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Chap 1st

We seem plainly \clearly/ to be lea|e|d by ye Instincts of Nature to Think That there is Somthing ἐφ' ἡμῖν i|I|n nostrâ |Nostra Potestate|, In our own Power (tho’ d|D|ependently upon God Almighty) and yt we are not all together, p|P|assive in our Actings, nor deferment \Determined/ by Inevide|ita|ble n|N|ecessity, in what soever we do. Because we Praise & d|D|ispraise, Com̄end & b|B|lame men, for their Actings, much otherwise, then we do, Inanimate Beings or Brute Animales. When we Blame or Com̄end a Clock or Automaton, we do it so, as not Imputeing to that Automaton, its b|B|eings ye cause of l its own moving well or ill, Agreeabley or Disagreeable to the end it was designed for; this being ascribed \by vs/ only to ye Artificor; B{i}|u|t when we b|B|lame a Man, for any wicked Action|s|; as for taking a way anothers man’s Life, either by Pu|e|rjurys or by willfull murther; wee blame \Him,/ not only as doing otherwise then he o|O|ught to have \been/ done but also as supposing yt \then/ he m|M|ight have Avoided \have done, & yt it was possible for him to haue avoided, it. So yt/ it and therefore was h|H|imself the cas|u|se of the e|E|vill thereof. We do not Impute the e|E|vill of all Men’s w|W|icked Actions, to God the Creater and maker of them; after ye \same/ manner, as we do the f|F|aults of a Clock, or watch, wholy to the Watchmaker. We free \com̄nly All mē’s words at least, Free/ God from ye blame <2r> of all mens wicked Actions saying \Pronouncing/ ὁ θεος ἀνάιτιος, God is c\C/auseless & Guiltless bu of it; \them,/ but \but|and| we/ cast ye blame of them wholy on ye men them selves, as being Principles of Actions; & ye t|T|rue causes of ye m|M|orall dD|D|efects of it them, So also do {we} we b|B|lame, Men’s Acting Vitiously & Immorally; otherwise \in another Sense,/ then we b|B|lal|m|e, a Halting, or a s|S|tumbling h|H|orse; or then we Blame, ye Naturall & Necessi|a|ty of men, when\ary Infirmities/ of men \themselvs;/ when unconst|t|racted by Vice|{s}|, For in this later case, we so b|B|lame ye Infirmites, as to pe|Pi|tty the m|M|en themselves, looking upon them as Unfortunate; but not as f|F|aulty; b|B|ut we blame their \Mens/ Vices, with a d|D|ispleasure to ye \against the/ Persons themselves.

The same sense of Nature’s Instincts appears yett more plainly, from men’s Blaming, Accusing, & Condemning, their|m| very s|S|elves, for their own Actions, when done either r|R|ashly or und Inconsida|e|ratly & \& imprudently/ to there|ir| own private disadvantage, or else Im̄orally & Vitiously, and agaist the Dictate of Honesty. In wch latter <3r> case, they \Men/ have an Inward sense of Guilt, (besides shame,) Remorse of Conscience, with Hor\r/or, Confutions & Astonishment. And they Repent of these \their/ Actions, afterward, with a kind of selfe Des Detestation, & somtimes not without Exercising Revenge upon themselves, as \being/ a peece of Iustice \Due./ No man a|A|ccuses or Condemns himselfe, nor looks upon himselfe as Guilty, for having had a f|F|e|a|vour, |ye| stone, or the Goute when uncontracted by Vice, And if all Humane Actions were necessary, men wld would be said no more to Repente of them, then of Diseases, or yt they were not born Princes, or Heirs to a thousand pounds ayear.

Lastly, we have also a sense of Retributive \Punitive Vindicative/ Iustice, as not a {illeg} \A meer/ Phancy \but a Thing Really Existing in Nature,/ when Punishments are Inflected upon for \malefactors for their/ u|V|njust and Illegal Actions p|P|ast, by Civill Magistrats in Perticulars \Com̄on Wealths/ For tho’ it be true, that these \Civill/ Punishments \do in pat|r|t/ look f|F|orwards to p|P|revent the like for the f|F|uture, by t|T|errifying others from doing the same, or to hinder those malefactors <4r> themselves; from doing \Acting/ the like \Doing the like Mischief/ a|A|gain afterwards \in like manner/ in by cutting them off by Death, as we kill Noxious Animals, wo|oo|lfes & Vipers, & Serpents & mad Dogs, yet it|s| it not true, yt this is all, \the meaning of them,/ in the Punishment of Civill Magistrates and \and/ yt they have no Retrospect to thes Actions p|P|ast; \but ar giving a Kind of as if yt were but as there/ or yt it is not a \being in about a|A|s a|A| being/ satisfaction to \the/ Ecquitable Nature of Rationall Beings, to \when they/ see wicked Men who have \both/ a|A|bused & d|D|ebased themselves, & \also/ Acted Injuriously to others, to suffer \haue/ d|D|isgrace & Pain, for their Rewards But mens naturall Instincts do more strongly suggest to them a|A|n Notion of I|Vi|ndicative Iustice, in the supream Governer of this Great Mundain Republick, God Almighty; in Inflicting Punishments upon Notorious Wicked Persons, \even/ here in this Life, tho’ somtimes \but/ slowly, as Plutrack has observed, \But/ b|B|eside wch \this/, the Generalyty of mankind have allways had a s|S|trong Presage of Punishments to be Inflected by the Deitye, after Death, And ye Scripture <5r> assure us yt there is a Solemn {sic} Pomp\o/us d|D|ay of Iudgment appointed in wch God will Conspicuously & Palpable|y|, \& Notoriously/ red render to every one accordding to to his Works \or Actions Parts/, a|A|nd yt those future Punishments \in Hell after death/ in Hell; will Respect only ye f|F|uture, and are no otherwise designed, then as \Iatricall or/ Mediciablcinall, in order to ye Curing or Recovering of ye Deceas Diseased Souls, \as some haue Imagined, (from/ and Consequently \whence they inferr as some haue imagined,/ yt they|re| are not \can be no/ Eternall \Punishments)/ is neither a|A|greeable to Scripture, nor sound reason. b|B|ut if all Actions, be necessary it would be no more Iust, yt men should be Condemned at ye l|L|ast Day, to Punishments, for x \there is \seems to be/ no more Reason, why there should be a Day of Iudgment appointed, to Punish men for/ Murthers \& Adultery,/ InIustice \For/ or Intemporence; then for Agues and Fevours, for sleeping, or being hungray Hungray or Thirsty. \Palsies & Lethargies/

Hence it|s| it yt Moralle|i|sts looking upon men’s f|F|ree & Voluntary Actions, as somtimes Blameworthy in a Percu Peculiar sense \{hence}/ call|ed| the <6r> evill of them, malum Culpæ, \The|An| Evill of Fault,/ in way of Distinctions from \those other/ Necessary Evills wch are wthout f|F|ault, yt is, \of/ wch ye d|D|oer of them himselfe, was not properly ye cause of. According Of \Concerning/ which Cicero thus, Ni Hoc tibi persuade nihil homine pertimiscendū, præter Culpam. |i.e.| \that/ No other Evill is so much to be feared by thee as \by a man comparatively\bly/ to/ the Evill of Fault. According to that Stoicall Doctrine, that the Truest and Greatest & \of Goods &/ Evills of Rationall Beings, are \consist/ ἐν τοῖς προαἰρετταοῖς, \or ἐνατοῖς ἐφ' ἡμῖν/, in their own Free-willed Actions, or Things in their own Power

I n|C|onclude therfor |I conclude therefore|

Wherfore according to i both to ye Genuin Instincts of Nature, rightly interpreted; and the Tenour of The Christian Doctrine, \Religion,/ we are to Conclude, that there is something in ἐφ' ἡμῖν in our own Power, & that Absolute Necessity dos not Reign over all \our |Human|/ Actions, but yt there is such a Thing as something of Contingent      Liberty \left/ in them. I|T|his being an Article of Christ. Faith That God hath appointed a day in wch he will Iudge {&}|y|e world, & Render Rewards & Punish <5v> ments to mē for their Actions Past \in this Life/, Good & Evill, Glory Hon & P. he every man that hath done well but Tribulation & Anguish vpō \to/ ev Soul of mā that hath done Evill — We cannot Possibly maintain ye Iustice of God in this, & Conseq the Truth of Christianity, without Ass. If all mens Actions be Necess. eith in their own Nature, or by Divine Decrees & Influx. That is we cannot Possibly maintain the Truth of Christianity, without a Liberty frō Necessity —


Chap. 2.

Notwithstanding wch , there haue not Wanted Some, in all Ages, who haue Contended, that there is no such thing as Liberū Arbitrium, no Contingent Liberty Nothing in our own Power, no Contingent Liberty in Human Actions, but whatsoeuer is done by men was Absolutely, & Vnavoidably Necessary.

And this vpō Two Different Grounds; First b|B|ecaus {C} \according to some,/ this Contingent Liberty, is πραγμα ανύπαρατον \or ανυποτατον/, a Thing both Vnintelligible, & Impossible to Exist in Nature. Secondly, Becaus, tho there be such a Thing Possible, & actually existing; yet it is no such thing can be Excercised \the exercize that it this can not/ but onely by \by any but is Peculiar onely to/ God Almighty \alone,/, It being an Essentiall Privilege, & Peculiarity \Property/ of ye Deity, to be \|A|nd that he is So that He/ is Sole Determiner of all |ye| Actions \of Creatures/ and Contra Inconsistent With ye Nature of a Creature, to determin itself in Action, \foras much as/ it plainly implying an Independency vpō the its Creator \& by His Dec Arbitrary Decrees fro all/ Eternity made ye Action of all other Creaturs were made Necessary — < insertion from p6v > by whose Decrees frō all Eternity they were all Determined & made Nesary < insertion ends > |×| < insertion from p6v > × yet in ye Exercice therof Peculiar onely to God-Almight, So yt he is the Onely Self deterning {sic} ||b|eing,| and the Actions of all Creatures were by His Decrees from all Eternity made Necessary. < insertion ends >

The Reasōs \alledged/ why, there should be no such t|T|hing in Nature, Existing any where, as a Contingent \Liberty or/ Freewill, <8r> are chiefly such as these. First becaus Nothing can Moove itself, but Quicquid Movetur, movetur ab Alio|{illeg} mooveth Necessarily Secondy| secondly Becaus, tho it should be Granted, that there is something Self-Active, and \or/ self-mooving \from itselfe,/, yet nothing can Change itself, nor Act vpon itself, and or Determin its own Action — ; Since ye same thing cannot be both Agent, & Patient at once. \Indifft Pōponatius,/ Thirdly Becaus ουδέν {α}αναίτιον, nothing can Come to Pass without A Cause; Or yt whatsoever is Done \or produced,/ had a Sufficient{sic} |Cause,| and \Antecedent — and as Hobs Adds/ Every Sufficient Cause is a Necessary Cause Fourthly, \Becaus/ All Volition is Determined by \ye Reasō of/ Good, or the Appearance of ye Greater Good; Now the Appearances \& Reasons/ of Good, are in ye Vnderstng, and \therfor/ all ye Actions of ye Vnderstanding are \not Arbitrary but/ Necessary, & not Arbitrary, Th\Wh/erf {sic} all Votions {sic} are \must be/ Necessariy. Determined Lastly \4th/ Becaus; Nothing yt is \{was}/ Indifferent in Itselfe, as such, \is Indifferent/ can eve |n|Ever {sic} \to Etern/ Determine itself —, but will stand Indifferent to Eternity \for ever/ without motion volitiō, action either way

Lastly Hobs sopisticall Argumt {sic}D Necessity of every Disjunctive Proposition —


From these & such like Grounds, Haue many of ye Ancients Concluded, That there is a Chain of Causes, frō Eternity to Eternity, Every Link wherof is Necessarily Connected, with tha both with that, wch went before, and that wch followes after. According to wch Hypothesis, was that Pronouncd in Ennius Vtinam ne in Nemore Petio Securibus Cæsa, cecidisset Abiegna ad Terram Trabes: (To wch Cicero addes, Licuit vel altius; Vtinam ne in Petio nata vlla vnquam esset Arbor. Etiam suprà; Vtinam ne esset Mons Vllus Petius. Similiterque superiora repetentens regredi in Infinitū licet.) Neve inde Navis inchoandæ Exordium — Cepisset — (Quorsū hæc Præterita? Quia sequitur illud) Nam nunquam Hera errans mea, domo efferet pedem Medea, animo ægræ, amore sævo sæucia — Agreeable to wch also is that Positiō of Mr Hobs Tho this (as ye same Cicero observeth), is onely \{illeg}/ {the Ser}|this| Chain or Series, of Causes, sine Quid Non. For tho there were never so many Ships ready at hand in Medææ’s <8v> Time, yet was \there/ therefore no Necessity That she should be tra Com̄it herself \to Sea or/ to be Transported in any \one/ of them —       But Mr Hobs Carys ye busines much further; by whē hee Dogmatizing|es| in this man̄er (p. 237.) That there is no One Action, how Casuall soever it seem, to ye Causing wherof, Concurr not whatsoever is {in} Rerum Natura — Wch, he saith Truly, is a Great Paradox; and becaus it \wch / depends vpon many Antecedent Speculations, \therfore/ He will not presse it in yt PlaceFor this is to make Infinite, Implex’d Chaines of Causes, all whose Lin{k}s are necessary So yt According to him Every Action doth not Onely depend vpō on Single Chaine but is Implexed \& intangled/ with Infinite Chaines —


But the Reasons assigned, Why tho there be such a Thing as Contingent Liberty in Nature; yet the{,} Exercize therof, must needs be Peculiar to the Deity — are Com̄only such as these First Because to make \suppose/ any Creature Determin itself, is to make it Independent vpō its Creator, wch is Contradictious to ye Idea of God — From wch whence it \will/ follows {sic} that God is \if a God then must He be/ ye Sole Determiner of \all/ Actions in ye Vnivers, & indeed ye {sic} Sole \Himselfe properly ye Onely/ Actor Secondly Becaus if there be Contingent Liberty, in any Creaturely Agents, there Could be no Divine Prescience of the{ef}e Actions — of t|T|hem ||\such Future Events/ \×/ < insertion from p9v > × 3dly — Nevertheles if it sh. be supposed yt is a Præscience not withst. {Contry} of mēs wills, yet this Præscience itself will bee \Consequently/ inferr Necessity — < insertion ends > Lastly \Thirdly/ becaus this is {sic} \if any Lib. of will as to morall things — this will be/ a Ground of Pelagianism, a Denying the Necessity of Divine Grace by reason of \being taken away by/ this so much Cried vp Αυτεξουσιον, Selfpower, or Freewill. Lastly it seems Absurd &; Vniust too, that men should be Damned to all Eternity, for a Con me Contingent Turn of their        own will — This takes away ye Reasons of it, mē may as well be Damned & for what they were Necessitated to by Divine Decrees


Ch. 3.

If there were nothing |ἐφ' ἡμῖν|, in our own Power |no ἀυτεξούσιον, or Sui-Potestas, No| Self Power no Contingent Liberty of Acting, but every thing whatsoever Acted necessaryally; Then upon suppossition yt God Almighty should after ye Conflagration of this Earth, b|p|ut ye whole f|F|raim of this World again, exactly in ye very same Poss|t|are, yt it was in, at ye Begining of this Mundain Revolution; a|A|nd make another Adam & another Eve, perfectly like ye former, without ye least Difference either of to Body or Mind, and yt Pair \They/ Propo|a|gateing or multiplying in successive Generations; it should continue or runn out, such {sic} another Period of time as this World hat|d|h lasted before|;| it seven thousands years or more; t|T|hen would every thing, every motions and Action in it, be ye Very same; wch \that/ had been in ye \Former/ Periodick Revolution of this World before, without ye least difference or Variation a|A|nother such like Cain & Abell; another Enock and \Another/ Noah; Another Abraham Isaac & Iacob <12r> Another Moses, another Phytho Pythegoras another Socretas, another Iesus Christ, another Pontious Pilot |&| another Caiphas; a|A|nother every thing and \Another/ every Person, exactly ye same, |&| war\ea/ring all ye same Cloths, dwelling all in ye same \or like/ houses, sitting upon ye same stools, making all ye same motions; \writing \all/ ye same Books,/ speaking all ye same Words |&| doing all ye \same/ Actions over again —

This was the Doctrine of the Stoicks yt there had been & should be Infinite such Worlds, exactly alike to A \or Mundane Periods & Circuits,/ from Eternal|it|y to Eternity exactly alike to one another, They supposing God Almighty {to be} himself too, to be a necessary a a|A|gent, too, and, therfore yt after the{se} severall Conflagations, he must needs put things in ye \very/ same Post Posture they were in \He had/ before every \And then all/ acting necessarily they \there/ must be all |along| the same \or like/ men doing all the same things exactly

Censors who


Celsus who for ye most part Personates a Platonist, having vented this Stoickall Dogma; the learned Origen Animadverteth upon him after this manner. Lib. 4. p. 208 I know not why Celsus writing against us Christian should think it necessary to Assert this Stoickall Dogma, wch wants \that has not/ so much as a Seeming or Proble Probable Demonstratiō yn \If/ from the Beginning to ye End \(or rather without Begin. or End/, there should be allway ye same Periods, or Circuits, of mortall things, and that of necessaty in certain opointed Revolutions; all things yt have been, a|A|re, & shall Be, should be ye very same \Again repeatedly./ From whence it will follow that of necessaty, Socretes shall \allwayes/ be a bout to Phylosophy|ize| & \to/ be accused for \holding/ new Gods and Corupting of ye youth; And Anitus and Ma|e|litus should allways \be always be about to/ bear wittness against the|Hi|m; & ye Senate of Areopagus \about/ to Condemn him to drink Poyson, <14r> |And| After ye same manner, \(sth ye same Origen)/ it will |it| be necessary that according to apointed Revolutions Fallary \Phalaris/ should allways be about to Tyran̄ize and ye Pherean Alexander to acte the same crueltyes, & men condemned to Phalliris’s Bull, allways about to Rore, \×/ Which if it be admitted I know not how free will can be maintained & or what places can be left for Prayer or Dispraise f|F|or \So that Likewise/ a|A|ccording to this Hypothesis of Celsus ,|(|yt this Period of mortall things from the begining to the end shall be repeated \ye same,/ over again; \infinitely,/ and wt allways ye same things, of necessaty shall \will/ be past, and Present, & to Come, Infinitely, \without End/ \so that/ Moses of necessaty Moses should allwayes, in every Revolution, lead the Childerns of Isarell out of Æ Ægipt throw the Red Sea, and Iesus being born <15r> again & again should do ye same thing, wch He had not once; but Infinite times done before; And \all/ the same Christians allso should be in appointed times, Infinitly. and Celsus should write this very same Book against Christians, which had written \×/ tentho Ten thousands times before. \×/ < insertion from p14v > × wch if it be admitted, I know not How any Liberty of will can be defended, or how there should be any Place left for Praise or Dispraise. Now < insertion ends > Now Celsus asserted|t||h| only, such Periodicall Revolutions of Mortall things, \Onely;/ wherin of necessaty the same things yt have been, are, & shall be in this world; should have \been/ here to fore; and shall be again If Infinite|l|y, b|B|ut the Stoicks generally maintain such Periodicall Revolutions of Immortall things too; or \at least of/ those wch they accounte Gods. f|F|or after ye Vniversall Conflagration wch hath been Infinitly, & shall be again Infinitly, all things \acc without exception, according to them,/ run Round in ye same order from the begining to the end; all the same Gods as well as well as the <16r> same men doing the same things. Nevertheless to lessen the Obsurdity hereof, they|se| Stoicks \indeed/ pretend, that they shall not be all Numerically the same, but ἀπαρραλλάχτους, exactly alike in every thing. So yt not the same numericall Socre|a|tes shall be again, but one in all things exactly like to Socrates, who shall marry one in all things \exactly/ alike to the ex Xantippe who and shall be as e\a/x\c/cused by two \Persons/, in all things alike to Anistus & Ma|e|litus, bu But I understand not this (says|th| Origen) how since the World is allwayes Numerically ye same, and not ano another a exactly alike to another; the things in it, should not be Numerically the same too, & not exactly alike only

But the Case will be ye very same \ye same/ should we suppose two Numerically Distinct Worlds made by God Almighty at ye same \or Contēporary/ time; exactly alike <17r> to one another two Adam’s, & two Eves Indistinguish\ab/ly the same; both in Soul & body, multiplying themselves by Propogation for severall thousands of years. If there was no such things as Contingent Liberty in nature they must needs all along at ye same time, make the same motions, speak the same Words, Write the same books, and \all/ as exactly alike to one another, as tho|e|se of \motions of/ ye Image in a glass \are/ to the body without it. –

But |Now| if we can not think this \to be/ possible; but that, if \then/ two \such/ worlds were \being/ made in all things Perfectly alike, and the f|F|irst Parents men & women \in them,/ Perfectly alike too; yet in pros|c|ess of time there would be \grow a/ some \Great/ Dissimmilitude \& Diversity/ between them \th/; < insertion from p16v > but if \tho/ this Divinity were never so little, yet must it needs be granted < insertion ends > then \tho this were never so little yet/ must it needs be granted that there is a Contingent liberty, and yt men have something in their own Power, \adde something of their own/ So yt they can change \thēselves/ & determine themselves, and not be lyable to a \all things are not linked & tied together in A/ fatall|, Adamantin{e}| Chain of Causes |of Causes|


Chap. 4.

But |Now| that it \this/ is not True. That Quod Cuncta Necesse, Intestinū habeant, or t|T|hat nothing in Rerum natura can possibly Act otherwise then they \it/ Suffer’s, or are \is/ a|A|cted upon by ye τὰ περιετ ῶτα, the Circumstant things without b and \But/ yt on{y} ye Cons Contrary there is some Conte|i|ngent liberty in nature, and yt men & other Rationall Creatures Can had \add or cast in/ somthing of their own, to turn the scales of a|A|ction, \when Even/ may I think sufficiently appear f|F|rom hence. Because it cannot be denyed but yt there are & may be many Cases in wch severall objects propounded to our Choise \choice/ at ye same time, \are so Equall or exactly alike/ as that there cannot possibly be any reason or motive in ye understanding \to det/ necessaryly to determine the choice to one \of them,/ rather then another \of them./ As for example suppose one man should <19r> offer to another, to {sic} give him one \out of {sic}/ of twenty guiney Peeces of Gold, or |of| \Golden Balls or/ silver Globulites so exactly a like, in b|B|igness f|F|igure & Colour, \weight, as/ & yt he could des de|i|scern no manner difference between them. \to make true {illeg} of one & no mor{e}/ Suppose \Adde/ also \that/ these g|G|uineys, or \Goldē/ b|B|alls to be \are may be/ so placed Circulerly as to be e|E|qua|i|llydiste|a|nt \every/ from him. \frō ye Choosers hand./ Now it cannot be doubted, but yt in this Case, tho \Any Any/ man would \certainly/ Choose one, and not stand in suspence \or Demurre/ taken, neither; because he could \not/ tell Could not tell {not} which to prefer or choose before the \An/other.\×/

< insertion from p18v >

|Nev| b|B|ut \Wherfore He But it {sic}/ being necessytated by no motive or Reason anticedent, to choose this, rather then that, he must Determine himselfe to Contingently or Fortuitoesly, \or co{nvers}ly/ it being all one \to him/ wch he took Nor could there be any foreknowledge ex cause|is| before hand, wch of these would certainly be taken|.| b|B|ut if yo will say there was a \some sudden/ necessary\ity/ Determinating in this Case then should \if should/ the tryall \made {sic}/ be made an hundred & an hundred times over & over again, or by a hundred severall men \Persons/; they must \|the{n} no reasō why not allso| all others/ needs take the same guina|e|y, \& every time,/ that is \either/ the f|F|irst or second or third &c. of them. as they ly in order frō ye Right or Left hand.

< insertion ends >

|Wherfore| Now f|F|rom hence \alone/ it appears yt Rationall Beings or ye Humane souls can a|A|ct further then they suffer, \extend thems. furth. then Necessary Nature or/ that they can \Actively/ change themselves & determine themselves Contingently or fortuitously; when they are not necessaryly determined by Causes {At} anticedent, Here is then \therefore/ a great difference betweeen Corporeall & Incorporeall things Bodyes that cannot move themselves, <20r> Can never a|A|ct further then they suffer and therfore if causes or|f| motions or impultions made upon them be of equall force or strengh they cannot move at all neither one way nor the |t’|other. If two equall scales in a ballance have equall weights put into them; they will rest to Eternitye and neither of them be able to move up or down But rationall Beings and Humane Souls standing in equilibree \an Equipoiz as to motives & Reasons,/ & having the Scales equa-pondreunt, having \frō |by| |from| ye weight of/ ye Objects and themselves and ye τα περιεγῶτα, all Circumstances without them equall or & no difference in the περιεγῶτα, Circumstanc things will not all \will not perpetually of {neer}/ wayes thus hang in suspence, but \can may/ themselves can add or cast in some grains, \into one Scale/ rather then ye other to make it \that/ Prepondrat, though here \so yt/ the determination \here/ will be Contingent <21r> and not \or/ loose and not necessaryly linked with what went before; h|H|ere will \therf./ be a sufficient cause & \is {but}/ not necessary, here will \is/ be somthing changing if selfe or acting upon it selfe {sic}n \A Thing wch tho/ Indifferent sthing \as to Reason yet can/ determining itselfe, & take away yt Passive Indiff.

But it cannot be denied by any Theist, but that this Liberty at least, must be acknowledged \to belong/ to God Allmighty — There being many Thanks Things in ye Frame & Constitution of ye world, for wch no reason could possibly be given, why they should be \of necessity/ so as they are rather then \& not/ Otherwise besides his Good \& therf. must be determind by his Arbitrary/ will & Pleasure. As for Example, The world being supposed not to be Infinite, there could not be any Necessity in ye Thing itself, why it should be Iust so Bigge as it is, & no more ,|&| not an Inch, nor a Haires-breadth Bigger or Lesser — There could be no Necessity, why ye Number of ye starres should be either Even or Odd, wheras one of them it must needs be, \& is, so/ as it seemed good to him, to appoint. So like <22r> wise Christianity assuring\e{th}/ {sic} vs, that God hath appointed a day, in wch He will iudge ye world.— Ma of wch or Sav. Mark 13. 32 But of that day & hour knoweth no man, no not the Angels wch are in Heaven, neither ye Son̄, but ye Fatherw In wch words it is Implyed, that this is a thing Determined by ye Arbitrary Good will and Pleas. of God ye Father — There being no necessity in ye Nature of the thing itself, that \why/ it should be iust at such a Precise time, & not an Hour nor a momēt sooner or Later — Nay it is com̄only Con{cer}ed, that this \whole/ Created world, & \wth all/ ye Things in it, having not a Necessary Existence, \but Precarious,/ but \both/ might not haue been; and is again \is/ Destroyable, was made by ye Arbitrary Will & Pleas. of God, accordg to |th|i|a|t. Apoc. 4. {2}|1|1. Thou Lord hast Created all things & for thy Pleasure they are & were Created — \×/ < insertion from p21v > The Creation being not a Natvrall, & Necessary Emanation, as ye Word & Son, is frō the Father, but a ve Free & Selfdetermined Emanation, it being as it were but the λογοι προφορικοι if God All. He spake ye word and they were made— < insertion ends >

But this \Arbitrary &/ Contingt Liberty of ye <23r> Deity, is caried on much too farr, by those who extended it to ye Necessitating of all Creaturely \Actions &/ Volitions, by a Divine Predeterminatiō of e|E|very thing, with a Consequent irresistible Influence; and to ye Reprobating of farr ye Greatst Pat of mankind, by absolute {Icrees} Decrees \frō Eternity/ & without any Respect to their own Actions, and \Also/ ye Future \execution therof by/ Damning of thē for w wt they were Necessitated Vnavoidably to do — /by G. Al. himself\

Tis indeed an Absurd Sayg \of some/ that Deum ser Tenetur ad Optimū; \God is Bound to do ye Best./ for God hath no Law but ye Perfection of his own Nature; nevertheles it may be well concluded that God cannot Act \Nothing/ contrary to ye same \Law of his own Perfections/, that is, can do nothing either Foolishly or Vniustly. And \therfore/ it may be Piously Beleeved, that what|en| he did Create ye world, He made ever the Whole, after ye Best manner that (All things Considered), they \it/ Could be \have been/ made in — And therfore \Consequently that/ as he can not be liable to any Blame, for making ye whole wors then it might haue been; So neither is he to be therfore Praised by {vs} \for that/ \ \such Praise & Com̄endat{illeg} // as men \are/, for Doing Better, when he might haue done wors |×|


Ch. 5

But this Contingent liberty which we have h of self-Determination wch we have heitheto spoken off, (\Heretofore/ called by some of the Greek Philosophers Epeleustick liberty) when there is a p|P|erfect Equallity in objects, & a meer fortu{e}|i|toes\ous/ self-determination, is not yt Liberty of αυτεξουσιον, that Liberū Arbitrium, wch is the f|F|oundation of Prayse or disprai|y|se, Com̄a|e|ndation or b|B|lame. For when t|T|wo Objects perfectly Equall & exactly, alike, are propounded to a man’s choise, as t|T|wo Eg{e}|g|s, \or/ Two Guineys, t|o|r two Golden Balls, of equall bigness and weight, \& value,/ are propounded to a man’s choise, he cannot be \iustly/ blamed \by any other or/ for choosing \Himself/ one of them, rather then another. And ye case must needs be the same in all other objects of choise that have an \Perfect/ equallyty of Good in them <25r> Or are m|M|eans equally t|T|ending \& conducing/ to ye same End. There can be no just b\B/lame or Commendation Disprayses, b\B/ut \onely/ where, the objects, being \in thēselvs Really/ Unequall, the one b\B/etter, ye orther w|W|orse, a man refusing\eth/ the Better, |&| chooseth the Worse As in ye Difference between the Dictate of Honesty and ye Dictate of \or/ Conscience, and ye suggestion of ye l|L|ower a|A|ppetites inclining either to s|S|ensuall Pleasure, or p|P|rivate Vtilitye, he yt resisting those Lower \& Worser/ i|I|nclinations, firmly adheires|th| to ye \Better Principle or/ Dictate{s} of Honesty & Vertue, \hath/ in all Ages & Places \of ye world/ hath been accounted prayes wo \ἐπαίνετος/ p|P|raiseworworthy {sic}, \as/ being sayd by the Greeks, to |be| |κρεὶττων εἁυτῶ| Superior to him selfe \or a Self-Conqueror,/. But he yt yeildeth up himsefe as Conquered \Vanquishd/ & \or/ sub\c/cumbes\th/ under, the Lower \& worser/ e|A|ffections, called the l|L|aw of the membeb members, agaist \in oppositiō to/ that superior <26r> Dictate of \of Honesty or/ ye Law of ye mind; |therfore being said to be| \accounted Blameworthy and and/ \as being/ ησσων ἑαυτῷ Inferior to himself, or Conquered by his worser p|P|art, is therfor justly counted Blameworthy Now yt there is such an ἀυτεξούσιον, \as this {;} {sic}/ too, or will or \such a/ Liberty of|r| will too ,|(|where there |is| \such/ an Inequallyty in ye \in ye of/ objects,|)| of determineing in them \ones/selfes Better or Worse, and so of deserving Com̄endation or Blame; (tho {this} be {no} \it be not rightly/ \Lately taken for an by ma|n|y \by some/ for an/ a|A|bsolute p|P|erfection, {t}|(|\as/ will be declared \{etreiv}ed/ else where,:|)| is undeniable|y| effi\evi/dent both from ye Comon Notions of mankind; and frō the Sense of Conscience in all ma|e|n, Accuseing, \Nor/ Excusing them.

Nevertheless it must be granted, yt there is no small Difficulty in |ye| explaining \of/ this Phænomion, rightly; so as to \as clierly to make it out &/ Vindicate the same from all exceptions made agaist it, e|E|spicially since the Vulgar Phsychology or |ye| now generally the <27r> the Received way of Philosophising, concerning the soul, doth eight \either quite/ b|B|affle and b|B|etray \that Liberty of Will,/ or else render it \Absurd &/ Ridiculous and a|A|bsurd \or Monstrous/

Now |For| the Vulgarly Received Phsychology run̄s thus. That in the Rationall Soul, there are two Facultyes, Understanding and Will, the \which/ Understanding hath nothing of Will |in| it, nor \and/ Will \hath/ nothing of Understanding \in it,/ a\A/nd to these two f|F|acultyes \do they/ are Attributed the Actions of Intellection and no Volition; the Understanding \(say they)/ Understand\eth/,eth, {sic} & ye Will Willeth.

But then comes a Bubiū \followes |succeeds| \Here is |followes|/ A Bivium/ wherein those Philosophers be \are/ divided, f|F|or f|F|irst many of them suppose the|is| Understanding, to be ye b|B|eginner & f|F|irst m|M|over of all Actions. For this reason b|B|ecause |Ignoti nulla Cupido,| there can be no desire nor no Will of that which is unknown. and then \Secondly/ they Conclude that the Understanding Acteth necessaryly <28r> upon it’s severall Objects without anything of Will, \or Arbitrary,/ to determine either, the \its/ exercise or Specification of it, \of its Object. |of them,|/ (which \Necessity/ some call a strain of t|T|houghts) Because the Will being blind \therfor/ cannot determine the Understanding either to e|E|xercise or s|S|pecification \of Object./ Thirdly that ye Understanding judgeth necessaryly, \of all things,/ not only as to ye t|T|ruth or f|F|alshood of Speculated\ive/ things but also \in {to ye} as to their Eligibility of Practicalls,/ what is to be d|D|one, or not d|D|one in Practicalls. Lastly yt ye Blind f|F|aculty of Will allways necessaryly follows{,} the l|L|ast Practicall judgment of ye necessary understanding.

But others there are who thing|k| it necessary, in order to the salving of this Phænomina of Liberty of Will to \think it necessary to/ suppose; that first of all <29r> the Will thô b|B|lind, yett \dos/ determines the Understanding both to ex{cu}se exercise; & specifit|c|ation, \of Object:/ And then |yt| ye Understanding yt is the \being/ necessary in his|its| Iudgments; doth but \onely/ p|P|ropropound to ye Blind Will, what he thinks ought to be done, or his Last p|P|racticall judgment in ye case; \& no more,/ only to a|A|llure, & i|I|nvite the Will theruntoo, \& no more;/ But |yt| this Sovereigne Queen or Empiress \of ye Soul,/ the Blind Will, still Remaineth as f|F|ree and i|I|ndifferent; to do or \or/ n|N|ot to do, to do This or That, as o|i| the understanding had given no judgment at all in the Case and doth \at last/ f|F|ortuitously determine it self \without respect to the same/ either way Which is their \this/ meaning, of that \their/ deffinition of Liberty of Will \com̄only given by/ That Voluntas Positis omnibus ad agendū requisitis, potest agere vel non agere {l} agere \vel/ Hoc vel agere illud. that the Will after all things Put, even the last Dictate or judgment of the <30r> of the Understanding it self \therin Included,/ the Will is yett f|F|ree or \& absolutely/ Indifferente to do, or both |as| to e|E|xercise, & |to| specification, and \dos/ determineth it selfe Contingently & Fortuitously \is Doer Not, To This or That/ There being no other way \as these \men/ conceve/ to salve the Liberty of ye Will besides this |but this onely.|

Chap. 6.

But, I say, if this Physchology be true, then either, is there \can there be/ no l|L|iberty at all, no f|F|reedom from Necessa|i|ty, or else no other, then such as is a|A|bsurd, |&| Ridiculous, & \or/ monstrous. For f|F|irst if ye Blind Will do allway necessi|a|rily follow, & \A/ necessary \Dictate of ye/ Understanding, \antecedent/ then must all Volitions & Actions needs be n|N|ecessary. That Pretence wch some here make, to salve the Liberty |of| Will, \notwithstanding it;/ from ye Amplitude of ye Understanding, as having a larger Scope & Prospect before it then Phansi{es}\cies/ & Hormæ, each wherof is determined <31r> to One, can sign{fy}\i/fy\ing/ nothing at all; so long as ye Understanding, in his his \all its/ Apprehentions, or|&| j|I|udgments; can concerning the difference of them; \those Obiects acts/ is altogether n\N/ecessary|ly|. And \But/ wheras \some/ others of these Philosophers, who contend yt ye Will must therfore of Necessa|i|ty, follow ye l|L|ast Dictate or Practicall judgment \of ye \Necessary/ vnderstanding,/ because it is in it selfe a Blind Faculty, do yett notwithstanding \nevertheless, (to \for ye in order to ye/ maintain{ig} {sic} Liberty,)/ assert, yt this b|B|lind Faculty of Will, doth \First of all,/ m|M|ove & d|D|etermine ye Understanding, both as to it’s e|E|exercise & to its Objects,: This is a manifest c|C|ontradiction, \In itself/ And; \Besides they are/ here they \are forced to/ runn Round in an endless c|C|ircle; \They/ maintaining yt ye Will can will nothing, but what is \as/ Represented to it \first/ by the Understanding, |(|since otherwise it must Will it knew not what.,|)| and \again yt/ ye Understanding cannot Acte \about about this or that/ but <32r> as it is \first/ moved & determined \therunto/ by ye Will, So yt there must be, both, an Action of ye Understanding, going before every Act of ye Will, and \again also/ A an Act of ye Will, going before every Act of ye Understanding.|, wch is \further/ Contradictious /& Impossible\|

But if ye Blind Will, do{es} not necesserily follow \×/ < insertion from p31v > × not onely at first Fortuitously determ ye vnderst both to Exerciz & Object, but also after all is Don, remains Indifferent to follow the Last Dictat of it or not – < insertion ends > ye Last Dictate & Practicall Iudgment of ye Understanding, \of ye Necessary Vnderstanding,/ but still Remain|ing|\s/ Indifferent, & \& dos/ Fortuitously Determins it selfe, either w|in|th complience wth the same, or not \otherwise/; then will not only Liberty of Will; be meer Irrationallyty & madness \itself,/ Acting;, {n}ay \or {&} determining all Human Actions. Nor is this all, but/ yt wch willeth in every Man, will Perpetually, Will \not onely it Knowes not why but also/ it knoweth\s/ not what. Then is all candor c|C|onsideration & d|D|eliberation of the mind, all c|C|ouncell & Advice from others, all exaultation \Exhortation/ & Perswasion, nay ye Faculty of Reason and Understanding it selfe in a man be alltogether Useless, and to no Purposse \at all./ Then can there be no h\H/aba|i|tts either of Uertue or Uice, that fluttering <33r> Uncertainty & \Fortuitous/ Indifference|y| which is supposed to be e|E|ssentiall to this blind Will, being \vtterly/ Uncap\a/ble of either n|N|or could Praise or Dis {sic} |after all, could the Hypothesis Salv ye Phænomē of Com̄endatiō & Blame, Reward & Punishment for no| praise Com̄endation or Blame, \could/ belong to Men for their free Willin|ed| Actions, \neither,/ since when they did well, {illeg} \they/ Acted \but/ Fortuitously, & I Irrationally \temerariously; & by chance,/ and when they did Ill they did but use their ow their Wills did but \vti iure suo,/ use their own \Naturall/ Right, and A|E|ssentiall Privelidge, \or Property/ of Acting Fortuitously \{illeg} as it happen’th \or/ any way/ without Reason \×/ Lastly as for yt \this scholastick/ Deffinition of f|F|ree Will; yt a|A|fter \viz. That it is, after/ all things are \being/ put, besides ye Uolition it self, even ye Last practicall Iudgment, in ye Soul it self, \too,/ an Indifference|y| \of Doing, or/ of not doing; \or of doing/ This or That. This is an Upstart thing. The account which ye Antient Peripatet. as Alexander & others give being this, \there \giving this |were vunacquainted with the{y}|r|e Account therof|// That \being {t}hi{s} That/ αὐτοῖς περιεγῶσι ye same things \being/ Circumstant \the same Impressions/ being made upon Men \frō without,/ \all that they are Passive to, being ye same,/ |yet| they may notwithstanding i|A|ct differently <34r> a|A|nd ye \The last/ Practicall Iudgement, \also/ being \as/ according to them|se| a thing \being That/ wch \as/ Men are not meerly Pasive too; and rarely \but and and so is it/ really, ye same thing, with ye Will, βόυλυσις, ye ye will, or volition \+/

Chap. 7. <35r> Ch. 7.

But this Scholastick Phsyc{ol}|ho|logy \Psychology |Philosophy|/ is manifestly Absurd, and meer Scholastick Iargon. For to attribute \ye Art of/ Intellection and Preception, to ye Faculty of Understanding \actiō of|&| Volition to the Faculty of will,/ or to say, yt ye|it is ye| Understanding |yt| Understandeth, and ye Will |yt| Willeth, This is all one, as if one should say, That ye Faculty of walking walketh, & ye f|F|aculty of Speaking Speaketh or yt ye Musickall Faculty, Playeth a Lesson upon ye Lute, or sings this or that tune.

Moreover, since it is generally agreed upon, by all Philosophers that |Actiones sunt suppositorū,| whatsoever Acts is a subsistent t|T|hing, Therfore by this kind of Lang{uage}\uage/ are those two Facultys of Understanding & Will, made to be |Two Supposita,| two subsistent things, two Agents and two Persons in ye Soul Agreeable to wch are those f|F|ormes of Speech com̄only used by Scholasticks <36r> That ye Understanding Propounds|eth| to ye Will |and| \\ye {illeg}/ Represents to ye will/ or a|A|llures and Invites, \ye Will,/ & ye Will \either/ f|F|ollows ye Understanding, or \els/ Refuses to Complye with it \its Dictates/, Exersi Exerciseing its \own/ Liberty Whence is that Inextricable confusion, & unintellige|i|ble nonsence; \Of/ ye Wills, \both/ f|F|irst Moving ye Understanding, & \also/ ye Understandings, f|F|irst Moveing ye Will, both together; \& this/ in an Infinite and endless Circuite. So yt ye \this/ Faculty of Will must \needs |be supposed to|/ move Understandingly; or knowl|i|ngly of what it doth; a|A|nd ye|t| Faculty of Understanding; must \needs/ move ye Will \to Moove/ willingly, or not without Will. Whereas to Intilect \as such, or/ as a Faculty, can belong|s| nothing, but meer Intellection & \or/ Preception, without anything of Will; & to Will, as a Power or \such or a meer/ Faculty, can belong nothing|,| but meer Uolition, without anything of Intellection


Wheras \But/ all this while, it is Really the \Man or ye/ Soul, yt Understands|{t}||{h}| & ye \man or/ Soul yt Willeth a|A|s it is ye Man yt Walks & ye man yt Speaks or t|T|alks \& ye Musitian that playes a Lesson on ye Lute./ So yt it is o|O|ne & ye Same Subsistent, t|T|hing, one S and ye Same Soul, yt both Understands|eth| & Wills|eth|, one \& ye same/ Agent only, yt Acteth Diversously. And So it \thus/ may \it/ well be Conceived, yt one and ye same Reasonable Soul in us, yt \may/ both Wills Understandly, or knowingly of what it Wills; & Understands or t|T|hinks of this or yt Object, Willingly.

Tis True \It is not Denyed, but/ that ye Rationall Soul, is πολυδύναμος, hath many Powers or Facultys in it, yt is, can \doth/ \yt it can & doth/ display it self, in severall kind of Energies, \{illeg} being one & the same./ \×/ < insertion from p037v > × As ye same Aire or breath in an org{a}|i|n \Pneumatick Instrumt/ passing throw severall pipes makes severall Notes < insertion ends > and \But/ there is a certain order or method, yt may be conceived of its \wherin/ \the Souls/ putting it’s self forth; in those its severall opperations, and a|A|ffections; of which I shall proceed to speak \Treat/ in ye next places


Ch. 8th

It was \is/ a very ma\ma/ta|e|riall Question, wch Aristotle hath started\th/ τὶ τὸ πρώτως κινοῦν, w|W|hat is yt, yt first moveeth in ye Soul, & setteth all ye other wheels on worke, yt is, w\W/hat is yt vitall Power or Energuy: which w ye Soul f|F|irst displayeth it Self i|I|n, and wch in order of Nature Preceeds all ye Rest, \all its other Powers/ it implying them, or setting them on Work, Sence \×/ < insertion from p37v > First therfore I say ye Outw Obj. of Corpor- Sense, are not ye Onely Beginning & First Moovers or Causes of all Cogitations in vs, as y{e} Epicurians & Hobbians, & others Atheists suppose — who indeed make all Cogitation \to be/ nothing but Locall motions in ye Braine: these being \intercurrent they/ onely occasionally things \raising variety of Cogitations/ — But. there is a Thred of Life allwayes spinning \out/, and a Living Spring or Fountain of Cogitation in ye Soul itself — Now < insertion ends > \Diver{self}\s// of ye Scholasticks \as we sd before/ tell us, yt it is \no other thē a/ a|n| \Indifferent/ Blind Will, yt \wch / first moveth, ye Understanding and causeth Deliberation, and \yet/ then \for all that notwithstand this/ afterward \th{is}/, \if it/ Blindly chooseth again, & determineth all Humane Actions /But if ye Soul haue \such/ a Blind Leader it must needs \must {nedes}/ be like to be well led.\ Whereas If there were \Wheras if there were/ |then| any such Faculty of ye Soul, as a Blind Will ,|(|which is Impossible \wch is impossible/) Knowledge; must of necessaty goe before it, to Represent things to it and \to \and/ hold a Torch to light it,/ show it, its way, following it guide and this \\And/ they this must come after it {or}/ must follow, \it as/ its guide, < insertion from p37v > Wheras if ye First Moover be Perfectly Blind, then must it moove to it Knowes not what \nor |& it| knows not why./And be perfectly Indifferent, to move to any one thing rather then Another. And Mo{orover} it is not Conceveble\d/\able/ How yt meer Indetermination & Indifferency should be ye First Moover to \of/ all Action – Moreover \Be{sides} wch / \{Necesary}/ Na{tur} must \be the/ Begin̄er in ye & & by {o} be ye Spring of all Action – < insertion ends > Therfore <39r> \Wherfore/ Knowledge and Understanding, Councell and \& Reason &/ Deliberation seemeth to bid \mens/ faire{st}\rest/ {sic} \for/ yt f|F|irst thing \Moover/ in ye Soul, and yt which leads ye Vanguard. Nevertheless, yt yt {illeg} \it is certain that/ neither the Speculative \nor Deliberating/ Understanding doth allway Act in {i} us \of itself in vs, of itself &/ Necessaryly; but we are \{sic} & vninterruptedly we being \but we are// Sensible yt it \our minds/ is|are| I|E|mpl|o|yed \& set awork/ by somthing else; yt \That/ we {im}|A|ply \Apply/ our \own/ minds \it them both/ about in \in/ Contemplation and Deliberation about \to/ this or that \Object,/ and call them off |continueth or stop| at Pleasure; as much as we open and shut our eyes \lid{sic}/ and \by mooving or Eyes/ Determine them \or sight/ to this or yt object \of sight./ , If ye Soul were allwayes in a Gaze and Stude|y|, it would Continually |ever| find it self \it would {have} no Prospect of mind, but would/ {to seek it|{illeg}| \& be in a Puzzle & bee/ being apte for Action} \alltogeth/ inept \for Action,/ and Unready for Sudden occurents, < insertion from p38v > If ye Soul were alwayes in a \constant/ Gaze or Study, or in \{a}/ necessary \&/ \vninter/ progresse of Meditation \necess. spinng out a Thred th{illeg}/ Coherent, vninterrupted \series &/ Progress of meditation, Thē could we h. no Presence of mind, but should be Perpetually to seek {it} be but should No \{s|d|el}/ attention to \Things/ Occurrent Objects \circūstances/, \but \{by}/ always/ be thinking of somethg els, & \to/ totally Inept for Action — — Or if we could do nothing, but as ye Result \after/ of studied Deliberatiō, thē should must we be, Continually in a Puzle, |&| Fumbling along time before we could do any thing Acte any thus Were our Souls in a Constant Gaze, or Study, alwayes Necessarily Spinning out, a Necessary Thred or Series, of \vninterrupted/ Concatenate Thoughts; Thē could we \never/ haue a{illeg}|ny| Presence of mind, no Attētion to b|B|usines; \{accns} occurs/ or minds \thinking/ \we/ always thinking of something els, \or having or {illeg} wits/ & running \out/ a woolgathering; and so should be Totally Inept for Action. Or, could we do nothing \at all/ but after \therupon \after// /after proper\ Studied deliberation, then should it be continually in a Puzle, \at a stand Dem{urre}/ & Fumble along time before we could Act \or Will/ any thing × < insertion ends > Aristotle Him\thē/self Determines |yt βουλὴ,| Counce|si|ll, can not be the first moving Princeple in ye Soul because then we must Consider, to Consider, to Consider, Infinitely, Again ye Princeple of all Actions and therfore Intellection it self it’s ends |is, Ends, & Good.| <40r> e|E|very thing Acting itself for ye sake of Some e|E|nd \& Good/ And concerning Ends, ye same Aristotle hath rightly observed, that they are |οὐκ ἀυθάιρετα, ἀλλὰ φῦναι δεῖ,| yt they are not |{self}| chosen, studed \out/ or devised \by vs/ but are \exist/ in Nature, & Preventively obtrude themself|v|es upon us.

Wherfore we must conclude that they τὸ πρωτως κινοῦν, t|T|hat which f|F|irst mooveth in us \& is/ the first \Spring &/ Princeple of \all Deliberatiō/ Action and Spring of Life in us, must not be \wch is being/ anything Excogitated and Devised by us, but it|yt| |wch| must \φῦναι/ be \it must Be or exist of Itself in/ in Nature; & it can be no other, then a Constant, Restless, Uninterrupted d|D|esire |or love| of Good; \as such a com̄on/ and \as su or of and/ Happyness. This is an ever-Bubbleing Fountain in ye \Centre of ye/ Soul, an \Natures/ Automaton, the \An Elatir or/ Spring of Motion, a \both A/ Primum |&| Mobile & a Perpetuum mobile \In ym |In vs|/, t|T|he first wheel yt sets all the other wheels in motion |x|, /And an Everlasting & Incessant-Moover\

God Almighty a Perfect Being his \is an/ overflowing \Fountain/ Love, Displaying Himselfe wisely & Powerfully, but in Humane souls in this \lapsed/ state by Reason of their Naturall Penia \by reasō of the/ Poverty & defectiveness \in thē/ as all their being <41r> God, an Absolutely Perfect \Being,/ is not \the \this// Love of Indigent Desire, but \a love/ of overflowing \Fullnes/ & Redundancy, com̄unicating itself. But imperfect Beings, as Human Souls, especially Lapsed, \by reasō of ye Penia wch is in them,/ are \by Restles Desire/ in Continuing|all| Inquests, \search & Restles Desire, {& search}/ alwayes Pursuing a Sent of God \before them,/ & Hunting after it. There are Severall things wch haue a Face & Meen or Alluring, Appearance \Shew, & Promising aspect/ of Good \to vs./. As Ple Ease, Pleasure, & Ioy, \& Ease,/ in opposition to Pain & Sorrow, \and stupidity Disquiet/ Labour and Turmoil, \Abundance/ Plenty & sufficiency \of all things/ in Opposition, to Poverty, straitnes, \scantines & {illeg} Penury/ & Indigency. Power not onely as Com̄anding Plenty, \it can/ Remooving want, \& com̄anding Plenty,/ & supplying with \matter (or/ Pleasures But also in Itself, and \or/ |t|a|h||e| \{verie} {d{illeg}}dly Great/ Sense of it \The Thing itself/ Honour, worship & Veneration, in opposition to \Evill|s| {Bu}senes, Disgrace/ Contempt, & Scorn. Praise & Com̄endation \& Applaus,/ in opposition to Th \Blame Censure of oth/ Ignominy & Infamy — Clarity and Celebrity in opposite to Privatenes |in| Obscurity — \& Conceatednes or living in & Corners Liv. in Corners/ Præcellency over others, Superiority, & Victory, & Success In opposition to being Batled \worsted or/ Foyled, \left behind/ outdone Frustrated & done & d|D|isappointed < insertion from p40v > Security in oppositiō to Danger of Loosing Pulchritude in Oppositiō to Deformity Honour Worship; & Veneration, in oppos to Contempt — — & scorne Praise ,|&| Com̄andatiō, applause, Clarity & Celeb in opp. to private obscurity Knowl. & Truth \Precellency Supiority & Victory —/ in opposit to Ignor or Folly, & Error for no mā would willingly \be {illeg}/ error ignorant mi{s}t{a}ken Mistakē & Erre < insertion ends > <42r> Pulchritude in Security in oppositiō to Fear, & Danger \& Anxiety by from {illeg} & Fear/ of Loosing \what we haue/, Pulchritude in opposition to \ye Event of/ Deformity & vglines \& Deformity/ Knowlidge & Truth, in opposition to Ignorance \ye Evill Ignorance \{or}/ ,|o|r or Folly,/ and Error, For \Since/ no man, would willingly Err \be Foolish, nor \man would/ Err,/ or|&| be Deceved\or be/ Mistaken & Deceved \to Err./ \×/ \× × ×/ < insertion from p41v > or loosing ye Prize Liberty in Opposition to Restraint Bondage Servility, to be subject to Com̄ands and Prohibitions < insertion ends > But above all these & \other/ such like things; the Soul of man hath \in it/ μάντευμα τι, a certain Vaticination, \Præsage,/ Sent, & Odour of a|One| Sum̄um Bonū, One Supreme Highest Good, tran farr transcending all others; without wch , they will be all Ineffectuall as to Complete Happines, & Signify nothing., a Certain Philosophers Stone, yt can turn all into Gold. —

Now this Love & Desire of Good as Good in Generall, & of Happines {t}|t|raversing ye Soul continually, & spurring it forwards, \act{u}ating & Provoking it continually,/ is not \a meer/ Passion or Harme; but a \setled/ Rooted Principle, Sour \&/ the \very/ Sours & Fountain \& Centre/ of Life – – It is necessary & <43r> mutable Nature \in all Souls, in vs & wch is {illeg}{state}/ and allways \continues ye same/ in Equall Quantity \in them/ As Cartesius supposes ye same q|Q|uantity of Motion or Agitation, to be allway \perpetually/ conserved in ye Vnivers, tho not alike in \al/ ye same Particular Bodies, but Passing \or being transferred & passing/ frō One to Other & {s} |so| |& more or lesse, Here & There.| So is there ye same Stock of De |this| Love & Desire of Good, allwayes \alive & working/ in ye Soul, by Necessity of Nature, \constantly remaining, & agitating it,/ tho by mens M Will & Choice; it may \may/ be Diversly dispensed out & Placed vpō Differēt Objects, more and lesse – –

|But| There are \Many/ Other Powers & Energies of ye Soul, \yt are/ Naturall & Necessary, \Nature \in vs/ too,/ as by|e|sides yt Lowest Of ye Plastick \appea/ Life, Subject to no \Com̄and or nor|t| no {sic} Power over/ Will — The {v}|I|ts Vitall Sympathy with ye Body, {in} displaying it displaying itself in ye Perceptions of ye outward Senses, & of \bodily/ Pleasure & Plain – – wch ye will \ye sentim {sic}ents wherof the Soul as willing/ hath no Power \no Imperium/ over, tho it haue a Despotick \& vndisputed/ Imperiū, over \Power — vpon/ ye Locomotiue Energy, in Locomotive Energy \in vpō/ ye Mēbers & Mēbers of ye Body <44r> |That ye| \Then to Phancy or Imagination/ Suddain Passions & Hormæ also Preventing ye Will \& Com̄otions {als} \called/ Concupiscible, Irascible, whose First Assaults Prevent or Will/, intended by Nature, as spurres to Action, & ye Quickness of Life, wch els \without them/ would be \grow/ Dull and Languid – – |The In{illeg}|{va}|sion Ne{ver} come vpon vs invade vs, & surprize vs with their Force| over wch notwithstanding ye Hegemonick of ye {sic} Soul may by require more a{n}d \or lesse/ Lesse Power – \swaye and Com̄and by degrees/ \& sometimes as it were fall asleep/ {F}|A|bove \all/ these is ye Dictat of Honesty, com̄only called the Sens of \Dictate of/ Conscience — wch often \majestically controlling them/ Clashes with ye Former \this is {Necess Nat too}/, {but} the \Here ye/ Hegemonik sometimes tak \may sometime ioyns its/ assesti|{s}|ng ye \Better/ One, \&/ sometimes Complying \takes Part/ with ye other \worser agst it —/ Lastly the \Vnderstand. both/ Speculative vnderstandg, Energy about |or ye Soul as action considering ye| Truth & Falsehood, \of these/ & ye Practicall about \considering their/ Good & Evill, or What is to be Done & Not Done, both \of them/ {n} {sic} inferring one thīg frō another by |consequēces of one thing frō Another frō Premisses in way of| Discursive Reason — The \meer {eter}/ Perceptions wherof \of wch / are \all/ Naturall & Necessary Subject to No \com̄and of/ will tho \both/ ye Exerciz, & \their/ specificatiō of the \obiects/ be Determinable by Ourselves \×/ < insertion from p43v > × These \are Natur {too}/ come vpon vs \vnawares/ and Invade|s| vs, & surprize vs with their suddain Force, \& we haue no Absolute Despotick \{illeg}a{k}/ vndisputed Power over thy/ notwithstanding which, the Hegemonick of ye Soul may \by c|C|onatuses & Endeavors/ acquire more & more power over t|T|hem by degrees < insertion ends >


Ch. 9th.

The next great \Grand/ e|E|nquiry, is, w|W|hat is The |τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν| the Ruleing, Governing, Com̄anding, Determining, Principle in us. For here, or nowhere, \els/ is to be found ye τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν & ye τὸ ἀυτεξούσιον, Sui-Potestas, Self Power or yt \such a/ Liberty of Will, \as/ wherby Men deserve Praise or Dispraise Com̄endation or Blame This Hegemonak|c|k of ye Soul is \a thing yt was/ much spoken of \taken notice of/ by the Greek Philosophers after Aristotle, and to this, is ascribed by them, ye Originall of |those| morall Evells, yt deservi|e|ng Blame and Punishment Thus the Learned Origen, \p. 207./ το ἑκαστου ηγεμονικὸν, ἄιτιον τὴς ὑποστάσης ἐν ἀυτῷ κακίας ἐστὶν, ἥτίς ἐστι τὸ κακὸν, καὶ ἄλλο οὐδὲν, ὡς πρὸς ἁκριβῆ λόγον, καθ ἡμὰς ἑστι κακόν. ἀλλ' οἰδα, τὸν λογος λόγον δεόμ{ε}νον πολλῆς ἐξεργασία{ς} καὶ κατασκευῆς — where ye τὸ ἑκάτου ηγεμονικὸν, is Rendred by Gelenius, Sua cuius\que/ Ratio, every mans own Reason, as \That this is/ to himself, \as |as if this were| ye thing Wher by he is/ ye Cause of Morall Evell, B He takeing it for granted, yt its \Origens/ Hegemona|i|ck, in every m|M|an, was his \is/ Reason; w|W|ch is \a thing/ comonly supposed to be Naturall and necessary \in its Perception,/ wheras Necessary Nature can be no f|F|oundation for Blame and Desert or Punishment, <46r> And if morall Evell were to be Imputed \wholy/ to necessary Nature, then must it \That and ye blame of it needs/ be Imputed to God \Himself/ as ye Cause of it \therof/. Wheras Origen’s design, here and every \els/ where, is to Impute \Free \both/ God & Nature from/ ye Blame of morall Evells \not to God or Nature, but & cast it vpon/ to Men themselves, wherefore as being \being/ Somthing, besides Necessary Nature; Loose, and at its \their/ own disposall, and a \therfore αρχαί πραξεων/ Principles of Action, \And/ Thus Therfore \according to/ Origen, Every Man’s own Hegemona|i|ck, or yt wch Rules or Com̄ands, in his Soul; is ye \onely/ Cause of Morall Evell, \Evill/ Vice, or Wickedness in him; wch is truly Evell, as also \are/ ye Actions wch|yt| proceed from it are Evell a|A|nd according, to \in/ stricktnes &|or| exactness, \of Philosophy, (saith He)/ there is nothing \els/ truly Evell besides this; \to a man/; that is, \nothing/ besides ye Evell of \sinne & {sic} \sin &// f|F|ault, b|B|ut I know (saith Origen \He/) yt this is a matter of great subtlety and niceness\ty/, and therfore |it| is and \it would be an/ Oppoross\ous/ thing to Explain |it| &c |and requires longer| ambages of Discours then is proper in|for| this place

Now ye generallyty \The Heard of {sic}/ of Modern Philosophers and Theologers, who Zealously maintaind the|is| Phænominis|o|m of Liberum Arbiterum or f|F|ree Will, t|T|hink ther is no other way \to do it, for it/ but this \onely/ to make an Indifferent & Blind Will fortuitously Determining it selfe <47r> to be both ye f|F|irst m|M|over, & ye Hegemona|i|ck, and \or/ Ruleing Principle in ye Soul |too|. Nevertheless they themselves acknowledgi|e|ng, that ther is so much of necessary nature \even/ in this Blind & Contingent fortuitous Will; yt it is \notwithstanding allwayes/ allway nessaryly Determined to Good, or some a|A|ppearence of it \in ye vnderstanding;/ and can never Possibley choose Evell \whē represented \to it/ by ye vnderst Such/ as Evell. But \as wholy such. But/ within ye|t| Latitude and Compass of any \an/ appear \a/ a|A|pparent Good, it \in to ye vnderstanding, the Will to them/ is free to determine it selfe, to \any either/ greater or Lesser, \Good; & so/ to any of ye Lowest Degrees and appearences, therof \therof/ Nay tho’ a thing have \never so/ much more of Good then Evell \appearing/ in it, yett if it have but ye \for ye/ |ye| least glimps of Good \glimmering in it,/ yt can be Imagin’d\ed able/ in it; \is enough for/ The Blind Will \is Free/ to Exercise it’s Laud\ord/ly and u|U|naccountable \Freedom or/ Liberty; in \so as to in/ prefering|ring| it before, such a \another/ good as hath not \any/ ye least shadd|o|w of Evell in it \apprehens|d|{ed}ed in it./ And when a \Any/ great e|E|nd is Proposed, and upon d|D|eliberation concerning Means, it Clearly appears \to ye vnders./ that there is one means wch \that |wch it| used/ cannot fail to reach \but seek reach/ and a|A|ttain ye e|E|nd \to It/; but Another wch |is| tho’ it be \onely is/ not <48r> Impossible \{to} to Procure it,/ /to do it\ but it may, yett there is {sic} \but hath/ ten thousand to One Oddes oddes \against it; {if} it do/ but it will not {illeg} \In this Case,/ they say) it is ye Perfection of ye b\B/lind \Indifferent/ Will yt it may \to be able to/ to {sic} determine it self \\indifferently &// Fortuitously to either of them that way rather and not \as well as/ the other.

But as it is very a|A|bsurd to make Active Indifference & \Blindly & Fortuitousnesly determing itself/ Contingent|c|ie yt is Active Irrationally, & n|N|onsense, to be ye Hegemonick & Ruleing Principle in every Man; And as it is \indeed/ Impossible, there should be any such thing in Nature, as a \Blind/ Faculty of Blind Will \wch dos nothing els but will/ Acting temer\ar/rously or Fortuitously; where there are different degrees of Good & Evell in ye Objects; which \such as/ shall be \perfectly/ Indifferent, to never so much Greater or lesser Good; a|A| Will yt is nothing else but \meer/ Will, |meer| Impetus \Force,/ and Activite, without anything of Light; \or vnderstanding;/ A will wch \acts/ both it know’s not why \and \or wh or {sic}/ wherfore,/ & \even/ it know’s not what; So could not such a Blind Indifferent & Fortuitous Will, \Ruling,/ salve ye Phænominan of <49r> Morall Good & Evell, \of/ Comendation or Blame Because this being supposed, of it to be ye sensuall L Perfection of its \the will’s/ own Nature, and a man’s asc|s|entiall Liberty \& Privilege to act thus,/ there can be no f|F|ault nor Blame in him for the vsing of it. \his exercizing/ the same, & acting according to his Nature. For n|N|o Nature is \being/ Sinne

Wherefore it can\must\can//not be suppossed yt ye Hegemonick and \or/ Ruling Principle in a man, is altogether \vtterly/ Devoid of \all/ Light and \Perceptiō or/ Understanding. Nevertheless it is not for all that Notwithstanding wch , Impeckable \In Peccable/ Beings, Reason, Understanding, & Knowledge, as such, or as Necessary Nature, cannot be ye al only Hegemonick or Ruleing Principle in them. \them./ Because Reason as such, can never Acte Irrationally \Vnreasonably/; Understanding as such, and cleare Preceptions, can never Err; There is no such thing as f\F/alse, and I|E|rrona|i|us {K} Knowledge, \nor Erroneous Vnderstanding/ nor can Sinne never be ye Resulte of Reason, Understanding, \&/ Cleare Prese Preceptions, & Knowledge any More then Error <50r> Erro\u/r is no \Nor is Error any/ more from God, and {yt} \ye/ Necessary nature of Understanding; then Sinne is. But ye Hegemonick of Created Souls, may Err & Iudge falsly, & be guilty of Sinne. Moreover we know by Certain experience, yt Speculation and \or/ Deliberation, about this and that \Particular things/, is determined by our self selves, both as to its Objects & exercise; we can call it \them |it|/ off from one thing & Impl|o|y it \or set t{to}|it| awork/ upon another, and we can surcease \Suspend/ it & stop it \ye exercize of them |it| (whē we please)/ too, diverting our selves to \into/ Action. From whence it is plain, yt there is somthing in us Superior to it, \therunto,/ some thing more generall \Vniversall/, more \&/ Comprehenc|s|ive & yett \withall/ more simple; wch is Hegemonick to it, & doth manage & determine it|the| |same.|

I say therfore that the Τὸ Ἡγεμονικὸν of the Soule — in vs, is And in every man, and that wch is properly w|W|e o|O|urselves — (we rather \rather/ Having \rather/ ye other


< insertion from p50v > Ch. 10th < insertion ends > Ch. 10

I say, therfore, that the Τὸ Ἡγεμονικὸν in Every man, & indeed that wch is Properly We Ourselves (we rather Having those other things of Necessary Nature, then Beeing them) is the Soule as Comprehending {i}|I|t Selfe; All \All/ i|I|ts Concerns & Interests, |its| Abilities, and Capacities, and h|H|olding it selfe /as it were Redoubled vpō itsel{f}\ as it were in it’s own hand: h|H|aving a Power of Intending \or Exerting/ it selfe more or less, i|I|n Consideration, & Di|e|liberation; and i|I|n Resisting ye Lower appetites |yt| oppo{ss}|se|ing Reason \both of vtility &/ & Honesty, i|I|n Self-Recollection & a|A|ttention, & Vigile|a|nt Circumspection \or Standing vpon our Guard;/ i|I|n Purpos{s}es & Resolutions; i|I|n De|i|ligence \in Carying on Steady Designs/ & Active, Endeavours; \This/ In order, to Self-Improvement, & the \Self/ Promoting of it’s own good, {illeg} & \the/ f|F|ixing \& Conserving/ it self in ye same Tho’ by accident, & |by| ye a|A|buse|;| therof; it often proves, a Self-Empairing Power, ye Originall of Sin̄e Vice, & Blame \Wickednes;/ wherby Men become to themselve, the \Iust &/ Meritorious Causes of \of {sic} their own Evill, Blame,/ Punishment, & Ma{s}|is|ery < insertion from p50v > In Consideration & Deliberation, i|I|n Resisting the Lower Appetites to \of/ Pleas. & Prof. |yt| opposi|e|ng ye Dictates of Reason & Honesty. In Confirming its own Resolutions, & in Diligence of Activity This being intended by Nature, \According to Nature or Intention in order to/ in Order to or Self-Improovin|e|gment, & inabling vs \being Able/ Actively to Promote our own Good, & F{ixe}e Conserve ourselvs in ye same. Tho by accident & ye Abuse \{illeg}/ therof \of th/ it often Prooves a Self-e{m}|m|pairing Power the Orig of Sin, vice, &|or| wickednes; \whereby we are to ourselvs ye Causes of our own Evill/ of |&| \{conscience}/ Guilt Blame Punishment & misery < insertion ends > Wherfore this, \Hegemonicon/ allways Determins the Ca Passive Capabilitye of our \mens/ Nature \one way or other,/, either for Better or \for/ Worsh|e|; a|A|nd is \has/ a s|S|elfe-forming <52r> and Self-Framing Power, wherfore by wch every one \man/ is Self-made, into what He Is: \And/ accordingly therby deservin|es|g either Praise or Dispraise; Reward or Punishment

Now I say in ye first Place; that \the \A mans/ Soul as Hegemonicall, over itself/ having a Power, of Intending \& Exerting/ Him\it/self, more or less, in Consideration, & Deliberation about \when different/ Objects \are |or| Ends are/ Propounded \or medi{ane}s/ to \His/ Choice, wch \that/ are in themselves really Better and Worse; may upon slight Considerations and Imm{aturur}\ature/ Deliberations, (He a|A|ttending to \some appearance of/ ye Good \in one/ of them, without taking notice of of ye Evells wch attend\ing/ it) Choose & Prefer, yt wch is Really ye Worse, before ye Better, \And/ so as to deserve Blame & Punishment \also/ therby and to Incur |some| Guilt for ye Same, But this, \not/ because, it \He It/ had a Naturall \by Nature an Equall/ Indifference|y| \& freedom/ either to a Greater or lesser Good; wch is a|A|bsurd; or because his Will \It had {sic}/ had a Naturall Liberty \of Will/ either to follow or not follow, his \its own/ last Practicall Iudgment wch is all one as to say, a Liberty to follow or not follow or not follow i|I|t selfe \its own Volition/ For in \vpon/ both those Cases there could be no \those suppositions there would haue been no such thing as/ f|F|ault nor Blame <53r> But because he might have Considered or Deliberated more Inten And here, \And For there also Here also the in the supposition/ he did |to| follow|,|ing \ye Person {illeg} supposed/ ye Greater appear|ar|ent Good, \at that|is| time, & not \at all {sin}/ {da}s{h}ing with {sin}/ & ye \his/ Last Practicall Iudgment \neither/. b|B|ut because h|H|e might Have made a Better Iudgment, \thē now he did,/ had he more Intended Himselfe in Consideration Intenc|s|ely Considered, & more Marturely Deliberated \wch that it did not was its own Fault/. Now to say, that a man hath not \this/ Power of \over/ himself, to Consider & {to}|D|eliberate \& Consult,/ more or lesse; is to Contradict com̄on Experience, and Inward Sense. And to deny, that a man is iustly to be blamed \blameworthy/ for Temerity, in acting in \any thing/ matters of moment, Without Due \& full/ Deliberation \& so choosing ye Worser,/ is Absurd. But if He \A man/ haue this Power over|over| himself, to \Consider &/ Deliberate more or less; then is \He/ not deter necessarily \always/ Determind thereto, by \any/ Antecedent Causes; \or by a Necessary\ly/ vnderstand/ These Two \things/ being Inconsistent or |&| Contradictious. And Consequently it \that choise/ was Contingent there was \something of/ Contingency in ye Choic

From what wee have \has been/ declared, it appears yt t|T|ho’ Perception be Nature or Necessary Understanding in us, yett for all that, wee are not meerly Passive to our owe|ne| Practicall Iudgments, yt wee have, and to ye severall a|A|ppearences of Good, but Contribute something of our Owne to them, to make them such as thesy are <54r> Because these may be very Different, accordingly as wee do more or Less Intensly Consider or Deliberate, wch is a thing |ἐφ' ἡμῖν| in our owne Power. A man who \dos/ but slightly Considers, may hastily Choose, yt as Better, wch upon more Serious and Leasurly Consideration, he will would Iudge to be \should be/ refused as yt wch \what/ is much ye Worse|r|. The same motives & Reasons \Propounded,/ have not allwayes the same f|F|orce \& Efficacy/ upon Different Men, \Persons,/ nor yet upon ye Same Man \Person neither/ at severall times; but More or Less as they are \differētly Apprehended; or more or less/ Attended t{oo}|o|, Ap Pondered or Considered, Ap wch \is a thing/ we are not meerly Passive to, but determined by ourselves

Besides wch , it is Certain, yt in our Practicall Iudgments, wee often Extend our selves or our E|A|ssenc|t|s, furthen|r|, then our Understanding, as Necessary Nature, goes; that is, further then \our/ Clear & Distinct Conceptions. For when upon a L|S|lighter Consideration of things we are somtimes wholy \become/ Doubtfull \{out} Which/ of two or more <55r> things which to \should be/ p|P|refer,|red| we not Clearly de\i/scerningrning at yt time any \any/ greater Eligibilyty \in one then Another of them,/ tho in Reall reality there be \were/ much \Difference/. Wee are not hereby\vpon/ necessited|at|ed to \Arrest & Stop &/ Suspend Action, but may, & often do \Proceed to/ make|ing| a Iudgment in ye Case, one way or other, stochastically or Conjecturally (wch \itself/ is not without some Contingent|cy| \neither/) and so go forward in|to| Action.

It hath seemed very strange to some, what Cartetius, \hath written: That/ It is not yt|e| Understanding, but ye Will yt Iudgeth,|;| & yt this is ye cause of Error as well as of Sinne. And indeed this may well seem strange, accordingl to yt Notion, wch men com̄only have of Will, as a meer Blind Faculty But it is more|st| Certain, yt even in Speculated|iv||e| things, about Truth & Falshood \as well as Practicall{s}/ the Hegemonick of ye Soul (wch is ye Soul & selfe-Comprehensive) and having ye Conduct & Manage|m|ent of it self in its own hand,) doth Somtimes Extend <56r> it self further in \way of/ Assent, then ye necessary Understanding; \goes,/ or beyond Cle{e}|e|r & Distinct Con\Per/ception. That is, when we have no Cleer & distinct Conception of \The Truth of/ a Proposition, (wch is ye knowledge, of ye t|T|ruth of it, \of it,/ and can never be f|F|alsh|e|), we may not withstanding, Extend our Assents further and Iudge stochastically, yt is Opine, this way or that way Concerning it, & yt somtime with a great deal of Confidence \& Assurance {illeg} too/ And this is undoubtedly ye Originall of all Error in speculated|ive| things \also,/ too, wch cannot be Imputed to Necessary Nature in us without casting ye Blame of them upon God \The Maker of it./ The Understanding, as necessary nature, in us, or Cleer C|D|istinct Conception, can never Erre, because there cannot Possibly \be/ any Cleer Conception of Falshood, in e|E|ternall things, as Geometry Geometry and Metaphysicks. Cleer Conceptibility <57r> is ye Essence of t|T|ruth, and Cleer distinct Conception, of \is/ klowleg|d|ge {sic}, wch can never be f|F|als Wherefore if we did always suspend our Assents, when we had no Cleer Distinct Conceptions of ye Connection, between ye Predicate and Subject of a Propossition, we should never Erre. But we do often Opine & Iudge stochastically, concerning Truth & Falshood \even/ in speculated|ive| things, beyound our cleer conceptions, & certain knowledge \×/ < insertion from p56v > × That of Aristotle, ἡ κακία φθαρτικὴ τῶν ἀρχῶν, and the com̄on Opinion, that Interest & vitious Inclinations – Bribe ye Iudgment, Showes that the Iudging Power in vs is not ye vnderstandg as Necess. Nat. in vs. For thē it could not bribed or Corrupted & swayed < insertion ends > And indeed \The Necessary vnderstanding that is/ our cleer Conception & knowledge, going so little away, ther|e| is great \need &/ use of this Stochasticall Iudging & Opineing beyound it \concerning Truth & Falshood, going further & beyond it,/ in Humane Life, Our Actions & Uolitions depending much upon our speculative Opinions, Concerning ye Truth & Falshood of things. \×/ < insertion from p56v > × \The weaknes of Hum. vnderst is such That/ There are very few things wch men|thy| do so s|C|ertainly know, as that no ma no manner of Doubt may by a Raised in stro{ng} minds agst. Either by Sophisiticall Arguments or Bigottree in Religion – < insertion ends > Hence is it, yt \Divine/ Faith is so much Commended to us in ye Gospel, wch is Undoubtedly an Assent \to things/ beyound Cleer Conception & Certain \Necessary/ knowledge <58r> t|T|he b|B|eleif of ye Existence of a God of ye naturall Immortallity of ye Soul, & Consequently of Rewards & Punishments after this Life, are things wch ye Generally of Mankind, have no cleer Conception |n|or Demonstrative Sience of|;| them, & yet they are hight|l|y necessary to be b|B|eleived, in order to a morally Vertuos & {a} Good Life And it was truly & wisely said by Plato, that \πιστις,/ Faith & true \&/ |ὀρθαὶ δὸξαι| \Faith &/ true opinions, are \things/ no less usefull & effectuall in Life, then Certain Knowledge \Science & Demonstrations./ Nevertheless it cannot be denied, but yt by the Vncausius \Rash & vncautious/ use of this Power of ye Hegemonicon|k|, of \in/ our Souls, of Extending As \its/ our Assent further then our cleer Conceptions & beyound our \Necessary/ Understanding as necessary Nature in us, we frequently fall into \Many/ Errors. Which Errors are <59r> therfore no more to be Imputed to God, then our Sinns \are/ because they are \being/ not, from necessary nature, as made by Him, butt from ye Ill Conduct or Managment of our Selves, & ye abuse of that αυτεξουσιον or Sui-Potestas, yt \Larger/ Power wch He hath given us \we haue/ over our selves, \given/ for necessary uses & Purposes; by \in/ extending our Assents and Iudgments by beyound our cleer Conception knowledg and Understanding, or knowledge; without sufficient grounds: And there may be very sufficient grounds, somtime to b|B|eleive beyound Knowledge, as well as beyound sense And yett notwithstanding is this \Divine/ Faith of |A| Vertue |or Grace|

||Chap. 11th.

Again in yt Contest betwext {i} the Dictates of Honesty & \or of/ Conscience, and ye Suggestion of ye Lower Appetites, urging & Impelling to \a Present Good of/ Pleasure & Priuat Utillity \or Profit/. I say in this Contest, there is no necessary Understanding interposing & Umple <60r> \{caring}{a} between to/ \to/ {H}umpir{i}|e|s between, & \between that dos/ unavoidable|y| \& irresitibly/ d|D|etermini|e|ng one way \or other/; b|B|ut the matter wholy depends upon the Souls Hegemonickcall\k/ & \or/ Power our {sic} it self, it’s exerting it self wch {sic} more or less f\F/orce and Viggor, i{t} in Resisting these Lower a|A|ffections or hinder those\ring/ |ye| Gratifications \of them/; And according to this will \Which/ the Issue of or e|E|vent of Action will be determined. But this is not \in/ One single Battle \or Combat onely, but cōmonly/ but a long Lasting \or Continued/ warr and a continued Colluctation, betwext ye Higher and |ye| Lower Principle \Principle/ in wch there are many Uicissitudes, Reciprocat|s|ions, & Alternations upward & {illeg}ward \downward,/ as in ye scales of a Pair of Ballences, before there come to be a Perfect Conquest \on either side/ or Fixsation \& settling/ of ye Soul as either way, either in ye Better or in ye Worse Dureing wch \Strugling &/ Colluctation, was that pronounced the Good yt I would \do/ I do not, ye Evell yt I would not do, yt do I. And \then/ according to ye Issue of this \Inte{s}ti{ve}/ War \will/ men either Receive praise from God <61r> or deserve Blame and Punishment \from him./ Glory & Honour to him yt doth well, but tribulation & anguish to him \every one soul/ that doeth Evell |And| I haue fought a Good Fight, and now there is layd vp, for me a Crown Life. And that a man may \we haue a Power/ m|M|ore & l|L|esse Exert him|our|self|v|s, \in/ to Resist the Lower Inclinations, or hinder the Gratifications \of them,/ & to Comply with ye Dictate of Conscience or Honesty, & that he is not \being not wholy/ \{now} {ay}/ determined \therin/ by Necessary \Causes/ Antecedent Causes one way or other, but that \having/ there is being something \at least of it/ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, In our own Power, Every mans own Conscience, bears witnes to, in \Accusing &/ Condemning him, when \ever/ he does amisse. Wheras it is plain, that if we be determined by Necessity of Nature here, then is there no thing in our own Power, nor can we be Blame-worthy or Deserv Punishment +

Morerover we are certain by Internall Sense, that our Souls as Comprehending themselves <62r> and Hegemonicall, or having a Ruling Power over themselves, can Exert themselves more or Lesse, in self-Recollection, self-Attention, Heedfullnes & Animadvertence, In Vigilant Circumspection, In fortifying themselves with \in Firmnes of Purpose &/ < insertion from p61v > × In Carying on & Pursuing steady Designs of Life < insertion ends > Resolution beforehand, in Endea Exciting Endeavors, in Activity \&/ & Diligence \of Execution,/ Now whē \men/ are com̄ended for Diliigence, Industriousnes, Studious Endeavors, Firmnes \& steadnes or F/ of Resolution \in Good/, Vigilant circūspection, And Blame for ye Contrary, |viz.| Negligence, Remisnes, Supinenes Vnaffētion, Carelesnes, &c. It is \These things are/ imputed to the mē thmselvs that they are such \& as their being no other Cause/ & that all their Actions {sic} \as the Cause of th{em} & as not being determind by Necessary Causes as m{ens}/ motions are not as Ne{ver} are ye Motion those of ye Wheeles of a Clock — ye Motion of a watch or Clock are


\Ch. 12/

But besides Internall Sense, & Com̄ Notions, the same thing is Confirmed — by the Scriptures, not onely Apocryphall, but Canonicall. The Genuine sense of ye Anct Iewish Church herin, appeareth frō this of Iesus ye Son of Sy|i|rach c. 15. 11. Say not, it is thro ye Lord that I fell away. For thou oughtest not to do the things that he hateth. Say not thou he hath Caused me to Erre, for he hath no need of the Sinfull man. The Lord hateth all Abomination, & they that fear God love it not. Himself made mā frō The Beginning & left him in ye hand of his Counsell + If thou wilt to keep the Com̄andmēts &c. He hath set Fire & water before thee stretch forth thy hand vnto whether thou wilt. Before man is Life & Death, & whether him liketh shall be given him. Wch latter Passage seems to Refer to yt of Moses Deut. 30. See I haue set before thee this day Life & Good Death & Evill. In yt I com̄and thee to Love ye Ld thy God, to walk in his wayes, & keep his Com̄andments <64r> I call Heavē & Earth to Record \this day/ agt you, That I haue set before yu Life & death Blessing & Cursing. Therfore Choose Life, that thou & thy seed may live. Hereby Leavg man in ye hand of his own Consell, is plainly asserted an ἀυτεξους. or Sui-Potestas, a Power of Determg Himself. towards the Better or ye worse. Life or Death + With wch Agreeth Salom. hims. Prov. 16. 1{3}|22|. He yt Ruleth his own Spirit is more Mighty, then he that taketh a City. He that is κρεισσων Εἁυτῷ superior to hims. Or a Conqu. over his Inter Pass. Irascible & Concupiscible. This implies 2 things \A kind of Duplicity/ in ye Humā soul, one yt wch is Ruled, Another that wch Ruleth Or ye Soule \to be/ as it were \to be/ Reduplicated vpō him\It/self and so Hegemonicall Over itself; Having A Power to Intend itself more {n}|o|r Less in Resisting the Lower Appetites, wch cannot be without something of \Contingecy or/ Non-Necessity. Were it \ye Souls/ Necessarily & Essentially Good: or Impeccable — He would be above this Self-Power — were He nothing but Lust Appetite & Horme, {a}|H|e would be Below it <65r> Now He is in a middle state of Perfectiō betwixt both. He hath some Power to keep vnder his Body, & bodily Lusts Rom \1 Cor./ 9. 27. To Mortify his Mēbers yt are vpō ye Earth Coloss. 3. 5 — To Gird vp ye Loines of His mind 1 Pet. 1. 23. To Adde something to hims. 2 Pet. 1. 11. Adde to yr Faith Vertue Knowledge To Improve. those Talents wch he hath Receved frō God; and to Return to him; his own, with Vsury — Matth 24. To Purge hims 2. 2|T|im. 2. 21 If a man Purge himself frō these he shall be a vessell of honour, To cleanse ourselv frō Filthynes of flesh & spirit — 2 Cor. 7. 1. To keep himself Pure — 1 Tim. 5. 22 To keep himself vnspotted of ye world Iam. 1. 27. To keep orselvs in ye Love of God Iude. 21 To keep hims. yt that wicked one Touch him not 1 Ioh. 5. 18. — To Overcome Apoc. 2. 3. — {Tn} In these Places it is plain yt ye sol{em} Soul ha of man hath a <66r> Reciprocall Energy vpō itself, Or of Acting vpō itself — So yt it is not meerly Passive to yt wch it Receves frō God — A Power \of Being a Coworker with God/ of keeping Hims. & Preserving himself in Good. Of Improoving itself furthe {sic} & further — And of keeping & Conserving himself in Good — All wch cannot be without a Non-Necessity — or Contingency.

Ch. 13

This Faculty of αυτεξους or Sui-Potestas, or Power over ourselves, wch belongs to ye Hegemonicon of ye Soule, or ye Soul as Reduplicated vpō itself, and self-comprehensive, whereby it can Act upō itself, Intrud & Exert itself more or Less; & by Reason therof to Act Iudge & Will, & Act differently. Is Intended by God & Nature for Good, as a Self-Promoting Self-improoving Power, <67r> in Good, & also a self-Conserving Power in ye same — Whereby mē P{o} Whereby mē Praise of God, and their Persons bee Iustified & sins Pardond thro ye Merits, \& true Propit. Sacrifice/ haue a Reward Graciously bestowed vpō them by God, \Even/ A Crown of Life. Notwithstanding wch by a|A|ccident, it & by ye Abuse of it, it Prooves that, whereby Many are \Men also/ come to be, \vn/to themselvs ye Causes, of their own Sin \of/ Guilt, Blame, & Punishment — The Objects of Gods Vindicative Iustice, \that/ wch will especially be displayed, in that great Day of Iudgment, which is to come The Iustice of wch day of Iudgmt to Punish mē for the Past Actions of their wicked Lives can no otherwise be Defended Then by Asserting — Such an Hegemonicon in ye Soul as wherby it has a Power over itself; or a Freedom frō Necessity


Chap. 11|4|th11|4|

< insertion from p67v >

To be Essentially & Im̄utably Good & wise, much a Greater Perfection, then to be so by Contingent Freewill —

< insertion ends >

It appeares from what I have declared yt this Liberum Arbitrium or Free Will, wch is properly an ἀυτεξούσιον or Sui-Potestas, a Power over our \ones/ selv|f|es, either of Intending or Remitting, & Consequently of determining our Selves Better or Worse; wch is ye Foundation of Com̄andation or Blame, Praise, or Dispraise & ye Object of Retributive Iustice, Remunarative or ye Indicative, Rewarding or Punishing; Is not a p|P|ure p|P|erfection, (as many have mistaken \boasted it/ to be;) But hath a m|M|ixture of Imperfection in it. So yt it cannot belong to God, or a Perfect Being \+/ It \It/ doth not belong to \is Inconsistent with/ a Perfect Being, to have \a self-Intending & Self-Remitting Power/ a selfe-Improveing & Selfe-Impairing Power, a Selfe Intending & self-Remitting, \A/ selfe-Advan Advancing & self-Depressing; to deserve Praise Com̄andation & Reward \on ye one hand/ <69r> (it being observed by Aristotle that \it dos not so properly belong to God/ επαινεῖσθαι dos not so properly belong to God) as μακαρίζεασθαι much less to deserve Blame & Punishment. \But/ to be L Mutable or Changable, in way of Diminution,; Lapsable or Peckable is an {A}|E|ssentiall Property of \such/ a Free Willed Being. And therfore it must needs be an Imperfect Being \of a Rationall Creature: —/ \of a Rationall Creature Imperfect Being;/ \Moreover/ A Perfect Being, cannot have any such Power of Streching its’ Iudgment, beyound Certain knowledge, or of eeking out, want of knowledge \ye Defect/ & \or/ Understanding, or|n||d| {sic} Supplying {le} it’s defect or lengthtening it out,|,| by Faith & Probable Opinion. A Perfect Being can neither be More |n|or Less |in self in {Ex}|In|tention or Exertion, being a in Itself; Pure Act, in can haue no \such thing as/ self-Recollection| but it is Immutable \or/ Unchangable \Goodness/ Wisdom \vigilant/ and Goodness, \Circumspection, or Diligence in Execution/ Undefectable. /× × ×\

< insertion from p68v > × × × Arius and his followers maintaining ye Logos ye Word & Sonne of God by wch allthings were Made, was \to be/ a Creature, did Consentaneously there unto Assert, yt He was Indewed with yt \this kind of/ Liberum Arbitrum, whereby He was mutable Lapsable & Peckable, \+/ b|B|ut the Nicene Fathers \on the Contrary,/ in Opposition thereunto Defending ye true God-Head or Divinity of ye Logos, Decreed on ye Contrary; yt being not Lapsable nor Peckable He was not Indewed with yt Liberum Arbitrum, wch is an Essentiall Property of every Rationall or Intelligent Creature. Accordingly |as| Origi|e|n had before declared yt ye Logos being Essentially Wise \{where had}/ could \therfore/ never Degenerate in to Folly, Nor \And/ ye Holy-Ghost being Essentially Holy, \{nes} \{illeg}/ {illeg} could not/ degenerate into Unholyness, \T & so/ neither of them therfore |could| had|ve| \to haue/ yt Liberum Arbitrum, wch is the Originall of Lapsability or \&/ Peckabibillity. And thus St Ierom, solus Deus peccere non potest, Cætera quia Lib. Arbitrio prodita sunt, p{o}ssunt in Vtrumque Partem se flectere. < insertion ends >

But some there are who Perswade themselves, yt ye Perfection of the Deity Consisteth in being Indifferent to all things, alltogether undetermined by any Anticedent motives or Reasons of Goodness, Wisdom, or Truth <70r> But \And/ its selfe to be ye sole Determiner of all, \these/ by an Indifferent, Arbitrary, Contingent and Fortuitous Will; \And/ This is yt monstrous and Prodigious Idea or Portraiture of God, wch Carthesius hath made to himselfe \framed drawn out/, in his MetiPhysicks That there is Nulla Ratio Veri aut Boni, in Nature, Anticedent, to his Will. So that according to him; God is both Good, & Wise by Will, and not by any Nature, And h|H|e is \being/ nothing but Blind Indifferent & Fortuitous Will, Omnipotent And {yt} all Divine Perfections are swallowed up into Will, or \That {hath}/ a Triangle hath two right angles not three Angles, equall to two right Angles,; yt Equalls ad{y}|d|ed to {,} Equalls, do not make Equalls,; or yt two & two, are not f|F|oure, \according to him and/ otherwise then because they \all these/ are \are/ were made such; by an Arbitrary decree of God Almighty Wheras according to Scripture God is \a Nature of/ Infinite Love, God|o|dness, or Benignity Displaying it selfe, according to Infinite and Perfect Wisdom, \& Govern Rat. Creat. in Righteousnes/ & this is <71r> Liberty of ye Deity of a pure Perfection so yt it consisteth not in Infinite Indifferencye Blindy & Arbitrary\ryly/ Determining all things. There is a nature of Goodness and a Nature of Wisdom, Anticedent to the Wil Rule & Will of God wch is ye Rule & Measure of it. But this Hypothesis of Carthesius \alike/ overthrows all Morallity & Sience at once making Truth & Falshood as well as ye morall difference|s| of Good & Evell, meer Arbitrary things, Will & not Nature \thereby also/ destroyes all f\F/aith and Trust or Confidence in God, as well as ye Certainty of Christianity |Religion.|

Upon this ground or Principle of God having an Arbitrary Contingent Free Will to all-things, do|id| some of ye Arian Party endeavour to overthrow the Divinity of ye Sonne or Word, Because God must needs Begett Him Unwillingly unless He Begott Him, by an Arbitrary Contingent Free Will, wch would make him <72r> have a Preca{t}|r|ious existence & to be destroyable again at Pleasure, & Consequently to be a Creature, But Athanasius & the other Catholick Fathers in oppossision here untoo, maintained That God ye Father Begott a Sonne, not by Arbitrary Free Will but in way of na naturall Emmination Incorporeall & yett not therefore u|U|nwillingly nor yett without Will neither but his Will and Nature here concuring & being ye same; it being, both a Naturall Will, & Will-ing Nature. So yt the Sonne Begotten thus from Eternitye f\r/om \by/ ye Essentiall Fecunditye of ye Father and from his overflowing Perfection, (which therfore is no necessa|i|ty Impossed upon |him| nor yett a blind & stupid nature as yt of fire burning or ye Sunne shining) This Divine Apaugesma or outseing shineing \splendor/ of God ye Father hath no Percarious but a necessary Existence and his \is/ Undestroyable. Wheras all Creatures having once had a Begining cannot Possibi|e|ly <73r> have a necessary Existence where it only for this reason because they once were not. But besides, this, there can be no Repugnance, but yt, what once was n|N|ot might Not be again; or be reduced to nonexistence by yt wch gave it a Being out of Nothing. Wherfore tho’ it should be affirmed yt Cr{e}|e|aturs also did Proceed by way of Emmi|a|nation from ye Deity, as Being a kind of λόγος προφορικὸς \of/ God Almighty it yett was this Em̄i|a|nation, of another kind from yt Naturall & necessary Em̄ination of the Sonne, or \namely/ a Vollentary Em̄i|a|nation suspenddable. Nor can it be denied but yt God Almighty, might by his Absolute Power Annihilate this Whole Creation; a|A|s suppose, if all Rationall Creaturs should d|D|egenerate (as a Great part have done) & Continue obstinatly in their Apostase|y,| \× ×/ < insertion from p72v > × (As a late sect supposeth, the Annihilation of wicked mens Soules, after ye Day of Iudgment Concluding this to be the Second Death Threatned–) And then instead therof Create another < insertion ends > & in-stead hereof \should/ create a|A|nother World of Rationall Creaturs Which Conceite of other <74r> Worlds Created before this, for|ro|m Eternity has been entertained by some \×/ < insertion from p73v > of the Christian Profession who assert the Novity of this World according to Scripture. Besides, < insertion ends > b|B|esides ye Stoicks who asserted \Hath not onely been {ow}ned by ye Stoicks asserting/ an Infinite Vicissitude and Revolution of Worlds all new, one after another, \all new/ as to the Rationall Creaturs in them Not to mention here yt a late Sect assert ye Annihilation of Huma ye Souls of Wicked men after the Day of Iudgment as ye meaning of yt Eternall & \Death/ thearned {sic} in Scripture. |A| < insertion from p73v > A Wherfore we Conclude with St Iohn ye writer of the Apocl|a|lips But also hath been surmized by some of ye Christ. Profess. it being indeed Origen himself having some vmbrage of it < insertion ends >

All Will, is generally Acknowledged to have this Naturally of \or/ Necessity belonging to it, to \be/ de {t}|t|erminated in Good, as it’s Object, it being Impossible yt any Intelligent Being should Will Evell as such; Therfore it seems both Rationall and Pious to conceive, yt ye b|B|est of all Beings, is \who is/ Essensially Good & Wise should allways acte agreeabl|e|y to it’s own Nature, and therfore Will ye Best; And Consequently make ye World in ye best Manner that it was Capable of Some <75r> indeed there are who will needs pretend yt God doth not allways do the Best, because they suppose this to be an Essentiall Freedom and Liberty in Him, to be Indifferent to Will either {to} ye Better or ye Worser, Which is all \one/ as to say yt God \He is {sic}/ is Indifferent, either to Acte \Either/ according to His owne Wisdom and Goodness, or not. But none of these Men nor any {E|Æ|}theis \Atheists/ neither, was|er||e| ever \yet/ able yett to show how ye Workmenship of God in any part of ye World, or in their own Bodyes could h |haue| been mended in ye least thing yt is. Nor can Gods Providence in ye Goverment of Rationall Creatures be suspected not to the Best, by any who believes yt God \He/ hath oppointed a day wherein He will Iudge ye World In Rightousness \& without respect of Pers. render to ev. mā accordg to his works/. When Moses tells us yt \of/ Gods Pronounced|ing| of of every things yt He had made, yt it was טוב מאוד very Good, We may well \are/ |to| Understand ye meaning to be, yt it was ye Best, the Hebrews having no other way to express\g/ the Superlitive by


Notwithstanding which, Arbitrary & Contingent Liberty is not qu{iet}|ite| excluded from ye Deity by us, there being many cases in wch there is no Best, but a great Scope & Latitude, for things to be determined either this way or yt way, by ye Arbitrary Will & Pleasure of God Almighty As for Instance the World being supposed to be Finite, (wch can {sic} \as it can/ no more be Infinite, then it could be Eternall) that it was \should be/ Iust of such a bigness \& not a jot Less or Bigger/, is \from by/ ye Arbitrary Determination \Appointment/ of God, since no man \it/ can with Reason affirme yt it was absolutely Best yt it should a been \somuch so much as an Inch or hairs breadth/ b|B|igger or Lesser then it is. the number of ye Stars is certainly \must needs be/ either Even, or Odd, but it can not be said yt either of them is \is Absolutely in itself, ye/ Best |Nor yet that there shoul the Nūber of those Nebulosæ stellæ| nor yt there ought to have been One more or Less, of those Nebulosæ Stella yt appear to our Sight as small as pin-dust, /should be iust so many as they are, & neither one more or lesse\ So likewise the number of Created Angles and Humane Souls or yt every one of u|U|s had a Being & a Consiousness of our Selves, must needs be Determined by ye Arbitrary <77r> Will & Pleasure of ye Deity, who can Obliterate and Blott \any one of/ us out again \out of Being/ & yett the World b not be a jott ye less Perfect by it; Wherefore we may {sic} \However we may/ well conclude with ye Writer of the Apocalyps \readily/ beare a Part & ioyn with ye four & twenty Elders in ye Apocalips f|F|alling down before ye Throne & saying \in that song of theirs/ Thou art worthy O Lord to Receive Glory; & Honour, & Power, for thou hath|st| created all things, και διὰ τὴν θέλη{τ}|σ|ιν σου, & for thy will (or \or/ Pleasure) they are, & were Created All our Perticular Beings were determined by ye Arbitrary Will & Pleasure of God & ye \The/ Whole Creation is not therfore the Less for his Will & Pleasure Because {h} it was his Will & Please Pleasure \was/ to do the \make ye Whole/ Best, or because the Best is his \therfore His/ Will and Pleasure after the Best manner < insertion from p77v > Tho all things in ye Vnivers had not been Arbitrarily made, such as they are; but according to ye Best Art & wisdom; yet were they not therf {t} \{lesse}/ διὰ τὴν θελησιν αυτου \θεοὺ/ for his will \of God/; it being his will & Pleasure, to make them according to \his/ wisdome — Or to order all things in Number measure & weight — wisd. 11. 20. < insertion ends >


Chap. 13|5|{sic} 15

They Instances of the \τὰ/ ενδεχόμενα ἂλλωι ἔχειν, as the Greeks call them, \such things as Things that are/ as, contingently, & \or/ Unnecessaryly such, as they are, have been frequently given \both by modern & Ancient writers,/ in Inanimate Bodys; wch yett \that/ have no selfe-moving, nor selfe-P changing Power, and therefore are \can/ never \bee/ moved nor changed \but/ but, as to themselves, necessaryly. As for example, yt That it may either, Rain or not Rain to morrow; That the Wind may either \then/ Blow, either from the \North/ South, or from ye North \South./ These & such like Instances are \haue been/ Com̄only given by Ancient Writers \as well as modern)/ who Assert Contingencie agaīst ye Democriticall or Stoickcall \Fate,/ of \or Necessity of/ all Actions; but \as I consider very improperly./ very absurdly. For tho’ there be an absolute \in Nature A/ Possibility, \of either of these,/ and Uncertainty to us wch there is an Uncertainty to us wch \of them/ will bee, yett wch so’ever of them did \at any time/ come to pass did not |it| come\th not/ to pass by any Contingent Liberty of <79r> it’s own; but was \is/ Determined necessaryly and yt \Determined/ by naturall & necessary Causes Antecedent \or without./ As for yt other \com̄on/ Instance, of ye Cast of a Dy, there is \Here is/ no Contingencie or non-Necessa|i|ty at all, of \neither, in/ ye motion of ye Dy, after it is out of ye Caster’s hand, tho’ it be Uncertain to us with {sic} side will fall uppermost. But there is a \is indeed \may be/ an Antecedent/ Contingencie in the Posture, & f\F/orce, \or Imputed/ of the t|T|hrower, with \wch / is to be Distinguished by \frō/ ye motion of ye Dy it selfe. Nobody, wch \that/ is by Nature ἐτεροκινητὸν; allways moved by some thing else & never \originally from/ it selfe, can have a Contingencie, \or Non-necessity,/ in it’s own motion, as such, tho’ it may be Contingently moved by some thing else, wch hath \having/ a Power over it’s own Action to determine ye same.

× < insertion from p78v p79v > But |Wherefore| there cannot possibely be any thing more senseless and Absurd then ye Doctrine of Epicurus, who assa{n} Asserting a Contingent Liberty of Willing \in all/ Animalls, f|F|ree from f|F|ate & necessity, Derived the Originall therof, from a Contingent Declination of Senseless Atums {for} from the p|P|erpendicular, more or less \{illeg} and vncertainly/ this way or yt way. L. 2. 44. 45. Sed {d}|n|e Res ipsa Necessū Intestinū habeat, cunctis in rebus Agendis, Et Devicta quasi cogatur Ferre Patique, Id facit exiguū Clinamē Principiorum, Nec regione Loci certa, nec tempore certo. And this forsooth upon this pretence Lest any thing should come from nothing, or be \be made/ without a Cause. Quare in Seminibꝯ quo idē fateare necesse est Esse etiam præter Plagas et Pondera Causam Motibus. Vnde hæc est nobis innata Potestas. De Nihilo quoniam fieri nihil posse videmus. Which is all one as if \Wherfore/ for \ye/ avoidg thi{i} y \y/ \Contingent Libertys/ Coming from Nothing, or \being/ without a cause, or from \He assigns it/ a{in} Impossible cause caused to Derive <79v> |For| Nothing being \can be/ more Impossible then \this/ yt A Senseless matter \Atom/ wch hath no Selfe-moveing Power, should have in it a Contingent Liberty, of moveing it self this way or yt way. < insertion ends >

Nevertheless it may well be Questioned whether there may not be <80r> somthing of Contingencie \or Non-necessity/ of \in/ ye Actions of Brute-Animalls, tho’ it be out of question that they have nothing of morallyty in them \or Morall Freewill in them;/ We did before take notice of a certain kind of Liberty from Necessity, where Blame or Com̄andations had no place called by some of the Ancients Epeleustick, where ther being an Equall Eligibility in severall Objects wthout ye Lest difference, we can determine our selves Fortuitously to either of them, Now it is hard \not easy/ to exclude Brute Animalls from this \sua {sic} a/ Contingencie, \as this/ for \Becaus/ there may be Objects, equally pro Propossed, \to them/ (as of meat & Drink) \to/ exactly equall proposed \to/ them; & equal \placed at such/ æquall Distences and for a considerable time; so yt \as that/ it cannot be conceived, what Physickall cause \there should be/ should necessaryly |to| determine them \at last,/ to either \of them, or/ & \And this rather than that. And/ yett they will not hang in <81r> suspence, but will \certainly/ do One. \or other/ So \again/ when there is \where they are Distracted betwixt/ an Equall f|F|ear and Aversation Equall \on one side & Equall/ h|H|ope and \or/ Desire \on ye other/ at ye Sametime, \as a Dog betwixt a {whip} & a Bone,/ there|y| will not allways \hang on/ be in Brutes or \continue in demurr/ Suspence of Action tho’ the Scales be \were be/ exactly even, or a \& is a/ \& yt/ Perfect Isorrope of \as to/ {of} motives & causes, but there will after a Determination wch /sometimes one way, sometimes Another, wch \ cannot well be thought necessaryly but contingence & Fortuitous x \Without any thing of \Fortuitous/ Contingency or Fortu/

Moreover Epicurus was of O Opinion, yt as well Brute Animalls, as Men, had a Power o|O|ver themselves, of E|I|ntending themselves more or less, to Essentiall or \their a Sensuall or/ Animall, Good, Phancied by them;

Gif. p. 44

Nonne vides etiam Patefactis tempore puncto, Carcerebus, non posse tamen


where he Conceived, yt Brutes were not meerly Passive, to their own Phancies & Hormæ, but yt they could Add somthing of the \of their own/ to them of their own, more or less, & actually Actively Intend themselves more or less beyound what they sufferd or \yt/ was \by/ Nature Imprest upon them, Which if it be So, then must there be somthing in Brutes Superior \to their Hormæ/ Some One thing; wch taking Notice, both of outward Objects by sense, and of it’s own \Phancie &/ Hormæ can Intend them. \more or less/ & add to them. more or less to them.

And there \may/ seems to be some \further/ Probi|ba|bility \of this;/ from Hence, because we find by Experience, yt Brutes \are/ many of them are Doscible, & can have acquire \Acquire/ habits, to do many things, even to admiration., Now Phancies and Hormæ \as such/ are not capable of h|H|abits, no more then of Freewill - And that which is And therfore that in wch these Habits is, \in & \wch / thus/ determining|s| their Motions, (& their Hormæ too), must be a kind of Hegemonick in the Acting \probably/ not without some contingency \+ A/ < insertion from p81v > A Ind

However, it is not easy to beleeve that every motion \wagging/ of a Dogs tayle, or of a \every motion of a wanton/ kitling sportfully playing & toying, or of a Flea skipping, hath such a Necessary Cause, as that it could never \{ev}|w|as none of them/ possibly frō Eternity haue that it should haue been otherwise – < insertion ends >


Chap. 16

But what ever be ye Case of Brute Animalls as to this perticular, whose Insides we cannot enter into, Yet we being in ye Inside of our Selves, \do/ know certainly by inward Sense yt there is in us, some One Hegemonicall thing wch comprehending all ye \ye our/ other powers Energies and Capacityes of ye \our/ Soule, in wch ἀνακεφαλου οῦνται they are Recollected & as it were sum̄ed up, having a Power of Intending and Exerting it Selfe More or Less, Determineth not only Action but also ye whole C Passive Capi|a|bility of our Naturs One way or other, either for ye Better or ye Worse

And I say yt according to Reason there must of necessity be such a thing in as this in Men & all \Imperfect Beings,/ Rationall Creaturs \or Soules Vitally/ United to Bodyes. For there being so many severall Faculties, & \different/ kinds of Energies in them, as ye Sensitive Perfec\cep/tion of outward \Bodily/ Objects together with Bodily Pleasure & Pain, Sudden Phancies & Hormæ Appi|e|tites {Invadeing} and Passions to wards a Present seeming Good or against a Present Parant \apparent/ Evell \rising vp in vs or/ <84r> Coming upon us & Invading us, with great f|F|orce and Urgencie, t|T|hen ye \Freer/ Reason of our Private Utility wch discovering future Inconveniencies \Present & Future attending them/ often contradicts these Appitites to\of/ a Present sensuall Good Again ye higer higher Superior Dictate of Honesty wch many times is Inconsistent \both/ with both the Appitites of a present sensuall Good \the/ or \of Pleasure or Vtility/ of a greater f|F|uture \& ye Reason of Private Vtility/ wch our Reason hath a Prospect of. Besides. these a Speculative Power wch can \of/ contemplat|ing| et \De/ Omnia ente & non ente of what soever is, & is not in Nature, and of ye Truth & falshood of things Universall, wch \whence is/ obtrudes upon \vs/ ye \Notiō of a God & His/ Existence of a God as \as/ ye Object of Religion, the Substantiallyty & \or/ Permanent Subsistence of our \own/ Souls after ye Bodyes decaying, Last|ly a| Deliberateing Power, of what is to be done in Life in order to ye Promoteing of our own Good, and upon Emergent occasions.. I say there being so māy wheels in the Machin of our <85r> Souls, unless yy were \be/ all aplye \knitt &/ put together so as to conspire into One, and \vnles/ there be some one thing Presideing \over the intending itself more or lesse/ Directing and ordering It \{them}/ could itself \& giving ye First for Action/ go forward in motion, & \nor could/ there could be any \but there must be/ thing but A Confution & Destraction \in it & wee must/ so yt it would be allway in a \needs b in a Perpetually in/ Puizle + We should be like |to| a disjoynted Machin or an O Autuamaton or all whose wheels are not \well/ sett together; which who \therfore will be/ eather be at a stand continually, or \els/ go on very slowly heavyly & combursomly, \we It/ could never carry on \evenly/ any steady Designes, nor manage it selfe orderly & agreeably in any understakeing, but would be altogether \A Thing/ Inapte for Action.

If apetites & Passion rise necessaryly from Objects without and ye Reason of private Utilitye \did/ necessaryly suggest something contrary to them from the Consideration of other Present Inconveniences or future \ill/ Consequencies unless \were/ there be \not/ some midle thing here to Interpose <86r> as the \or to/ Humpire between them, we must of necessity be here \Non-pluq; ea/ at a stand b|B|ut if either of these by the Prevelencie of \its superiority of/ Strenght, did \always/ necessaryly prevail over the other; then \would/ was that other \be/ altogether Useless & superflus & so \And so the whole/ a Bungle in nature.

The case is ye same as to the Clashing & discord, betwext ye superior Dictate of Honesty & Conscience and yt of sensuall Pleasure or Private Utility. If these two be e|E|quall Ponderate\ant/ & \as scales in a Ballance/ there be no hand to turn the ca scale, \or cast in Gram’s of Advantage either way/ then must ye Machin of ye Soul be at a Stand, b|B|ut if one \of these/ do always necessaryly Preponderate over the other, then is the Lighter altogether Idle and to no purpose.

\Again/ If speculative & deliberative t|T|hought be alway necessary in us both as to Exercise & to Objects \specification/ then must it be either because they are all necessaryly Produced & determined by <87r> Objects of sense from without according to the Doctrine |of| Democritick & Hobbetian Atheis or else because ye Understanding \allways/ necessaryly worketh of it self upon {illeg} this or that Object, & Passeth from one Object to a nother by a necessary {strain} {scerious, a\es/} a t\T/rain, or\&/ Concatination of thoughts \vpō supposition of ye/ If ye former, \of these we/ then could we never \think of any thing, nor/ /speak a word about \of/ any thing time\ but what Objects of sense \without did/ at yt time Obtruded up {us} \In vs vnavoidably/ - We could never devert our own thoughts, nor stop the {ferrere} \Inundation/ of them \{though a frō ye} stream of \frō/ Objects flowing/ nor entertain any /constant\ design /of Life,\ or carry on any Projects for ye future; we being only passive to ye Present of Objects of Sense, \before vs,/ \all/ our thoughts being all \all/ scribled \or stamped/ upon us by them our souls by them, \by them/ as \vpō/ a White sheet of Paper by them \X/


But if ye Latter, \of these; be supposed/ then could we never have any present|ce| of mind, {\no ready/ accation} to Emmergent{s} Accurrences or occat|s|ions no self Recollection \but/ our minds would be always Roveing \strugleing/ & Rambling, \out,/ we having no Power over them, to call them in \back frō their struglings and/ fix them, or determine them, on any \certain/ Objects, or to any Purposes.

Lastly if we could not Intend our selves in d|D|eligence of Activitye & Indeavours more or less \set ourselvs to pursue any Purpose or Designe, to/ fortify our minds with Resolution, |to| excite our selves to watchfullness and sercumspection, \to/ Recollect ourselves more and less, to \in/ consider|ing| all our Intrests, & Concerns, < insertion from p88v > cannot fr If we could not frō ourselves exert any Act of Vertue or Devotion for wch we should be Truly \deserv/ Prais-|e|worth, nor any thing that \Act of sinne for wch / we should iustly Deserve \any/ Blame for, we should be < insertion ends > we should be but Tanquam Nervis alienis Mobile Lignum, a dead machins moved by Gim̄ers & wyers. - A thing wch can-

To conclude God Almighty Almighty could not make such a Rationall creature as this is, all whose joynts \springs & wheels of Motion/ are \were/ Necessaryly tyed togather wch had|th| no self-Power \& yt hath/ no Hegemonick, or Ruleing Principle \nothing to knitt & vnite ye multifarious \parts of/ action together int con/ in Him \to knitt all, or to steer & manage ye conduct of itself/ no more then He could have made all ye Birds of ye Aire \onely/ wth one \onely/ Wing all ye Beasts of the feild Horses & other cattle <90r> and three Leggs, for ye Idea of these things is nothing so Ina|e|pte as that of an Imperfect Rationall Being, all whose Powers & wheels of action move \are/ necessaryly, \tyed together,/ wch hath no one thing Presideing |in| it & Governing, \in it,/ have\ing/ a selfe Intending, & selfe Determining & selfe Promoteing Power

Wherefore this αυτεξουσιον, Sui Potestas self-Power, com̄only called Liberty of Will is no Arbitrary \contrivance or/ appointment of Deitye \meerly by Will/ \{annexed} to Rationall & Creatures,/ {what yt} \but a thing/ wch of necessity belongs to ye Idea or Natures of an Imperfect Rationall Being w|W|hereas a Perfect Being. a|E|ssens|t|ially Good & wise, is above |t|his f|F|ree Will or self Power, it being Impossible yt it should either \ever/ Improve itselfe, or \much less/ Impaire it self |– But an Imperf Rationall being \wholy/ without any \this/ self-power, is an Inept moped, & monstrous, ×| < insertion from p89v > × thing. So ye \& therfore/ such a Thing \as God/ could not not be made by God \make/. But if he would make any Imperfect Rationall Creature, he must of necessity g endue \them/ with an Ηγεμονικον, or self Ruling Power — Wherfore that Wch by accident follows frō the Abuse of this Power, cannot be Imputed to God – Almighty – as ye Cause of it – \viz Sinne & {w vice} & wickedness/ Since he must either make no Imperfect Rationall Creatures Beings, \at all,/ or els make th  {sic} \{sush} {sic} who will may/ Lapsable & Peccable by their own Default – < insertion ends >

Chap - 17

I have now but one thing more to add & yt is to take notice of a com̄on mistake wch Learned men <91r> have been com̄only Guilty of, |And| yt is of confounding this Faculty of Free Will with Liberty as it is a state of \Pure/ Perfection For what is more com̄on then in writ writings wth Ancient & Modern, to find men creaking & boasting of the εξουσὶα τῶν αντικειμένων, the Liberty of Contrareity, i.e. to Good or Evill, as if this were really a Liberty of Perfection, to be in an Es Indifferent Equilibrious State, to do g|G|ood or Evill Morall. wch is too like the Language of ye First Tempter. Thou shalt be as God, to know\ing/ Good & Evill. Whereas ye True Liberty of a man, as a \it speaks/ Pure Perfection, is when by the Right vse of ye Faculty of Free will, together with ye Assistence of Divine Grace, he is Habitually Fixed {illeg} \in/ Morall Good, or such a state of mind, as yt he doth Freely, readily & Easily comply with ye Law of the Divine Life; taking a Pleasur \in/ and Complacence theruntly; and having an Aversation to ye Contrary: o|O|r when ye Law of ye Spirit of Life, \shall/ mad|k|es him free, from ye Law of Sinne, wch is the Death of ye Soule;

But when |by| ye Abuse of that Naturall Faculty of Freewill, men come to \be/ Habitually Fixed in Evill, & sinfull Inclinations, then are they <92r> as Boetius will expresseth it, Propria Libertate Captivi made Captive, and brought into Bondage, \& brought into/ & Bondage{illeg} by their own Freewill, & obnoxious to Divine Iustice \& Displeasure/ for ye same. Whosoever \customarily/ com̄itteth sinne, wch is by a mans \his own/ Freewill abused &|or| Perversly vsed, contrary to ye Design of God & Nature in it bestowing it \{ye same}/ vpon vs, is thereby made ye servant of it, and Deprived of that True \state of/ Liberty, wch is a Mans Perfection \+/

The Faculty of Freewill is Good, wherby Men are advanced above the Low Condition of Brute-Animals, who are vnder a Necessity of Following their Phancies Hormæ, and Appetites of to a Sensuall Good Onely, or |a| Good of Private Selfish Vtility, they having no Sense of yt Good of Honesty, \& Righteousnes,/ wch is of a Different kind f|F|rom it. But this Faculty being that wch is Proper to Creatures onely, and to Imperfect Beings, \onely/ hath a Mixture of Creaturely \weaknes &/ Imperfection in it; and therfore is Oli liable to be Abused, so as thereby to become \to ourselvs,/ ye Causes of or own Bondage & Servitude. Wheras True Liberty <93r> wch is a State, of Vertue, Holines, & Righteousnes, C (A Com̄unicated Divine Perfection) can never be Abused \X/ or Participation of the Divine Nature, can never be Abused.

Chap. 18

I now Proceed to Answer all ye Arguments or Objections made agst this \Faculty of ye το/ ἔφ ἡμιν \#/ or αυτεξου\σι/ον, this|e| Sui-Potestas, Power over ourselvs, \wch inferrs Contingency or Non-necessity & is/ com̄only called Arbitriū and Liberum Arbitrium + \ye Foundat. of Praise & Dispraise, of Retributive Iustice/ which as it /And this as ye matter\ hath \Rewarding & Punishing/ been |now| allready explained by vs, \And this as ye matter/ will be very Easy \for vs/ to do

And First I begin̄, with the Pretended Ground, why it \this/ should be, πρὰγμα ἀνύπαρατον, A thing wch hath no Existence in Nature, but \in itself vintelligible &/ Absolutely Impossible \X/ The first wherof is this, yt nothing can m|M|ove or Act any way, but as it is m|M|oved or a|A|cted upon by Somthing else without it. \× ×/

< insertion from p92v > × × This Argument is thus Rediculou|s|ly propounded by Mr Hobbs I conceive yt nothing taken begining from it self but from ye Action of Som other Immediate Agent without it self But But his meaning if he had any meaning could be no other then this yt no Action taketh begining from ye Agent it self, but from ye Action of some other Agent without it. Which is all one as if he should say yt no Agent can begin to Acteth from it self nor otherwise then as it is Passive |for| to some other Agent, without it, that is there is nothing self-moving nor selfe Acting in ye World nothing yt Acteth otherwise then as it suffereth or is made to Acte by something else without < insertion ends > now if this Proposition be true, it must needs be granted yt there can be no Contingent Liberty or freedom from <94r> necessity in nature, but all things \will/ depend upon a Chain or Series of Causes each link wherof is necessa\r/yly coll|nn|ected both frō what\th what went/ when before, & what follows after, from all Eternity, or ye Begi

But it is certain yt this Argument makes no more against Contingentcie, or non-necessity, then it doth against the Existence of a God or \or and \an/ vnmooved Moover and/ first Cause, \of all things/ yt is of equall force both ways, & therfor if it doth substancially & Effectually Prove ye necessity of all Actions Then doth it as much prove, \firmly evince/ yt there is no first \Cause no vnmooved \or/ Uncaused/ Cause or \yt is no/ God. And I do not Question, but yt this is ye very thing which Mr Hobbs amay \Principally/ ame’d at, Tho he disguizes him Self \His design/ some what \as well \much/ as he could/, in his Book d|D|e Corpore cap 26. p. 237. Etsi ex eo &c. Altho’ from hence, yt nothing can move it self it is rightly enough Infered, yt there is a f|F|irst mover yt was Eternall; \yet/ neverthes|l|ess it can not be Infer\r/ed from thence yt as it com̄only <95r> Com̄only |is| supposed \That there is any Eternall Im̄oveable \or Vnmooved/ Moover,/ but on ye Contrary, yt there is an Eternall Mooved \Mooved Moover,/ Because as it is true yt nothing is moved from it selfe, So is it likewise true, yt nothing is moved but from a|A|nother, wch was it selfe also before moved, by somthing else. In wch words he doth at once endeavour to Conqvey ye \Transfuse \& convey/ ye Poyson/ & Ætheism of and \yet so/ to do it, so craftily, as yt if \he be/ charged with it, he may\ight/ have some \seeming/ subterfuge, or e|E|vasion; h|H|e says|th| at first, it is rightly Infered, yt there is some |First| Eternall mover; \wch seems to looks very well;/ but \then/ He doth not stand to this it \this/, but Contradicts it \im̄ediately afterwards/ in d|D|enieing yt there is any Eternall Immovable mover, or any other Eternall mover, then such as was it self before mooved by some \thing els,/ other; \thing/ wch is all one, as to say, yt there is \was/ no f|F|irst mover; \×/ < insertion from p94v > × But one thing mooved another frō Eternity without any Beginning, any First moover Any vnmooved Self moved Moover < insertion ends > For the f|F|irst mover \if there be indeed any such,/ must \needes/ be an Unmoved mover wch was not \not/ it self \before/ moved \or Acted/ before by any \any/ other, |but a selfmoving mover.|


But this whole Argument is ye most wch \thus/ at once strickes\ing/ against contingencie, & ye Being of a God, \both together, and & wch / \intends to the \Mathematic Evidence of/ Demonstration, is thē ridiculous/ most Egregious |piece of| nonsense yt ever \yet/ was written for, if there be motion in the World then of necessity Corporeall world, as there is, \& no part of it could moove Itself,/ then must there of Necessity, be some Vnmooved \or selfmoving/ thing \as ye First Cause therof,/ as the Cause. Something wch could Moove \or Act/ frō itself, or Acting frō itself without being \Mooved or/ Acted vpō or Mooved by Another; which was the Cause therof Becaus if nothing \at all/ could mooue or Act by it selfe, but only as it was moued or acted upon by another then could \not/ motion \nor Action/never \ever Begin or/ have come into ye \Corporeall/ World; but since there is {illeg} motion in ye \corporeal/ World \{needs} either originally Proceed frō a First Vnmooved \or selfmooving/ moover {illeg} or els/ it must all come from nothing, and been Produced wthout a Cause. \X/

But the truth is, This, that these unskilfull Phylosophers apply that to all Being what soever wch is ye \Property of/ Body only, yt it cannot move \itself Locally/ from Itself, nor otherwise \moov,/ then as it is <97r> Caused to move by Somthing else, \without it,/ a|A|s it can not Stop \its/ motion neither, when it is \once/ Imprest upon it; (it being wholy of a Passive nature.) And from hence is afforded an Undeniable Demonstration, \to vs,/ yt there is some Incorporeall Being and somthing \Vnmoved or/ self-moveing & Self Acting|ve| \as ye First Cause of all Motiō & Actiō/ which it \such {as it}/ self not being moved Locally \Nor Acted/ by another, can cause body to move, \Locally,/ & did at first Impress such \Quantitye of motion upon the/ a Corporeall motion universe, as is now \there is/ in it.

Wherefore if ye Issue of this Contraverse, Concerning necessity and Contingencie, \Depend vpō this/ whether or no there be anything self moveing or self Acting \As the Gran/ (as it doth in \a/ great measure) it is Then demonstratively Certain; it is demonstrative Certain yt the cause of necessity, must needs fall to ye grounde


Chap -

Again it is Objected, yt tho’ it should be granted yt There was Somthing Self Moveing & Self Acting\ive/ & wch was not meerly Passive to \Another/ Something else without it, \Acting vpon it,/ yett for all that, it is not possible, yt anything should Determine it self, Actively change it selfe, or Act upon it Selfe, because One & ye Same thing cannot be both Agent and Patient at once.

To wch I reply, f|F|irst yt there is no necessity, yt what Acteth from it self should always Act Uniformly or without any difference or change That in us, wch moves ye members of our body by Cogitation or Will, doth not allway do it alike, but Determineth \itselfe/ differently therin, Acting somtime on one member somtimes on another, moving somtimes this way sometimes yt way & with <99r> more or less {& with a} Celerity & strenght and somtimes Arresting motion \again/ So yt nothing can be more plain then yt by Determining it self Differently, it \dos accordingly/ determin|e|et ye motion of ye Body. And it is Contrary to ye Verdict of our Inward Sense \To affirm/ yt when we thus move our Body & members Arbitraryly & at pleasure, no \one/ motion of our Finger no Nictation of our Eye Lids \no word spoken by our Toungue/ could \ever/ possiblybyly have been otherwise, then it was at yt time but yt it was necessaryly \so/ Determined, by a successive chain of causes, from all Eternity or at Least from ye Begining of ye World. Much less, as Mr Hobbs further Dogmatizes; yt there is no one of these a Actions, how Causall or Contingent so ever it seem; to ye causing wherof, did not \at once/ Concur, what soever is in Rarum Naturæ \x/

That wch determineth it self, & changeth it self made|y| be said to Acte upon it self & <100r> Consequently, to be both Agent & Patient. Now tho’ this cannot possibily belong, to a body wch cannot \never/ moves it self, but is Essentially ἑτεροκινητὸν, always moved by somthing else without it, yett yt wch is by nothing hinders, but yt what is by nature αὐτοκινητὸν Selfe-moving, & Self-Acting\ve/ may also Determine it’s own Motion or Activite, & so the same, be \said to be/ both Agent and Patiente. We are certain by inward Sense, yt we can Reflect upon our selves and Consider our selves, wch is a Certain Reduplication of Life, in a higher degree; For all Cogitated|ive| Beings as such, are selfeconscious, Tho’ Conscience in a Pa|e|culiar Sense, be com̄only attributed to Rationall Beings only, and such as are sensible of a|the| Discrimen Honestorum when et Turpium, when they Iudge of their own Actions according to yt <101r> Rule & either Condemne or excuse \acquitte/ them selves. Wherfore yt wch \is thus/ is self Conscious \of itselfe/ and self Reflect un Reflexive upon it self, may also \as well/ Act upon it self, either \as/ Fortuitously Determining it’s own Activity; or else \as/ Intending\ing & Exerting/ it self more or less, in order to ye Promoteing of its own good /+\

Chap + |20.|

But it is still further Objected, yt \A/ not|T|hing wch is Indifferent as such, can never \never/ determine it self to move or Acte any \either \any/ way,/ but must needs Containe in suspence without Action, to all Eternity, This \is an/ Argument wch Pomponatious Relyes much upon, to destroy Contingent Liberty of Will, and esta Establish a fatall Necessity of all Actions

And here we must |again| Observe again yt what belongeth to Bodyes only, is by these Philosophers unduely Extended, to all Beings what soever, Tis true that a Body wch is unable to move it <102r> self & \but/ Passively Indifferent to Receive any motion Imprest upon it, once Resting, must needs continue to Rest to all Eternity, unless it be determined to this or yt motion, by something else without And if it should be Impelled different ways \at once/ by two equall forces \it/ can never be able of it self to move one \either/ way or other. Two Scales b|P|ut into a Perfect Equalpoyze \Poize/ can neither of them \move/ upward or down-ward. But if will not therfore follow yt if equall motives to Action Equall appearences of Good after them selves to aman He must therefore stand for ever in an Horrope or Equi-Liberium, and can never determine himselve to Acte one way or other

Nevertheless this is a great mistake of Pompantius & many others to to {sic} think yt that Liberty of Will wch is the foundation of Praise or Dispraise, \must/ consisteth in a man’s haveing an \Perfect/ Indifference after all motives & Reasons of Acting|on| Propounded and after the last practicall Iudgment to <103r> Iudgment to, to do this or yt to choose the Better or yt Worser & to Determine Him selfe Fortuitously either way, for ye Contingencie of Free Will doth not Consist in such a Blind Indifferencie as this is, after the Last Iudgment,; \& all Motives of Action considered;/ but it is Antecedent therunto, in aman’s Intending or Exerting Himselfe more or less, \both/ in Consideration & in Resolution to Resist ye Inferio\u/r appetites & Inclinations urging to ye Worser.

Chap 19

Another Argument used to Prove yt Contingent Free Will is a thing that can have no Existence from \in/ Nature \is/ because it is Reasonable to think yt all Elections \& Volitions/ are Determined by ye Reasons of Good, & therfore by ye Appearence of the greater Good; n|N|ow the Reasons & a|A|ppearences of Good are in ye Understanding only And therfore are not Arbitrary but Necessary. w|W|hence it will follow yt <104r> all Elections & Volitions must needs be necessary.

But Aristotle Himselfe seems to have had a suspition\long since,/ made a Question of this whether all a|A|ppearences of Good be\were/ necessary or no? And it is most Certain yt they are not so. For as we do more or less Intend our selves in Consideration & deliberation;, \&/ as we do more or less fortifye our Resolutions to rest resist ye Lower a\A/ppetites and Passions so will they Appearences of Good, & our Practicall Iudgments be Different to us accordingly, Whence it \frequently/ comes to pass, yt ye same motives & Reasons have not ye same effect upon Different Men, nor yett upon {D} ye same man at Different times. Wherfore this is but one of the Uulgar Errors; to think yt men are meerly Passive to ye Appearences of Good & \to/ their own Practicall Iudgments


Chap. 22

Another Argument for ye Naturall necessity of all Actions much used by ye Stoicks is is \was/ this, That Ουδεν ἀναίτιον nothing can be without a Cause ind and what soever hath a Cause must of necessity come to pass. m|M|r Hobbs endeavours \thinks/ to Improve this & to make \Argum. into/ a|A| demonstration of it against contingent Liberty in|after| this manner. Nothing can com to pass without a sufficient Cause & a sufficient Cause is yt to wch nothing is wanting \needfull/ to enable it to produce ye Effect, Wherfore every sufficient Cause must needs be a necessasary Cause, or produce ye Effect necessaryly

To wch \childish Argumentation The/ ye \the/ reply is easie; that athing may have sufficient power \or want \therto/ no Power necessary to enable it/ to produce an Effect, wch yett hath \may haue/ power \also or Freedom/ not to Produce it too Nothing is produced without an Effecient Cause & such a|n| \Effic/ Cause as had sufficiencie of Power to \enable it to/ produce it. <106r> \But yet yt wch had Thing wch Person who had sufficient Power to Produce an Effect might notwithstanding Will not to Produce it./ So yt there are two kinds of sufficient Causes one is such as Acteth Necessarily & can neither suspend nor determine it’s \own/ Action. Another such as Acteth Contingently \or Freely Arbitrarily./ & hath a power over it’s owne Action either to suspend it or Determined it - |as He pleaseth.|

I shall subjoyn to this Another Argument, wch Mr Hobbs glories of as being ye sole Inventor of. From ye necessity of A disjunctive Proposition nothing can be so contingent but yt it was \necessaryly true of it beforehand That it/ true before this will either com to pass or not come to pass t|T|herfore says He if there be a necessity in ye Disjuntion there must be a necessity in one \or other/ of ye two parts therof, \alone by itself./ i|I|f there be no necessity yt it shall come to Pass, then must it be necessary yt it shall not come to pass, as if it \there/ could not be \no/ necessa|i|ty in the Disjunction tho’ both the members of it & were Continged|nt|, & neither of them necessary. This is a most shamefull Ignorance in Logick especially in <107r> is \for/ one who pretends so much to Gramaticall Demonstration.

And yett this childish and Rediculous Nonsense \& Sophistry/ of his was stollen from the Stoicks too, who play’d the fool|s| in Logick after the same manner. e|E|very Proposition say’d they concerning a tang \A/ supposed \Future/ Contingent, yt this \It/ will come to pase, was either t|T|rue or f|F|alc|s| before hand; \& frō Eternity/ i|I|f it were t|T|rue then it must of necessity come to pass, if false then it was \it/ necessary it should not come to pase And yett this Rediculous Sophistry Puzzled \not onely/ Cecero & others so \but/ \also Aristotle himself {soo}/ much as \to/ mad|k|e them deni {illeg} hold yt Propositions concerning f|F|uture Contingence|ts| \to be/ was neither t|T|rue nor f|F|alse.


Chap. 23

I come now to answer the Arguments of those for the necessity of all Action who suppose yt tho’ contingent Liberty, do Indeed naturally belong to all Rationall Beings as such yett notwithstanding the exercise therof is peculiarly r|R|eserved to God Almighty himself only be from all Eternity determineing all Actions and Events whatsoever according to his Arbitrary Will & Pleasure, & so by his \Irresistible/ Erisistable Decreese \& Influx/ make them necessary, Tho’ otherwise in their own nature they would a \haue/ been Contingent

The first ground of wch oppoinnions is this. f|f|or a Creature to e|E|xercise a Contingent Arbitrary Free Will, is all one \is for it to Acte Independently upon God/ Wherfore it|this| must needs be Reserved to the Deitye Contingently & as his peculiar Priviledge & Prorogative Arbitraryly & Contingently. to Determine all things and thereby to make all Actions Necessaryly to us God who not be God if he did not Arbitraryly Determine all things

But first This is to Swallow vp all things into God. By making him <109r> the Sole Actor in ye Vnivers? All things els being \meerly/ Passive to him, & Determind in their Actions by him. wch is indeed \This at least is/ as Plotinus intimates, to make God the Im̄ediate Hegemonick, & Soul of yt whole world.

Again This is not the Supreme Perfection of the Deity, to Determin All things and Actions Arbitrarily & Contingently & Fortuitously - But to Act according to Infinite Good. Goodnes & Wisdome. God being Infinite Dist - Interested Love Displaying itself wisely. Therfore Producing frō His Fecundity All Things that Could be made & were Fit to be made. Suffring them to Act according to their own Natures. Himself ex Presiding over all, & Exercizing His Iustice in ye Managemēt & Goverment of |A| the Whole - \A A/ < insertion from p108v > A A

And since all Rat. Creatures, haue Essentially this Prop. of Lib. Arbit. The τὸ αυτιξους. Self Power Belonging to them — To suppose that God Allm. could not govern ye world without offering a Constant Viωlence to it, never suffering them to Act according to their own Nature; is very Absurd < insertion ends >

This Power of Contingent Free <110r> Will, \is no/ not Independent vpō God, but Controllable by him \at pleasure/. As also it is obnoxious and Accountable to His Iustice in Punishing the Exorbitances of it And were it not for this the Divine Iustice Retributive, dispensing Rewards & Punishment, could haue no Place in ye world, nor no Object to exercize itself vpon \x/

Moreover it is certain That God cannot determ. & Decree all |Hum| \volitions &/ Actions - but that he must bee |ye| sole Cause of \all ye/ Sin, & morall Evill, \in it,/ and men be \totally/ free frō the Guilt of them. But in Truth This will Destroy The t|T|hing Reality of Morall Good & Evill Vertue & Vice, & make them nothing but meer Names - or Mockeries /


Chap. 22|4|

Again it is Objected. That if all Hum Actions, be not \nether/ Necessarily Determined \in themselvs/ by Antecedt Causes Naturall, nor yet made Necess. \such/ by Divine Decrees They cannot possibly be f\F/oreknown by God - Therf we must \need/ eith deny Divine Omni-Prescience, or \deny/ els ye Contingency.

Where in ye First place we shall grant, That Volitions Purely Contingent in their own Nat. as when the Objects \or Means/ are Perfectly E Equall, & haue no Difference of Better & wors {if \becaus/} not made Neces. by Divine Decrees, \or Influence,/ neither they are not certainly Foreknowable Ex causis. Since yt cann. that cannot be certainly foreknown Ex causis, wch has no Necessary Causes -

And if Contingent Volitions be neither \certainly/ foreknowable ex causis, nor \any way els/ otherwise then by causes <112r> neither, but are absolutely every way vnforeknowable. Then would it be no more Derogat. frō the Div. Omni|Præ|science, that it cannot foreknow, things Vnforeknowable, then to ye Divine Omnipotence, that it cannot do Things yt are not Doable, or \yt/ ar Impossible to be done – /× ×\ < insertion from p111v > × × However these thgs {sic} would not be so many as is Com̄monly supposed. For all Voluntary Actions are not Contingent — man’s Will being allways {s} necessary Determined to Good and ye aversation of Evill so yt those are Innumerable cases in Humane Life, In which we may Certainly know before hand what any man in his Witts would do as also many other wherein there can be no doubt but yt a good man would do one way, and a man of Vicious Currop Corrupt Principles another way < insertion ends >

Notwithstandg wch it is Pious conceve; that tho Future contigents ca be not foreknowable. ex causis, nor we able to co Comprehend how they should be foreknown - otherwise, yet would it be greatr Presumption in vs \therfore/ flatly to deny the Divine Prescience of them. Because ye Divine Nature, & Perfections surpass or Hum. comprehension - We do beleve ye Div. Eternity without Beginning, & therfore without successive flux (for we clerly conceve yt whatever hath a successive Duratiō, must haue had a Begin.) <113r> \Tho we cannot comprehend this Eternity./ And we beleev Gods /the Divine\ Omnipresence, or Vbiquity, tho do not vnderstand ye manner of it, since He cannot \conceve God to/ be extended {illeg} Partes extra ext Partes, numerically distinct & Infinite - \Wherfore it would be/ so would it be Pious to Conceve \beleeve conceve likewise/ yt God Foreknows all Future \Conting/ Events, tho we can not vnderstand \ye manner/ how \this/ he should \be/ foreknow Contingents, that haue no necessay Causes -

But many Learned Men and Good Philosiphers have satisfied then selves here, yt the Event perfectly Contingent be not certainly to foreknown Excauses yett they are seen & known to God by an Anticepatient of futurity. the Divine Divine Duration of Eternity wch is without Succesive flux being present to ye Past, & future, as well as to the Instant now. He yt calls things yt are not, as if they were He whose name is ὁ ὢν ὁ ἦν καὶ ὁ ερχο{illeg} <114r> is and was & will be He who is \both/ was & will be yt is He who is both past & future see’s all future Contingent Events In specula Æternitatis in his high watcht hour of Eternitye and yt there is such a Divine Eternity is demonstrable by Reason

Chap 25

But it is still further urged that upon a supposition of the Certain Prescience of future Contingencies it will follow unavoidablely yt the will Certainly \necessaryly/ come to pass This is the Constant cry of Socinus & his followers but without the least shaddow of Reason for if the Prescience be true they must be foreknown to be Contingents & therfore to come to pass not necessaryly but contingently moreover the {sic} do not therfore come to pass because the {sic} are foreknown but the {sic} are foreknown because the {sic} will come to pass, the certain Prescience is not ye cause of there future comeing to pase but their future coming to pass is the cause of their being foreknown There is no more necessity riseing from ye <115r> Presciences then there would a been from their futurity had the {sic} not been foreknowne For yt wch now is tho’ never so Contingent yett since it is was future from all Eternity but but it was not therefore necessaryly future but Contingently only. Here is no necessity but Ex hypothesi or Hypotheticall upon supposition yt it will be it is necessaryly future but there is no Absolute necessity in the thing it selfe When a Contingent thing hath been and is now past it is then necessary that it should have been; or it could not possibly not have been Ex hypothesi so when a Contingent Action is now adoing it is at yt time necessary yt it should be Ex hypothesi but it doth not necessaryly \therfore/ follow yt it was necessaryly caused or yt it was Impossible not to have been.

Chap 26

Again it is objected yt ye supposition of Liberty of Will is <116r> Inconsistant with Divine Grace & will necessaryly Infer Pelegeiasme. b|B|ut the falsity of this may appear from hence that those Angles wch by ye right will of Liberty of Will stood when other by the abuse it|of| it fell tho’ by yt same Liberty of will they might still \Possibly/ continue without falling yett for all that it would not be Imposible for them to fall, Unless they had aid & esistence of Divine grace to secure them from it, wherefore it is com̄only conceived yt as not-withstanding that Liberty of Will by {wch } wch it is possible for them never to fall, they had need of Divine grace to {be} secure them against a Possibilyty of falling and yt they are now by Divine grace fixed & confirmed in such a state as yt they can never fall

Much more is the aid and esistence of Divine grace necessary both for the recovery of Lapsed souls & for their Persevere|a|nce the use of there own free will is necessaryly required for God who made us with out our selves, will not save us with out our <117r> selves we are to strive to enter in at ye strate gate to fight a good fight & to runne a good race, we are to purge our selves from all uncleaness {from} of flesh & spirit; we are to keep our selves in the Love of God. He was certainly an unregenatedrated Person who in ye Parable had but one Talent given Him and is condemn’d for a slothfull servant because he did not by the use of his Free Will Improve yt Talent wch he had received & return to his master his own with usary, wch had he done more would a been given to him, that is Divine grace would a been superadded; Our own {illeg} endeaours & Activity of Free Will are Insuficient without the add & esistence of Divine grace for it is God yt worketh in us both to Will & to do by Grace ye are saved & by the Grace of God I am what I am.

Chap 27

There is yett another Witty objection made by a modern writter asserting a fatall necessity of all <118r> Actions that wa|h|eras Liberty of Will is Introduced to salve a Phænomenone of a Day of Iudgment and the Iustice of God of Inflecting Punishment upon men after this Life for their Actions past this will by no means serve theire turn I say Contingent|cie| will no more salve this Phænomenone then necessity For it is no more just yt men should be Damn’d to all Eternity for a {C} meer Chance of \or/ Contingencie then yt they should for n|N|ecessity To Dam’n Men for their Contingent Free Will|ed| Actions is all one as if one should be damn’d for throwing such a cast of a Dy. \×/ < insertion from p117v > Men could no more helpe Contingencie then necessity. < insertion ends > Wherfore the matter can \be/ Resolved into nothing else but Gods Absolute power & his Arbitrary & unacountable Will wch by reason of \his/ Omnipotence makes that to be just what soever he’ll doe It seem He thinks not fitt to damn’d men to Eternity but such as were necessitated to do wicked Actions before but He might have done otherwise if he had thought Good by His Absolute power


To answer this, no man shall be damnd for ye Contingencie of any Action where there was no difference of Better or Worse a Perfect æquallity & one thing as much Elligable as the other here can no fault nor Blame in the case as was said before but But where there is an Inequallity of Better or Worse a Diversity of Good Honesty & Duty one one hand and sensuall gain & Pleasure on ye other Men having a Power here over themselves to Intend and Exert them-selves in Resisting their sensuall apetites and endeauouring more and more by degrees to Comply with ye Dictates of Conscience opposett to them If at ye end of their Lives they have run̄e their Course as that they have suffered themselves at last to be quite filed & Vanquished by ther worser; i|I|t is Iust yt they should fall short of the Prize sett before them that they should Loose ye Crown, & receive shame, Disgrace, & Punishment.

Men shall not be damnd for the cast of a dy or such a Fortuitous Cong <120r> Contingencie But for them not useing that Power wch the {sic} have over themselves, to promote themselves toward ye Good of Honesty & also for their abuising yt Power, by Actively Determining themselves to Wicked Actions, & fixing themselves in Vitious habetts

Cite as: Ralph Cudworth, A Treatise of Freewill (complete text) [British Library Additional MS 4978] (c.1658-c.1688),, accessed 2023-12-01.