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Book. II. Chap. 1st.

I It hath been a ^very Ancient Controversy in the world Whether all things are Fatally Necessary, or there ^are some things ἐφ' ἡμῖν In our own Power. And In the begining of the former Booke, we have observed, That the Fatall Necessity of all Actions and Events, has been maintained upon three severall grounds; whence proceed three Fatalisms, or False Hypotheses of the Intellectuall System of the Vniverse, that are ^all severally to be impugned by us. And First some have asserted ὑλικαι ἀναγκαι A Material Necessity of all things wthout a God, they makeing the First Principles of all things, to be either Senseless and Unqualified Atoms, as Leucippus and Democritus, or at least inanimate Bodies as the other Atheists ^ This it is that ^wch Epicurus in his Epistle to Menoeceus calls τὴν τῶν φυστικῶν ἑιμρμένην, the Fate of Naturallists, that is indeed of Atheists It ^is true that in Ancient writers the Materiall Necessity ^where one thing is moved by another from without is many times opposed, not soe much to Contingent Liberty as to Mind and Vnderstanding Councell & Wisdome; ^from within itselfe ordering things for Good Thus is it sd by Plato, that in those Ancient times, Astronomers Geometricians and Physiologers were commonly suspected by the Vulgar, for friends to Atheism, because they dealing soe much in Materiall things, & Naturall Causes, would be thereby disposed to think, that all things came to passe ἀνάγκαις, ἀλλ' ου διανόιαις ρουλὴος μη ἀγαδῶν πέρι, by Necessities, and not by the Determinations of Mind and Will for the sake of Good From ~ whence it is yt ^this Necessity and Fortune are joyned together in the same Plato, where he describes the Atheistick Hypothesis, κατὰ τύχην εξ ἀνάγκης συνεκεράσδη that things being moved & mingled together, ffortuitously, out of Necessity, Heaven and Earth and all things ^there in ^ were thus produced wthout any Mind or God Where Fortune is taken for the Temerarious Motion of Atoms, undirected for Ends, and Good, wch eth well wth Materiall Necessity. +Nevertheless it is certaine that according to the tenor of the Atheistick Hypothesis wch Deriveth all things in the Vniverse for Sensless and Inanimate Bodies, moved one another Though all be Fortuitous there cannot possibly be any such {Cōtingence} or Free Will because there is noe Foundation for it in the Principles Which Epicurus being well aware of, that if the Motions of Atoms were all Necessary, Soules & Minds being Generated out <55> out of them, they must needs be Necessary too in all their Cogitac~ons and Volitions, but that which being convinced from the Phenomena, that there was in all Animalls, selfe-Motion, and in Men Fatis Avolsa Voluntas, a Will free from Fate, he therefore, though in other things ^com̄only Apeing Democritus, yet in this departed from him, & devised a of whereby they should Decline from the Perpendicular ^vncertainly both as to time & place. Nec regione loci certa nec tempore certo thinking by this means, to Salve Liberty of Will X Whereas nothing could be more Sensless & Sotish then this; it being indeed to Atribute Liberty of Will to Dead and Inanimate Atoms, and as Cicero observeth, to introduce Motion without a Cause, wch to all Physiologers is the greatest absurdity. And he is accordingly for this utterly abandoned by all the Democritick and Epicurean Atheists of these latter times. Nor ^indeed is this Liberty of Will onely inconsistent wth that Democritick Atheism, but alsoe wth all other Forms thereof, they agreeing in this, that they derive all things from inanimate Matter, ^necessarily moving & acting; insomuch that Spinoza himselfe, who at last discarding Hobbianism, was transformed into a kind of Hylozoick Atheism, he Atributeing Life to all Matter, explodes , as an Impossibility, and contends for Universall Necessity Wherefore this First Atheistick Fate is thus described by Plotinus, οἱ μὲν ἠγχὰς σουματι καὶ θέμινοι, ὁῖον ἀτόμουι, τῆν τούτων φορᾶ, καὶ πληγαις καὶ συμπλοχαῖς πρὸς ἀλλυλα ἓκαία ποῦντει, καὶ ὅταου εχων γίνεσθας ᾗ ἐχεῖνᾳ συνέστη ποιεῖ τε καὶ πάχες; καὶ ἁμετέρας ὁρμὰς και διαθέσιν ταυτη ἔχειν αὑ ἂν ἐκεῖνα πνιῶσι ἀνάγκε την παρὰ τούτων εἰς τὰ ὄντα συμεγουσι. καὶ ἄλλα δὲ τες σώματα ἀρχας διδῶ, καὶ ἐκ τουτων τὰ πάντα γίνεσθας τῶ παρὶ τουτων ἀνάγκα δουλένειν ποιεῖ τὰ ̔ντα These Philosophers who suppose Corporeall Principles, as Atoms, Generateing all things from their Motions, Impressions & Complications from with one another, and makeing them to Bee, Doe, & Suffer, accordingly and consequently our own Motions, Dispositions and Volitions to be such as they produce, from these their Principles introduce Necessity and Fate into all things whatsoever And though one should suppose other ^Sensitive Bodies, besides Atoms ^& Elements &c to be the ffirst Principles and derive all things from thence, yet must he in like manner make all things serve Necessity. And againe afterward in his Confutation of this Atheistick Hypothesis he concludes thus; ὁ ολως γὰρ τὸ <56> ἡμετερον ἐριον, καὶ τὸ ξὤοις εῖναι ἀπολεῖτας, φερομίνων ᾖ τὰ σώματα ἄγει ὠθοῦντα ἡμαῖ, ὥσπερ ἄψεχα πίσματα, τὰ ὀντὰ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ προὶ τουι ἕτερα σώματα ἀιτὶα τῶν πάντων τιδεμινους In a word this ^Democritick Hypothesis, leaves noe Action to be our own, nor our Selves to be Animalls, we being ^alwayes carried as the Atoms drive & impell us, like inanimate Bodies. And the same is to be said also agt those other Atheists, who make other Bodies (besides Atoms) the Causes of all things, that they must needs introduce a Vniversall Necessity or Fate.

2 Wherefore it is to be here observed that neither the Greek Εἱμαρμένη nor the Latin Fatum were alwayes soe taken as ^ commonly is supposed to signify Decree, Destiny, or Appointment, nor for a Divine thing, but sometimes for that wch is meerly Naturall, & hath nothing at all of Decree or Appointment in it. As for Example, when Epicurus in his Epistle to Menecus writeth thus Κρῖπτον ἠν τῳ περὶ θεῶν μόδῳ ακιακολουθεῖν, ἢ τῇ τῶν φυσικῶν ειμαρμένῃ δουλευειν It were much better to adhere to ye Fate of the Gods, then to serve the Fate of Naturallists or the Physicall Fate; the one promising to men a possibility of declineing and avoiding evills by means of the Worship and Invocation of the Godds, but the other quite hindering all such hopes by an undeclinable, and inexorable Necessity Where as this Fate is opposed to the beleife of the Godds ^ & {illeg} is called Physicall or Atheisticall, soe hath it nothing at all of Decree or Destination in it In like manner when Lucretius tells us of Epicurus his designe, in his third Motion of Atoms declineing uncertainly from the Perpendicular, to finde out thereby, Principium quoddam, quod Fati Cordera rumpat Such a Principle as might breake all the Bands and Leagues of Fate; That this is not at all to be understood of a Divine Fate, or Fatall Decree but a Naturall Fate onely, the Necessary Conection of things in themselves as shall be {illeg} afterward. Evident from the following verse, and the whole Context We say therefore that by Fate in generall is meant nothing else but necessity, and accordingly as it is defined in generall by Seneca to be Necessitas omnium rerum actionemque quam nulla vis rumpat, the Necessity of all things and Actions wch noe Force can breake or interrupt Wch <57> Now this Necessity of all Events may be either made by the Things themselves & their Train & {Sucession} or else by Divine Decrees. That Fate wch arises from the Nature of Things themselves wthout ^any thing of Divine Decrees, is the Naturall and Atheistick Fate; such a Necessity of things as follows from the Principles of all Atheism, according to the genuine Tenor of them, and wch hath been asserted by all Atheists in their several Ages ^accordingly onely Epicurus and a few thus Excepted as was said bywho indeed offered violence to their own Principles. For Atheism is that wch deriveth all things from Inanimate Bodies as the First Principles; and noe Inanimate Bodies can move themselves Contingently, but whether they be moved Naturally as Epicurus his Atoms in ^their Descent downward, or els by Externall Force, as in their Plagæ, they are alwayes moved necessarily; Nor can any Contingent selfe-Motion or selfe-Determination, ever - Emerge out of such Principles ^as these described, as ^ Series, Chaine, or Concatination of Causes Motions and Actions, one things necessarily moveing another ^& that wch followes being alwaies linked with that wch went before, and ^thus from Eternity or wthout beginning Seriesꝗ Causarum, cum Causa Causæ nexa, rem a se gignat; and described by Lucretius ; Quum Semper Motus connectitur omnis, Et Vetere exoritur semper novus ordine certo, p215. Accordingly Alexander Aphroditius declares the sense of these Fatalists ^For the Stoick herin agreed with the Democtricks ως αει το πρωτον γεγονος ἀντιασθας τοῦ μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ ποιεῖν ἐπισυνδεσιν τινα καὶ συνεχιαν τῶν ἀιτίων, That alwayes something going before, is the Cause of something that follows after, and soe there is made a Connection & Continuity of Causes. Which Connection or Chaine of Causes, also as the same Alexander addeth, was supposed by them to be backeward Infinite; πιῦς οῦκ ατοπον τὸ λέγειν επ' ἄπειρον εἶναι τὰ ἄιτια, καὶ τὸν εἱρμὸν ἀυτῶν και ἐπισύνδεσιν, ὡς πρῶτον τι μὴ εἶναι μύτε ἔχατον. How is it not Absurd <58> That there should be an Infinity of Causes, & their Chaine & Series such as hath nothing neither first nor Last As if every thing must have a Cause, whereas though whatsoever be made, have a Cause; yet it does not therefore follow that every thing must have a Cause, because every thing is not made. Wherefore according to these Physicall or Atheisticall Fatalists, the whole Cause of every Action, ^is neither the Agent itselfe nor that Motion or Action that went Immediately before it, but the whole Infinite Chaine ^or Series of Causes t backward from Eternity and wthout begining. Moreover ^becaus besides the Proper Efficient Cause of every Action, there ^are many other improper Collaterall Causes, of that Kind that is commonly called, sine qua non, such as wthout wch the Effect could not be produced; therefore did they suppose that there was not onely one ^such Chaine ^backward Infinite but alsoe many other Chaines runing together paralel from Eternity, that did someway concur to the production of every Effect, since without them it could not have been. To this purpose is that cited out of Ennius by Cicero, Vtinam ne in Nemore Pelio securibus Cæsa cecidisset abiegna ad terram trabes Licuit (saith Cicero) vel altius, Vtinam ne in Pelio nata vlla vnquam esset arbor: etiam suprà Vtinam ne esset mons vllus Pelius; similterque superiora repetentum, regredi in Infinitum licet. Neve inde navis Inchoandæ exordium Cepisset. Quorsū hæc præterita, quia sequitur illud Nam nunquam hera errans mea efferret pedem Medæa, animo ægro, amore sævo saccria – Not that the Beach Beames cut down in the Pelian Forrest; nor yet the making of ships out of them, were any true cause of Medias Frantick Love, any more then ^as Cicero expresseth it Viator bene vestitus est causa granatori cur ab eo spoliaretur; a well clothed Travellor is the cause of a highway mans robbing – but becaus without this, she could not have gone to Sea in that Ship And thus is the Necessity of All things maintained by Hobbs in his Questions concerning Liberty and Necessity Numb~ ch 16:th The Necessity <59> The Necessity begins from the first Motion towards the Action, that is from Eternity, where indeed there is noe First; and accordingly he concludes Numb the 10th That the last dictate of the Judgment concerning the good or bad that may follow any Action, is not properly the whole Cause, but the Last part of it, (that is the last Linke of the Chaine of Causes from Eternity) and yet it may be sd to produce the Effect Necessaryly, in such manner, as the last feather - may be said to breake an horses back, when there was soe many laid on before, as there wanted but that one to doe it Indeed he affirmeth, That wch Necessitateth & determineth every Action, to be the sum~e of all those things, wch being now Existent, Conduce & Concurre to the Production of that Action heareafter; whereof if any one thing now were wanting, the Effect could not be produced, Soe that the whole Cause of every Action ^ consisteth of the Concourse of all Agents & Causes, and therefore does not make one Simple Chaine or Concatenation, but an innumerable number of Chaines Joyned together Thus againe Number the 21th I attribute not the necessity of the Will ^to the Influence of the starres But to the Aggregate of all things together that are in Motion; where he advances this further Paradox, That there is not any one Action in the world to the Causeing of wch, Concurres not whatsoever is in Rerum Natura: wch he defendeth after this manner, If I should say that all Action is the Effect of Motion, and that there cannot be a Motion in one part of the world, but the same must alsoe be communicated to all the rest of the world, my {Adversaries} would say, that this were a great Paradox, But yet if I should say, that if a lesser Body as a Concave Spheare or Sun were filled wth Aire or other liquid matter, and that any one little particle thereof were moved, all the rest would be moved alsoe; he would conceive this to be true; or if not, a Judicious Reader would. It is not the greatness of the Sun, that altereth the Case, and therefore the same would be true alsoe, if the whole world were the Sun From whence it follows that upon never soe little motion, made in any one part of the world, as upon the skipping of a flea, the matter of the whole vniverse, must be put into motion, and that not onely the fluid parts thereof; but even the most Solid, As the Earth Sun Moone & Starres must communicate therein Which Absurd Paradox, was founded upon the grosse ignorance of Physiology, or the not understanding that there is in all Motion a Circle, soe that though there should be a Plenitude ^in the world without any Vanity yet would neither Motion be hindred, nor yet communicated to the ^matter of the whole world, but onely to a certain Circle of Matter, equall in to the biggness of the Body Moved: nor is there any more necessity, that the Matter of the whole world should be disturbed by the Progressive Motion of every Body, then by the turning round of a Vaste Circle or Spheare, if it could move of it selfe, Wherefore though Hobbs <60> Speakes sometimes of Divine Decrees as whereby the frame of things in Nature was ^set & determined and would draw an Argument for the Necessity of all things from Divine Prescience and sometimes he pretends not to differ from the Stoicks save onely in this that he substitutes God Almighty in the roome of Jupiter ^whē they Define Fate to be Effatum Jovis; nay he sometimes cites St Paul and Calvin and Perkins too, yet we may as I suppose wthout any great breach of Charity conclude that ^all this was but a Blind & that he was really neither Calvinist, nor Stoick, nor any Divine Fatalist; but an Atheistick one and that according to the Democritick forme; he plainly and possitively declareing else where, that there is noe First Mover or cause of Motion but that one thing moved another from Eternity wthout any first Cause or ^VnMoved Mover, wch is all one as to deny a God

3 Now We have in the Former Booke fully confuted all the severall Atheistick Hypotheses or Formes of Atheism, not onely the Democritick, which was an Anomæomery or Dissimilar Atomology, ^& wch Generated all things {illeg} but the Substance of Matter, & produced thē out of nothing, but alsoe the Anaximandrian which was an Homœomery or Similar Atomology, this latter makeing ^Eternally Qualified ^& selfexistent Atoms, (as the former Vnqualified ^{ones} to be the first Principles of all things, Againe the the Pseudo-Stoicall & Cosmo-Plastick or Cosmo-Physicall Atheism, wch makes ye whole world not be an Animal, ^ nor Produced or Governed by any Vnderstanding Nature but a ^huge Plant or Vegetable onely; that is, not to be Produced or Governed by not to be governed by any ^Vnderstandg Nature, but a Plantall and Plastick, onely such as Herbs ^Plants and Trees are shaped ^out by; and lastly the Stratonick and Hylozoick Atheism, wch attributes to all Matter as such, (their onely Substance and first Principle of all things), Life and Perfect Vnderstanding too, but wthout Animality, Sense, and Consciousness. Nor indeed can there well be any ^other Form of Atheism ^but what may fall vnder one of these foure; because the first Principle of all things, if it be no Animalish & Conscious Nature, must either be Matter ^altogether Vnqualified, or ^els Qualified wthout of Life, or endued wth a Plantall & Plastick Life onely, or Lastly wth a strange kinde of ^Fictitious Knowledge & Understanding also, yt is devoid of all Animality, Sense, and Consciousness. I say we have demonstratively proved the Impossibility of all these severall Forms of Atheism to as by other mediums, wch we shall here omitte, so from hence, all agree in this that because they all bring something out of Nothing; that is they bring all that Animal Life and Conscious Cogitation or Understanding ^that is in the whole world out of Matter, that is utterly devoid thereof, or that is from Nothing; and consequently suppose it to be caused by Nothing, or made wthout a Cause. Now all the severall Formes of Atheism being confuted the Atheistick Fate or Necessity ^that is derived from any one of them, must needs be ipso facto confuted alsoe


Nevertheless we have also further particularly confuted, that ^Democritick Fate, wch is the Principall, after the same manner: For where as, this is built wholly upon this Supposition, That Nothing in the whole Vniverse can move ^or Change itselfe selfe. Nor Act from it selfe, but onely as it is Moved and Acted upon, by some other Agent wthout it, wch Democritick Principle ^& Ground of Necessity is thus laid down by Hobbs, Numb. 30. Nothing taketh begining from it selfe but from the Action of some other im̄ediate Agent wthout it selfe And that therefore when first a man had a Will to something, to wch Immediately before he had no Will, the Cause of his Will, is not the Will it selfe (nor indeed the man himselfe) but something else not in his own disposeing: soe that voluntary Actions have all of then Necessary Causes: We have ^in the Former Book clearely showed, that if nothing could Move it selfe, nor Act from it selfe: ^then all that Motion that now is in the world must have come from Nothing or been made wthout a Cause. It being vtterly Vnconceivable, & Contradictious that Motion should ever have entered into the world; if from Eternity Nothing could ever Move it selfe or Change itself for it would have been a Passion from no object To make an Infinite Progress here in the order of the Causes of Motion, according to Democritus ^did not Aristotle ^rightly observeth ^ to deny it to # have any Cause at all # Moreover ^we might object it is a gross mistake of these Democriticks, when they take it for granted, that if once but never soe little Motion could get into the world by chance or ^they know nothow; or if some part of the Matter should have one such onely given to it; that from thence ^forward one thing would ^still continue to move an other ^without cessation to all Eternity, . It is true indeed as the Case now stands wth things in the Corporeal world; that as no Body wch is in rest, can cause it selfe to move, soe ^can no Body that hath an Impetus of Motion upon it, as a Bullet shot out of Cannon, or an Arrow from a Bow ^or a Stone from a sling stop that Motion or Cause it selfe to Rest And though Animals grow weary of Motion & are tired out wth it & feel a lassitude therupon yet is there no more labour or difficulty to Inanimate Bodies, in Motion then in Rest, Nor doe all Bodies, as the Peripateticks suppose, Naturally of themselves tend to Rest, and seek repose and quiete. Nevertheless the continuation of Motion in Bodies after an Impression once made upon them, is not from hence as if a Body could of it selfe continue to move wthout any Impetus or or Active Force upon it, or after the ceasing of such Force, but because there is a continuation of the Same Quantity of Motion or Active Force upon the Corporeall Vniverse, always maintained & kept a foote by the Cause that first produced it; and wch by the Law of Natures Imutability still abideth in the same Bodies whence it was untill it be hindred ^or distracted by some Externall ^Cause or Impediment & Transferred upon other Bodies Though there be as much Force <62> required to stop a Body that was in Motion & make it Rest, as to make a Body that Resteth Move, yet Motion is Action and ^so is at Rest nor is there required any continued Active Force to keep a Body in Rest, as there is to keep it in it selfe, or stop all that Motion that is upon ^it or damp it & extinguish it nor is it a thing that could fade dy or decay of it selfe as being ^meerly a violent thing wch therefore ^Nature would at length prevaile over Notwthstanding wch if that wch Acted upon it & made it at first Move ^should cease ^to Act or withdraw its Force the whole world would immediately become Stagnant, and be fixed into a Rocky or Adamantine Hardnes. Wherefore both our Ancient & modern Democriticks ^haue been here guilty of 2 Grand Errors the first not of of bringing Motion into the world wthout a Cause, and alsoe that the Second after they had swallowed down that; of supposing That Motion once begun, they know not how, ^& without any efficient Cause would necessarily of it selfe, continue to all Eternity, without any Conserving Cause -

Inanimate Body as such cannot Move nor indeed Change it selfe ^any way not From Motion to Rest, any more thē frō Rest to Motion but it follows from hence undenyably, that there must be something else in the world that is Selfe-Moveing, and , and can Change it selfe or other things; because it is Impossible that otherwise there should ever have been any Motion ^or Change in the world, Wherefore as the Democritick Fate is built upon this Foundation, that Nothing is SelfeActive or can Change it selfe, but the Action of every thing is a Passion from something wthout it, soe this being removed, the whole structure thereof falls to the ground; the ^selfe Active & selfe-Determineing Nature, wch must vnavoidably begin to quite breaking the Chaine of the Naturall Fate, the Necessary Concatenation or Linking ^things together of whatsoever follow to what went before it from Eternity to Eternity.

4. Wherefore besides this Naturall & Atheistick Fate wch hath nothing at all of Devise or Destination in it ^it being onely the Naturall Connection of things in themselvs there is another Divine Fate directly opposite thereunto, wch is wholly made up of Decrees and nothing else; it supposeing a Deity or Knowing & Unerstanding Being Omnipotent, wch from Eternity Decreed all particular Actions & Events whatsoever, and does accordingly in Time, Physically Predetermine all Agents to those severall Decreed Actions & Necessitate them to the same. Wch Divine Fate is soe far from denying the existence of Contingent Liberty, and Selfe-Determinac~on ^or frō supposing it to to be πραγμα ἀνυποστατον (as the other Naturall Fate doth) a thing that hath noe Existence ^any where in Nature; or that Necessity Essentiall to all Agents or as Lucretius expresseth it, Quod res quæque Necessum Intestinum habeat, cunctis in rebus agendis, Et Devicta quasi cogitur Ferre Patique - <63> that on the contrary it asserts Contingent Liberty & Arbitrary Will to be the Essentiall Perfection of the Deity: and we shall afterwards show, that some of these Divine Fatalists themselves, acknowledge ^also that Created Wills would have the same Contingency ^in them were they left to themselves, and did not the Deity enterpose wth his Decrees & Influences; by means whereof their Determinations would be altogether Unforeknowable: Wherefore the Necessity of the Divine Fate, is indeed a Necessity made by Contingency, Or by the Arbitrary Will of an Omnipotent Deity, determining all things. Nor is there here any Order, ^or Commectiō any Chance, or Concatenation of Causes, however some of these Divine Fatalists, affecting it seems to Symbolize wth the other Fatalists in their Language, have talked of an Armilla Aurea, a Golden Chaine, and of the Order of Causes of Salvation & Damnation, they meaning nothing else hereby, but that order of the Divine Decrees, wch is Fancied by them; whereas there is indeed according to this Fatalism, but One onely ^single Cause of all things, the Deity Arbitrarily Willing & Decreeing them. Nor is there any Orderly Conection or ^dependent Concatenation of things or actions in themselves, or in their Immediate Agents or Second Causes; but all is here Abrupt, InCoherent and Independant: the Deity wthout any respect to the Naturall Inclinations and Wills of Creatures, determining them to such & such Actions, or necessitating ^(though not be any outward force or compulsion but by a secret Irresistible Influ. to the same: Upon wch account it is that we call this Divine Fate violent. Becaus the Necessity therof proceeds not frō the Nature of the things themselvs but from an Extrinsecall Cause.

5 Furthermore besides these two Fatalisms, the One Naturall & Atheisticall wthout Decrees, the other Divine & Wholly made up of Decrees, there is yet a Third Fatalism, wherein both ^the Former are in a manner compounded together; it both supposing ^both a Deity that did contrive, set, and Decree, the generall Frame of things ; and after a Naturall Concatination of Second Causes, all things necessarily following from that first Frame: and not onely soe, but ^even that the Deity it selfe alsoe, is in a manner Involved, & Linked in the the same , wch is supposed to be Infinite, wthout either First or Last. This as we shall afterwards show, was that Fate asserted by the Ancient Stoicks, and it is called by us, the Divine Fate Naturall, in opposition to that other Divine Fate properly soe called, wch hath Nothing of Naturality in it, but is all ^both Arbitrary and Violent. And therefore we must here ^needs reprehend Lipsius ^besides others who in his Constancy, perverts these ^ Divine Characters and contrary to evident truth, calls that Stoicall Fate Violent, and the other Divine Fate, Naturall. A

6 And as we have in the Former Booke, fully confuted, together wth the Grounds of Atheism, the Naturall and Atheistick Fate, or Materiall Necessity of all things, soe shall we now proceed, wth the Divine assistance, to the Confutation <64> of the two other Divine Fatalisms, both the Violent, & the Naturall; we intending to substitute in the roome of them as the true Hypothesis of the Intellectuall System of the Vniverse, that of a προνοῖα {η} ἰλασιμος ^as M. Antoninus calls it, a Placable Providence of a Deity Essentially Good ^Just, and Wise, wch made all things after the best manner Possible, and therefore Rationall Creatures wth Liberty of Will, and doth still conserve them in the free Exercise of the same , we excludeing hereby that severe Tyraness (as Epicurus calls it) of Universall Necessity reigning over all that leaves nothing in ^Nostra Potestate in our Own power, but takes away all hopes of {illeg} Bettering our own Condition in outward or inward things, either by our own endeavours, or by our Prayers & Supplications to the Deity; according to wch Nothing is possible ^but what is necessary, and whatsoever Can be Must be & Shall be; & whatsoever Is, was Unavoidable, and whatsoever Is Not, Impossible to have been.

Notwithstanding wch, we intend not quite to take away all manner of Fate ^ neither nor banish the Notion of it, but acknowledge such a thing in Subordinatiō to Divine Providence, and inDependant upon the same, Fate according to the best of the Ancient Philosophers, being in Thus distinguishd from Providence, that the one is onely in the Mind & Councill of God, the other in Things themselves, executive thereof; soe that the Deity is not Necessitated ἀυτουργεῖν ἅπαντα to doe all things it selfe immediately, in the world it haveing this Vicarious Instrument of Fate, to doe it, to be as it were the Χειροτέχνης or Manuall Opificer & Drudging Exec. Wherefore we acknowledge ^First a Fate ^derived frō Divine Providence governing the Corporeall world, & ruleing over the matter, wch we have already showed to be a certaine Regular, or Artificiall and Methodicall Nature distinct from the Deity, but depending on the it , or a Perfect ^Mind, and wholly Directed & Inspired by it, to Confirme that loose Possibility, and fluctuateing uncertainty of things, & to take away temerarious Fortuitousness of them; it Acting for Ends, and doeing in its Sphere all for the Best And this was the onely Fate, that Aristotle acknowledged, as Alexander the Aphroditian Philosopher declareth ^I mean no other then Nature. Neither does this extend onely to Inanimate Matter, but alsoe to Vegetables herbs & Plants, and even to the Bodies of Animals, it Artificially Frameing & Organizeing them, soe as that noe Humane Art or Wisdome, can possibly comprehend all the Intrigues & Consequences thereof And this is that Fate wch the Platonicks call λόγον σπερματικὸν the Spermatick Reason of the world. Besides which we acknowledge alsoe even in Rationall Creatures and in Humane Soules themselves though prevented the free use of their Liberty, a certaine Fate Interwoven in their very Natures, <65> ^& in the order of ^Second Causes, by means whereof, though their volitions & Actions be not all necessarily determined, yet the Consequences of them are respectively, and they are silently carryed ^on, by a certaine Fatall Magick ^of Nature & disposed of into such severall Places ^or Regions, Bodies, and Companies; as is agreeable to their former Acti^ngs & Dispositions X by an Adrastian Law world ^ Divine Justice ^is made to appear in every thing silent and all things are carryed on in Exact Geometricall proportion and ^& though of differēt & Cōtrary kinds yet are made to conspire into one Vniform Order & Harmony, that wch of it selfe is most Extravagant, & goes out of Order being strangely overruled by the Art ^of that great Choragus & Præcenter that guides all separable to contribute ^& brought into another Order & to the Musick of the whole


But though there be such a Divine Fate as this, Interwoven in the very Natures of things, and in the Order of second Causes themselves; in respect whereof God cannot be said to be a meer Idle Spectator, what is done by it being wholly done by God himselfe; yet doe we not deny but that besides this generall Providence, there is another more special Providence alsoe, exercised upon particualr persons, here in this Life, by the Ministry of Spirits or Angells; And over & above that besides both these God who constantly presides over all ^with a watchfull eye, doth himselfe sometimes immediately & extraordinarily interpose, whensoever there is need of a θεος ἀπομαχησης, (as in the Tragick Dramata of the Ancients) and for the more signall manifestation of his Goodness and Justice; Instances whereof, as to the generall Oeconomy of things, we have in those Articles of Our Christian Faith, concerning the Incarnation of the only begotten Son of God, the Eternall word, and alsoe of the future ^Solemn & pompous day of Judgmt and Resurrection; to be transacted ^ likewise by our Saviour Christ as Gods Vicegerent

7 We shall now begin wth that Divine Fate, wch supposes God Almighty, who Acteth nothing Necessarily wthout himselfe, to have Arbitrarily Decreed from all Eternity, all Events and particular Actions whatsoever, done by Angells ^& Devils Men and Inanimate Creatures, and by a Physicall Influence in Time, necessarily to determine the respective Agents accordingly Where that we may not seem to ^combate a Shaddow, and confute a meer Chimera or Figment of our own, we must first make it appeare; That such a Fate as this hath been really asserted And because it will be undenyably Evident, that ^some in the Reformed Churches, are to be charged herewith; to prevent all mistakes and prejudice, we must of necessity declare, That as the Prophetick Spirit in the Scriptures did predict, that there should be an Apostacy and Degeneracy in the Christian Church; soe doe we undoubtedly beleive that this hath already accordingly come to passe It haveing been Lapsed into Pagan-like Idolatry and overrun with other grosse Errours and Corruptions, the Contagion whereof as it did overspread the face of the whole; soe was the Roman Church most infected therewith, and most Active and Industrious in promoteing the same The seaven Hilled City is ^plainly the Metropolis of this Apostacy, and the Roman Hierarchy, that Apocalyptic Whore that rideth the ten horned beast or Civill Power, and th whome the Kings of the Earth have com̄itted fornication, and wch hath made her selfe drunk wth the bloud of the Saints and of the Martyrs of Jesus. Wherefore as we can never be sufficiently thankfull to Almighty God for freeing us from this Yoke of the Roman more then Egyptian Bondage soe ought all <67> those worthy Hero’s who have been Instrumts of this happy Reformation to be had in ^perpetuall honour by us Nevertheless it does not therefore follow that they were all of them in every point infallible and perhaps it was not wthout a Divine Providence that they should ^be permitted to haue something of humane Frailty and fallibility ^appearing in them least otherwise that they should have been too much Idolized ^by vs. And the first Reformation seems to be but the dawning or Day breake, after a long night of Egyptian darkness, of that Light wch is to grow more & more unto perfect day; or the milleniall & new Jerusalem brightness, when the Light of the Moone shall be as the light of the Sun and the Light of the Sun ^shall be Seaven fold as the Prophet speakes

8 That our Countryman John Wickliffe was an asserter of the necessity of all Actions is Evident from the Acts and Records of the Councell of Constance, Where amongst the forty five Articles of his Doctrine Condemened we find this for One Omnia de Necessitate absoluta eveniunt: That all things come to passe by Absolute Necessity Where ^that by Absolute Necessity is not to be understood a Necessity intrinsecall to the Nature of everything but an Extrinsecall Necessity cause by Divine Decrees is evident from certaine Manuscripts of the Said Wickliff, still preserved and as John Huss and Jerome of Prague followed Wickliff herein soe did Luther alsoe in his Former writings, as in his Assertion of the Articles condemned by Leo Fol. 112. the Tenth. Malè dixi quod Liberū Arbitriū ante Gratiam sit Res de solo Titulo, sed simpliciter debui dicere, Liberū Arbitriū est Figuratū in rebus, seu Titulus sine Re. Quia nulli est in mana quicquam cogitare Mali aut Boni, sed omnia sub Deo sunt, &c . Quod et Porta voluit quandò dixit Certa stant omnia Lege. Wherefore - Erasmus in his Collation De Lib. Arbitrario, ioyneth Wickef & Luther together in this manner, Docuit Wicklevus, Lutherus asseruit, Quicquid fit a nobis nō Lib. Arbitrio sed Onera necessitate fieri. But after Zuingleus in the same Cause yt He Wickliff before him had done, and maintaines the Vniversall Necessity of all Action Caused by Divine Decrees he supposeing Divine Providence & <68> Liberty of Will in men to be directly contradictious to one another and concludeing, ea quoque quæ Fortuita et Contingentia vocamus, none essi Fortuita aut temereria, sed Numimi insui ac dispontine cuncta geri. We shall content our Selves here wth a few passages more out of his Booke De Providentia Dei, where {as first} opposing Chrysostom he endeavours ^ to Reconcile Sin & Punishment, with Gods Fol. 365 or Impelling men to all Actions. Hæc tam lati tractamus, in Chrysostomi quorimonia quinquam moreat, quasi dum omnia Divinæ Providentiæ referamus; iniuria Supplicio adficiamus Sentes, et cætera, quæ ille ρητορικῶς multa queritur. Nam cum Lex Homini est data, semper peccat cū contra Legem favet, quantum vis seu sit, nec vivat, nec operatur, nisi in Deo, ex Deo, et per Deum. Sed quod Deus operetur per Hominē, Homini vetis vertitur, non ^etiam Deo. Hic enim sub Lege est, ille Liber Lege Spiritus – Vnū igitur atque idē Facinus, putà Adulteriū aut Homicidium, quantum Deò est Authoris, motoris ac Impulseris opus, primerū non est, quintū autem Hominis est Crimen ac Scelus est. Vt Adulterium David quod ad authorem Deum pertinet, non magis Deo sit Peccatum, quam cū Taurus totum Armentum inscendit et implet. Et cum occidet eum etiam quē per Latronem, aut Corruptum iudicem trucidat, non magis peccat, quam cū Lupū Lupe aut Elephantū Dracone interficit. Sua enim Sunt Vniversa &c. Idem ergo Factū quod Deo Authore et Impulsere fit, illi honorificum est, at homini crimen ac erefas. Jure igitur perituntur Sorites; in Legem enim pruarunt non quasi autheres, sed quasi Instrumenta, quibus Deus liberui pro suâ voluntate, vti potest quem Paterfamilis aquam aut bibere aut humi effundere. Cumque movet ad opus aliquod quod prefeciendi instrumento fraudi est, sibi tamen non est. Neque Instrumento facit iniurians, cū omnia sint magis sua, quam cuiusque opificis instrumenta, quibus nullà facit iniuriam, si nunc timam in malleū et contra malleū in Limā convertat Movet ergo Latronē ad accidendū innocentem &c. Nec dicet quisquam innocem igitur est Latro, Deo enim Impulsore occidit; nam contra Legem peccarit. At inquies, coactus est ad piaru ^dum <69> Permitto inquam Coactū esse, sed in hoc eret alter (iimoēs scil. interfectus) transferretur, alter (Latro) cruci adfigeretur. Hic hallucinantur Liberi Arbitrij defenseres, et proinde Providentiæ Dei Adversarij; consistunt enim postquam dixerunt, Si impulsare Deo trucidavit Latro, Ergo iniuria plectitur; cum semper debeant progere, vtipsa Providentia nunquam cessat, et dicere, Percussit Latro impulsere Deo in hoc, vt et percussus in cœeles hinc migret, (aut si illequoque perfidus est ad Inferes,) et Latro a iudice cruci affigatur Prompta igitur est responsio dū Providentiæ adversarij sic dicunt, si in homine prorsus nullū Liberū est consitiū, eam fateri cogimur, Divina Providentia, facta, homicidia et omnia scelerū genera fieri. (Sic enim Providentiā, inquam, agnoscimus vt omnia curantis atque gerentem) – Nam Imputit Deus latrinē vt occideret, sed æque impellit Judicem, vt Percussivē mactet. Et qui impellit agit sine omni suspicione, non enim est sub Lege. In wch passages of Zuinglius God is plainly made to be not onely the Impulser but the Author of all wicked Actions done by men as Adulteries & Murders & Robberies and the like, he being excused onely from hence, because he is above Law wch men are subject to.

After Zuinglius Calvin Espoused the same Opinion managing it not onely more industriously but alsoe wth much more witt & Eloquence He in the first Booke of his Institutions in like manner plainly makeing the Providence of God to ^be his Immediate Determining and Doeing ^of all things ^to be on the same For first as to Inanimate things, whose ordinary Actions are commonly referred to Nature, but such as was at first caused by God, and is still conserved by him ; himselfe ^acknowledging that, in genere quidē arcanæ Dei Inspiratione Vegetari omnes mundi partes et Philosophi docit, Instit: L.1.c.16. Et humanæ mentes concipiunt, that in generall according to Philosophers and vulgar apprehension it is all the parts of the world are secretly acted & inspired by God But not being contented here with <70> of ^he supposed God im̄ediately to Act all himself therin He writing thus first Inst. L.1. c.16.#2. inanimate things Ac de rebus Inanimatis sic habendum est, quamvis Naturaliter singulis indita sit sua Proprietas, vim tamen suam non exercere, nisi quatenus præsenti Dei manu diriguntur. Sunt igitur nihil aliud quam instrumēta, quibus Deus assiduè instillat quantum vult efficaciæ, et pro suo arbitrio ad hanc vel illam Actionē flectit ac Convertit, and againe in his Booke De Prædestinatione, Divinitus omnia fiunt, He would have all the things in Nature to be done Immediately & Miraculously by God himselfe Thus does he afterwards determine, Non cadere pluriæ guttam nisi certo Dei mandato, and Nullū ventum oriri vel surgere, nisi speciali Dei iussu. In like manner as for all humane Actions, he rejects that com̄on opinion as false Hominē a Deo moveri secundū Naturæ suæ inclinationē ipsū ante convertere motū quò visū fuerit, That man is moved by God according to the inclination of his Nature but that himselfe converteth his motion whether it seemed good to him And therefore whereas St Austine somewhere writes Partim Libero hominis Arbitrio, partim Dei Providentia omnia geri, that all things in the world are carried on partly by the free Will of Man & partly by the providence of God he soe interprets him as to make this distribution signify nothing. Again he thus condemns the same, vulgar opinion, Qui hominem volunt Libero voluntatū suæ arbitrio huc atque illuc se convertire, ita inter Deū et Hominem partiuntur vt ille motionem sua virtute inspicet qua agere sperint pro naturæ sibi indite ratione, hi autem actiones suas voluntario consilio moderētur. Previter Dei Potentis, sed non Destinatione res hominū subionare volunt they who would have man by his own free will though dependently vpō God to turn himselfe this way & that way divide it and halfe it betwixt God & Man supposing that God does inspire Active Power & Vertue into man whereby he may Act according to his Nature but that he doth & determine his Actions by his own voluntary Councell these men would have the world and all the things of men to be governed by the Power of God onely but not by his - Destination. Wherefore Calvin on the contrary concludes all the voluntary actions of men to have been decreed by God from all Eternity & in time to be executed and brought to passe by his im̄ediate influence soe that none of them come to passe Contingently but all Necessarily I say he does not conclude this onely of Good Vertuous & Spirituall Actions but alsoe of all other Actions of humane Life and even sinfull action themselves L2.4.6. For first as to such as are in themselves of a middle and indifferent Nature He Præfaceth Thus, In actionibus quæ nec iustæ per se nec <71> vitiosæ sunt, et ad corpoream magis, quam spiritualē vitam spectant; (nonnulli Liberam homini Electionem concesserunt, magis vt arbitror quod e re nō magni momenti discerptare nolebant, quam quod asserere pro certo vellent illud ipsū quod concedunt Ego etsi eos qui nullus esse sibi ad Justitiū vires tenent, quod inprimis ad salutem cognitu {illeg}enariū est tenere fateor, nō tamē puto hāc quoque partē negligendum. Where he ^would insinuate that these Lutheran Composers of the Augustane Confession though they granted liberty of Will as to Naturall & Civill things yet this was rather done by them because they would not contend about it as being a matter of Lesser moment then that they would assert it to be certainly soe and he grants that they who acknowledge men naturally have noe power as to spirituall things hold that wch is cheifly necessary to Salvation Nevertheless as for his part he thinks it necessary to declare his Judgmt according to the Scripture concerning Externall Actions and all those wch are in their own nature indifferent Instit. L.2. c.4. #6. that these are alsoe ^im̄ediately determined by God Almighty Equidē si sensu nostro reputamus rerū externarū adminsitrationē, nihil dubitabimus eatenus sub humano arbitrio sitas esseos, verū si aures 1st testmonijs probemus, quo Dominum in his quoꝗ regeor animes hominum clamant, arbitrium ipsū speciali Dei motioni subijcare nos cogent. And again afterward Quū scribit salomo Cvr regis quasi rivos aquarum in manu #7. sua tenere et inclinare quocunque voluerit, sub vna profecto spiere totū genus comprehendit. si {eni} Regia voluntas Dei manu flectitur, neque nostra eximetur ea conditione Where it is plaine that Calvines meaning was that the Wills of men in all Exeternall & Civill Actions were necessarily moved and determined by Divine Decrees from all Eternity because there ^is no body that denyes but that God does sometimes either im̄ediately or by the ministry of Angells move and incline not onely the hearts of Kings but alsoe of private persons whether soever he pleaseth notwithstanding wch there may be some use of mens free-Will ordinarily left to them whereas Calvin supposeth mens wills in all Civill Actions to be soe determined by the Divine Will as that they have no Exercise of free choice or Election left to them And that indeed Calvin Exempted no humane Volitions whatsoever from the necessitation of Divine Decrees and Influences is evident from hence ^that he doth not extract any of the most sinfull or wicked actions of men he writing thus in his Book <72> Booke De Prædesinatione Dei Quæ pupegasi et inuictè ab hominibus fiunt eadē esse recta et iusta Dei opera And Quod prevenesoidies faciunt non nisi Deo ordinante Oceri Scriptura docet. Deus reprobos in obsequiū cogit. Deus Satanī suo arbitris flectit Deus author Satan Ministro Dicitur Satan excrecare infiditiū mentes sed vnde hoc nisi quod a Deo ipsi manat efficicia erroris. Inst. L.1. 18. But he soe plainly discovers himselfe and takes off all Mask & Vissard where he doth wth such indignation reject and explode that opinion that the wicked Actions of men are not all to be imputed to Divine Destination and Inst. L.1 c.18. #1. Causality but that God does onely permit them & foreknow them Perperam mendacij patrocinio asserere tentant Dei Justitiam ab omni Sinistra nota. Absurdum videtur Volente ac Jubente De excæcari hominem, qui mox cæcitatis suæ pœnas daturus est. Tergiversando itaque effugiunt, Dei tantum Permissu, non etiam Voluntate hoc fieri. Ho vero palane se facere pronuntians, effugium illud repudiat. Quod ante nihil efficiunt nisi arcano Dei nutu, nec quicquam de liberando agitent nisi quod ipse iam apud si decreverit, et arcanâ suâ directione constituat innumeris et claris testimonijs probatur. And afterward Satis superque liquet nugarè eos et ineptire qui in locum Providentiæ Dei Nudam Permissionē substituunt, acsi in speculâ sedons expectaret fortuitos erentur, atque ita eius iudicia penderent ab hominum arbitrio. B In like manner does he reject alsoe that of Prescience wthout Decree he blameing the Ancients for this quod Religionus interdū simpliciū L.2. c.4. #3. veritatis Confessionē in hac partem formidant; not excepting S. Austin hims. Ne Augustinus quidē illa superstitionæ solutus, vbi dicit Indurationē non ad operationem Dei sed ad Præscientiam spectare – A Neither A did Calvin assert this onely concerning all the Sinnes ^of men since the fall, that they were not onely permitted & foreknown, but alsoe ordained & appointed and efficatiously wrought by God himselfe; but alsoe concerning the first Sin of Adam itself L.3. C23.7. Disectis verbis hoc extare negant Decretum fuisse a Deo vt suâ Defectione periret Adam Quasi verò idem ille Deus quem Scriptura prædicat facere quæcunque vult ambiguo fine condident nobilissimā ex suis Creaturis <73> Liberi Abritrij fuisse dicunt vt fortunā ipse sibi fingeret, Deū verò nihil destinasse nisi vt pro mente eū tractaret. Tam frigidū com̄entū si recipitur, vbi erit illa Dei omnipotentia, qua secundū arcanum consiliū quod aliunde non prudet omnia moderatur. Atqui Prædestinatio velent redint in posterei se prodit. Neque misu factū est Nadaratitur vt a Salute exciderent omnes vnius Parentis Culpa. Quid eos probibet faleri de vno homine quod inveti de toto humanæ genere concidūt &c X & #8. Cur permittere dicemus nisi quià ita vult? Quanquam nec ipsum quidem per se probabile est Sola Dei Permissione, nulla Ordinatione, hominē sibi accersisse interitum. Quasi vero non constituerit Deus qua conditione præcipuam ex creaturis suis esse vellet. Non dubitabo igitur cum Augustino simpliciter fateri, Voluntatē Dei esse rerum necessitatem &c – Lapsus est primus homo, quia Dominus ità expedire censurat, cur censurrit nos latet. Certum tamē est non aliter censuisse, nisi quià videbat nomini sui Gloriam inde merito illustrari/ Again, Æterna Dei Providentia, in eam cui subiacet Calamitatem, Conditus est homo. Where Calamity in his sense includes as well Originall Corruption as the punishment thereof as he more fully declareth else where L3: Chap: 23 Sect: 4 Rursum excipiunt, Nonnec ad eam quæ nunc pro damnationis causa obtenditur corruptionem Dei ordinatione prædestinati antè furrant? Quā ergo in sua corruptione percunt, nihil aliud quam pornas tuunt euis Calamitatis in quam ipsius Prædestinatione lapsus est Adam, ac posteros suos præcipites suum traxit Annon itaque iniustus qui Creaturis suis tam crudeliter illudit se Fateor sane in hanc qua nunc illigatè sunt, conditionis miseriam, Dei voluntate decidisse vniverros filios Adam: atque id est quod principio dicebam, redeundū tandē semper esse ad solū Divinæ Voluntatis Arbititrium cuius causa sit in ipso abscondita C C

The like doth he conclude also concerning The <74> Sinne & Fall of Angels. 3. 23. 4. Angelos qui obstetreunt in sua integrtate Paulus Etrites vocat Si eorum cōstantia in Dei Decrepta cito fundata fuit, aliorū Defectio arguit fuisse deretistos Cuius rei causa non potest alia adduci quem Reprobatio, quæ in arcano Dei Consitio abscondita est, the names of the doctrine suggested by him are cheifly these First because God could not possibly foreknow future Contingent Events unless as decreed by him 3.23 7 Pro præfivit quia Decreto suo se ordinaret, and often elsewhere Second because God would not be otherwise truely and properly Omnipotent; vnles he did actually do all things. L. Inst. 1. 16. 3. Omnipotentiam sibi vendicat ac deferri a nobis Vult Deus, non qualem Sophista fingunt otiosam et ferè sapitum, sed vigilere efficacē operosam, et quæ in continuo actu versitur – Ideò censetur omnipotens non quod possit quidem facere cesset tamen interim et desideat, sed quià certū et terram gubernans sic omnia moderatur vt nihil nisi eini consitio accidat – Lastly because God must be Omnivolent as well as Omnipotent, it being absurd to suppose things to be done Dei Potentia sed non Destinatione, by the Power of God without his Destination – vpō all wch accounts he concludes tha though things may be said to be both Fortuitous & Contingent to vs, yet in Respect of God nothing is so, But all Necessary & Designed or Appointed. And as if it were a kind of Blasphemy, to deny or except against Gods efficacious working & necessitating Influence vpō Devils & wicked men as to all the sin̄s com̄itted by them, he writeth thus 1. c.18. #3 Fuerunt omnibus seculis impij et profani homines qui adversus hanc Doctrinæ partem Ore rabido latrarent.

Cite as: Ralph Cudworth, The True Intellectual System of the Universe: The Second Part [British Library Additional MS 4982(2)] (c.1671),, accessed 2020-01-28.