, which would make him <72r> have a Precarious existence & to be destroyable again at Pleasure, & Consequently to be a Creature, But Athanasius & the other Catholick Fathers in opposision here untoo, maintained That God the Father Begott a Sonne, not by Arbitrary Free Will but in way of naturall Emmination Incorporeall & yett not therefore Unwillingly nor yett without Will neither but his Will and Nature here concuring & being the same; it being, both a Naturall Will, & Will-ing Nature. So that the Sonne Begotten thus from Eternitye by the Essentiall Fecunditye of the Father and his overflowing Perfection, (which is no necessity Impossed upon him nor yett a blind & stupid nature as that of fire burning or the Sunne shining) This Divine Apaugesma or out shineing splendor of God the Father hath no Percarious but a necessary Existence and is Undestroyable. Wheras all Creatures having once had a Begining cannot Possibely <73r> have a necessary Existence were it only for this reason because they once were not. But besides, this, there can be no Repugnance, but that, what once was Not might Not be again; or be reduced to nonexistence by that which gave it a Being out of Nothing. Wherfore tho’ it should be affirmed that Creaturs also did Proceed by way of Emanation from the Deity, as Being a kind of λόγος προφορικὸς of God Almighty yett was this Emmanation, of another kind from that Naturall & necessary Emmination of the Sonne, namely a Volentary Emmanation suspendable. Nor can it be denied but that God Almighty, might by his Absolute Power Annihilate this Whole Creation; As suppose, if all Rationall Creaturs should Degenerate (as a Great part have done) & Continue obstinatly in their Apostasy, × × < insertion from p72v > × (As a late sect supposeth, the Annihilation of wicked mens Soules, after the Day of Iudgment Concluding this to be the Second Death Threatned–) And then instead therof Create another < insertion ends > & in-stead hereof should create Another World of Rationall Creaturs Which Conceite of other <74r> Worlds Created before this, from Eternity Hath not onely been {ow}ned by the Stoicks asserting an Infinite Vicissitude and Revolution of Worlds , one after another, all new as to the Rationall Creaturs in them < insertion from p73v > But also hath been surmized by some of the Christ. Profess. Origen himself having some vmbrage of it < insertion ends >

All Will, is generally Acknowledged to have this Naturally or Necessity belonging to it, to be terminated in Good, as it’s Object, it being Impossible that any Intelligent Being should Will Evell as such; Therfore it seems both Rationall and Pious to conceive, that the Best of all Beings, who is Essensially Good & Wise should allways acte agreeabley to it’s own Nature, and therfore Will the Best; And Consequently make the World in the best Manner that it was Capable of Some <75r> indeed will needs pretend that God doth not allways do the Best, because they suppose this to be an Essentiall Freedom and Liberty in Him, to be Indifferent to Will either the Better or the Worser, Which is all one as to say He is Indifferent, to Acte Either according to His owne Wisdom and Goodness, or not. But none of these Men nor any Atheists neither, were ever yet able yett to show how the Workmenship of God in any part of the World, or in their own Bodyes could haue been mended in the least thing that is. Nor can Gods Providence in the Goverment of Rationall Creatures be suspected not to the Best, by any who believe that He hath oppointed a day wherein He will Iudge the World In Rightousness & without respect of Pers. render to ev. man according to his works. When Moses tells us of Gods Pronouncing of every things that He had made, that it was טוב מאוד very Good, We are to Understand the meaning to be, that it was the Best, the Hebrews having no other way to expressing the Superlitive

Notwithstanding which, Arbitrary & Contingent Liberty is not quite excluded from the Deity by us, there being many cases in which there is no Best, but a great Scope & Latitude, for things to be determined either this way or that way, by the Arbitrary Will & Pleasure of God Almighty As for Instance the World being supposed to be Finite, ( as it can no more be Infinite, then it could be Eternall) that it should be Iust of such a bigness & not a jot Less or Bigger, is by the Arbitrary Appointment of God, since it can with Reason affirme that it was absolutely Best that it should a be so much as an Inch or hairs breadth Bigger or Lesser then it is. the number of the Stars must needs be either Even, or Odd, but it can not be said that either of them is Absolutely in itself, the Best Nor yet that the Number of those Nebulosæ stellæ or Less, of those Nebulosæ Stella that appear to our Sight as small as pin-dust, should be iust so many as they are, & neither one more or lesse So likewise the number of Created Angles and Humane Souls or that every one of Us had a Being & a Consiousness of our Selves, must needs be Determined by the Arbitrary <77r> Will & Pleasure of the Deity, who can Obliterate and Blott any one of us out again out of Being & yett the World not be a jott the less Perfect by it; However we may readily beare a Part & ioyn with the four & twenty Elders in the Apocalips Falling down before the Throne in that song of theirs Thou art worthy O Lord to Receive Glory; & Honour, & Power, for thou hast created all things, και διὰ τὴν θέλησιν σου, & for thy will ( or Pleasure) they are, & were Created < insertion from p77v > Tho all things in the Vnivers had not been Arbitrarily made, such as they are; but according to the Best Art & wisdom; yet were they not therf {lesse} διὰ τὴν θελησιν θεοὺ for his will of God; it being his will , to make them according to his wisdome — Or to order all things in Number measure & weight — wisd. 11. 20. < insertion ends >

Chap. 15

The Instances of the τὰ ενδεχόμενα ἂλλωι ἔχειν, as the Greeks call them, such things as are , contingent, or Unnecessary have been frequently given both by modern & Ancient writers, in Inanimate Bodys; that have no selfe-moving, nor selfe- changing Power, and therefore can never bee moved nor changed but , as to themselves, necessaryly. As for example, That it may either, Rain or not Rain to morrow; That the Wind may then Blow, either from the North , or from the South. These & such like Instances haue been Commonly given by Ancient Writers as well as modern) who Assert Contingencie against the Democriticall or Stoickcall Fate, or Necessity of all Actions; but as I consider very improperly. For tho’ there be in Nature A Possibility, of either of these, and there is an Uncertainty to us which of them will bee, yett which so’ever of them at any time come to pass it cometh not to pass by any Contingent Liberty of <79r> it’s own; but is Determined necessaryly by naturall Causes Antecedent or without. As for that other common Instance, of the Cast of a Dy, Here is no Contingencie or non-Necessity neither, in the motion of the Dy, after it is out of the Caster’s hand, tho’ it be Uncertain to us which side will fall uppermost. But there may be an Antecedent Contingencie in the Posture, & Force, or Imputed of the Thrower, which is to be Distinguished from the motion of the Dy it selfe. Nobody, that is by Nature ἐτεροκινητὸν; allways moved by some thing else & never originally from it selfe, can have a Contingencie, or Non-necessity, in it’s own motion, as such, tho’ it may be Contingently moved by some thing else, having a Power over it’s own Action to determine the same.

× < insertion from p78v p79v > Wherefore there cannot possibely be any thing more senseless and Absurd then the Doctrine of Epicurus, who Asserting a Contingent Liberty of Will in all Animalls, Free from Fate & necessity, Derived the Originall therof, from a Contingent Declination of Senseless Atums from the Perpendicular, more or less {illeg} and vncertainly this way or that way. L. 2. 44. 45. Sed ne Res ipsa Necessum Intestinum habeat, cunctis in rebus Agendis, Et Devicta quasi cogatur Ferre Patique, Id facit exiguum Clinamen Principiorum, Nec regione Loci certa, nec tempore certo. And this forsooth upon this pretence Lest any thing should come from nothing, or be without a Cause. Quare in Seminibus quoque idem fateare necesse est Esse etiam præter Plagas et Pondera Causam Motibus. Vnde hæc est nobis innata Potestas. De Nihilo quoniam fieri nihil posse videmus. Wherfore for the avoiding Contingent Libertys Coming from Nothing, or being without a cause, He assigns it a{in} Impossible cause <79v> For Nothing can be more Impossible then this that A Senseless Atom which hath no Selfe-moveing Power, should have in it a Contingent Liberty, of moveing it self this way or that way. < insertion ends >

Nevertheless it may well be Questioned whether there may not be <80r> somthing of Contingencie or Non-necessity in the Actions of Brute-Animalls, tho’ it be out of question that they have nothing of morallyty or Morall Freewill in them; We did before take notice of a certain kind of Liberty from Necessity, where Blame or Commandations had no place called by some of the Ancients Epeleustick, where ther being an Equall Eligibility in severall Objects without the Lest difference, we can determine our selves Fortuitously to either of them, Now it is not easy to exclude Brute Animalls from such a Contingencie, as this Becaus there may be Objects, Propossed, to them (as of meat & Drink) to exactly equall ; & placed at such æquall Distences for a considerable time; as that it cannot be conceived, what Physickall cause there should be necessaryly to determine them at last, to either of them, or & And this rather than that. And yett they will not hang in <81r> suspence, but certainly do One. or other So again where they are Distracted betwixt an Equall Fear and Aversation on one side & Equall Hope or Desire on the other at the Sametime, as a Dog betwixt a {whip} & a Bone, they will not allways hang on continue in demurr Suspence tho’ the Scales be exactly even, & that Perfect Isorrope as to motives & causes, but there will after a Determination sometimes one way, sometimes Another, which cannot well be thought necessary Without any thing of Fortuitous Contingency

Moreover Epicurus was of Opinion, that as well Brute Animalls, as Men, had a Power Over themselves, of Intending themselves more or less, to their Sensuall or Animall, Good, Phancied by them;

Gif. p. 44

Nonne vides etiam Patefactis tempore puncto, Carcerebus, non posse tamen

where he Conceived, that Brutes were not meerly Passive, to their own Phancies & Hormæ, but that they could Add somthing of their own to them , more or less, & Actively Intend themselves beyound what they suffer^d or that was by Nature Imprest upon them, Which if it be So, then must there be somthing in Brutes Superior to their Hormæ Some One thing; which taking Notice, both of outward Objects by sense, and of it’s own Phancie & Hormæ can Intend them. more or less & add more or less to them.

And there may seem to be some further Probability of this; from Hence, because we find by Experience, that Brutes are many of them Doscible, & can Acquire habits, to do many things, even to admiration., Now Phancies and Hormæ as such are not capable of Habits, no more then of Freewill - And therfore that which these Habits is, in & which thus determins their Motions, (& their Hormæ too), must be a kind of Hegemonick in the Acting probably not without some contingency + A < insertion from p81v > A

However, it is not easy to beleeve that every wagging of a Dogs tayle, every motion of a wanton kitling sportfully playing & toying, or of a Flea skipping, hath such a Necessary Cause, as that it could none of them possibly haue been otherwise – < insertion ends >

Chap. 16

But what ever be the Case of Brute Animalls as to this perticular, whose Insides we cannot enter into, Yet we being in the Inside of our Selves, do know certainly by inward Sense that there is in us, some One Hegemonicall which comprehending all the other powers Energies and Capacityes of our Soule, in which ἀνακεφαλου οῦνται they are Recollected & as it were summed up, having a Power of Intending and Exerting it Selfe More or Less, Determineth not only Action but also the whole Passive Capability of our Naturs One way or other, either for the Better or the Worse

And I say that according to Reason there must of necessity be such a thing as this in Men & all Imperfect Beings, Rationall or Soules Vitally United to Bodyes. For there being so many severall Faculties, & different kinds of Energies in them, as the Sensitive Perception of outward Objects together with Bodily Pleasure & Pain, Sudden Phancies & Hormæ Appetites and Passions to wards a Present seeming Good or against a Present apparent Evell rising vp in vs or <84r> Coming upon us & Invading us, with great Force and Urgencie, Then the Freer Reason of our Private Utility which discovering Inconveniencies Present & Future attending them often contradicts these Appitites of a Present sensuall Good Again the Superior Dictate of Honesty which many times is Inconsistent both with the Appitites of the or of Pleasure & the Reason of Private Vtility hath . Besides. these a Speculative Power of contemplating De Omnia ente & non ente of what soever is, & is not in Nature, and of the Truth & falshood of things Universall, whence is obtrudes upon vs the Notion of a God & His Existence as the Object of Religion, the Substantiallyty or Permanent Subsistence of our own Souls after the Bodyes decay, Lastly a Deliberateing Power, of what is to be done in Life in order to the Promoteing of our own Good, and upon Emergent occasions.. I say there being so many wheels in the Machin of our <85r> Souls, unless they be all aplye knitt & put together so as to conspire into One, and vnles there be some one thing Presideing over the intending itself more or lesse Directing and ordering & giving the First for Action go forward in motion, & nor could but there must be A Confution & Destraction in it & wee must needs b Perpetually in Puzle + We should be like to a disjoynted Machin or an Autuamaton all whose wheels are not well sett together; which therfore will be eather be at a stand continually, or els go on very slowly heavyly & combursomly, It could never carry on evenly any steady Designes, nor manage it selfe orderly & agreeably in undertakeing, but would be altogether A Thing Inapte for Action.

If apetites & Passion rise necessaryly from Objects without and the Reason of private Utilitye did necessaryly suggest something contrary to them from the Consideration of other Present Inconveniences or future ill Consequencies were there not some midle thing here to Interpose <86r> or to Humpire between them, we must of necessity be Non-pluque ea at a stand But if either of these by superiority of Strenght, did always necessaryly prevail over the other; then would that other be altogether Useless & superflus And so the whole a Bungle in nature.

The case is the same as to the Clashing & discord, betwext the superior Dictate of Honesty & Conscience and that of sensuall Pleasure or Private Utility. If these two be Equall Ponderaant & as scales in a Ballance there be no hand to turn or cast in Gram’s of Advantage either way then must the Machin of the Soul be at a Stand, But if one of these do always necessaryly Preponderate the other, then is the Lighter altogether Idle and to no purpose.

Again If speculative & deliberative Thought be alway necessary in us both as to Exercise specification then must it be either because they are all necessaryly Produced & determined by <87r> Objects of sense from without according to the Doctrine of Democritick & Hobbetian Atheis or else because the Understanding allways necessaryly worketh of it self upon this or that Object, & Passeth from one Object to a nother by a necessary {sceries} a Train, & Concatination of thoughts vpon supposition of the former, we could we never think of any thing, nor speak a word of any time but what Objects of sense without did Obtruded up {us} In vs vnavoidably - We could never devert our own thoughts, nor stop the Inundation of them {though a } stream from Objects nor entertain any constant design of Life, or carry on any Projects for the future; we being only passive to the Present Objects of Sense, before vs, all our thoughts being all scribled or stamped upon our souls by them as vpon a sheet of Paper X

But if the Latter, of these; be supposed then could we never have any presence of mind, {no ready accation} to Emmergent{} Accurrences or occasions but our minds would be always Roveing & Rambling, out, we having no Power over them, to call them back from their struglings and fix them, or determine them, on any certain Objects,

Lastly if we could not Intend our selves in Deligence of Activitye & Indeavours more or less set ourselvs to pursue any Purpose or Designe, fortify our minds with Resolution, excite our selves to watchfullness and sercumspection, Recollect ourselves more and less, in considering all our Intrests, & Concerns, < insertion from p88v > If we could not from ourselves exert any Act of Vertue or Devotion for which we should Truly deserv Praise, nor any Act of sinne for which we should iustly Deserve Blame for, we should be < insertion ends > we should be but Tanquam Nervis alienis Mobile Lignum, dead machins moved by Gimmers & wyers. -

To conclude God Almighty could not make such a Rationall creature as this is, all whose joynts springs & wheels of Motion are were Necessaryly tyed togather which hath no self-Power & that hath no Hegemonick, or Ruleing Principle nothing to knitt & vnite the multifarious parts of action together int con to steer & manage the conduct of itself no more then He could have made all the Birds of the Aire onely with one Wing all the Beasts of the feild Horses & other cattle <90r> and three Leggs, for the Idea of these things is nothing so Inepte as that of an Imperfect Rationall Being, all whose Powers & wheels of action are necessaryly, tyed together, which hath no one thing Presideing & Governing, in it, haveing a selfe Intending, & selfe Determining & selfe Promoteing Power

Wherefore this αυτεξουσιον, Sui Potestas self-Power, commonly called Liberty of Will is no Arbitrary contrivance or appointment of Deitye meerly by Will {annexed} to Rationall Creatures, but a thing which of necessity belongs to the Idea or Natures of an Imperfect Rationall Being Whereas a Perfect Being. Essentially Good & wise, is above this Free Will or self Power, it being Impossible that it should ever Improve itselfe, much less Impaire it self – But an Imperf Rationall being wholy without this self-power, is an Inept moped, & monstrous, × < insertion from p89v > × thing. & therfore such a Thing as God could not make. But if he would make any Imperfect Rationall Creature, he must of necessity endue them with an Ηγεμονικον, or self Ruling Power — Wherfore that Which by accident follows from the Abuse of this Power, cannot be Imputed to God – Almighty – as the Cause of it – viz Sinne & { vice} & wickedness Since he must either make no Imperfect Rationall Beings, at all, or els make them such who may Lapsable & Peccable by their own Default – < insertion ends >

Chap - 17

I have now but one thing more to add & that is to take notice of a common mistake which Learned men <91r> have been Guilty of, of confounding this Faculty of Free Will with Liberty as it is a state of Pure Perfection For what is more common then in writings with Ancient & Modern, to find men creaking & boasting of the εξουσὶα τῶν αντικειμένων, the Liberty of Contrareity, i.e. to Good or Evill, as if this were really a Liberty of Perfection, to be in an Indifferent Equilibrious State, to do Good or Evill Morall. which is too like the Language of the First Tempter. Thou shalt be as God, knowing Good & Evill. Whereas the True Liberty of a man, as it speaks Pure Perfection, is when by the Right vse of the Faculty of Free will, together with the Assistence of Divine Grace, he is Habitually Fixed in Morall Good, or such a state of mind, as that he doth Freely, readily & Easily comply with the Law of the Divine Life; taking a Pleasur in Complacence theruntly; and having an Aversation to the Contrary: Or when the Law of the Spirit of Life, shall make him free, from the Law of Sinne, which is the Death of the Soule;

But when by the Abuse of that Naturall Faculty of Freewill, men come to be Habitually Fixed in Evill, & sinfull Inclinations, then are they <92r> as Boetius will expresseth it, Propria Libertate Captivi made Captive, and & brought into & Bondage by their own Freewill, & obnoxious to Divine Iustice & Displeasure for the same. Whosoever customarily committeth sinne, which is by his own Freewill abused or Perversly vsed, contrary to the Design of God & Nature in bestowing {the same} vpon vs, is thereby made the servant of it, and Deprived of that True state of Liberty, which is a Mans Perfection +

The Faculty of Freewill is Good, wherby Men are advanced above the Low Condition of Brute-Animals, who are vnder a Necessity of Following their Phancies Hormæ, and Appetites to a Sensuall Good Onely, or a Good of Private Selfish Vtility, they having no Sense of that Good of Honesty, & Righteousnes, which is of a Different kind From it. But this Faculty being that which is Proper to Creatures , and to Imperfect Beings, onely hath a Mixture of Creaturely weaknes & Imperfection in it; and therfore is liable to be Abused, so as thereby to become to ourselvs, the Causes of our own Bondage & Servitude. Wheras True Liberty <93r> which is a State, of Vertue, Holines, & Righteousnes, (A Communicated Divine Perfection) X or Participation of the Divine Nature, can never be Abused.

Chap. 18

I now Proceed to Answer all the Arguments or Objections made ag^st this Faculty of the το ἔφ ἡμιν # or αυτεξουσιον, the Sui-Potestas, Power over ourselvs, which inferrs Contingency or Non-necessity & is commonly called Arbitrium and Liberum Arbitrium + the Foundat. of Praise & Dispraise, of Retributive Iustice And this as the matter hath Rewarding & Punishing been now allready explained by vs, And this as the matter will be very Easy for vs to do

I beginn, with the Pretended Ground, why this should be, πρὰγμα ἀνύπαρατον, A thing which hath no Existence in Nature, but in itself vintelligible & Absolutely Impossible X The first wherof is this, that nothing can Move or Act any way, but as it is Moved or Acted upon by Somthing else without it. × ×

< insertion from p92v > × × This Argument is thus Rediculously propounded by M^r Hobbs I conceive that nothing taken begining from it self but from the Action of Som other Immediate Agent without it self But his meaning if he had any meaning could be no other then this that no Action taketh begining from the Agent it self, but from the Action of some other Agent without it. Which is all one as if he should say that no Agent Acteth from it self nor otherwise then as it is Passive for to some other Agent, without it, that is there is nothing self-moving nor selfe Acting in the World nothing that Acteth otherwise then as it suffereth or is made to Acte by something else without < insertion ends > now if this Proposition be true, it must needs be granted that there can be no Contingent Liberty or freedom from <94r> necessity in nature, but all things will depend upon a Chain of Causes each link wherof is necessaryly connected both wth what went before, & what follows after, from Eternity

But it is certain that this Argument makes no more against Contingentcie, or non-necessity, then it doth against the Existence of a God or vnmooved Moover and first Cause, of all things that is of equall force both ways, & therfor if it do substancially Effectually Prove the necessity of all Actions Then doth it as firmly evince that there is no first vnmooved or Uncaused Cause that is no God. And I do not Question, but that this is the thing which M^r Hobbs ame’d at, Tho he disguizes His design as much as he could, in his Book De Corpore cap 26. p. 237. Etsi ex eo &c. Altho’ from hence, that nothing can move it self it is rightly enough Infered, that there is a First mover that was Eternall; yet nevertheless it can not be Inferred from thence as it commonly <95r> Commonly is That there is any Eternall Immoveable or Vnmooved Moover, but on the Contrary, that there is an Eternall Mooved Moover, Because as it is true that nothing is moved from it selfe, So is it likewise true, that nothing is moved but from Another, which was it selfe also before moved, by somthing else. In which words he doth at once endeavour to the Transfuse & convey the Poyson & Ætheism and yet so to do it, craftily, as that if he be charged with it, he mayight have some seeming subterfuge, or Evasion; He sayth first, it is rightly Infered, that there is some First Eternall mover; which looks very well; but then He doth not stand to this, but Contradicts it immediately afterwards in Denieing that there is any Eternall Immovable mover, or any other Eternall mover, then such as was it self before mooved by some thing els, which is all one, as to say, that there was no First mover; × < insertion from p94v > × But one thing mooved another from Eternity without any Beginning, any First moover Any vnmooved Self moved Moover < insertion ends > For the First mover if there be indeed any such, must needes be an Unmoved mover which was not it self before moved or Acted by any other, but a selfmoving mover.

But this whole Argument thus at once striking against contingencie, & the Being of a God, both together, & which intends to the Mathematic Evidence of Demonstration, most Egregious piece of nonsense that ever yet was written for, if there be motion in the Corporeall world, as there is, & no part of it could moove Itself, then must there of Necessity, be some Vnmooved or selfmoving thing as the First Cause therof, . Something which could Moove or Act from itself, without being Mooved or Acted vpon by Another; Becaus if nothing at all could mooue or Act by it selfe, but only as it was moued or acted upon by another then could not motion nor Actionever ever Begin or have come into the Corporeall World; but since there is {illeg} motion in the corporeal World {needs} either originally Proceed from a First Vnmooved or selfmooving moover {illeg} or els it must all come from nothing, and bee Produced without a Cause. X

But the truth is, This, that these unskilfull Phylosophers apply that to all Being what soever which is the Property of Body only, that it cannot move Itself, nor otherwise moov, then as it is <97r> Caused to move by Somthing else, without it, As it can not Stop its motion neither, when it is once Imprest upon it; (it being wholy of a Passive nature.) And from hence is afforded an Undeniable Demonstration, to vs, that there is some Incorporeall Being and somthing Vnmoved or self-moveing & Self Active as the First Cause of all Motion & Action such {as it} self not being moved Nor Acted by another, can cause body to move, Locally, & did at first Impress such Quantitye of motion upon the Corporeall universe, as now there is in it.

Chap -

Again it is Objected, that tho’ it should be granted There was Somthing Self Moveing & Self Active & which was not meerly Passive to Another without it, Acting vpon it, yett for all that, it is not possible, that anything should Determine it self, Actively change it selfe, or Act upon it Selfe, because One & the Same thing cannot be both Agent and Patient at once.

To which I reply, First that there is no necessity, that what Acteth from it self should always Act Uniformly or without any difference or change That in us, which moves the members of our body by Cogitation or Will, doth not allway do it alike, but Determineth itselfe differently therin, Acting somtime on one member somtimes on another, moving somtimes this way sometimes that way & with <99r> more or less Celerity & strenght and somtimes Arresting motion again So that nothing can be more plain then that by Determining it self Differently, it dos accordingly determine the motion of the Body. And it is Contrary to the Verdict of our Inward Sense To affirm that when we thus move our Body & members Arbitraryly & at pleasure, no one motion of our Finger no Nictation of our Eye Lids no word spoken by our Toungue could ever possibyly have been otherwise, then it was at that time but that it was necessaryly so Determined, by a successive chain of causes, from all Eternity or at Least from the Begining of the World. Much less, as M^r Hobbs further Dogmatizes; that there is no one Action, how Causall or Contingent so ever it seem; to the causing wherof, did not at once Concur, what soever is in Rarum Naturæ x

That which determineth it self, & changeth it self may be said to Acte upon it self & <100r> Consequently, to be both Agent & Patient. Now tho’ this cannot possibily belong, to a body which never moves it self, but is Essentially ἑτεροκινητὸν, always moved by somthing else without it, yett nothing hinders, but that what is by nature αὐτοκινητὸν Selfe-moving, & Self-Active may also Determine it’s own Motion or Activite, & so the same, be said to be both Agent and Patiente. We are certain by inward Sense, that we can Reflect upon our selves and Consider our selves, which is a Reduplication of Life, in a higher degree; For all Cogitative Beings as such, are selfeconscious, Tho’ Conscience in a Peculiar Sense, be commonly attributed to Rationall Beings only, and such as are sensible of the Discrimen Honestorum et Turpium, when they Iudge of their own Actions according to that <101r> Rule & either Condemne or acquitte them selves. Wherfore that which is thus Conscious of itselfe and Reflexive upon it self, may also as well Act upon it self, either as Fortuitously Determining it’s own Activity; or else as Intending & Exerting it self more or less, in order to the Promoteing of its own good +

Chap + 20.

But it is still further Objected, that A Thing which is Indifferent as such, can never determine it self to move or Acte any way, but must needs Containe in suspence without Action, to all Eternity, This is an Argument which Pomponatius Relyes much upon, to destroy Contingent Liberty of Will, and Establish a fatall Necessity of all Actions

And here we must again Observe that what belongeth to Bodyes only, is by these Philosophers unduely Extended, to all Beings what soever, Tis true that a Body which is unable to move it <102r> self but Passively Indifferent to Receive any motion Imprest upon it, once Resting, must needs continue to Rest to all Eternity, unless it be determined to this or that motion, by something else without And if it should be Impelled different ways at once by two equall forces it can never be able of it self to move either way . Two Scales Put into a Perfect Equal Poize can neither of them move upward or down-ward. But if will not therfore follow that if equall motives to Action Equall appearences of Good after them selves to aman He must therefore stand for ever in an Horrope or Equi-Liberium, and can never determine himselve to Acte one way or other

Nevertheless this is a great mistake of Pompantius & many others to think that that Liberty of Will which is the foundation of Praise or Dispraise, must consist in a man’s haveing a Perfect Indifference after all motives & Reasons of Action Propounded and after the last practicall Iudgment to <103r> Iudgment to, to do this or that to choose the Better or that Worser & to Determine Him selfe Fortuitously either way, for the Contingencie of Free Will doth not Consist in such a Blind Indifferencie as this is, after the Last Iudgment,; & all Motives of Action considered; but it is Antecedent therunto, in aman’s Intending or Exerting Himselfe more or less, both in Consideration & in Resolution to Resist the Inferiour appetites & Inclinations urging to the Worser.

Chap 19

Another Argument used to Prove that Contingent Free Will is a thing that can have no Existence in Nature is because it is Reasonable to think that all Elections & Volitions are Determined by the Reasons of Good, & by the Appearence of the greater Good; Now the Reasons & Appearences of Good are in the Understanding only And therfore are not Arbitrary but Necessary. Whence it will follow that <104r> all Elections & Volitions must needs be necessary.

But Aristotle Himselfe long since, made a Question whether all Appearences of Good were necessary or no? And it is most Certain that they are not so. For as we do more or less Intend our selves in Consideration & deliberation;, & as we do more or less fortifye our Resolutions to resist the Lower Appetites and Passions so will the Appearences of Good, & our Practicall Iudgments be Different to us accordingly, Whence it frequently comes to pass, that the same motives & Reasons have not the same effect upon Different Men, nor yett upon the same man at Different times. Wherfore this is but one of the Uulgar Errors; that men are meerly Passive to the Appearences of Good & to their own Practicall Iudgments

Chap. 22

Another Argument for the Naturall necessity of all Actions much used by the Stoicks was this, That Ουδεν ἀναίτιον nothing can be without a Cause and what soever hath a Cause must of necessity come to pass. M^r Hobbs thinks to Improve this Argum. into A demonstration after this manner. Nothing can com to pass without a sufficient Cause & a sufficient Cause is that to which nothing is wanting needfull to to produce the Effect, Wherfore every sufficient Cause must needs be a necessary Cause, or produce the Effect necessaryly

To which childish Argumentation The the reply is easie; that athing may have sufficient power or want therto no Power necessary to enable it to produce an Effect, which yett may haue power also or Freedom not to Produce it Nothing is produced without an Effecient Cause & such an Effic Cause as had sufficiencie of Power to enable it to produce it. <106r> But yet that Person who had sufficient Power to Produce an Effect might notwithstanding Will not to Produce it. So that there are two kinds of sufficient Causes one is such as Acteth Necessarily & can neither suspend nor determine it’s own Action. Another such as Acteth Contingently or Arbitrarily. & hath a power over it’s owne Action either to suspend it or Determine it - as pleaseth.

I shall subjoyn to this Another Argument, which M^r Hobbs glories of as being the sole Inventor of. From the necessity of A disjunctive Proposition nothing can be so contingent but that it was necessaryly true of it beforehand That it true before will either com to pass or not come to pass Therfore says He if there be a necessity in the Disjuntion there must be a necessity in one or other of the two parts therof, alone by itself. If there be no necessity that it shall come to Pass, then must it be necessary that it shall not come to pass, as if there could not be no necessity in the Disjunction tho’ both the members of it were Contingent, & neither of them necessary. This is a most shamefull Ignorance in Logick especially in <107r> for one who pretends so much to Gramaticall Demonstration.

And yett this childish and Rediculous Nonsense & Sophistry of his was stollen from the Stoicks too, who play’d the fools in Logick after the same manner. Every Proposition say’d they concerning A supposed Future Contingent, that It will come to pase, was either True or Fals before hand; & from Eternity If it were True then it must of necessity come to pass, if false then it was it necessary it should not come to pase And yett this Rediculous Sophistry Puzzled not onely Cecero but also Aristotle himself much as to make them hold that Propositions concerning Future Contingents to be was neither True nor False.

Chap. 23

I come now to answer the Arguments of those for the necessity of all Action who suppose that tho’ contingent Liberty, do Indeed naturally belong to all Rationall Beings as such yett notwithstanding the exercise therof is peculiarly Reserved to God Almighty himself only be from all Eternity determineing all Actions and Events whatsoever according to his Arbitrary Will & Pleasure, & so by his Irresistible Erisistable Decreese & Influx make them necessary, Tho’ otherwise in their own nature they would a haue been Contingent

The first ground of which oppoinions is this. for a Creature to Exercise a Contingent Arbitrary Free Will, is all one is for it to Acte Independently upon God Wherfore this must needs be Reserved to the Deitye as his peculiar Priviledge & Prorogative Arbitraryly & Contingently. to Determine all things and thereby to make all Actions Necessaryly to us God who not be God if he did not Arbitraryly Determine all things

But first This is to Swallow vp all things into God. By making him <109r> the Sole Actor in the Vnivers? All things els being meerly Passive to him, & Determind in their Actions by him. This at least is as Plotinus intimates, to make God the Immediate Hegemonick, & Soul of that whole world.

Again This is not the Supreme Perfection of the Deity, to Determin All things and Actions Arbitrarily Contingently & Fortuitously - But to Act according to . Goodnes & Wisdome. God being Infinite Dist - Interested Love Displaying itself wisely. Therfore Producing from His Fecundity All Things that Could be made & were Fit to be made. Suffring them to Act according to their own Natures. Himself Presiding over all, & Exercizing His Iustice in the Management & Goverment of A the Whole - A A < insertion from p108v > A A

And since all Rat. Creatures, haue Essentially this Prop. of Lib. Arbit. The τὸ αυτιξους. Self Power Belonging to them — To suppose that God Allm. could not govern the world without offering a Constant Viωlence to it, never suffering them to Act according to their own Nature; is very Absurd < insertion ends >

This Power of Contingent Free <110r> Will, is no Independent vpon God, but Controllable by him at pleasure. As also it is obnoxious and Accountable to His Iustice in Punishing the Exorbitances of it And were it not for this the Divine Iustice Retributive, dispensing Rewards & Punishment, could haue no Place in the world, nor no Object to exercize itself vpon x

Moreover it is certain That God cannot determ. & Decree all Hum volitions & Actions - but that he must bee the sole Cause of all the Sin, & morall Evill, in it, and men be totally free from the Guilt of them. But in Truth This will Destroy The Reality of Morall Good & Evill Vertue & Vice, & make them nothing but meer Names - or Mockeries /

Chap. 24

Again it is Objected. That if all Hum Actions, be nether Necessarily in themselvs , nor yet made such by Divine Decrees They cannot possibly be Foreknown by God - Therf we must need eith deny Divine Omni-Prescience, or deny Contingency.

Where in the First place we grant, That Volitions Purely Contingent in their own Nat. as when the Objects or Means are Perfectly Equall, & haue no Difference of Better & wors { becaus} not made Neces. by Divine Decrees, or Influence, neither are not certainly Foreknowable Ex causis. Since that that cannot be certainly foreknown Ex causis, which has no Necessary Causes -

And if Contingent Volitions be neither certainly foreknowable ex causis, nor any way els but are absolutely vnforeknowable. Then would it be no more Derogat. from the Div. Omniscience, that it cannot know, things Vnknowable, then to the Divine Omnipotence, that it cannot do Things that are not Doable, or that ar Impossible to be done – × × < insertion from p111v > × × However these things would not be so many as is Commmonly supposed. For all Voluntary Actions are not Contingent — man’s Will being allways necessary Determined to Good and the aversation of Evill so that those are Innumerable cases in Humane Life, In which we may Certainly know before hand what any man in his Witts would do as also many other wherein there can be no doubt but that a good man would do one way, and a man of Vicious Corrupt Principles another way < insertion ends >

Notwithstand^g which ; that tho Future contigents be not foreknowable. ex causis, nor we able to Comprehend how they should be foreknown - otherwise, yet would it be great^r Presumption in vs therfore flatly to deny Divine Prescience of them. Because the Divine Nature, & Perfections surpass our Hum. comprehension - We do beleve the Div. Eternity without Beginning, & therfore without successive flux (for we clerly conceve that whatever hath a successive Duration, must haue had a Begin.) <113r> Tho we cannot comprehend this Eternity. And we beleev the Divine Omnipresence, or Vbiquity, tho do not vnderstand the manner of it, since He cannot conceve God to be extended {illeg} Partes extra Partes, numerically distinct & Infinite - Wherfore it would be be Pious to beleeve conceve likewise that God Foreknows all Future Conting Events, tho we can not vnderstand the manner how this should be

But many Learned Men and Good Philosiphers have satisfied then selves here, that the Event perfectly Contingent be not certainly foreknown Excauses yett they are seen & known to God by an Anticepatient of futurity. the Divine Duration of Eternity which is without Succesive flux being present to the Past, & future, as well as to the Instant now. He that calls things that are not, as if they were He whose name is ὁ ὢν ὁ ἦν καὶ ὁ ερχο{illeg} <114r> is and was & will be He who is both past & future see’s all future Contingent Events In specula Æternitatis in his high watcht hour of Eternitye and that there is such a Divine Eternity is demonstrable by Reason

Chap 25

But it is still further urged that upon a supposition of the Certain Prescience of future Contingencies it will follow unavoidablely that the will necessaryly come to pass This is the Constant cry of Socinus & his followers but without the least shaddow of Reason for if the Prescience be true they must be foreknown to be Contingents & therfore to come to pass not necessaryly but contingently moreover they do not therfore come to pass because they are foreknown but they are foreknown because they will come to pass, the certain Prescience is not the cause of there future comeing to pase but their future coming to pass is the cause of their being foreknown There is no more necessity riseing from the <115r> Presciences then there would a been from their futurity had they not been foreknowne For that which now is tho’ never so Contingent yett since it is was future from all Eternity but it was not therefore necessaryly future but Contingently only. Here is no necessity but Ex hypothesi or Hypotheticall upon supposition that it will be it is necessaryly future but there is no Absolute necessity in the thing it selfe When a Contingent thing hath been and is now past it is then necessary that it should have been; or it could not possibly not have been Ex hypothesi so when a Contingent Action is now adoing it is at that time necessary that it should be Ex hypothesi but it doth not therfore follow that it was necessaryly caused or that it was Impossible not to have been.

Chap 26

Again it is objected that the supposition of Liberty of Will is <116r> Inconsistant with Divine Grace & will necessaryly Infer Pelegeiasme. But the falsity of this may appear from hence that those Angles which by the right will of Liberty of Will stood when other by the abuse of it fell tho’ by that same Liberty of will they might still Possibly continue without falling yett for all that it would not be Imposible for them to fall, Unless they had aid & esistence of Divine grace to secure them from it, wherefore it is commonly conceived that as not-withstanding that Liberty of Will by which it is possible for them never to fall, they had need of Divine grace to secure them against a Possibilyty of falling and that they are now by Divine grace fixed & confirmed in such a state as that they can never fall

Much more is the aid and esistence of Divine grace necessary both for the recovery of Lapsed souls & for their Perseverance the use of there own free will is necessaryly required for God who made us with out our selves, will not save us with out our <117r> selves we are to strive to enter in at the strate gate to fight a good fight & to runne a good race, we are to purge our selves from all uncleaness of flesh & spirit; we are to keep our selves in the Love of God. He was certainly an unregenarated Person who in the Parable had but one Talent given Him and is condemn’d for a slothfull servant because he did not by the use of his Free Will Improve that Talent which he had received & return to his master his own with usary, which had he done more would a been given to him, that is Divine grace would a been superadded; Our own endeaours & Activity of Free Will are Insuficient without the add & esistence of Divine grace for it is God that worketh in us both to Will & to do by Grace ye are saved & by the Grace of God I am what I am.

Chap 27

There is yett another Witty objection made by a modern writter asserting a fatall necessity of all <118r> Actions that wheras Liberty of Will is Introduced to salve a Phænomenone of a Day of Iudgment and the Iustice of God of Inflecting Punishment upon men after this Life for their Actions past this will by no means serve theire turn I say Contingencie will no more salve this Phænomenone then necessity For it is no more just that men should be Damn’d to all Eternity for a meer Chance or Contingencie then that they should for Necessity To Dam’n Men for their Contingent Free Willed Actions is all one as if one should be damn’d for throwing such a cast of a Dy. × < insertion from p117v > Men could no more helpe Contingencie then necessity. < insertion ends > Wherfore the matter can be Resolved into nothing else but Gods Absolute power & his Arbitrary & unacountable Will which by reason of his Omnipotence makes that to be just what soever he’ll doe It seem He thinks not fitt to damn’d men to Eternity but such as were necessitated to do wicked Actions before but He might have done otherwise if he had thought Good by His Absolute power

To answer this, no man shall be damnd for the Contingencie of any Action where there was no difference of Better or Worse a Perfect æquallity & one thing as much Elligable as the other here can no fault nor Blame in the case as was said before But where there is an Inequallity of Better or Worse a Diversity of Good Honesty & Duty on one hand and sensuall gain & Pleasure on the other Men having a Power here over themselves to Intend and Exert them-selves in Resisting their sensuall apetites and endeauouring more and more by degrees to Comply with the Dictates of Conscience opposett to them If at the end of their Lives they have runne their Course as that they have suffered themselves at last to be quite filed & Vanquished by ther worser; It is Iust that they should fall short of the Prize sett before them that they should Loose the Crown, & receive shame, Disgrace, & Punishment.

Men shall not be damnd for the cast of a dy or such a Fortuitous <120r> Contingencie But for them not useing that Power which they have over themselves, to promote themselves toward the Good of Honesty & also for their abuising that Power, by Actively Determining & fixing themselves in Vitious habetts