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We have now propounded such an Hypothesis of ye Soul as - may render this thing called Freewill possible & very intelligible, The sum̄e whereof is this yt we are to conceive as it were two stories \or/ gradations & regions in ye Soul, whereof one is simple & necessary Nature, ye other ye whole Soul redoubled upon itself, self-comprehensive, selfreflexive, self-recollective & self-exertive & therefore lastly self-determinative to wch latter \second thing/ belongs yt wch is com̄only called Will, wch therefore is not one particular \& Private/ Faculty of ye Soul coordinate wth ye rest whether necessarily determined by a foregoing necessary Vnderstanding, or or chanceably & fortuitously determined by itself, in every thing wthout respect to any Light; but it is ye whole Soul reciprocating & rebounding vpon itself, conscious of all its congruities & capacities whereby it becomes present wth itself, within itself & superiour to itself, & holding itself as it were in its own hande doth wield & turn itself, govern & direct its cogitations & Acti ons. I say \Govern/ Cogitations as well as Actions, for if our Thoughts & Cogitatiōs either \did/ spin along necessarily by ymselves according as ye impulse of outward objects did excite ym & give ym ye first hint, so yt we ourselves had noe governmt or com̄and over ym at all to determine, turn ym, fix ym: & stop ym, we could not be able to manage any \of or/ Actions nor carry on any designes of Life nor indeed maintain converse & \pertinēt/ com̄unication wth one another, but {illeg} be distracted, confounded, puzzled & moped things, having our witts allwayes to seek; & wanting Presents|ce| & recollections of Mind should be carryed away wth a|ye| galloping Carrier of ungovernable & unmanageable Thoughts we know not where|ither|; we \&/ should be no more able to answer opportunely \per/ & readily \pertinētly/ to every Question & to carry our selves decorously in respect of ye various circumstances of \outward/ Life, yn a Machin would be so necessary \a thīg/ is this Faculty ^\of self-power/ to humane Life yt wthout it we cannot be our selves nor have any despose|all| of our selves, b|B|ut we affirm |yt| this \is/ not to be a blind Will, nor one single \Private/ Faculty coordinate wth ye rest, standing as it were in ye same plain & levell wth thē \it/ but ye whole Soul reduplicated upon itself comprehending & wielding itself, wch after ye Verdit of all other naturall Faculties given ^\is sums vp all into a Conclusiō/ passes ye descisive voat, determines volitiō & gives ye Fiat to Action, & governs in ye whole man.

And yt there is really such ^\{illeg}/ a reduplication of \{illeg}/ ye Soul as we conceive it sufficiently evident from wt we have allready declared, so we shall endeavour to make it further manifest from an ordinary Phænomenon ^\not well vnderstood/ by wch it will appear yt these two Powers of ye Soul \or two {illeg} of Life/ are seperable from one another, so yt ye Soul may act as simple Nature wthout reduplication self-comprehension & self-activity, & yt is ye Phænomenon of Sleep & Dreames wch no Phylosopher has yet so far as we know \of/ ever pretended to give a satisfactory accompt {illeg}. Wherefore we say yt in Sleep & Dreames besides ye Ligation of our outward senses com̄only taken notice off, \{illeg}/ there is an \{illeg}/ other Ligation or impedition in ye Soul itself, we haveing not yn our witts about us, nor any recollection of Mind, are commanding Power over our Thoughts to steer ym or direct ym, or carry on any \{illeg}/ designes & therefore we are so foold & imposd upon by our F{illeg} {illeg} things & yt wthout any wonder {illeg} \{illeg}/ at all so yt wn we are awake we often reflect upon ye Non-sense of those our dreames ^\{illeg}/ <2> & looke upon ourselves then but as half ourselves & \as/ having ourselves to seek & yet notwithstanding all this in our dreaming sleeps we do not only exercise yt those lower facultyes of our Soul of Fancy & Imagination wch then is taken for externall sense, & of Appetites & Passions but have also sometime in us a sense of Conscience or ye dictate of Honesty & do also exercise oftentimes ye Faculty of Ratiocination though not wth so much vigour & so long continuance ^\{illeg}/ together & coherence & \not/ makeing such a series & \of/ pertinent contextures of Ratiocinac~ons as wn - we are awake. However since we are conscious yt we do sometimes syllogyze & ratiocinate in Sleep, it cannot be sd yt ye Faculty of Reason & Vnderstanding is quite bound up & consopited, wherefore we cannot possibly give any accompt of this Phænomenon of Sleep & Dreams wthout acknowledging something else in ye Soul besides what ye vulgar Psicology takes notice off, it being most evident yt besides ye relaxation of ye bodily nerves wch is ye same thing wt yt yt is com̄only called ye ligation of ye outward senses, there is something else bound up & consopited in sleep we being not yn all yt wch we are wn awake externall sensation only excepted \{illeg}/. I say there must be ye relaxation & langor also of some higher & more inward power in ye Soul itself And having before showed yt there are two stories or gradations in ye Soul according to this dichotomy we give a true ^\& plain accompt/ of this difficulty yt in sleep only ye lower of ym is acted in nothing yn working but what is naturall & habituall & \(for/ habit is a kind of an acquired nature, \{illeg}/) but ye reduplicate self=comprehensive, self=attentive & self=exertive Power of ye Soul is yn consopited & relaxated ye reason whereof is because this cannot be exercis’d wthout a greater agitation of corporeall spirits, yn will consist wth yt relaxation of ye bodily nerves wch \{illeg}/ are asleep Wherefore this being fatally & sympathetically charm’d in sleep & its tone remitted & consequently ye inward tone & \or/ tention & exertion of ye whole Soul & \its/ Powers, relaxated from hence it comes to passe yt we are conscious yt our mind is but half itself in dreams \{illeg}/ \{illeg}/ There being yn wanting yt wch \binds &/ knits all together & actuates ye whole Soul \{illeg}/ yt self=attention, recollection & exertion yt should invorgte all its \ye other/ Powers, so yt ye Ratiocinations yt are yn put forth are but weak, languid & flexing \and/ things abrupt & incohærent, from whence it comes to passe yt wn strange \though never so strange/ monstrously & absurdly false things are obtruded upon us by Fancy we do not question ye truth of ym, nor suspect or conclude ourselves to be in a dream but wn \onely/ sometimes we have in a suspition \of such a mastery/, thereof this ^\whē we are/ is a kind of tendency to expergefactiō in us & proves often times an occasion of \really/ wakening our selves Moreover frō hence it is likewise yt Reminiscence is not exercisd in Dreams from ye defect whereof it comes to passe yt wthout Resistancy or demurre we assent to such thing as true wch otherwise tho we think \should know/ false wch thing Lucretius hath well observed Præterea meminisse jacet, languetq; sopore, Nec dissentit enim mortis lætiq; politum Iam pridem quem mens verū se cornere credit.

We dream often of seeing & conversing wth such deceased Friends as living, wn our selves well know dead many years before, wthout gainsaying or contradicting ye Truth of this Phantasm wch is because Memory & Reminiscence is for ye time consopited, yt ^\either/ probably consisting in or requiring an active & a wakened exertion of ye Soul itself, Now this reduplicate self=attentive & self=active Life of ye Soul being yt wch \binds &/ knits ye whole Soul together & puts ye powers of it upon attomick exertion, wch directs ym to one scope & makes ye thoughts musicall & harmonious, no wonder if upon ye remission thereof ye same kind of Langour seize inwardly upon ye Soul after a manner as possesseth ye body in sleep, it having noe <3> self=wielding nor self=ruling Power in ym \it/ for though yt strings of ye Soul, be \{illeg}/ plaid upon yet they make no Musick at all ^\but are assuredly incoherent/ It being nothing but \loose/ Nature yt doth now toyingly sport & act \play/ in us, ye soul being as much unbent as ye Body & yt wch properly we ourselves being silent sympathetically & charm charm’d unto a slumber From a tacite acknowledgmt. of which ^\Truth/ it is yt Casuists will not arraign men as guilty for wtsoever passeth from them or seems to be done by ym in sleep & Dreams, though otherwise very exorbitant wch is an Argument yt yey take it for granted yt it is nothing but ye lower nature yt yn loosely playes & layes in us \(& yt/ ye Soul being as it were unbent\) yt/ it is not προαίρεσις Will & Election properly so called yt yn act, but Nature & Spontaniety yt yn acts in us, ye ende & informed parte of of ourselves but as we said before yt higher vigorous & self-active Life of ye Soul, cannot be exercised wthout an such an agitation of ye corporeall spirits as may \will/ unbind & unlock all our senses & rouse up our & awaken’d Life all ye drowsy sentiments\tinells/ of ye Body \into Activity./

Tis true yt Dreams are com̄on to men wth other Animalls & indeed as to Bruits we cannot be certain yt sleep is any thing else wth ym but only ye relaxation of those bodily nerves & ye ligation of sense but we contend yt in men yt besides ye feriac~on of externall sense there is another feriation of something more inward in ye Soul itself, which what it is can never be well explain’d according to ye vulgar Psycology & therefore hath not been so much as attempted, yt I know off hitherto by any Phylosopher We say ^\therefore/ yt ^\in men/ there is a double tone relaxated in - sleep & therefore \commonly/ a double ligation or defect in us men, first of ye tone of ye bodily nerves wch in vigilia are tense, by ye inflation of ye Animall Spirits from ye brain but by \vpō/ ye stoppage of ym in sleep are relaxated wch causeth ye defect of externall sense. 2:ly ye tone of ye Soul as self=comprehensive & self=active, wch is a constant self=exertion of ye Soul itself & of its powers, directing ye operations of it, not wthout ^\a certain/ Labour & power\Cohesion/, in wch respect yt is \may be/ true wch Aristotle tells us |yt| ye old Phisiologers determined yt our Life is \was/ a continuall labour & pain, though being - accustom’d to it we take noet notice of it, for this tone of ye mind causeth a perpetuall agitac~on of ye Spiritts & tone \{illeg}/ in ye Body likewise, so \the latter Tone must needs {illeg} ye former/ yt these two tones must needs be intended both together, ye tone in ye Mind causing a tone in ye Body also, & though there may be a tone in ye Body or nerves Mechanically \caused/ wn ye tone of ye mind is in part relaxated, as in those musing tempers & brown studies wch men are in sometimes awake wn their Thoughts are directed by noe intenc~on but rove losely & at at random, wch men do not differ from ymselves asleep, save only yt ye bodily tone of nerves is kept up ^\with externall sense/ But ye relaxation of ye Tone of ye Body wn caused mechanically must needs be accompanyed wth a sympatheticall relaxation of ye tone of ye Mind \& an inward feriation in ye soul/ because so long as yt is exerted ye tone of ye Body cannot be relaxated Of all ye antient Phylosophers only ye Stoicks seemd to have had some hint of this Truth who seemed to be \were/ ye only Persons yt ^\allsoe First/ tooke notice of yt peculiar Faculty of ye Soul ye Hegemonicall wch can be no other yn ye Soul self=comprehensive & self=active, for ^\in/ Laertius in ye life of Zeno there is This accompt of sleep given by ym τὸν δὲ υπνον γίνεσθαι ἐκ λυομένου του αισθητικου τονοῦ περὶ τὸ ἡγεμόνικον <4> yt Sleep is ye relaxation of ye sensitive Tone about ye Hegemonicon yt is \wch is always/ wch allwayes accompanies ye Tone of ye Hegemonicon so yt according to {illeg} & ye Stoicks sleep was not only a relaxation of bodily sense as Aristotle {illeg} to make \it/ but of two tones, of ye tone of ye Body & nerves, & also of a Tone in ye Soul itself, of ye Hegemonicon & ruling power in it, wch exerts invigorates & imployes all ye other Powers of it -

And from above we are able to give an accompt also of yt Problē long agoe propounded by Plato, \in ye Theotetus/ wch some acute Neoterick Phylosophers have - thought to be ^\{illeg}/ {illeg} insoluble how we can certainly know ourselves to be awake at any time ^\by any internall {illeg}/ & not to dream ^ They conceived yt there is no inward difference in ye things ymselves by wch they are distinguishable from one another but only yt we {illeg}\{illeg}/de our selves to be awake by ratiocination ^\& things to be really so without vs/ because ye objects seem to be constantly ye same wn we are awake whereas wn asleep ye scene alters \continually/ perpetually, but we do affirm yt there is an inward difference also in ye things ymselves by wch according to internall sense we are im̄ediately conscious to ourselves of being awake, & yt is from ye exercise of our self-exertion \selfpower/ & self-attention & self-exertion, of our selfpower in \of/ com̄anding & directing our own Cogitations & Actions, yt is wn at awake by internall sense we plainly feel ourselves to be all ourselves \& Tense/ whereas in sleep we feel ourselves to be but half ourselves, \loose & relaxated/, simple Nature wthout redoubled self-activity.

Wherefore from this Phenomenon of Sleep our Psicologicall Hypothesis is strongly \seems to be/ confirmed in wch we make yt \a/ Dichotomy of ye Soul into simple Nature & reduplicate Self=activity, it appearing yt these are two really distinct Powers in one & ye same sence soul because they can be seperated from one another Neither is this self cōprehensive & self=active vigour of ye Soul only relaxated thus in sleep wn Nature sportingly toyes wthout in ye exercise of all ye other Powers, not only Imagination but also Reason itself & uninterrupted Cogitation wthout any feriation, but we often find by exerience also yt even in vigilia w~n we are awake it hath some lazy fitts comes upon it, as in those com̄only called wakeing Dreames, wn ye Mind being not self=exerted, but loose & unbent, ye Soul spins out an easy web of thoughts by itself wch are perfectly of ye same nature wth Dreams in sleep & we differ noe otherwise yn from ourselves in sleep but only yt ye bodily chaine tone is yn mechanically exerted The minds of Men awake are often so unattentive, heedlesse & inadvertent to their own Actions yt wt they do at such times proceeds from lower spontaniety & necessary nature & not from will in ym Thus ye Tone of ye Hegemonick of ye Soul cannot be exerted, but ye tone of ye Body must be needs intended wth it, yet \when/ ye Tone of ye Body may \is/ be mechanically intended yn ye Tone of ye Mind may be relaxated But in both cases it appears yt ye attentive self=exertive & recollective - Power of ye Soul yt belongs to ye hegemonick in us is a distinct - Power from yt of Ratiocination as Nature in us \& yt/ wch quickens & invigorates it of ye whole Soul forasmuch as there may be one of these wthout ye other & therefore yt there are two such gradac~ons or Regions in ye Soul as were before described.

Now because there are some writers yt contend yt there is no instance <5> of reduplicate self=activity or of any thing ἐφ' ἡμιν or in nostra^ potestate but only in ye Lucta or ^\conflict/ contest yt is in ye Souls of Men betwixt ye Animall & Divine Principle ye dictate of Honesty & ye dictate of selfish Appetite, but yt in all other things we are determined by necessary spontaneity & have no self=power \or Liberty at all/ in any thing we must |ye| rather, here take notice of two degrees of Liberum Arbitrium ^|autoxousy| or self-power in us, first such as is contained wthin ye compasse of ye Animall Life only, wch for distinction sake we shall call Animall Free=will 2ly such as ariseth from ye difference or distraction there is in nature betwen ye divine principle or dictate of Honesty & ye lower Animall Inclinac~ons wch we shall call Freewill Morall \First for ye lower Animals Freewill i.e. yt there is a/ That there is a reduplication of ye Soul \wth/in ye Animall Life, wch hath a sui potestas a power over itself or of determining itself is evident from internall sense, for in such Actions in wch Honesty is not at all concernd we are plainly conscious to our selves of such a redoubled self=power severall ways, first over our Cogitations in yt we can intend ourselves more or lesse ^\both/ in a way of speculation & deliberation & thereby \as allso/ determine both ye exercise & object of our Vnderstanding 2:ly yt in yt lower kind of Conflict betwixt particar passions & inferiour Reason, respecting nothing but our own utility, we can exert more or lesse a vigorous force to resist ye violence of particular Lusts, Appetites & ὁρμὰ wn inclining us contrary to ye Reason of our own Vtility according to - wch different exertion of our selves either Lust & Passion or inferiour Reason will prevail 3:ly yt in doubtfull cases both of speculac~on & Action & where we have no certain science we can determine both our Assents in speculative things & also our practicall Judgm:ts, volitions & resolutions beyond necessary Nature & confirm ourselves in those opinions or resoluc~ons more or lesse Lastly yt we can more or lesse intend our selves in externall Activity & execuc~on of Purposes com̄only called Industry & Diligence wch in matters belonging to ye Animall Life only may be more or lesse exerted In wch respects we have not only an hypotheticall |a| Liberty of doing this or yt if we will (i.e) if such a Will or Appetite doth necessarily invade us & seize upon us; we have ^sometimes a sufficiency of Power \Liberty of outward Impediment/ to execute ye same but also yt we have ye liberty of & Power of inward self=determinacon\nings of Evil selves/ wch is yt yt is strictly called Will & a thing wch is vulgarly supposed not to be in Buruits who though they oftentimes ^\have/ a Power of doing wt they will, ye word & Will being taken improperly for Appetite (i.e.) a power of doing wt they have an Appetite or Inclinac~on to, yet are not thought to have any inward power of determining ymselves one way ^\rather or other/ wn they might have equally done it another, but are conceived to be & by ὁρμὰ or necessary Phantasies only antecedent as we ourselves are in passions & these first motions of Desire yt obtrude ymselves upō us

And yt there is such a self-power in us wthin ye compasse of ye Animall Life is plainly witnessed by ye Instincts of Nature wch leading men often to blame ymselves as also to blame other men for having been wanting to ymselves as to their own Vtility without any ^\respect to any/ Morall evill or Sin, if com̄endacon & blame used according to ye Instincts of nature be a good Argumt: \In ye Instincts of Nature/ to prove Morall ffree=will yn ye same will also evinces yt there is a lower Free=will Animall, <6> men being oft blamed & com̄ended by ymselves & others for exerting ymselves more or lesse in a way of considerac~on, vigor vigour, resoluc~on & activity in order to their own private good wthout respect to any thing of Honesty or Dishonesty.

We shall a little further insist upon this one thing here, yt as there \besides ye/ conflict yt is in ye Soul between ye Divine & Animall Principle, ye dictate of Honesty & selfish Appetite, there is another Distraction or conflict wch it is liable to ^\within ye cōpas of ye Animal Life/ not only between severall coordinate Lusts & Appetites but also between two Principles ^\subordinate/ whereof one is by nature subordinate to ye other, yt is between particular passions, lusts & ὁρμὰ & yt inferiour Reason wch is a larger comprehension of our own private Vtility yn is in particular Appetites & passions, in respect of wch these ^\Lusts &/ passions wch urge importunately towards their particular Objects wthout any free considerac~on of all ye Conveniencies & Inconveniencies thereof are com̄only said to be blind or narrow=sighted, \thus/ whereas this Inferiour Reason hath a large & comprehensive view of what belongs to our Vtility considers all ye conveniencyes & Inconvencies of things, compares ye Future wth ye present & discovers yt some small present gratificac~on may procure a greater future Inutility wch Faculty of inferiour Reason is much improved by use & experience whereby we are sensible of Hurts we have formerly received by impotently yielding to ye importunity of some present Lust or Pleasure That here is such a conflict as this wthin ye compasse of ye Animall Life, between such a Reason as doth not at all respect ^\Honesty/ but only our own private Vtility & ye impetuosity of particular Lusts, Appetites & Passions is plain, as for example wn men are distracted between a present \sensuall/ Appetite of eating or drinking any thing set before ym wch is ye degree of a present sensuall pleasure & yt Reason wch tells ym this will probably procure after\ward/ a greater pain of ye Stone or Gout, And wn^ever ye dispute is betwixt one certain Lust impetuously urging to an Act of Pleasure a large or more comprensive Reason yt suggests ye good of ye present pleasure not to be comparable \Equall/ to those future greater evills of Disgrace & Infamy, Losse of Estate, ruine of bodily Health & danger of Death yt will follow Wherefore I say yt this conflict wch often happens in ye lower Animall Life doth as well demōstrate liberum Arbitrium or self=power as yt other yt is between ye divine & Animall Principle For here in like manner as well as there there is ^\in/ ye Soul a μεσοντι a certain middle or Third thing between both yt is conscious of both these Inclinations & attractions & is ^\at first/ as i were puzzled & distracted between ym wch accordingly as it doth autexousiously more or lesse exert her \its/ strength or force to assist ye better Principle, inferior Reason, so is ye Victory determined either way

Wherefore we see yt ye Soul is not perfectly ho^\mo/geneall & uniform in ye Animall Life itself but subject to discord & schism betwixt a better & worser Principle ye latter factiously & seditiously opposing ye former wch is a kind of Heterogenesy \in/ & Neurospasty in ye Animall Life itself, wn a worser principle wch is least ourselves rebells against a better wch it ought to <7> be subject to & by reason of ye remissenesse of ye middle Power often getts ye victory over it, such a broken & distracted, thing is Mankind as not in this lapsed state as yt his Animall Life itself hath discordant & jarring principles in it, though here it be not wthout a \superiour/ principle also wch can \by {illeg}/ compose ye strife & determines ye clashing & Composition yt is in nature by striking in & complying either wth one side or other |ye better Part|

But However though there be such an Animall Freewill in men acknowledged by us, it doth not therefore follow yt we must needs assent to Lucretius & Epicurus who asserted yt all brute Animalls had a liberum Arbitrium in ym, yt there was Fatis a volsa voluntas a will free from Fatall & naturall Necessities & a self=determining Power in all other Animalls as well as man, & yt as it is s~d of Man by Aristotle yt he is ἀρχὴ καὶ ἀιτὶα πράξεων yt he is ye cause & prin ciple of Action yt ye same must be said likewise of every Bruit There appearing to us no certain evidence yt Bruit Animalls besides ὁρμὴ & φαντασία have in ym many such other large comprehensive Faculties & \as/ yt inferiour Reason before spoken off in men whereby they can consider ye Conveniencies & Inconveniencies of their Actions & compare ye future with ye present & consult & deliberate of wt is to be done, for as it is false concerning men what a late Phylosopher asserts that deliberacon in ym is nothing but alternate passions where ye Victory at last falls to yt Passion whose necessary force is most preponderating, wch therefore he will have to be ye only thing wch is called Will in ym, so it may very well be true concerning Bruits yt there is no other deliberation nor will in ym yn such & yt all ye discord yt is in ym, \&/ yt all ye discords yt is in ym is not only of things coordinate & standing upon ye same levell, not of things subordinate to one another a discord between b narrow & short=sighted passions tugging ag~st one another & alternately inclining ye scale till ye issue is at last determined - either way by their respective prevalency yt there is noe one com̄on or third thing in ym yt takes notice of all, no reduplicate ^\{illeg}/ principle yt vari exerting itself more or lesse can oversway things one way or other.

But however if there were any such liberum Arbitrium in Bruits as Epicurus fancies it would not at all follow from thence yt Bruits could be capable of any Morall Vertue or Vice Nay though we should be more liberall & grant unto Bruits as some do besides ffree=will discursive logicall Reason alsoe so as yt they could make Syllogisms in mood & Figure unlesse they had some higher Principle superadded & consequently another kind of Free=will wch we called Morall they could not be capable of any duty or obligac~on properly so called, Honesty or Dishonest, Morall Vertue or Vice For ye better illustration of wch we will suppose God to create a world either in ye Moon or some other Planett of Creatures indued, not only wth humane shape & wth a power of deliberating according inferiour Reason, by considering \all conveniences & Inconveniences/ all consequences & circumstances of Action & compare ye present wth ye Future & wth using \with/ Free <8> will & election \{illeg}/, but also wth a power of discoursing syllogistically concerning universall Theorems of speculative sciences as of Geometry & not only so but \over & above all this/ we will further suppose to all this yt such - work=men as these should be indued also wth ye |ye| notion of a the Deity likewise but only as an omnipotent self=willed Being yt must be worshiped & courted ^\& flattered/ by externall worship or otherwise would impotently let fly his Thunder=bolts at ym & consume them in \Irefull/ wrathfull Displeasure & therefore they should accordingly build temples & erect altars & make supplicac~ons to him merely for their outward utilities sake & to appease such a wrathfull & morose Deity I say notwthstanding all this such imaginary Men as these yt are so far elevated above ye condic~on of Bruits would not be indued wth any true morality nor indeed by any more capable of true Vertue, Honesty & Piety yn Monkeyes, Apes & Babouns they having really no Principle of Obligac~on in ym otherwise yn by selfish Appetite & private Vtility by wch all their Actions would be measured & circumscribed, Aristotle somewhere takes upon him to determine yt ye reason why Bruits are not capable of acracy or Incontinency is because they are not capable of Vnderstanding an universall proposition διὰ τοῦτο τὰ θιρμα ουκρατὴ ετι ουκ εχει των καθουλου υπολυχιν αλλα των καθεκεστα φαντασια και μνημον Bruits are therefore not capable of being incontinent because they have not an apprehension of Vniversalls but only a phancy & memory of singulars, and indeed, it is probable enough by ye Phænomena yt Bruits have no clear conception of Vniversalls but only a Phantasy of singulars & therefore are so far from syllogisticall Reasō yt they are devoid of Axiomaticall judgmt: \&/ can neither affirm or deny any thing But however if it were otherwise & yt besides Free=will they could explicity syllogize & demonstrate Vniversall Theorems all this would not capacitate ym for Vertue or Vice properly so called as Aristotle supposeth, unlesse they had over & aboue anonother vitall principle in ym \superior to yt of/ above ym of selfish Appetite & - \A/ private Vtility \A/ Though ^\In ye meantime for my part/ I am far from thinking yt there are de facto, any such Creatures any where made by God as are indued wth Logicall Reason yt can demonstrate Geometricall Theorems & also wth Animall Freewill & \which/ yet are utterly uncapable of yt Principle wherein ye discrimen honestorū et Turp~m is founded

But we have ye rather taken notice off this lower kind of liberū Arbitrium wch is wthin ye Spear of ye Animall Life & reacheth not to Honesty & Morality, because we have often observed a great æquivocac~on in ye use of this word Liberū Arbitrium it being many times taken in yt sense we have described for ye lower Animall Freewill & yet many times yt attributed to it yt belonges to another species of liberum Arbitriū wch we call Morall, from wch æquivocation springs yt vulgar error yt there is no more required <9> for ye begetting of Morality of Duty & obligac~on, Justice & Injustice in Actions yn an Arbitrary Law externally promulgated - com̄anding outward Action & a liberum Arbitrium or ffree=will to do or not do ye same. The Assertors of wch opinion understand by ffree=will nothing else but such a power of self-determinac~on as may be wthin ye compasse of ye Animall Life only & though they define their Will wch they would have to be free, to be a rationall Appetite or an Appetite following after Reason & deliberac~on, yet by reason & deliberac~on they mean nothing else but yt ratio inferior before described, ye reason of private Vtility wch at best is nothing but ye sagacity of ye Animall Life discoursing syllogistically about ye fittest means for ye attaining those Ends wch Animall Appetites suggests Wherefore ye thing wch they assert is, yt to a Being so far elevated above Bruits yt it is not led - meerly by Fancies & Hormæ, but yt it can also consider, ratiocinate & consult in order to its own utility & determine itself this way or yt way, there is nothing more requisite to beget morall Obligation yn only ye giving an externall Law wth outward rewards & punishments annexed Whereas if there - were no other Principle in a Man yn selfish Appetite & consequently noe other Free=will besides this Animall, though God himself should call all ye Nac~ons of ye earth together as sometime he did ye Israelites & there appearing to ym from ye Top of some high Mountain, flaming wth Fire in a most terrible manner ^\should/ promulgate Lawes to ym wth ye voice of Thunder makes threatning ye greatest punishmts: imaginable to ye violatours of ym those Lawes could no otherwise operate or seize upon ym: ym by takeing hold of their Animall selfish Passions, ye fear of Bodyly Punishmt: & hope of outward reward and he yt will allow of no other Morall Obligation yn this is utterly destroyes all Morality

It is true indeed yt wn it is com̄only s~d yt civill Lawes do necessarily suppose a liberum Arbitriū or ffree=will in Men, wthout wch it would be unreasonnable & unjust to punish any for Transgressions past since none could do otherwise yn they did there is no necessity of understanding this concerning any other Freewill yn is contained wthin ye compasse of ye Animall Life whereby they might have avoided such externall Actions forbidden And if there were any where a world of such men before menc~on’d as were not only indued wth humane shape but also wth a power of syllogisticall Reasoning wthout any higher principle in ym to cause a discriminac~on in ym of Morall Good & Evill there is no doubt but they might have civill Societies, Polities & Lawes & yt not only civill but also Ecclesiasticall & religious inferred wth punishmts: & rewards to good purpose, in order to ye advantage of private Persons & ye safety of ye whole, wch is ye very constituc~on of ye Leviathan, I say they might have agreemts: & Lawes & a leviathan Common=wealth, but yn there could be no other obligacon upon any to - keep those Lawes but only from their own private Vtility of wch ymselves were Judges, no Obligac~on truly Morall in yt wch would be called Injustice ye breach of Lawes & Covenants


We have now declared yt wthin ye compasse of ye Animall Life there is a liberum Arbitrium or ffree=will, yt is, a redoubled self=activity wch also doth demonstrate itself in a Lucta or Conflict betwixt two subordinate principles of Action whereof one is inferiour Reason ye other particular Appetites & Passions, there being μέσον τι a certain middle thing betwixt both a self=comprehensive, self=reflexive & self=active power whereby ye Soul is conscious to itself of both & and as it doth \can/ more or lesse exert itself may \to/ determine itself either way & accordingly deserve blame or Com̄endac~on The spring or rise of wch liberū Arbitrium is from a participac~on of a higher principle of Action yn yat of particular Appetites & Passions {illeg} wch have but a narrow light in ym & are determined to one, a freer, more elevated, enlarged comprehensive Being \Principle/, but so as it is neither this nor yt æssentially but may determine itself to one or other & thereby ^\more or lesse/ promote their \{illeg}/ Animall Good

But we are in ye next place to observe yt this is not ye ^\onely/ Freewill yt is in us as some suppose erring again on this hand who allow no other Freewill yn an indifferent Power, of doing or not doing any externall Action; but there is a higher redoubled self=activity or liberum Arbitriū in humane Souls wch we call Freewill Morall wch not only respects externall Actions & their Vtility & |or| Inutility, but ye inward dispositions of ye Mind & Will in wch Morall Goodnesse (as was before observed) properly consists, wch is a - thing yt Aristotle seems to have taken notice off in this excellent passage of his having showed before yt Vertue doth not consist - meerly in doing such outward Actions, but in doing ym in such a manner, as Arts do not consists merely in doing things but in ye manner of doing for he is not a Gram̄arian yt doth it γραμματίκὸντι unlesse he do it γρμματικοντως & yet s~th he ye case of Arts is different from yt of Vertues \{illeg}/ for ye things wch are produc’d by Arts have their perfection in ymselves & it is sufficient if ye things ymselves be in such a manner, but it is otherwise as to things produced by Vertues for it is not sufficiently to make ym be done justly & temp~ately if they ymselves, be in such a manner, but also ye doer of ym must be in such a manner affected, & qualified, as first yt he do it knowingly & yn yt he chuse it for itself not by accident or for Vtilities sake & lastly yt he do it wth a firm & constant Will Now this Morall Free=will is originated in ye participation of a higher principle not only yn particular Appetites & passions but also yn ye whole Animall Life |& Reason of it| wch is called by us superiour Reason & it is one & ye same thing wch is sometimes called by a low name, \το καλον/ ye dictate of Honesty & again by a high name ye τὸ Θείον in us by means whereof ye Soul hath another kind of Autexousy or self power over ye Animall Life, yt is, not only over ye particular passions & Appetites, but also over ye Reason & wisedom of it For ye better understanding whereof it is necessary to observe, yt - <11> though there be in Man a divine Principle or ye principle of a higher Light & life yn ye Animall yet it is not in him as in God & other impeccable Beings, if there be any such besides God, yt is naturally necessary & essentially but only by way of participac~on We are not ye same wth It, but We & It are two, we having something else besides an inferiour principle of Animall Life wch could not be of use were ye other essentially & im̄utably. \But/ {illeg} are indeed μέσον τι a Third & middle thing betwixt both \{illeg}/ wherefore since we are not this by Nature nor im̄utable essence, we cannot be It any other wise yn by self=active exertion & self=determinac~on, by voluntary adhæsion, by an {illeg}, \{illeg}/ vigilant attention & fixed resolution we are not this by simple Nature but by ourselves, as reduplicated, In a word we are this by liberū Arbitrium by Autexousis suipotestas or self=power. Freewilled Beings are such as are not essentially good & Wise, but may by ye different use \of their Powre/ become either such or ye contrary From these two subordinate vitall Principles whereof one is ye instinct of ye Animall Life, ye other of ym a divine Instinct, we being neither of ym essentially - there doth necessarily emerge & result \This/ μέσον τι a \this/ certain middle or Third thing between ym both wch is ye Soul self=comprehensive & reduplicatly selfactive. Free=will whether Animall or Morall doth arise from ye participac~on of a higher & lower principle \neither of wch ye soul is Essentially/ \B/ ye lower whereof is either particular Appetites or ye whole Animall Life ye higher (though it be called by one & ye same name of Reason) yet they are different things signified by ^\this/ one equivocall word And though ye Antients had some perception of this yet they were very - much confounded & at a losse to give a right definic~on of Will & Free-will, for whereas they com̄only make it to differ from sensitive Appetite in this ^\onely/ yt it is an appetite directed by antecedent Reason, consultation & deliberac~on, wch if it \this/ were true ye Will - would allwayes act rationally, & yn there could be no such thing as Fault or Sin, wch p|b|ut this proceeded from not=understanding ye reduplicac~on of ye Soul, there is a higher & lower principle in all Free=willed Beings, wch makes ym amphibious things but \And/ there is a reduplicac~on of ye Soul upō ym both whereby it can determin itself either way wch is its Will or Self=power


Though we have now given a generall accompt of this Faculty of the Soul yt is com̄only called Libertas Arbitrij, yet |^| it will be convenient to make a further & more particular inquiry into ye nature of it & make it yet more clearly intelligible To wch purpose we must examine ye vulgar Doctrine concerning it wch runs thus \B/, yt ye essence of Liberum Arbitrium consists in Indifferency But because it is obvious here to object yt indifferency only is a passive principle & therefore cannot be an active Power, they adde further yt ye essence of Free=will doth not consist in a passive but an active Indifferency


Wch active Indifferency is further thus described, to be a Power of doing or not=doing & a Power of doing this or ye contrary Indifferently after all things were \are/ put yt were \are/ put yt were \are/ antecedently requisite for Action \Either/, yt is, yt Indifferency of Contradiction ^\or Exercize/ & an Indifferency of Contrariety ^\or Specification/ wch latter ^\in Creatures/ principally respects these two contraryts of Morall Good & Evill & \And/ amongst those prerequisites to Action wch being put, a Free Agent may \{illeg}/ either act or not=act accordingly ^\indifferently do this & ye Contrary/ ^ye great Champions of Freewill & ^\{illeg}/ advancers of it in Man do com̄only place not only all outward Objects & Circumstances but also ^\Diverse Premotions/ all inward Reasons & Motives & ye ^\last/ Practicall Judgment itself & \{illeg}/ also divine premotion, So yt according to ym a Free=Agent is such as till yt very moment of his actuall Willing is not determined by any thing whatsoever antecedent ^ to will one thing rather yn another, but is æqually Indifferent till it determine itself. Nay some of them talk so extravagantly as if a Free=Agent were not only Indifferent to do this or yt of those things yt were before under do = liberac~on but also were \likewise/ at once alike Indifferent to Nothing in ye ^\whole/ world or \to/ wtsoever could be done, As if he |it| were able at any time to make ye Cogitation of any thing whatsoever, to come into {illeg} minds, & will it accordingly.

But this doth not seem to be a true & genuine Accompt of the Phænomenon of Free will nor ye representation of any naturall true perfection, nor indeed of any naturall Power For first it is not easily conceivable how Indifferency can be active, nor how indeterminatation can determine itself 2\ly/ It seems repugnant to ye Phænomena æ experience yt wtsoever externall things are put wthout put a man should be ^\still/ alike indifferent to do this or that, as if there were no such things for this is to suppose a man to be an absolute thing, by himself & to have no connexion wth ye \Vniverse/ world nor dependence upon any thing wthout him. \But/ Whereas it is most evident by dayly experience yt things wthout us & such as are not in our own power are ye causes of many \have a great influence upon our/ Volitions \I/ acting upon our nature or n̄rall propensions & Inclinac~ons, so yt if these things had not been we should never have willed, such & such things \so & so/ & those things being put as they are we could many times hardly will otherwise yn we do, Hence it is yt mens dispositiōs & Inclinac~ons are so much diversified by ye diversity of things, wthout ym as by mens \their/ different fortunes, course of Life conversation & temper of Body \A/ wherefore ye learned Origen did not wthout cause \very iudiciously/ perstringe such a \this/ wild & fluttering notion of Free=will as this is, wch makes man by reason of his autexousion, an absolute thing by himself so yt nothing yt is out of his power hath any influence upon his volitions If any one would make Free=will in us to be a thing loose & disjoyed from ye from ye whole Vniverse so yt by reason of such & such things happening to us, we do not will & chuse this or yt ^\wch otherwise we should not/ he hath forgot himself to be a part of ye world, & yt he is comprehended in ye com{illeg}\plexiō/ of men & ye whole Vniverse wch he further explains thus \Wherefor he ads further to this purpose/ We willingly confesse yt of many things yt are in our own power, things out of our Power are ye causes of ym, wch things yt are out of our power if they had not been such & such things wch are in our power, would never have been done for many things yt are in our power are done or not done consequently upon some things going before not in our Power, so yt if these things had been otherwise they would have caused us to do otherwise yn we do. Thus he. Whereas according to yt wild conceit of Freewill before mentioned. {illeg} of \Man as a/ Free=agent {illeg} be such a thing, as be all \Let/ things wthout of his power & wthout him ^\& out of his Power be/ w\t/ they will be is still alike \as/ indifferent to do this or yt, as if there were no such things, yt is, he is απολελυμένον τι τοῦ παντὰ a thing disjoyned from & independent upon ye whole Vniverse wch is so farre frō doing true of man yt any we dare affirm yt this <13> is no essentiall perfection of ye \concerning/ Deity itself though he be ^\truly/ απολελυμένον {illeg} παντὲς and a solide thing by itself & disjoyned from all things wthout him as independent upon ym & though he be not no part of ye world nor complicated wthin ye systeme of ye Vniverse \& of Rationall Beings/ & Man, yet \I say/ notwthstanding \all this/ yet is no priviledge of his nature yt all things wtsoever being put wthout him, he should be \thus/ equally indifferent to will or act so or so, for his essentiall Holinesse \Wisdome/ Justice & Goodnesse, will oblige him in certain cases to do necessarily to act so & not otherwise, because ^\In {illeg} cases it is {illeg}/ ye things wthout him \{illeg}/doe not impose upon him, but only ye Perfection of his own nature |yt determining|es| his Volitions.|

Moreover \Thirdly/ if ye τὸ εφ' ἡμιν were such an absolute thing as yt all things wtsoever being put antecedently ^\{illeg}/ ye Will & {illeg} indifferent to do this or yt as if they were not yn nature acted nothing at all ^\in us/ & had no power upon us & we were not partly nature & partly self=activity as was before declared but all self=activity & self=power Then all our n̄rall propensions Appetites & Inclinations were in excess & to no purpose, nay Reason & Vnderstanding itself were {illeg}straneous ^\would be Superfluous &/ it could be nothing but a meer mockery in nature to endue men ^\thus/ wth those Faculties of Reason & Vnderstanding & to incline ym to make long ^\{illeg}/ deliberations concerning their future Actions if after all were done yt wch sway'd & determin'd \concluded/ all ^\in them/ were ἀπολελυμένον τὶ an abs loose & abosolute thing ^\still equally/ indifferent to determine itself - either way. How can this be thought to be ye perfection of a man or of any Being yt is indued wth Reason & Vnderstanding to be alike indifferent to act wth \Reasō/ or against it. \Reason or vnderstanding/ And wch is yet more monstrous (if it were rightly understood) to be indifferent to follow or not=follow its own last practicall Judgment? Nay how can this be ye most glorious of all Perfections or rather how can it be any n̄rall Power at all for a Being to be perfectly loose to its own Good & \{illeg}/ indifferent ^\either/ to its own Good or Hurt for such is ye indifferency of contrariety to Morall Good & Evill wch learned Doctors make to be ye top of ye \highest/ glory of Free=will Such an active Indifferency as this is to ones own Good & Hurt, what is it else but an active madnesse or ye activity of blind ^\{illeg}/ chance & Fortune of \{illeg}ding in vs/ {illeg} so far from being ye highest of all Perfections yt it can hardly be conceived to be any innaturall Power to have \be indued with/ a great impetous & agitation or inclination to Action wthout any byas to direct any {illeg} mark to aim at, such an {illeg} active power ^\a Principle of {illeg}/ as this would be a kind |A| of active nothing |A| |B|

|B| Whereas ye indifferent Free=willers \Further/ It is observable yt many of these inconvenient Consequences wch are urged by these indifferent Free-willers agst necessity ye asserters of ye Necessity & ye Wills necessary following & necessarily understanding may be retorted wth equall or greater ^\or equall/ force upon y\m/selves \{illeg}/ It is objected agst ye Asserters of Necessity yt this Doctrine takes away ye use of all exhortations, for according to yt Hypothesis exhortac~on must either be directed to ye Vnderstanding or ye Will, to exhort ye Vnderstanding to understand is alltogether in vain, since it doth not understand by choice & cannot choose but understand whatsoever is clearly propunded to it, ye understanding is only capable of Reason & Councells neither can exhortation be directed to ye will because yt necessarily followes ye Judgmt of ye Vnderstanding & cannot do more or lesse yn wt other determines it unto. but this same inconvenience may be retorted ^\as strongly/ upon ye asserters of indifferent Free=will yt they take away all use of exhortac~ons because after all things put antecedent to Volition & therefore after all exhortac~ons ye Will is a like indifferent to do or not do as it was before. Nay ye indifferent <14> Free=willers are here guilty of much greater absurdity yn ye Necessitarians ymselves, forasmuch as they do not only take away ye use of all exhortation, but also of all Councell & advice, all motives & Reasons & of Vnderstanding itself as \wch ye/ the other do not because according to ym Motives & Reasons do often necessitate Action & yt cannot be thought in vain yt necessitates ye effect, but according to ye indifferent Free=willers motives & Councell & Advice, Motives & Reasons must needs be in vain because they effect nothing at all, & do not at all abate of ye Indifferency of Will yt determines Action & And ye same may be sd of Lawes ^\Precepts/ Rewards & Punishmts wch are but Motives & antecedent requisites of Action & therefore can have no influence upon Free=willed Agents to make ym do one thing rather yn Another.

\Again/ It is justly objected agst ye Asserters of Necessity yt they destroy ye Nature of Sin & Morall Evill & take away all Praise & Dispraise, &|b|ut it is very hard for ye indifferent Free=willers \{illeg}/ think those Phænomena to be salved \cannot/ wthout Liberty of Will, yet according to yt notion of Liberty yt they have framed \indifft Freew. haue fram./ they will be as unable to give an accompt \held/ by ym \Phenomena/ as ye Necessitarians ymselves -

For if ye highest perfection of all rationall Beings be such an indifferent Liberty of contradiction & contrariety as was \after all things put/ before described yn wtsoever they do in ye use of this Liberty they can never Sin because they can never act contrary to their nature or ye ^\true/ perfection of their own |B| Being \B/ there could not yn be any measure of Morall Good & Evill in ye nature of Intellectuall Being ymselves according to this Hypothesis of indifferent Liberty any more yn according to yt of Physicall & materiall Necessity There were Some \Indeed other/ asserters of Necessity do notwthstanding allow of two \that their/ Paradigms in nature to wch Morall Good & Evill are to be referred they make a reall difference betwixt Virtue & Vice though they determine \suppose/ yt men were necessarily ^\determined to/ both & none was Blame=worthy or Praise=worthy for ym \ye same/, but according to this Doctrine of indifferent Liberty made to be ye highest perfection of all Intellectuall Beings there can be no Pattern or Paradigm of Morall Good, \& Evill/ in nature \of Intelligent Being/, Whatsoever keeps its own nature never sins, nor erres; & if active Indifferency after all things put either w\th/out - us or wthin us, be ye true nature of all Rationall Beings, yt wtsoever Free=willed Beings do, they can never swerve or deviate from their nature) ye exercise of infinite indifferent Liberty being their highest Perfection Wherefore it - would\ill/ follow unavoidably from this Doctrine yt Morall Good & Evill, Just & Vnjust do not spring from Nature, \nor any {illeg}/ but only from positive Lawes & externall Institution & yt they are indeed things contrary to nature nothing but curbs & shackles to hinder naturall Liberty & therefore \Evill in {illeg}/ only submitted to out of necessity by reason of weaknesse & imbecillity, If this be ye true Nature & perfection of ye highest Principle, ye hegemonicall or ruling power in us, after all ye Dictates of Light & Reason to determine it self indifferently yn their can be no foundac~on for Morality in ye nature of man

Moreover ^\according to/ this Hypothesis likewise {illeg} Praise & Dispraise, in yt sense wch it supposeth ye merit & |A| Demerit of |ye| Persons \A/ for active Indifferency is nothing else but active Chance & Contingency & if active Chance or Contingency determine ye Actions of - Free=willed Beings, they would be no more culpable or blame=worthy for ym yn if they were {illeg} determined by fatall necessity, there \For wt/ could be no more Mastership, Lordship & Dominion over our Actions <15> under ye rein of blind Indifferency, Chance & Contingency, yn under ye empire of Fatall necessity, for If blind Chance itself was a positive efficient & cause of Actions & did ^\with its hand/ turn mens wills this way & yt way, all its determinac~ons would be as necessary from to ye will, as if they had been by fixed fatall \{illeg} to thē by Fate or/ Destiny; But this Hypothesis is indeed utterly impossible yt Indifferency & Chance should be ye active causes or Efficients of any thing, \for/ indifferent Contingency is so far from being a positive cause & principle of perfection \Action/, yt it is nothing but a name given to ye defectivenesse & imperfection of Free=willed Agents, but \yet/ if there could be any such thing, though it might seem to be a Paradox yet it is \most/ true yt - infinite contingency determining all Actions would be to us ye same thing wth fatall Necessity & leave us as little \no more/ power over our selves & Actions

|B| \Again/ Agai \{illeg}/ If active Indifferency & Contingency were essentiall to ye Wills of Rationall Beings, yn it is plain they could not carry on any steady ^\& uniform/ designs of Life, nor have any firm purposes & resolutions, nor \they could not/ have any assurance \to themselves/ concerning their future Volitions & Actions \+/ because their wills being all wayes essentially indifferent ^\after all {illeg}/ there cannot possibly \& therfore Changeable & {illeg}/ be any certainty or \naturall/ assurance of their future determination, yt is, we can have no selfpower, no Mastery over ourselves any more yn we could have under Fatall Necessity whether divine or Physicall It is true indeed yt if all our Actions & Volitions, all our Cogitations be \were/ determined by a constant streā of Atoms moving upon us from us wthout yn no man could have any tollerable assurance of his Will & purposes \for/ to Morrow & \or/ ye next moment & ye same inconvenience doth as much follow from yt other Hypothesis of all active Contingency or Indifferency being ye essence of Free=will

According to ye Doctrine of Necessity there could be no Lucta or Conflict in ye Soul, all things would go on easily because necessarily, ther could be no striving nor contention, no laborious conatous yt we should be sensible off as our own wch if contrary to ye Phænomenon|a|, but ye same inconvenience doth likewise attend yt other Hypothesis of active Indifferency according to wch Vertue & Vice would be nothing else, but ye Wills nodding \indifferently/ this way & yt way wth ye same facility ^\so long as/ ye card or Hinge \{illeg} one way or other/ upon wch it allwayes ^\still ye same/ turns ^ being ^\nothing but/ easy indifferency, \Again {illeg}/ The \this Hypothesis/ Will would not only have an equally facill flexibility to Good or Evill wthout any laborious Contention, but it would be able also to passe to ye greatest extreams of Vertue or Vice or wtever it was capable off in a moment, so yt if it were in this moment diabolically wicked it might become in ye next Angelically holy, nothing could hinder ye Will, being infinite & active Indifferency, from makeing such large \{illeg}/ skipps & strides as these are, as if one should suppose yt a Being were at all times indifferent to be in any place whatsoever nothing could hinder it from striding im̄ediately from ye Center of ye earth or Sun to Saturn or ye fixed stars or skipping from ye lowest Hell to ye highest Heaven in a moment. But it is plain according to ye Phanomena & experience yt ye will hath not an equally facile flexibility to moral Good & Evill but must use Labour & Contention to ye one, <16> whereas it easily slides & sinks down into ye other & also yt it is more slow pac'd ^\in its {illeg}/ yn yt it can make such vast Leaps & transitions \& Stepps/ in a moment & passe im̄ediately from one extream to another, a Freewilled Being once fixed in a vertuous state cannot upon a suddain & in a moment do an action yt is enormously facinorous \flagitious/, & ye same obdurately hardened in Evill by long Practice & Custome, will find|s| itself incumbered w\th/ an evill habit like \certain with/ to an Ephialtes or Nightmare lying upon it & \or/ pressing it yt it was \can be/ hardly able to move or stirre towards Good. |Besides all wch there are further Inconveniences yt still attend this Hypothesis|

Again \For/ according to this notion of Free=will yt it consists essentially in Indifferency after all things put yt can be put besides ye Volition itself ye Will must needs be utterly uncapable of any Habits whether in things Morall or Naturall for as much as Habitts take away Indifferency & are inconsistent wth it. It was an argument used by ye antient Stoicks as Alexander Aphrodicens tells us against ye τὸ ἐφ' ἡμιν or Free=will, because \yt/ Free=will Morall was neither in good men nor in vitious men \& so nowhere/. Not in good & vertuous men because they were not indifferent to do flagitious Actions, nor in vitious Persons because they had an - impotency & inability to good Actions, wch \ye/ difficulty ^\of wch {illeg}/ ariseth only from a false anticipac~on concerning ye nature of Free=will yt it is an indifferent æquilibrious things ^\after all things out/ constantly reciprocating this way & yt way & for ye same reason our modern Indifferent Free=willers are very much puzzled to give an accompt of ye state of Angells & Saints confirmd in Holinesse how this should consist wth Free=will, & are forced to determine, yt these have lost their Free=will as to Morall Good & Evill, & yt they are not now freely Good wch ye Necessitarians taking for an absurdity, endeavour from hence ^\{illeg} advātage/ to confirm their assertion yt Free=will & necessity whether Naturall or Fatall may very well consist together, because Angells & Devills are at once freely & necessarily Holy & Wicked & there It is true indeed according to this Hypothesis of active Indifferency after all things put that \there/ can be besides ye Volition itself, it is not conceivable how there should be any firm Habitts either of Vertue or Vice, nor consequently how there could be any such thing as Morality; for Free=willed Beings must \then/ allwayes of necessity be, in an Indifferent, pendulous & æquilibrious state allwayes reciprocating this way & yt way; in a fluttering uncertain Volatility, unfixt to any thing, having no habituall Inclinations to determine ym, no firm & steady purposes or resolutions of Life whereas indeed Free=will is \such/ a power yt \as whereby/ rationall Creatures have to \can/ fix their own Volatility ^\deter/ to determine ymselves into firm resoluc~ons & settle ymselves into Habituall Inclinac~ons this way & yt way It is true indeed yt Free=willed Beings are \de/void of antecedent Necessity whether Naturall or Fatall, but yet they are liable to a kind of self=contracted subsequent Necessity, a Free=willed Being is yt wch can form & fix itself into this or that & wn it hath brought itself into yt state yt Vertue & Morall Goodnesse is become a kind of 2dary factitious & self=made nature so yt it cannot upon a suddain do flagitious Actions, it hath as \{illeg} as/ much of Freewill in this state, as it had wn it was most pendulous & æquilibrious, it doth as much exercise self=power as a Faculty & it hath much more of ^\{illeg}/ Suipotence in it ^\as a state/ wch is ye result & consequence of ye right exercise of yt Faculty wch is called Free=will & self=power, I say there is as much of Free=will in this state ^\of Habituall Goodnes/ & much more of true Liberty (wch is a different thing from ye Faculty of Free=will) as in a state of Indifferency <17> to Morall Good & Evill. Indifferency to Good & Evill Morall is not the Faculty of Free=will itself, but it is only one state of it, it is a weak & - middle state of Free=willed Beings, neither ye best, nor ye worst it being much better yn ye state of obdurate Wickednesse & much inferiour to a state of confirmed Holinesse But it is an error wch we have often observed ^\some Learned/ Ethicall writers, \of the/ to fall into, to suppose yt there is no \as if there were That there/ Free=will Morall, but only in a middle state of Indifferency, betwixt Vertue & Vice, whereas this is not ye Faculty or Power of Free=will but ^\(as we said before/ only one state of it, wch indeed is found in very few yt they should be in a perfect equipoise or an ^\absolute/ equality of warering alternac~ons & reciprocations either way & where it is it never continues long, but will quickly settle into an habituall preponderancy on one side or other yt is into an habituall disposition to either Vertue or Vice. And it hath been observed yt nobody continues so long in a state of perfect Indifferency either of Judgment or Inclinac~on as to any thing of Life, it being ye nature of Free=willed Beings yt they - love to determine ymselves \as/ to all \every/ things

If ye essence of Free=will consisteth in nothing but Indifferency, it would allwayes be a very weak & limber thing & ye Freedom & Flexibility of it, would be but like ye Flexibility of a Reed or Stone ^\{illeg} Rush/ or like ye ^\Reciprocall/ mobility of an Aspen Leaf, it could have no tone nor strength, no sinewes nor nervosity in it, noe firmitude & vigour of Self=power, it would be nothing but languid flexility ^\Flaccidity/ for wt could \can/ be more weak & devoid of Tone or Strength yn Indifferency or Chance \is/, but this again is confuted by ye Phænomena & experience wch plainly shewes yt though will be a thing easily mutable by itself yet it hath notwthstanding great strength & power also in it, for wt is stiffer yn Will? If Will were nothing but flax\cc/id & limber Indifferency yn it could have no pertinacity of purposes, no stratnesse & Gallantry of Magnanimity \Courage/ no invincible resolutions, no inexpugnable firmitude in - Vertue nor obdurate stiffnesse in Vice, no constant steadinesse in carrying on designes ^\of Life/ all wch are plainly repugnant to ye Phænomena; Love & Affection are either Will or something akin to it & of this we read yt it is stronger yn Death & more cruell yn ye Grave; & Plato in his Cratulus tells us yt Will is a stronger Bond yn Necessity, & it is a known Saying of one of ye School=men, yt Libero arbitrio post Deum nihil \est/ potentius yt after God nothing is stronger yn Free=will. Free=will fixed habitually upon Good prooves often ^\a thing/ more inexpugnable yn Brasen Walls & Iron Barrs. We \2/ conclude therefore yt Free=will is not Indifferency but a Power \& Contingency/ It \I/ ill agrees wth ye Phænomena to make Free=will nothing - but Ludibrium, Fortunæ Fortunes Fool & Vassal, or ye meer Tennis ball of Chance

It was no weak assault made against this opinion of the Wills being active Indifferency by a propugner of Necessity upon yt Ground of ye Wills allwayes following & \a/ necessary Vnderstanding, yt it would follow from hence \vpō this Hypothesis/ yt a Man might choose \will/ Evill as such, for if after all things put antecedent to ye Volition, yt is, after all appearance \& worth/ of Good represented by ye Vnderstanding \or Judgmnt/ ye Will be still indifferent \to this or that thing/; as ye man |may| {illeg} act \wtout/ wthout respect to any considerac~on of Good so he may act \but allso/ also against it, yt is choose Evill as such; & indeed w\n/soever he chooseth yt wch ye last practicall Judgmt concludes to be lesse eligible, he chooseth Evill as such, a lesser Good comparatively <18> to a greater being Evill. |& yet this is allowed by these Authors yt ye third Faculty of will may act cōtrary to all Judgment of Good -|

Again such a Creature as this Free=will it would ^\seem to/ be a thing alltogether inaccessable by divine Grace, Assistance & Providence, it being such a slippery thing as yt it hath no Ausæ, no handles in it, yt Gods can lay hold upon God having put it quite out of ye reach of his own Power, Government & Jurisdiction & made it independent upon himself, so yt God could not though he would never so fain by all his Omnipotence do any thing yt might in ye least promote or advance ye Good & Sanctity of any Free=willed Being, nor cast in ye least grain to turn ye state of their \his/ Will towards Goodnesse & Honesty, no though he should stand by & soe all ye Free=willed Creatures in ye world at once be miscarry\ing/ & preciptating ymselves into Sin & Wikcednesse & continnue in ye Same.

Again from this Hypothesis it followes yt ye Will can never be free wn it acts \wills/ but only before it wills, because ye essence of Freedome being Indifferency it was only indifferent before ye Volition & not in yt very moment wn it wills for yn its Indifferency & Indetermination \ceaseth/ is taken away

If ye essence of Free=will consisted in Indifferency after all motives & Argumts, reason & Judgmt inclining one way yen Free=willed Beings could never do any thing wth a perfect & full will, because by how much more there is of Indifferency in our determinac~ons so much lesse is there of Will ^\& Voluntareity/. Indifferentia illa quam experior, cum nullæ me ratio in unam partem magis quam in alteram impellit, est infimus gradus Libertatis, et nullam in ea perfectionem sed tantūmodo incognitione defectū quendam testatur; Wherfore those indifferēt endeav Freewillers endeavouring to {illeg} Will quite destroy it.

From these Absurdities suggested it may sufficiently appear yt this ^\active Indifferency/ \after all things put/ is not a right & genuine but a false & spurious noc~on of ye Faculty of Freewill, but ye most effectually convincing way \herof/ to confute it is by confining our thoughts only to naturall things, yt is, to ye Animall Life; And it is most true wt we have before observed yt there are two ^\distinct/ degrees of Free=will in us one of wch we call Animall ye other Morall though Writers upon this Argument have takē no notice of \it/ this difference but jumbled ym both together, ye reason whereof seems to be this, because they com̄only suppose Morality to consist only in outward Actions done or not done according to an externall Rule. Let us therefore consider Free=will only in Naturall things or in externall Actions as yey \they/ referre to ye Interests of Animall Life \Onely./ Now here it will be so evident an absurdity to say yt ye highest Perfection & ye Ruling Principle, in a man is nothing but active Indifferency & chance determining all his Actions, & yt this is ye great priviledge of a Man yt wn ^\Inferior/ Reason plainly tells him, yt this ought to be done as conducing to his Good \in Inferēce to his/ Interest & Advantage & yt \rather yn an/ other to be avoided as noxious & hurtfull, to be \yt {illeg}/ Indifferent to either & \{illeg}/ determine himself fortuitously & contingently ^\one way or other/ wthout any respect at all to ye reason of his own Good. yt after all reason, deliberation & consultation used, irrationall Indifferency presiding in him \should/ determines all, a Principle yt is altogether carelesse & regardlesse of ones own Good as if it were a Perfection for a Man not to be determined \no/ to direct & guide his steps <19> wth discretion, but to have an Indifferent Liberty, to tumble down precipices & to dash himself against Walls & Posts, or as if a Traveller should coūt it a liberty yt he is not \to be confined &/ determined to god in ye open \{illeg}/ highwayes & to passe over Bridges ^\& stiles/ but to take his way thorow deep Rivers thorow Ditches \{illeg}/ & Hedges, Inclosures & Thicketts Wch is plainly nothing but ye Liberty or Indifferency of a \plainly ye Perfectī of a Madman/ Madman. \And what can now/ & nothing can seem more \absurd/ non=sensicall to any one, yn now to h talke here as {illeg} \such a Freewill as this/ of Freewill as this \as some do yt it/ is ye \most/ glorious priviledge & perfection of it \of Humane Nature/, yt it can thus act ^\blindly/ wilfully \&/ irrationally \yet/ These are ye words of a late famous Writer de Libero Arbitrio Hic est Libertatis humanæ apex, quòd se stultum et Brutum reddere possit homo si velit i.e. quòd ita eligere aliquid possit sine Judicio tanquam si ratione prorsus destitueretur, Bruti et Fatui instar. This is ye top of humane Liberty yt a man can in his Actings render himself Foolish & Brutish if he will, i.e. yt he can so chuse wthout Judgmt as if he were altogether devoid of Reason as \like/ a fool or Bruit And again Ex eo liberi hujus dominij gloria elegisse \{illeg}/ quòd homo possit sibi ipsi imperare, ne adhibeat Rationem in consilium sed ut feratur in objectum aliquod Bruti instar non aliter quàm si ratione et Judicio omni careret, hic est apex humanæ Libertatis quod homo possit hominem exuere et seipsum Brutum et irrationalem reddere The glory of this dominion & liberty shines \forth/ out from hence yt a man can com̄and himself not to call Reason at all into Counsell wn he is about to choose any thing but yt he can be carried to this or yt object like a bruit no other wise yn if he was utterly destitute of all Reason & Judgm\t/ this is ye top of humane Liberty yt a man can devest himself of his Manhood & render himself Brutish & irrationall Now if this be nothing but downright madnesse in Nrall things & ye concernment of |ye| Animall life, to make this ye most glorious Liberty privid|l|edge & perfection Liberty & dominion of a Man \yt {illeg}/ & devest himself of his manhood & act brutishly & irrac~onally wnsoever he pleaseth, \certainly/ it is no lesse madnesse to assert ye same in morall things yt it is a glorious priviledge, Liberty & dominion to have εξουσιαν των αντικειμενων ^\after all things Put Indifferēt/ Liberty of Contradiction & Contrariety as to Good & Evill; Just & Vnjust, & to be determined by active \Irrationall/ Indifferency either way, Though it be not so much diserned here because men are not so thorouwly convinced of these differencies of Morall Good & Evill as they are of ye \other/ differences of Good & Evill naturall.

This is ye great mistake & error of those Indifferent Free=willers yt they think Free=will consisteth in being free from Reason & acting Irrationally wthout any regard to ye dictate of Judgmt & Vnderstanding ^^\& yt it is a Power yt Supersedes ye Vse of Reason/ whereas it is indeed a Faculty bestowed upon us by God & Nature for no other End or purpose but to inable us to intend ye use of our Reason & Vnderstanding and advance it to ye highest pitch as shall be showed afterwards.


But Aristotle never counts an error well confuted unlesse one shew also {illeg} some thing of Truth {illeg} & complicated wth \it/ every error. Wherefore we will shew also ye occasion of this error & by wt appearances of Truth these Authors were {illeg} unwarily & unadvisedly tempted & drawn unto it \induced & fed into it/. First therefore it is most true as we have before expressed yt Free=will is such a Faculty whereby we are inabled to determine ye various passive capability ye Infinity & indifferency of one Nature & Nature presenting us wth severall Congruities \& capacities/ higher or lower we are inabled by it to determine ourselves to either And it is not improbable yt these writers seeing a glimse of {illeg} but having an impartial {illeg} conception of it might bunglingly endeavour to expresse it after this manner yt Free=will is ye same thing wth active Indifferency, Whereas it is not ye Indifferency \itselfe/ yt is active, th but there are these two Principles in ye nature of all Free=willed Being, ye first whereof is passive capability and Infinity & Indifferents wch is {illeg} nature in us ye or matter of ye Soul & ye 2d is \ye {illeg}/ reduplicable self=activity wch is ye form yt actuates & determines ye rude passive & Indifferent Chaos of its nature into wt it is

But we will \shall/ descend to something yt is more \{illeg}/ superficiall \& is more/ easy & obvious in this businesse \A/ I cannot be denyed but yt there is something of Contingency & Indifferency included in ye notion of Free=will, it being inconsistent wth ye necessity of either Naturall or fatall determination wch those Writers \{illeg}/ know \will/ not where \{illeg}/ the place (but {illeg} \placed it/ in ye Will itself after all things put yt were antecedently requisite to ye Volition of this or yt, because objects & outward circumstances as also inward Inclinac~ons & Reasons - seem to be necessary wherefore they made ye Indifferency & Contingency of Free=will to be seated in ye Will itself after all things \{illeg}/ put yt were antecedently requisite, yt is, all things \put/ besides ye very Volition itself yt yn Indifferency & Contingency \& there/ as it were sitting at ye stern did im̄ediately \W/ govern & determine all ye motions of ye Soul, But we shall afterwards shew this was very unskillfully done for as much as yt Contingency yt properly belongs to Free=will comes in rather amongst som of ye antecedent Requisites, yn ye meer Volition or com̄and of Action, it lieing in yt \{illeg}/ first generall power wch ye Soul hath over its whole self of - intending & exerting itself more or lesse That contingent Indifferency yt is after all things put being yn only allowable in Free=will wn either things are perfectly equall or Reasons are so doubtfull on either side yt we know not wch to preferre & therefore in this case do negligently & indifferently determine ourselves either way, wch is ye lowest exercise of Free=will & may rather be called fortitium\ion/ yn Electum\ion/ But wn in other cases men will negligently carelessly & Indifferently determine ymselves either way, this is not ye Power or Faculty of Free=will in generall but - only ye voice of it. Indifferency & Contingency are no Power or Faculty wch can be ye Active cause of any thing they are only , ye manner of a cause & they have not only but not subsistence only but \only/ Assistence <21> or adnascens to some positive thing, active Indifferency & Chance ^\ruling all/ is little better yt active nothing. \A/

^\Wherefore/ Secondly another ground of this Error ^\complicatiō here/ is yt because Free=will is a noble Perfection in respect of brutish Necessity, they unskillfully mistake it for a pure & absolute Perfection wch hath not ye least mixture or complicac~on of Imperfecc~on in it, as Goodnesse, Wisedome & Power are. From whence it is yt they conclude yt ye τὸ πρῶτον ὑποκείμενοι ye first Subject of Free=will is God himself, arguing |after| this manner yt there could be no Free=will in Creatures if there were not only Freewill first in god, as men commonly argue yt there could be no wisedōe & Knowledge in Creatures if \there/ were not first in God, whereas Freewill (as we shall show afterwards) is but a mixt & mungrell Perfection yt hath a complication of Imperfection in it & there not warily distinguishing betwixt ye Perfection & Imperfection of it is yt wch hath caused ye greatest obscurity about it & made so many prejudiced against ye thing itself, For indeed to hear Men vaunt of ye glorious priviledge & Perfection of this Free=will whereby \man can Brute agree as we said before & whereby/ Homo eximitur divinæ Omnipotentiæ ut independetèr aborum aliâ re agat, ut possit nolle subjici Deo et contrarium vel en quod Deus ipsi precipit as ye \same/ late famous Writer doth yt \Freewill/ it is a thing so far exempt from ye divine Omnipotence yt it can act independently upon every thing besides itself & refuse to be subject unto God & will ye contrary to what he com̄ands it. I say to hear - Men thus boast of this as a most glorious Perfection in Free=will were enough to turn any sober mans stomach against it & to - make ym endeavour to beat it down as a proud Gigantean thing ^\that Swaggers with God himselfe/ but all this proceeds from grosse Ignorance concerning ye true nature of this power wch is not a pure perfection but a thing wch riseth below God & in umbrâ Dei, in yt shade of Nothingnesse & defect yt is beneath him, as shall be showed afterwards

This last mistake ytwe have mentioned makes an easy way - for another \to follow/ & yt is yt Liberum Arbitrium is ye same thing wth Liberty as it speaks pure Perfection & is synonimous to Happinesse wch ^\whereas this/ latter thing in us ^\Liberty/ is only a state & not a Faculty & ye Faculty of Free=will is a Power by ye right use of wch & \with/ ye concurrence of divine grace ye Soul may assert itself into this state of Liberty & \be/ infranchized wth \in/ ye Freedome of divine Life ^\or ye sum of it/, as the like manner it may \again/ by ye abuse of this doubtfull & versatill Power fetter & shackle itself in ye greatest of all Bondates yt of Sin & Wickednesse wch are \& ye Very/ Chaines of Darknesse & make itself become propria - Libertate captivans by this \its/ miserable Liberty & \of/ Indifferency captive, by wch still \wherby which Indifferēcy,/ I mean not ye power & Perfection of Free=will, but ye vice ^\Imperative/ of it \Freewill/

And being thus far {illeg} \advanced/ to make ye Faculty of Free=will ye same thing wth ye pure Perfection of Liberty w\ch/ in Creatures <22> is not a Faculty but a state, here they are madly \plainly fudled &/ intoxicated wth yt old {illeg} yt their first Progenitors, were sick off yt ye experimentall Knowledge of Good & Evill & \loose/ Indifferency to both, is ye only true perfective Liberty ^\{illeg}/ yt irrationall Liberty \{illeg}/ from ye supposed Bonds & shackles of Reason & Wisedom, Goodnesse & Truth, yt is, yt uncurbed Arbitrary Self=will is ye highest Perfection in ye Vniverse, so yt God could not be God wthout this & yt this irrationall indifferent Self=will together wth infinite Power \so exists & subsists ye same is enough to/ {illeg} make vp a God, That is these writers do plainly mistake ffree=will, & Liberty, & \Arbitrary/ Self=will to be all one & ye same thing.

Now it is plain yt where this Hypothesis is once admitted if men will adhere to ye genuine consequences of \it/ they must needs utterly explode Morality & ye difference of Good & Evill, for if arbitrary selfwill be ye Liberty & Perfection of ^\{illeg}/ all Rationall Beings ^ yn Righteousnesse & Holinesse cannot be Liberty & Nature, but ^\imposed Force/ Law & Bondage; where indifferent, arbitrary & irrationall self=will are, ye highest Law, there there can be no foundac~on for Morality. If Liberty as it is a pure Perfection of Nature consisted in an universall Indifferency both of Contradiction & Contrariety & therefore to Good & Evill Morall, then there must needs \would/ be equall Perfection in those things \{illeg}/ called Vertue & Vice, Honesty & Dishonesty. If ye \Arbiter of ye/ highest Hegemonicon in humane nature, yt ought to rule & determine all Actions be \to be/ indifferent to all thing, yn both it & humane nre \itself/ are alike free from Morality. i.e. Morality is not Nature but a shackle cast upon it, Whatsoever casts an Obligation upon yt wch is naturrally Nothing can \beget/ cast a true & proper Obligac~on upon yt wch is naturally free from all Obligac~on, Lawes arbitrarily made & written down upon Paper could not do any such thing. Indifferent Free=will must needs be \is/ ^\would be/ such a soveraign Queen & absolute Empresse over herself & her own Actions yt for her to suffer herself to be hamperd & yoked to Lawes & Com̄ands either of Men or God or to be imposd upon by any previos dictates of Judgmt & Reason any thing besides itself ^\any further then Imbecility & Necessity {illeg}/ would be nothing else but for her to abandon her own native Right \& Royalty/, her essentiall Priviledge & Perfection, wch God & Nature hath invested her w\th/ & therefore ye ^\only/ Vnjustice & Nonnaturality yt she could be guilty off To conclude, to suppose a Faculty of Will ^\& Liberty/ whose naturall Perfection is to be indifferent to Reason & all Morall Good is all one as to say yt yt wch is called Righteousnesse & Holinesse, Duty & Obligac~on is not Nature & perfective Liberty, but Contra=naturality, Force & Bondage, ^\or nether/ an externall \but an/ hindrance of Liberty & And \But/ according to simple Nature unsophisticated by Politicians, Law=makers & Theologers ye top of humane Liberty can consist in nothing else but in being undetermined by any thing but our own Will & Appetite Indeed ye <23> ye Truth of ye Scripture is herein verified wch made this yt most dangerous & Powerfull Temptac~on by wch ye Parents of mankind was \at first/ seduced, this error having ever since rumed \so much/ in ye blood of - their Progeny & \so yt/ ye Poison of it having transfusd itself \{illeg}/ into Phylosophy & Theology itself & generally imbued mens minds wth an Opinion yt ye perfection of this naturall Faculty of Freewill in men is to be indifferent to Reason & yt wch is called morall Good & yt this is true Liberty if we & would \be able to alone to/ make us Gods if we had but power to execute ye Same & \correspondent to it - neither could/ God himself could not be God wthout it And From hence we may also gather no small Argument to confirm yt Mankind is now generally in a lapsed state, since ye most refined part of ye world, the subtill Philosophers, & acute sharp=willed Theologers are so much inffected wth this perswasion, for if ye Parents of Mankind fell into a degenerate state by \reasō of yt/ being seduced|tiō| \of it this false Persuasiō/ by this false perswasion yt to know Good & Evill & have an Indifferent Liberty is to become a God yn certainly they be grovling in ye same state \still in ye fallē state/ yt are still \still/ so fuddled, & intoxicated w\th/ ye poisonous vapour of it. |this Opinion -|

But yt is not an uncharitable constriction made of this Opinion & a groundlesse surmize suspition of our own may \in part/ appear partly from hence in yt a late learned \& acute Writer/ Author endeavouring to give an accompt of this Indifferent Free=will to Morall Good & Evill layes his foundac~on here yt ^\Boni Honesti Nulla Est per se Justio/ ye Good of Honesty & Justice so called is not a thing desireable in itself but only for ye sake of some Pleasure & Vtility yt may redound from it & yt ye delight wch riseth from it how great soever it be as yt is not so great a Good as yt ye Soul of Man can rest in it as its End, but yt Delicac~o quæ ex virtute et honesti, rectiq; studio existit, posterior est et posponenda naturæ ordine Delectac~oi quæ ex voluptatum carnalium com̄ercio est yt yt delight wch ariseth from Vertue & Honesty is inferior & to be postponed or put after yt delight wch ariseth from carnall Pleasures according to ye order of Nature Whence he concludes yt Vertue & Honesty being not ye cheif Good, but carnall or se Animall Pleasure being ye first desireable thing it is no wonder if there be such a Faculty of Free=will in us as - whose Perfection consists in Indifferency to Morall Good & Evill And sliding thence he doth plainly conclude Honesty not to be a Naturall Good nor to have any setled nature of its own Virtus mandatur et Ꝑscribitur homini Naturalia autem non mandantur, quæ causa est et homo nunquam jubeatur appetere Bonū delectabile And again he useth yt com̄on Argument Recti et Honesti species usq; qua certa non est quod enim huic populo, huic homini honestū et rectum - est, id alteri inhonestum est et turpe ad Bonū delectabile omnibus populis, nationibus, hominibus unum prorsus idemq; est Now if there be no naturall Good of Honesty yn nothing can hinder but yt Indifferent, temerarious fortuitous, arbitrary \self/ determinac~on should <24> be a pure Perfection & ye highest Perfection \Privilege/ of all Intellectuall Beings as well God as Men it having ye greatest appearance of Power & Liberty in it.

But there are some of these Indifferent Philosophers more nasute & ingenious yn ye rest, who are sensible of those \grosse/ absurdities before mentioned yt must needs follow in ye com̄on Life of Man, if \from ye/ active Indifferency or Contingency be made to be ye highest perfection & ye Hegemonick or swaying Power, wch Inconveniences notwthstanding they suppose to arise from it not directly but by accident, because of our imbecility wch would render us obnoxious whereas if we had infinite Power yn we might exercise this indifferent Liberty of doing what we list wthout suffering any inconvenience therefrom

Moreover though there be no naturall Good of Honesty yet because of |an| omnipotent Deity by his decrees & Lawes hath arbitrarily made something Just & Vnjust, Honest & Dishonesty wch unlesse we observe in our Lives, we shall suffer greater \Punishments/ Inconveniency afterwards therefore though Indifferent & Arbitrary Will be ye greatest Good & Perfection in itself yet by Accident it is not so to us Creatures by reason of our Imbecillity, but it must be accompted our perfection to be determ who are such obnoxious things to be determined by ye reason of our own Good & by ye divine Lawes & ye more necessarily we are determined to either ye better it is But ye case is far otherwise in God because e is omnipotent & irresistably powerfull & therefore in him pure Nature obtains wthout any check or controll yt wch is simply in itself ye best is best to him & yt is infinite Indifferency of Will determining all things because this is ye exercise of ye greatest - Power & Liberty & ye very essence of absolute Indepesiency wch is ye chief Character of a Deity depends \confuts/ in it whereas if there were any - natures either of Goodnesse or Trueth im̄utable in itself they would be - independent upon God & God \would be/ dependent upon ym Whence a learned Author concludes \that though/ yt is ^\Large/ alia raro Libertatis in ^\De quam in rebus/ Creaturis, alia in Deo in Creatures by reason of their Imbecillity their Perfection consisteth in complying wth their own ^\Necessitous & obnoxious/ state & condic~on ^\of or state/ state & acting accordingly for avoiding of those Evills they are Anxious to \wch we shall be otherwise liable to/ but in God it is otherwise whose highest Perfection is absolute & infinite Indifferency of Will Sum̄a Indifferentia in Deo summū est ejus Omnipotentia argumentum Indeed & \Nether would/ God w\c/ould not be omnipotent of he were determined by any Necessary & im̄utable Nature of Goodnesse & Truth If he did not a|r|bitrarily make not only all things wthout him but also every thing w\th/in himself His words to this purpose Quantum ad Arbirtij Libertatem longe alia ejus ratio est in Deo quam in nobis repugnat enim Dei voluntati non fuisse ab æterne Indifferentem ad quæ facta sunt aut unquam fiaret quia nullum bonum vel verum, nullum credendum vel faciendum vel omittendum fingi pot potest cujus Idæa in Intellectu divino prius fuerit quam ejus voluntas sed ut determinares ad efficiendum ut ad tale esset ne hie loco - <25> prioritate temporis sed ne quidem priùs fuit ordine vel Naturâ vel ratione ratiocinatâ ut vocant ita scilicet ut ista bona Idæa sed sum̄a Indifferentia in Deo summmum est ejus Omnipotentiæ Argumentum \+/ from whence he concludes yt God did not do one thing in making of ye world rather yn another because one thing was better yn another but he determin'd all things by an Indifferent Will & because he determin'd ym therefore is every thing best as it is, he did not make ye world in time because he saw it - was better it should be made in time yn from Eternity, but because his Indifferent Will did determine to create it in time therefore this is better yn if he had made it from eternity. neither did God will ye three Angles of a Triangle to be equall to two right ones because it was necessarily true & could not be otherwise, but because he willed it to be so therefore it is now necessarily true Sed quantum ad Hominem cum naturâ omnis Boni et veri jam à Deo determinatam inveniat, nec in aliud ejus voluntas - ferri possit, evidens est ipsum eo libentius, ac proinde etiam liberias Bonum, et verum amplext, quo illud clarius videt, nunquam ne esse indifferentem, nisi quando quidnam fit melius aut verius ignorat, vel certè quandò - tam perspicuè non videt, quin de eo possit dubitare: Atq; ita longe alia indifferentia humanæ Libertati convenit quàm divinæ. Indifferentia non pertinet ad essentia in humanæ Libertatis cùm non modo simus Liberi quando ignorantia Recti nos reddit indifferentes sed maximè etiam quando clara perceptio ad aliquid prosequendū impellit.

The result of all is this yt absolutely in itself & to a Being devoid of all Imbecillity, indifferent, temerarious, fortuitous, arbitrary Will together wth power are ye highest Good & Perfection ^\& Happines/ wch Indifferent Will of his is ye first Law of all Truth & Goodnesse \wch therfore must be {illeg} {illeg}/ they are all mutable by him at Pleasure, for it is a childish thing to assert yt he yt made arbitrarily made all Truth & Goodnesse should be necessarily determined thereby ^\aftē he had made it/ & could not arbitrarily change wt he had arbitrarily made Moreover if Gods Liberty & Perfection consists essentially in Indifference of Will, yn he was \must/ not \be/ only once Indifferent for a moment but being allwayes free & perfect must needs continue allwayes Indifferent ^\or otherwise not always happy/ And if this was true \then/ no doubt but he would exercise this great Liberty & Perfection ^\ever & anon/ us turning topsiturvij ye ^\whole frame of ye/ world, hurling one Planet against another perpetually alterg ye position of ye Zodiack, \Æquator/, & ye Poles of ye world, & not only change ^\Position/ Religious but also all ye reputed fundamentalls of it, all com̄on notions & ye grounds of all Sceincies & make ym no longer to be eternall Veritys, \but whatsoever is trew to day/ make all yt false to morrow which was true to day by his legislative Power upon Truths \& some time after another/

But certainly he must needs have a great deal of Charity yt doth not think all this to be really nothing but Hypocriticall & disguised Atheism wch \thus/ makes not only ye frame of ye whole \Vniverse/ world but also all - Goodnesse & Truth of things to owe its originall to nothing but Omnipotent Indifferency |blind Indifferēcy ^ & Chance Omnipotent| called by ye name of God The ground & pretence of wch Atheism & yt wch might lead & invite men to it might be \And/ this vulgar Doctrine of indifferent Free=will \pursued is yt wch/ is ye pursued to ye utmost leading men to this at last yt \may thus fairly lead one But this strange kind of Mysticall {illeg}/ ye only Soveraign Deity in <26> ye world is infinite blind Chance & fortuitousnesse Contingēcy omnipotēt -

But ye generality of those who assert this indifferent Free=will to be a pure perfection belonging to God as well as rationall Creatures do not go this way, but make a kind of jumble of things together, they both supposing yt there is an essentiall Holinesse & Morality in ye Deity wch it hath no indifferent Free=will to, but is necessary in respect of it, & yet notwthstanding yt there is an indifferent Free=will in God as to all other things & ye most of things in wch God is not a Servant to his own Vnderstanding, Reason & Wisedome but by his will hath a Dominion ^\& Mastership/ over it, ^\{illeg}/ after all things are put \{illeg}& notwthstanding/ all motives & Reasons of his Vnderstanding, it remaining still indifferent to determine itself either way meerly because it will, this being such an essentiall Liberty & Prerogative yt to deny this were to deny ye very Godhead itself

Somethings they hold to be so Evill yt God cannot do ym & some things such yt if God do but act ad extra he cannot but act according to ym, as if he do make a world he cannot but make it wisely, & yet notwthstanding, there are innumerable things left besides in wch God hath a scope to exercise yt dominion of indifferent arbitrary Will, & yt Deus non tenetur ad optimum, if he \God/ make things tolerably well so as they may but - serve he \ye Turnes he/ is not bound to do all things \them/ in ye best manner possible & yt God doth de facto use this arbitrary dominion of indifferent will, \they think to be/ be evident both from ye \whose system of the created Vniverse/ Creation in generall & also from ye severall parts of it, for ye whole world might have been made better yn it is, as also ye severall parts of it & therefore by arbitrary Will they were made thus as they are & no better there might also have been more worlds or one bigger yn this is, & wt necessity was there but yt there might have been more Planets about ye Sunne yn now there are, yt ye Earth might not have had fower Moones or Secundary Planets as well as Jupiter hath, or yt Mars migh not - have had one as well as ye Earth, hath, \why/ might not ye fixed Starres been otherwise placed yn they are in a more regular \& {illeg}/ order wch would have made ym a farre more delightfull spectacle to us men for whose sakes alone all thing were made, yn yt present, rude & carelesse disposition of ym doth, but yes Author \ye only Pair/ of this argumentation do indeed urge meaner & more triviall Instances Quis enim credat (sth one) solem qui loties est terrâ major, non potuisse vel vnū digitum sive majorem esse, sive minorem, quis credat Litera maris non potuisse latum pedem latiora vel angustiora, mentes alliores vel \aut/ minus allos, hoc potius in loco quàm in illo exstare fontes? And indeed they \he/ might as well have demanded why every straw \Whether it were {illeg}/ might have of necessity been in ye same place & posture yt now it is in, ^\or they were not thus disposed by Arbitrary {illeg}/ as some of those other things wch they \he/ instances in.

But here we argue in this manner yt either active Indifferency & arbitrary will is ye highest perfection in ye Deity or \else/ whether there \is/ be any - immutable nature of Good w\ch/ is ye rule & measure of ye divine Actions volitions & Actions, if Indifferent arbitrary Will be ye highest Perfection yn this ought not to be an confined any where in God; neither must we assert yt God is necessary to any thing, from whence it followes yt there can be no such things as Morality in ye Deity, nothing unjust antecedently to his will wch therefore he hath not liberty to do \+/ Or else if there be any positive nature of morall Good, of Rectitude & Wisedome wch is ye highest perfection of ye Deity yn it is plain yt there can be no Indifferent Free=will in opposition to his naturall Goodnesse & Wisedome & to say yt God is Indiffe <27> rent to do ye Better or |ye| worse, is to make him Indifferent to his own highest Perfection, \wch is {illeg}/ to his own Good, to his own being Better or Worse. Indeed \if th/where \be any/ things are exactly equall according to ye Judgmt of infinite Wisedome, so yt there is not one gram of Goodnesse in one more yn another here there would be no imperfection at all for ye Deity to determine him\it/self indifferently, nor indeed any great dominion or Perfection would here consist in yt he could its being able do this, this being not so much election as sortition; only yt it seems \a/ there would be a necessity in - such a case {illeg} of determining one way or other But whether ye divine Wisedome haveing contrived ye Best Frame of ye created Vniverse possible foreseeing all things yt would result from it did not leave many of those minutall things wch we would needs ingage his particalar & absolute decrees about, to ye ἀκολουθία & sequall of those things ymselves is ^\frō whence his/ all comprehending Wisedome forseeing yt nothing would result from thence \&/ yt was ^\{illeg} inept/ enormous & \or/ incongruous in respect of ye \to/ whole But ye reason why men do so easily conclude yt ye whole Vniverse migh|t| have been made better yn it is is partly from hence, because they know not ye vastnesse of this \Gods/ Creation & partly from their narrow & short sightednesse, by reason whereof they cannot comprehend ye End & Fitnesses ^\& congruitie/ of things: & wch of those \Now of those/ Atheists yt have so constantly confidently affirmed yt ye world was not made by God (i e) by infinite Goodnesse & Wisedome ^\but by Chance/ could ever shew how \so much as/ ye Organicall Mechanism of mans Body could have been mended in any one thing or indeed could discover ye thousand'st part of yt divine artifice & contrivance of it, wch ye more it is inquired into by ye curious & sagacious still appeares more & more.

All yt can be ^\yet/ pretended for such a \Faculty/ Free=will as is ^\whose Perfectiō consists in being/ indifferent to ye reason of ones own Good ^\& Understanding & Judgmt both in God & Mē/ is this yt though ye no Being can be indifferent to its \own/ sumū Bonū yt there are many lesser Goods wch it may have a Dominion over & a priviledge to determine itself either way indifferētly in respect of them Or else as others would have it though ye Will is necessary in respect of ye End wch is chiefly to be understood of ye first End wch is never a means yet it hath a liberty to determine itself indifferently as to means wthout being determined by any necessary Reason or Vnderstanding antecedent But to ye first of these we reply yt ye true Sum̄um - Bonum or highest of all Goods as was before declared is ye divine Life of Vertue wch it is plain yt humane Souls are not necessary to & this is indeed ye Nature of Free=willed Beings yt they are such things as may possible degenerate & fall from their own highest Good & sinkn down into certain lower goods or Congruities Wherefore some late asserters of Free=will doe for this Reason, because it seems plausible to make ye Will necessary to ye summum Bonum but yet to have a Perfection of being contingently arbitrarily Free, they will needs determine yt ye sum̄um Bonum is not ye Good of Honesty, but Animall Pleasure & self=preservation & from thence endeavour to shew how ye Will is ^\becomes/ indifferently f free or indifferent to ye Morall Good & Evill & yt it is its perfection so to be because yt wch is called Honesty is a Good not desired for itself but only for ye sake of <28> an Animall Pleasure, ytis, it is not an End but a Meanes And to say yt ye Will hath an indifferent Freedome to Meanes, is all - one as to say yt it hath a Freedome to lesser Goods for as much as lesser Goods have but ye Nature of meanes in order to ye highest Good It is true as w may be granted to be true as was before shewed yt ye Animall Life & Congruity is ye τὸ πρῶτον ὀικείον ye first concililation of Nature as yt wch lies more shallow & superficiall in ye outside of us the referer putting itself forth first, but though yt wch is naturall be first & afterwards yt wch is Spirituall yet it doth not follow from thence but yt ye latter may be ye highest Good And indeed to affirm yt ye Good of Honesty is not desireable in itself & yt it is not a higher & more noble Good yn yt of Animall Congruities is but ye Philosophy of a Bruit unworthy of a Theologer & since yt kind of Liberum Arbitrium whose Perfection consists in Indifferency to Morall Good & Evill & to all Contrariety & contradiction after all things put, it is most deservedly to be exploded as a spurient\ou/ figment of mens Brains nothing being more certain yn yt ye highest Good of all Intelligent Beings is ye Good of Honesty or divine Morality wch indeed humane Souls & Angelicall Beings by reason of ye imperfection & defectiveness of their Nature may lapse & fall from, but it is no glorious Power or Perfection yt they have, as is fondly supposed \yt/ they are indifferent to it But ye Deity being a Being infinitely perfect is essentially yt divine Life & can never fall from, nor hath any such indifferent Free=will towards it, as is by most of these writers ymselves acknowledged, But to say yt either God or Man have a naturall Priviledge or Perfection in ym in respect of all lesser Goods yt they can indifferently determine ymselves proceeds from much childish Ignorance of their nature of yt highest Good as if it were a narrow particular thing, whereas it is a certain Life yt extends itself to all Actions & is ye measure of ym & all inferiour Goods Wherefore it can be no naturall Power or Perfection in any Vnderstanding Being to determine itself indifferently as to inferiour Goods Hic et Nunc they having allwayes a certain respect or Analogy to ye highest Good Indeed there is a sense in wch it is very true yt it is a noble power or Perfection of ye Soul as a late Author contends to have an Indifferency to all lower Goods in order & tendency to ye highest Good wch is indeed ye true amplitude of ye Soul And ye same is to be sd of Meanes yt it is no perfective Power in any Being to be indifferent to any Meanes tending to this or yt End but contrariwise ye Perfection of ye Rationall Nature requires as to choose ye best End so to use ye fittest & most congruous meanes to Ends resolv'd upon We conclude therefore yt there is no naturall Faculty or Perfection in any Intellectuall Being whatsoever whereby it can act I hath a priviledge to act Indifferently in respect of its own Good, Reason & Vnderstanding, but such an indifferent Dominion as this is ever ones self is no Power or Dominion, no freedome or Liberty but only ye vice of Free=willed Beings wch by reason of ye imposture of ye Animall Life is taken for Freedome & Perfection.



It now remains yt we give a true & clear accompt of ye Nature of this Faculty of F=will a possible & intelligible Ideah ^\of it/ & such as will salve all ye Phænomena's yt belong to it ^ wch we shall do by severall steps & gradations

First therefore ye genericall nature of Liberum arbitrium is this yt it is a certain Power yt a Being hath over itself & over its own ^\Volitions &/ Actions, thus yt is rightly called by ye Antiens ἀυτεξουσία & sui potestas \+ B/ some called \it/ by ye name of Dominum to ye same purpose, but because this word seems to imply \an absolute/ dispotick Power, therefore I conceive it not so proper here lest it should confirm \lead/ men in \to a/ yt false apprehension as if this Faculty in man did imply yt he had an absolute despotick Power over his whole Soul & \his/ morall Dispositions \to/ Good or Bad ^\{illeg}/ quite to change ym in a moment as he pleaseth as if it were an infinite vertibility in us whereby we could at any time make ourselves Morally good or Evill as easily as we can turn our hand or head this way or yt way & also therein did exercise equall Power either way whether to Good or Evill, but of this afterwards

It is true indeed yt this self=power doth plainly imply in ye notion of it a Freedome from all absolute ^\naturall/ Necessity, yt is, so it hath something of Contingency in it wch if any one will need call by yt improper name - of Indifferency we shall not contend wth ym \him/ about it, provided it be not taken in yt sense before exploded, as if it were a naturall Power or pure Perfection to be alike indifferent to act wth Reason or against it & to be fortuitously determined in all our Free=actions \to Good or Evill/ Self=power is a thing to wch something of Contingency doth adhere \& cleave/ παρα φυαδος εικος as an ad nascense to \it/ something else, for Contingency as well as Evill hath not ὑποστασιν but παρυπόστασιν only, \{illeg}/ it is not ἀιτία ye cause or Efficient of any thing, but τροπος τῆς ἀιτιας ye manner of a cau cause only, but how this Contingency is to be Vnderstood & how much there is to of this Contingency in Free=will'd Beings as also where it is lodged we shall discourse more afterwards

The genericall nature of Free=will is not rightly assigned to be Indifferency or Contingency acting for neither of these is a cause, but it is a \positive/ power or ability to wch Contingency ^\or Non-necessity/ hath παρυποστοσιν an ad sistem a thing yt doth insinuate it self into \it/ & is an Affection of it.

Secondly all Power being for Good, for yt wch tends to Evill is not Power but impotency, Free=will is a Power wch a Being hath over itself for Good τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι ἀαθοῦ χάριν ἐφνέται to be ones own, & at ones own disposall is desired only for ye sake of Good, ουδεν οικοιοτερον αγαθὸν Good is most ourselves our Evill being heterogeneous to every Being & therefore not itself Wherefore Free-will according to ye proper & genuine \notiō/ nature of it is a Power wch a Being hath wch \whereby it/ can contribute something from himself to promote itself towards Good & to sin & keep itself in ye same self=power hath \is/ a Faculty wch a Being hath bestowed upon him by God & Nature whereby we are able to contribute something <30> of our own towards \in order to/ ye procuring yt suipotence wch is a state in us as happinesse wch is to all Free=will'd Beings, wn they are habituall is fixed in ye predominancy of ye higher & p|b|etter principle for we {illeg} \{illeg}/ yn only truly Power & Dominion over ourselves wn ye best thing yt belongs to our Nature & ye best thing in ye Vniverse reignes in us It is a spurious notion of self=power to make it nothing but Indifferency & Contingency itself acting, as if infinite indeterminac~on were ye highest perfection of any Being & consequently most itself & yt is also a false Idolum of Power over ourselves wch is imagined by some wthout respect to Good, Infinite Power over ourselves any way indifferently whether to Good or Evill \{illeg}/ for Power is not Power wthout respect to Good Free=will or Self=power is nothing but a self=promoting Power to Good or a self=preserving Power to adde something to its own Perfection, of wch Action there are - those two degrees, first a Power of intending itself in a way of consideration, in recollection, self=attention or introspection in speculation about Truth & Falshood & deliberac~on about wt is practically Good & Evill in Life, again in a way of \in a way/ vigorous exertion of itself, in a way \in to/ of strenth & force & resolution to resist ye lower Inclinations & promote itself towards ye higher principles 2ly in accordingly determining its assents & Volitions or Actions Freewill'd Beings are \as/ reduplicated upon ymselves & self=comprehensive, they have a self=intending & self=exerting Power wch is their strength to Good ye Power of Free=will properly so called is to Good & ^\It was design'd & intended for this only/ Nature /sufficiently\ obtrudes ye lower things upon us, but as to ye higher things our own active premotion & exertion of our|A|selves towards ym is expected from us. 3\ly/ this Power of Free|3|willed Beings wch they have over ymselves for Good is but an imperfect Power, for perfect Power over ones self is no other yn essentiall Goodnesse & Wisedom where ye reduplicac~on of Free=willd Beings ceases & is swallowed up in ye simplicity of absolute Perfection. - But it followes to be by unavoidable necessity yt such a Being as has a power over itself to intend & exert itself must also have a Power (if it be a Power) not to do ye same wch is ye only indifferent liberty of Contradiction if it may be so called {illeg} antedecent {illeg} free=will therefore is a Power over ourselves to promote & fix our selves in Good, imperfect & self=determinable, it is such a Power as we ourselves have a Power over by meanes whereof we are able to make it a self=determined strength or weakenesse. {illeg} to exert it or not & consequently to use it or abuse it y it is per se a power of promoteing ourselves to ye higher Good & fixing <31> ourselves in ye same, but by ancient of Power, of languid self remission & consequently of selfdeterminac~on to ye worser Principle wch latter Power is its impotency, & acting according to it is ye |vn|naturall abuse of ye \Naturall/ Power of Free=will whereby we are - guilty of Sin & Fault, become ye causes of our own Hurt in yt we might have done otherwise & deserve blame & punishment & And \But/ this hath been ye grand & capitall errour of Writers upon this Argument yt they have not taken notice of this διφυία in this Faculty of Free=will, nor distinguis'd between ye Perfection & Imperfection of it, its Power & Impotency, its right use & abuse, but have taken it ^\all/ for a pure Power & Perfection & therefore have seated it first in God himself takeing \as if/ Free=will for \were/ one & ye same thing wth Liberty ^\& happinesse/ wch in Creatures is but a state & not a nrallPower Wch Hypothesis plainly destroyes all difference of Morall Good & Evill makeing all Actions alike to be ye genuine & proper offspring of - Free=will as a nrall Power & a pure perfection whereas \indeed/ Sin & Morall Evill are but ye Spurious & bastardly Offspring ^\or a By-blow of it/ of free=will a thing of wch ye power of Freewill is not ye univocall but ye equivocall cause only or a cause per Accidens, it proceeding not from ye Power but from ye impotency of it \therof/, so yt Free=will is an imperfect perfection, a mungrell thing, a self=determinable Power & weakenesse, Liberum arbitrium is not Liberty but a certain nrall Power according to ye right use of wch we may rescue \assist/ & recover ourselves into a state of true Liberty & suipotence or inthrall or by ye abuse of it may inthrall ourselves in ye greatest Bondage

Fourthly it is an im̄ediate πάθος or essentiall property of this - ambiguous middle Power, this imꝐfect Ꝑfection of Freewill yt by ye use & abuse of it, a man may become either ἑαοτοῦ κρὶτων or {illeg} as ye Greeks emphatically expresse it better or worse yn ones self ie. a man may either advance & promote himself, be under God a subordinate cause of his own Good or else may damage & detriment himself & - become ye proper cause & efficient of his own hurt, of Sin & Morall - Evill The chief Argument wch hath in all ages been used to prove yt there was such a thing as Free=will was frō Cōendac~on & Blame not such a one as only seem signifies our approbac~on & dislike of |ye| things ymselves Cōmended & Blamed \absolutely/ but wch doth also reflect upon ye persō of as ye cause of either to himself wn it was possible he might not - have been so And we have shewed before yt such Praise & Dispraise Cōmendacon & Blame could not be founded in such an Indifferent Free=will whose Power & Perfection equally consisted in determining itself either way & indeed chiefly shined forth in being loose from - Light & Reason & being free from it, ye glory of yt Free=will consisting in this yt it is not bound to any thing & therefore not to that wch <32> most pretends to have a right to binding & limiting our Actions i.e. Reason & Vnderstanding wch notion of Free=will is an impossible Idæa but Free=will being such a Power ye various use of wch qualifies men either for Praise or Cōmendac~on, it is evident yt it must be such a mungrell & ambiguous Power as we have allready described Wch may abate yt envy wch is in ye minds of many against this thing called Free=will occasioned by a false representation of it.

Fifthly haveing now shewed yt Free=will is such an imperfect Power as though intended by God & nature for Good yt by it Freewilled Beings may be able to adde & contribute something to their own Good yet ^\such as yt/ accidentally \{illeg}/ by ye abuse of it, we \they/ may by it become ye causes of our own Hurt & justly deserve Blame & Punishmt we - should in ye next place speake something \more/ concerning yt wch is purely & properly ye Power of it ^\its Power to Good/ & shew how far it doth extend wch is \It being/ so much extolled & advanced by many ^\Idolaters of Freewill/ as if it were a nat perfect Dominion & absolute despoticall Power over ourselves, a thing yt is allwayes indivisibly ye same, & never impareable or |X| diminishable by \vertuous or vitious/ wicked Actions \X/ For ye better clearing of wch we must repent \again/ wt was before suggested yt full & absolute Power over ourselves is nothing but perfect Goodnesse & Wisedome wch being essentially in God he is therefore ye only true autexousious or selfpowerfull Being ^\in yt sense/ but because \as/ autexousy & self=power are commonly taken for Free=will in Beings reduplicated upon ymselves therefore it may be also sd of God as an antient Platonist expresseth it yt he is πλεον ἤ ἀυτεξούσιος more yn self=powerfull \& Freewilled/ or more yn in his own Power; he being a simple Being & essentially ye same thing wth his own \Good/ Perfection so yt he & it are not two & consequently is not reduplicated upon himself in a way of Composition, he is essentially Goodnesse & Wisedome itself But yt wch in Free=willed Beings who are not essentially their own Perfection \is called self Power/ is not a perfect Lordship & Mastery \{illeg}/ over ymselves; such Power as whereby with Labour Care ^\{illeg}/ & Attētion, they may Promote & preserve their own Good {illeg} by intending & exerting ymselves wth ^\much/ labour, pains & earnest attention they can promote their own Good.

In yt other notion of Freewill wch is asserted by many whereby it is made nothing but Indifferency & Contingency itself turning ye Will this way or yt way either to Morall Good or Evill, as if there were equall Power in its turning both wayes there is nothing of laborious conac~on, striving or contenc~on in its moving towards Good towards Vertue & Wisedome \any more/ yn to Evill, Ignorance & Vice, whereas this ^\doubtfull & double Nature/ doublefac'd thing Freewill puts forth itself very differently these two wayes in one \it is/ active & laborious self=intention & self=exertion, in ye other sluggish self=remission, relaxac~on & langor

And Because Free-will'd Beings have an easy des <33> poticall Power & Cōmand over ye executive faculty & rational organes wch wth ye \a/ meer beck of their Will they do easily determine to different motions this way or yt way, wthout any dispute or reluctancy therefore some have been \thus/ mistaken to make ye Power of Freewill ye - same ^\over ye inward affections of ye Soul & think/ as well to Good as Evill yt they can as easily & wth as litle labour & difficulty turn ymselves to Good as they can turn yr hand or nod yr head this way or yt way \& as easily as to evill & with as little adoe as they can to Evill/ whereas Free=will is only Power to Good, there it is active conation, tone & strength, but to Evill it is inert sluggishnesse - Flaccidity & langour

In ye Animall life itself Free=will hath \as/ a Power to promote ye Animall Good, consists in vigorous exertion & intention, in laborious conation, but ye Evill for wch its actions are at any time blamed are imputed to nothing but inertnesse & want of putting forth or intending ourselves. Here our Power over our Cogitac~ons is not so despoticall & easy as it is over ye locomotive Power of ye Body there being labour not only in ye intention of Speculation \meditatiō/ & consideration but also in ye constant direction of our thoughts to ye same scope wch will \are/ otherwise \apt to/ straggle & wander being interrupted wth ye continuall risings of involuntary thoughts obtruding ymselves upon us & turning ye course ano|X|ther way, \X/ but there is need of greater force & laborious exertion to prevail over suddain passions Appetites & Hormæ & contracted habituall Inclinac~ons clashing wth Inferiour Reason, so yt wthin ye compasse of this Animall - Life wee are plainly sensible yt there is ὑτεροκινητον τι wch causes a Lucta & Conflict in ye Soul, it doth not wth indifferency & like ease turn itself either way to either to comply wth indifferency & like ease turn itself either way to either to comply wth inferiour Reason or wth blind \lower/ Appetites but its motion to one is vigour & strength towards ye other inertnesse, langor & remission.

But this appeares much more in Morall Free=will In ye generality of mankind, but especially in those yt have been long under vitious habits There is no such Power of Free=will as can despotically com̄and - those inclinacons & turn itself to Good wth ye same ease as one can nod his head or turn his hand, as ye indifferent Free=willers suppose The Power of Morall Free=will cannot change such habituall vitious Inclinac~on as these in a moment & yt wthout any labour & contention it can only prevaill over ym by degrees & by little & little by earnest ^\means/ striving & contention & constant laborious conation \{illeg}/ Wherefore it is a false notion of Freewill wch some have set up as if it were such an omnipotent thing yt were {illeg} alike in all states & could despotically com̄and & turn ye Soul to Good as well to Evill wth ye same facility as if it were nothing but \with/ nodding this way or yet \It is/ such a thing as allwayes consisted in an Indivisible whose strength was \is/ both unincreasable & undiminishable & indeed such an absolute Power over our selves to Good as stood in no need at all of any divine assistence from whence it hath come to passe yt ye name & thing of Liberum Arbitrium hath come under so much odium & prejudice by reason of yt false notion yt hath been made of it as if every Free=willed Being was so much in his own hands & had such an absolute Power & Lordship over himself to turn himself either way as yt he stood in no need at all of God or of is assistence. \X/

And indeed ^\it cannot be denied but yt/ among ye Philosophers there have not been wanting|ed| |not some| who have thought Free=will to be such a ^\self sufficiēt/ Power in Morall things <34> & so sufficient to itself as yt it was a vain & foolish thing \for any {illeg}/ to implore ye divine Assistence for ye procuring of Vertue or a good mind or to \& yt never did/ owe - any thanks. at all to ye Deity for it, \{illeg} Though as for/ outward things indeed wch are called ye gifts of Fortune they would acknowledge ym to God & pay their thanks for ym but as \yet/ for ye inward ^\good/ dispositions of ye Mind they thought yt every man had such an absolute dominion & lordship over ym by his own Freewill yt he need neither seek ym of God nor ascribe ym to him, to this purpose is yt of ye Poet Hæc satis est orare Jovem quæ denat et aufert Det vitam det opes, æquum mihi animum ipse parabo.

It is enough to pray to Jupiter for Life, Health & Riches\wch are properly his Gifts/, but a good Mind I will bestow upon myself Bonam mententem (sth Seneca) stultū est extare cùm posses a te impetrare and Turpe est Deos fatigare quid vetis opus est facte ipse felicem. thus also Cotta in Cicero Judicium hoc hoc omniū mortalium est fortunam à Deo petendam, à seipse sumendā esse sapientiam & agam Hoc quidem omnes mortales sic habent omnē cōmoditatem prosperitatemq; vitæ a Diis se habere Virtutem autem neme unquam acceptam Deo retulit \No mā thanks God for Virtue, but {illeg}/ And yt of Sinesius also ye Christian sounds to this purpose Disturb \Trouble/ not ye Gods \with thy Prayers Nay since thou mayst/ being able to be saved by thy self if thou wilt for if every one may be ye fountain of this, in willing to be God wch passages cannot be excused of ye highest Insolence & Arrogancy though perhaps some might make this charitable construction of it yt as if their meaning was yt men must not attend upon prayers \to God only/ wthout Endeavours nor conceit yt Vertue & Vice are things determined by Fate only ye rather because some of these same Phylosophers sometimes spake otherwise Roga bonam mentem, bonam valetudinem animi deinde corporis, \X/ Orandum est ut sit mens sana in corpore sano Who notwthstanding adds afterwards Monstro quod ipse tibi possis dare \as suppose these two to be consistant/

But it cannot be denyed but yt it is most true yt if there were such a Free=will as is com̄only described as there wer could be really no such thing as Vertue or Vice, so as for \in order to/ yt wch is called Vertue as also \&/ for all ye guidance & direction of our Will, we should be absolute & compleat things in ourselves & such as could neither be helped nor hindred by ye Deity Neither did ye doctrine of ye Pelagian|u|s yt tooke away all necessity of divine grace proceed from any other originall yn this false notion of Free=will yt it is an absolute power in a|ye| Soul of turning itself indifferently to Good or Evill But this Doctrine was cryed down by some of ye \very/ heathen Phylosophers ymselves If God do not bestow Vertue upon men & yt by be a thing yt we owe only to ourselves but only give Riches & Health wthout Vertue he doth not profit or help men at all, forasmuch as Riches & health wthout Vertue have no true Goodness in ym & therefore if God do not contribute any thing ^\at/ all to Vertue but only dispense Riches & Health & such outward Good things to us he doth not contribute any thing <35> at all to our true Good And to ye same purpose yt pious Emperour Marcus Antoninus L.9. Sect 40 Either ye Gods cannot help at all or else they can help, if they cannot help why dost thou pray unto ym? But if they can help men & promote their Good why dost you not rather pray yt they would inable thee neither to fear nor desire no nor be grieved inordinately for any outward thing rather yn these things should either happen or not happen to thee, for if God can help men at all yn certainly he can \must needs be able to/ help ym as to those things wch are ye only true Goods But yn he brings in an Objection concerning Free=will Αλλα {illeg} But perhaps (sth he) you will object yt God hath put these things in our own Power, yt is, he hath given him \vs/ Free=will & hath made us fully Lords & Masters of our own Volitions so yt though outward bodily things as Riches & Health be not in our Power for wch cause we pray unto God for ym, yet Vertue consisting only in ye Will itself we must needs have it perfectly in our power & need not implore Gods assistance in any such thing, to wch after some other things interposed Who - told thee yt God doth not help in these things wch belong to theire own power or are in thy Free=will, as if he should say, This is notoriously false yt Free=will is such a Power to Good so compleat & absolute as yt it stands in no need at all of ye divine assistence wherefore he earnestly exhorts men to pray for Gods help & assistance as to vertue & Morall things confidently assuring ym of good successe therein begin to pray to God for these things & thou shall see wt will follow; Let other men pray yt they may enjoy this outward Pleasure or Vtility or be freed from this outward Evill, but do you pray yt you maist not desire such things nor stand in need of ym, nor fear ye Contrary Contrary turn thy prayers altogether this way & tha see what will come of it And Epictetus himself in Arianus - though he is thought to \elswhere/ attribute|s| so much to Free=will & seems to make it such an absolute independent thing \yt he/ running out into this extravagant expression yt Jupiter himself cannot conquer ye Will, yet notwthstanding contradicting this again he earnestly exhorts wn they are strongly tempted & assaulted by their Lusts to call upon God & implore his divine assistance as also at ye same time to put forth ye utmost of their endeavours & to strive wth all their might as being otherwise in danger of being over powred by \such/ Appetites & Phantasies &c Stand to it, be not snatchd away by <36> thy Fancies Appetites & Passions, ye contention is great tho|e|ugh undertaking divine, it is for a Kingdome for Liberty, for Prosperity, for undisturbednesse of mind remember God, call upon him as thy helper & assistant as ye Mariners call upon Castor & Pollux in a storm, for wt greater storm can there be yn yt wch proceeds from strong Phantasies bearing down Reason From - whence it appeares yt this Phylosopher did not take Free=will to be such absolute thing of we our selves to Good but yt it was only a Power of Conation & striving wch by degrees might prevail more & more over ye lower affections, & wch also stood in need of divine assistance or grace to strengthen it & help it forwards

We have shew'd before yt Freewilled Beings are half nature, half Self=activity or Free=will & yt nature goes a great way in us \thē/ & therefore yt things wthout us \thē/ laying hold upon our lower Appetites & natural Inclinations have a great Power upon us, ye neurospastus this is yt nurospastia yt strongly drawes as it were wth cords this way & that way & in this sense we are not perfectly ἀυτοκίνητος we are not perfectly light & nimble \{illeg}/ to turn ourselves to Good as we please wthout any labour or difficulty, but we have πολυ ετεροκινητον in us, much Heterokinesy & Reluctancy & a weight yt strongly presseth down another way ^\To this mix be added all {illeg}/ Wherefore if things wthout ^\of our Power/ us have a great Power upon us Gods providence wch orders & disposeth these outward things must in this respect have a great force & Influence upon us, \likewise To/ If wch grace & Providence \This belongs/ this is in main part not to lead us into temptation nor suffer us to be tempted above what we are able & to make all outward things to work for Good to a sincere & upright Heart, in wch respect of \Gods {illeg}/ disposing outward things yt of ye Philosopher may be taken yt Men do not so much order their own affairs nor dispose of their own Actions as God & Opportunity order all things, God & opportune Providence Besides wch there are other more inward & more im̄ediate actings of divine grace & Providence by ^\internal/ motions & suggestions of Thoughts \by/ strengthening & corroborateing Good Desires \by inward {illeg}/ Inward convictions of Conscience & ye like by wch divine Grace may effectually insinuate itself in us wthout any Violacon of our Freedome or self=power not to speake here of yt divine spirit of God himself wch is an inward principle of Life & Light in regenerate Persons & wch worketh all their works in yem, of wch something afterwards.

We conclude yt Liberum Arbitrium according to ye true notion of it being an Imperfect Power over ourselves doth no way exclude ye assistance of divine Grace & Providence ^\wch takes care of all weak things in ye world/ wthout wch it would be insufficient of itself to keep men in a state of Vertue but much more to recover any yt are deeply lapsed into Wickednesse to wch purpose ye learned Origen well determines yt ye Good of - Free=willed Beings wch have but an imperfect Power over ymselves doth not depend only upon τὰ προαιρετα ye use of our own Free=will, but also stands in need ἀπροαὶρετον τι something else <37> wch is out of our own Power wch is ye divine ^\Power &/ Grace \{illeg}/ As one may say yt ye Good of Agriculture in order to fruit is a mixt thing consisting partly of something wch is arbitrary to ye husbandman his plowing & tilling ye ground according to art & \partly/ something wch is not arbitrary & \nor/ in his Power, yt Providence wch orders ye temperature of ye air & seasonable showers so ye Good of Rationall Beings in order to Vertue may be sd to be a mixt thing ytis compounded of ye Free=will of ye Agent himself & of ye divine grace conspiring, wch he illustrates also from yt of ye Psallmist unlesse ye Lord build ye house he laboureth in vain yt buildeth it, & unlesse ye Lord keep ye City, he watcheth in vain \{illeg}/ yt helpeth it wittily allegorizing it in this manner \He yt builds a house/ every one yt is a proficient in Vertue builds a house \He yt Keeps a Citty/ & every one yt is perfect in Vertue keeps a City, but ye work \Labour/ of him yt buildeth & ye watch \{illeg}/ of him yt keepeth are both in vain unlesse ye Lord \both/ build & watch \with them/, when he whence he concludes yt besides our own Free=will our Morall Good depends upon ye divine Power & Assistence wch helps ye building of him yt builds & doth as it were rebuild wth him yt buildeth, who ^\by {illeg}/ alone was not able to finish his building & ye same is to be sd of ye keeping of a City allready built Wherefore sth he there is not only need of ye Cons concurrence of our own Free=will & of divine \grace/ conspiring wch as to us is out of our Power) for ye begetting of Vertue & Honesty but also for ye keeping of ye same And ye most consumate in Vertue will ipso facto \consequently/ sink from yt state if he make himself ye cause & do not give due glory to him for wch cause sth he ye Apostle seeing yt \wt/ our Free=will contributes much lesse to morall Good \is much lesse/ yn ye divine Power & Grace sth yt it is not of him yt willeth nor of him yt runneth but of Gods yt sheweth mercy not as if God had mercy on men yt did not will nor runne but because our willing & running is nothing in comparison wth ye divine Grace & therefore we ought much rather to entitle ye divine grace & Goodnesse yn our own Free=will\ing/ in willing & running to Morall Vertue as \being/ ye cause \of it/; and at last he concludes yt ye end of all this is to shew yt we ought \both/ wth \or own/ laborious endeavours & Prayers ^\to God for his Assistance/ loyalty to seek to attain spirituall Goods & to expell vitious evills from our Minds Besides Origen all ye antient Doctors of Christianity did con \likewise/ unanimously assert ye Concordia gratiæ et liberi Arbitrij ye \{illeg} &/ friendly concord of Grace & Free=will together & yt they were not contradictious to one ano <38> ther as many men suppose who wn they hear of Freewill, think Grace is ^\presently/ excluded & wn they hear of Grace think Freewill is destroyed whereas there is a friendly concord \most amiable assistance/ betwixt these two together as is plainly intimated in ye holy Oracles in those expressions Work out your Salvac~on wth fear & trembling for it is God &c I have labour'd more abundantly yn they all, yet not so much I as ye grace of God yt was w\th/ me Wch concurrence of Gods grace wth our own Will & Indeavour ye very Heathens ymselves expressed in such passages as these God speeds ye course of him yt sets himself to run And Synesius tells us yt by mens joyning of these - two together Wherefore it was rightly sd by one of ye Antients Tolle gratiam non salve erit quo salvetur Tolle Liberum Arbitrium non erit quod salvetur If \Take away/ grace be taken away there \there/ will not be \what one should be saved by/ yt by will one can be saved & if \{illeg}/ Free will be taken away \&/ there will \not be yt very thing left/ be nothing to be saved any {illeg} But lest that should be saved - For vertue & salvation belong onely to a selfactive Being - But many by Grace mean, Gods doing All both in vs & for vs, so as to leave nothing at all for vs to doe, as if we were but senseles Macins - And ye Philosopher Epictetus ubbraids such as these after this ^\blunt/ manner 213. \That/ We betake ourselves to our Prayers o Lord God how shall I be freed from ye power of strong Lusts & Pantasies, thou Fool hast you not Hands & hath not God made ym then for something sit down & pray now yt thy potuitous excrements may not {illeg} \fall/ down out of thy nose or rather use thy hands & blow thy nose & accuse not ye Deity, Is not ye case just ye same? Hath God given thee nothing here? Hath he not given thee magnanimity? Hath he not given thee Fortitude since you hast so many hands Dost thou notwthstanding sit still & - pray to God to {illeg} thee \or blow thy Nose for thee./ This is ye very condition of those yt hypocrytically pretending ye Fall of Adam & originall Sin & ye inability of depraved nature to any {illeg} supernaturall Good ye confessing of wch ^\alone/ they think to be ^\propitiatory/ Sacrifice \& Holocaust most/ highly gratefull to ye Allmighty in ye mean time slothfully neglect to use yt Power wch really they have wch is all one in this blunt language of ye Stoick as if a man having hands should not use ym to blow or wipe his nose but expect sit still expecting yt God by Miracles should do it \yt office/ for him, And there is another error concatinate wth this yt they think salvacon & holinesse to be an externall thing clapt upon men wch therefore must be done for ym wthout ym


Though ye essence of Free=will be not be nicer ^\of/ differency & contingency active, these being no active Powers, yet it is most true yt Contingency or non=necessity is a πάθος or affection yt intimately belongs |X| is this naturall Power in a certain sense \X/ But this is very much misunderstood by many as if this contingent Indifferency were also in ye Will - itself after all things put besides ye Volition itself & as if all Free=willed Actions were such as yt till ye very moment of doing of ym there was no more probability of the thing to be done rather yn another but ye Agent was perfectly Indifferent to do this or yt or to do & not do wch if it were true there could be no fixed habits either of Vertue or - Vice, nor no firm purposes, nor resoluc~ons of doing any thing, in life & every free=willd Being would be απολιλομενον τὶ a thing not only independent upon all things in ye Vniverse besides him \self/ but also perfectly loose to his own Good, this one thing only excepted, yt as yey say, a man cannot actually desire ye et or chose ye eternall misery of his whole man, his Body & Soul at once, Wherefore though it be most true yt Free=will & self=power supposes some kind of Non=necessity, yet there is so not s|o|uch \much/ in sin contingency in all Volitions as is com̄only supposed whereas \For/ neither wisedome nor Vertue can \bring/ consist\ence/ wth such a contingent uncertainty of all Actions as yt it cannot be known before hand wt such a man will do in such any case, \no/ nor indeed Vice itself

The Contingency of Free=willed Being is this yt though they be fixed in never so habitts of Vertue or Vice so yt there is no probability at present of their acting contrary to ym, yet it is not absolutely impossible but yt in length of time they may by little & little by their own s different use of their own self=active Power loosen & change ymselves from either of those Habits to ye contrary We speak of Free=willed Being in ymselves seting aside a devine confirmation in Good & a vitious obdurac~on in Evill, we say in ymselves yt though there is a possibility of their continuing in vitious or vertuous Habits to all eternity yet there would be no absolue ^\{illeg}/ possibility to ye contrary, but so as yt it must be allwayes understood yt their changing from Good to Evill by ye neglect of their own - Free=power is to be ascribed wholy to ymselves & their change - from Evill to Good though by ye use of their own self=power, is notwthstanding to be reputed principally to God & not to ymselves, of wch more else where.


It will not be amisse to speake something here concerning Contingency in generall wch is a thing yt Metaphysicians have writ so much of We conceive therefore yt there are but these two Instances of Contingency or Non=necessity in ye whole world ye first is yt wch is intimately essentiall to Free=willed Beings yt they are not their own perfection by im̄utable nature, but by self=exertion & - - therefore are defectable or peccable, for though many Freewilled Beings will continue pure & happy to all Eternity, yet if we consider ym only in their selves wthout divine Grace there is no absolute impossibility but ye most holy Saint or Angell migh \in/ at - length of decline time ^\{illeg}/ decline, defectibility or a possiblity of defection or declension is as essentiall to an imperfect Free=willed Creature as Indefectability & Impeccability to ye Deity This is ye first Instance of Contingency in our intending or not=intending ourselves or doing it more or lesse in a way of consideracon, vigorous exertion, resoluc~on & activity The 2d Instance of it is in a negligent, carelesse indifferent determinac~on of action of wch there are three cases First wn things propounded to our choice are exactly equall in Goodnesse or wn meanes equally conduce, to ye same end so yt there can be no difference put betwen ym at least by humane Vnderstanding wch things often occurre in Life, but \least/ of any should deny yt there is any s such thing we shall propound a triviall Instance If two peeces of Gold of equall bignesse & exactly alike in colour & figure cast in ye same mold should be placed at equall distance from ye hand of him to whom it \this/ is offered & ye choice given him to take wch he will, here being no imaginable difference to be found betwixt ym nor reason to incline ye choice to one rather yn another it cannot be certainly ^\fore/known by any antecedent cause wch of ym will be chosen, so yt there must needs be a contingency in ye Choice & ye Choser must needs determine fortuitously, yt is, wthout any reason, negligently or carelessly this way or yt way The 2d case is something like to this & yt is wn things \though/ are not exactly equall in ymselves but yet by reason of |ye| defect of our Vnderstanding or want of considerac~on we do not clearly apprehend wch is best but \for/ for ye present they seem to us there are reasons inclining both wayes & we are doubtfull wch to preferr & <41> we do in this case venturously & contingently determine ourselves to this or yt not wthout some Contingency And here there is no fault nor blame neither unlesse ^\onely where/ our doubtfullnesse did Ꝑceed for want of due & mature Considerac~on wch if we had used we might clearly have discovered a difference Lastly wn men willfully resolve to neglect Reason & to act temperariously wch is a vice yt Free=willed beings may be liable to, & though we happen to chose right or rong we are in this case blame=worthy for what we do, because by a due exertion of ourselves we might have complyed wth yt Reason wch tells us we ought not to determine ourselves temerariously in matters of moment, so yt ye only Contingency to wch blame & com̄endac~on doth belong is yt wch consists in ye exercise of our self=power or of intending or not intending ourselves.

From what we have declared all along it appeares yt Liberum Arbitrium is but a subalternate or middle perfection wch hath a great mixture of Imperfection in it And it is not difficult now to give a true accompt of ye originall of it wch those Authors yt make it to be a pure perfection \placed/ wch is therefore originally in God himself, are no way able to do For whereas they pretend yt as it is a pure perfection to be necessary to ye highest Good so it is a pure Perfection likewise to be indifferent to all other Goods beside & determine ones self indifferently to this or yt, this cannot be true, because wnever one lower Good hath a nearer relacon to ye higher Good yn another, it cannot be a perfection to be indifferent to ye choice of either, It also implyes ignorance concerning ye nature of ye highest Good wch is not one particular thing but an universall Life wch measures all lower Goods & may be exercisd more or lesse in all actions wtsoever, but ^\though/ Indifference to all lower Goods in order to ye highest is an imperfection & vice though Indifference to all lower Goods wthout respect to ye highest Good be an imperfection & Vice, it being only ye Indifference of Persons morally vitious, yet it may well be sd yt Indifferency to all lower Goods in ordine ad Bonum summum is true Perfection & Liberty

And whereas others pretend yt ye rise of Indifferency as a pure perfection is from hence because though Indifferency to ye End is not a - Perfection, yet Indifferency to severall meanes tending to Ends is a Perfection, this is plainly false likewise yet \For/ Indifferency to meanes yt tend to Good Ends can never be void of Imperfection unlesse it be wn those meanes are exactly equall & wn they are so there is no perfection in determining rather one way yn another Thus we see it is impossible to give any <42> accompt of Contingent Freewill is a pure perfection unlesse we would ^\{illeg}/ resolve yt Indifferency to all things is itself ye highest Good & greatest of all Perfec & only Perfection & ye essence of ye - divine Will, wch is all one as to say yt there is no Morall - Good & Evill at all.

But there is a deteminate Sum̄ū Bonū in nature wch ought to be ye measure of all Wills & Liberum Arbitriū is but a mug|n|grell thing compounded of Perfection & Imperfection together, so yt ye genesis or generac~on of it is as ye Philosopher observeth from a certain συμπλοκὴ τοῦ ὀντος καὶ μὴ ὀντος a complicac~on of Entity & Non-entity together It ariseth from hence because this middle rank of Free=willd Beings are not essentially their own Perfection they have a certain participac~on & Capability of ye highest Good, but they are not essentially their own Perfection, but they & It are two, they are not It by im̄utable simple nature but by reduplicate self=activity & self=exertion they have a higher & a lower Principle in ym & there is a great Latitude or compasse wch they have of being better or worse, more or lesse perfect, according as they actuate their own possibility more or lesse they are self=contractable & self=inlargeable & by this meanes may become vertuous or vitious, Wise or Foolish & be in very different states, so as yt ye cause thereof is in part\ly/ imputable to ymselves, wthout a continuall renovac~on of ymselves by self=exertion they are apt continually to sink down lower & lower, ye Good & Perfection of all Free=willd Beings because they are Imperfect Beings is not by im̄utable nature, but it is a self=exerted thing.

|B| And \B/ from he now it plainly appeares yt Liberum Arbitriū taken in yt sense as we have described belongs not to ye Deity because no \it being an/ Imperfection belongs to him, \For/ he cannot actuate his possibility more or lesse he being perfect Act & his ὀυσία his ἐνεργα, his Essence his Operac~on, He cannot exert himself more or lesse, he cannot intend & remitt himself, he is necessarily all yt wch he can be & hath no passive Capability in him, he is not defectable & capable of any Fault, neither Blame nor Com̄endacon belong to Him, whereas this {illeg} is yt wch directly belongs to ye Actions of Free=will as such yt they deserve Com̄endacon or Blame - more or lesse, he is not ἐπάνιτος but τίμιος not praise=worthy but honourable, he cannot be com̄ended for doing well as if it had been possible for him to have done otherwise, he can adde nothing to his own Perfection wch is ye priviledge of Free=willed Beings ^ & this St Jerom rightly determines Solus Deus est in quem peccatum non cadet cætera cùm sint Liberi Arbitrij possunt in utramq; partem suam flectere voluntatem


But as for yt notion of Liberty yt it consists in arbitrary self=will this I conceive to be much lesse in God yn Liberum Arbitrium itself, for Freewill is a naturall Power & Perfection though it have some defectivenesse complicated in it but irrac~onall arbitrary self=will is no ^\n\rall// Power ^\at all/ but ye vice of Free=willed Beings though there be many yt think yt God cannot be God wthout it, yet this - doth but shew ye Blindnesse & degeneracy of Mankind & ye strange \blind intoxicating/ witchcraft of Vice yt it makes men transfer not their very vices - upon ye Deity because they are strongly facinated wth this opinion yt lawlesse unbounded arbitrary self=will is ye greatest Liberty And if they could have together wth this Infinite Power to execute ye same wthout being obnoxious to any inconvenience from it they would think ymselves compleatly happy \Perfect Gods/ They therefore draw out a picture of God according to their - own dark & vitious apprehensions & make him to be nothing but arbitrary Self=will armed wth infinite Power We are far from denying true Liberty of Will to God as it speakes any thing of Perfection or yt he doth not act all things both in Heaven & Earth according to ye Free councell of his own Will, but we cannot We must not conceive God to so \For we ought not to concurre of God as if he were/ under ye necessity of nature of in all his actings ^\in such manner/ as Bruit Animalls are supposed to be, yt are below Free=will & do not emerge to yt degree of Perfection ^ as to be something of ymselves & at their own disposall, who therefore are not properly {illeg} \accounted/ Actors in ye world yt is, their Actions & \nor/ ye consequences thereof are not ^\of their actions/ imputed to ymselves but it is rather \rather to Nature under whose/ supposed yt they are under servitude \they are/ to nature acting in ym I say God is not thus to be conceived as subject to necessity wch implies a plain Imperfection, nay herein {illeg} P. 744 he is not comprehended under necessity, but himself is ye necessity & law of other things. God indeed is ye most determinate Being in ye whole Vniverse, free from fortuitous Chance & Conting\ency/ 741 \For/ Matter wch is conceived to be a thing infinitely undetermined is taken to be ye greatest Imperfection & most opposite to God, wherefore \But/ God is ye most determinate - Being ^\in their sense/ because he is one way; but not as if he were \vnder {illeg}/ frō necessity there for there is no necessity as yet, but necessity ariseth from those thing yt follow God & are below him. And though God cannot be sd to have yt imperfect contingent Free=will yt is in Creatures wch plainly imples defectability; yet he is most of all in his own Power ἀρχωκὶ κυριος ἑαυτοῦ a Prince & Lord of himself, he is most of all autexousious in a ^\simple/ refined sense under ye Power of nothing but himself & his own Perfection, Free=willed Beings are not essentially their own perfection & therefore yt self=power of Freewill is but an imperfect power over ones self, a staggering & uncertain thing


\Again/ Neither is God ^\is not/ to be conceived as if he were a servt to his own Nature in all his actings The Actions & Volitions of God being not a servts to his nature or essence |are| most perfectly free, neither is God a servt to himself but he is most freely himself For as - his nature of Goodnesse & Wisdom may be sd also yt God Freely wills his own Nature 747 God doth not more will & act as his nature inclines him to will yn his Nature is such as he wills & acts; therefore he is in ye most perfect sense Lord of himself, his na having his nature perfectly in his own Power - it being no other yn he willd it to be God must not be conceived to be something of necessity by his nature first wch afterwards determines his Will but it may be sd of him yt he willd his nature to be such as it is, or yt his nature & his will are ^\one &/ ye same thing In his essence was his Will & therefore there was nothing in him differing from his Essence nor nothing in him but wt was Will - Wherefore he was all Will & there was nothing in him yt was not willed by him or before his Will, so yt God was first of all his own Will he was as he willed & such as he willed to be. Nay the Phylosopher ventures to adde further as if it might be said in a certain sense yt God ^\eternally/ made himself by Will he is as it were \his own/ ye work \{illeg}/ of his own Will for \because/ he is yt wch he wills himselfe to be, nor would he be any thing else yn wt he is.

But notwthstanding all this though we take so much care to free God from ye servitude of nature & necessity as this may be apprehended to be an imperfection yet we must not on ye other hand subject him to Contingency nor ^\Reson/ make his Will from his nature & make it a fortuitous ^\giddy/ temerarious & irrationall thing his - Will being ye Will of yt wch is. ye best is no temerarious Will nor such as \did/ it happend to be ^\such as it is/ His will is not irrac~onall nor for fortuitous & such as came upon him but such as ought to be & there is nothing temperarious in him we cannot per\con/ceive it to be a perfection of God to have a random _ Will yt is loose from his own nature, ^\his/ Goodnesse & Wisedom & contingent to ye same It is no liberty to be able to act contrary to nature & Perfecc~on It is absurd to think a thing to be yn free wn it \can/ acts contrary to nature especially wn this nature yt ye highest Good & greatest perfection To be able to do appe Contraries is neither Power nor Liberty but inability of persisting in ye best Wherefore we cannot consent to yt assertion of theirs who place this Liberty as a perfection in God yt positis omnibus ad agendum <45> requisitis at posito quolibet Judicis in Intellectu, nihilominus tamen aliter possit agere aut noc aut illud agere for to be able to act contrary to his own Wisedome is is imbecility or inability of adhering \continuing its/ to ye best, it is defectability & not Liberty Wherefore though God do all things according to ye Councill of his own Will both in heaven & Earth yet certainly he wills to not agreeably to Wisdom in every thing. Necessity & nonnecessity or Contingency, may \as/ it may be taken in different senses may either imply ye greatest imperfection or ye greatest Perfection, ye necessity of Bodyes in their action & moc~on wn they are allwayes determined by something wthout ym is ye greatest ImꝐfecc~on next to yt is ye dull necessity of Brutish Appetite & Hormæ stupidly fixed & determined to one, it \{illeg} actions/ having not Judgmt ^\of nor power/ over itself nor Power over itself & Actions, it is not above ym but a servt to ym or to Nature in ym & ye \loose/ Contingency of Liberum arbitrium or Freewill is much a higher perfecc~on yn this Bruitish necessity But \yt/ this contingent Free=will is much \farre/ below ye necessity of perfect im̄utable Goodnesse & Wisedome, such a Being as perfectly comprehends all & cannot possibly act unwisely or foolishly Necessity in all senses is \dos/ not ^\alwayes {illeg}/ imperfection, wherefore though it be \alwayes/ contradictious to Liberum Arbitrium because yt is an imperfect & an incompleat power over our selves, & neither admitts of ye lower nor higher necessity it being above one & below ye other, yet it is no way contradictious to Liberty as yt is taken for a pure perfection for it is a great mistake yt Libertas & Liberū arbitrium, Liberty & Contingent or staggering Free=will ^\acting indifferētly any way/ are one & ye same thing it is absurd to think yt a Being immutably fixed in Goodnesse & Wisedome should be therefore in a state of Bondage, thralldome & Misery They yt make pendulous, wavering & versatil Freewill to be an equall Perfection every way & to be an essentiall attribute of ye Deity & conceited \it/ to be ye most glorious prerogative thereof, not to be necessarily but to be contingenty determind to Goodnesse Justice & Wisedome \though/ thinking hereby to advance his Dominion Soveraignty & Liberty do exceedingly debase ye excellency of his divine nature ignorantly transfering their own humane Imperfections & ye Imperfections of Free=willd Beings yt are a middle rank of defectable Beings & amphibious things, upon him & clos\th/ing him therewth Nay they yt make ye top of all perfection to consist in an absolute indifferency of Will to Light & Vnderstanding Reason & Wisedome & yt this is ye most glorious Liberty to be able to act irrac~onally they do not make ye Faculty but ye \very/ Vice of Free=will \itself allso/ to be ye greatest Ꝑfection they make infinite \lawles & vnbounded/ Lust & irrac~onall arbitrarinesse to be ye Supream governesse & Moderatrix of all things ye onely Deity in ye world


To be free frō Goodnesse & Truth is to be free to irrationall Lust & Bruitish Appetites fortuitously & contingently determining all Volitions ā it proceeds only from ye depravac~ons of mens natures & \these/ being ^\themselves/ captivated up under ye Lust of arbitrary Dominion yt they make this to be their highest Liberty, Dominion & authority, whereas ye highest Power & Liberty wch \Perfections/ are ye im̄table natures of Goodnesse & Wisedome wch are determining Principles, they \&/ take away contingency or ἀπειρία or|&| Infinity ye Platonists determine yt mens est principiū necessitatis ye Principles of perfective Necessity & God is called by ym περας & μετρον & νομος ye Bound measure & Law of ye whole Vniverse his endlesse Goodnesse & Wisedome having bounded & determined ye loose Infinitude & possibility of things in\to/ ye best order possible & \but/ απερία or Infinitude is ^\to them/ a name of ye greatest imperfection wth ym wch they call Darknesse, Poverty, Informosity & ye first Evill most infinitely remote from God ye highest Perfection Now absolute Indifferency of Will contingently determined to any thing is nothing but ἀπερία itself & therefore most unsuitable unto ye divine nature wch is ye most determinate thing in ye world, Goodnesse & Wisedome itself measuring & bounding all things Gods will is ye id quod oportet yt wch ought to be in every thing throughout ye whole Vniverse ^\But it will not follow frō hence as some suppose/ However we must not be so im̄dest as to conclude from hence \yt/ because Gods Will is yt wch is best in every thing yt therefore we are \may be/ able certainly to determine from hence in all cases wtsoever, both wt God hath done & also wt he will do, I say we must not presume yt we are able wth our shallow Vnderstandings to resolve wt is or was absolutely ye best in every case And \some have so fair pretended/ Ꝑhaps it was not so much of Atheism as an affectac~on of this Phyloso \a ought {illeg}Pretense to this/ modesty in some Phylosophers yt they would banish finall causes out of n̄rall Phylosophy this seeming to imply as if we were able to comprehend ye divine Wisedomes & reach to ye End of all things they thinkg it not proꝐ for us to make ye Ends supposed & conjectured by us to be ye true \Reall/ & proper causes of all Phænomena because our Vnderstandings are finite & we were not ye first contrivers ye Architects or Master=builders of ye Vniverse But if we are so well able from wt is absolutely best in itself to demonstrate infallibly wt is de facto yn we should by this \{illeg}/ determine not only whether there were any more habitable worlds yn this, but also how many they be & in what form every one of ym is & also inform us \tell vs/ exactly wt are all ye Lawes of Providence <47> & of ye divine Œconomy concerning Souls after this Life -

Chap 4.

But because this is a businesse of subtill COnsiderac~on & our explication of it is different from what is found in Writings yt have been hitherto extant concerning this Argumt we shall again propose a sum̄ary comprehension of ye whole doctrine concerning it & though we shall repeat wt hath been before suggested yet it will not be wthout a further advantage & fuller explicac~on of ye whole, First therefore it is ^\a thing/ plain\ly/ & a thing implyed in ye very notion of Liberum Arbitrium yt Freewilled Beings are such who are not meerly passive in their moc~on to ye action of Agents wthout ym as Inanimate Bodyes are Machins & Neurospasts wch are all perfectly ἑτεροκίνετα moved by something w\th/out But Freewill implies some kind of Autokinesy, w\ch/ indeed it were superfluous to menc~on, were it not for this yt ye greatest Champions for Necessity as well \both/ antient as|nd| modern lay their foundation here yt all moc~on & Action in ye Vniverse wtsoever, is perfect Heterokinesy & yt there is no originall Action any where or such as springs frō ye Agent itself, but yt it all takes its \Life &/ Beginning from some other Agent wthout, ye meaning whereof is yt there is no other Being in ye world besides Body & Matter of wch it is truly sd yt it never moves itself but wtsoever Body is moved is moved not from any Principle of motion in itself but it is allway passive to ye Activity of something else ^\without/ upon it And if there were no other Substance in ye world but Body yn not only Bruits but men also must be acknowledged to be nothing but meer Machins & Neuropasts

But we have showed in ye former part of this discourse yt there is a certain kind of Autokinesy in all Cogitative Beings w\t/soever & therefore if Bruits be not meer senslesse Machins but have Cogitac~on in ym they must needs have some Actiō or Energy wch is not put into ym from wthout but springs frō wthin ymselves, yt is, they must needs have something above Mechanicall, Motion, above Body & Matter But this simple Autokinesy wch is \com̄on to/ included in ye nature of all Cogitac~on, ye action ^\& {illeg}/ of Cogitative Beings \cogitatiō it/ being \is/ internall or ^\Actiō/ in ye essentiall profundity of yt yt thinks, & not a translac~on from place to place or ^\that/ outward change of distance {illeg} is not yt thing wch we are now to enquire after in wch ye nature of Freewill consisteth, but |yt| is a peculiar mo kind of self=moc~on or self=activity whereby yt wch moves doth not only act from wthin itself but also upon itself determining & ^\govourning/ com̄anding its own moc~on, Sensitive Appetites, Passions & Hormæ wch are com̄only sd to be spontaneous, have no power over ymselves to stop or excite their own moc~on ^\& Come/ to retard or accelerate their Force no more yn a stone flung out of sling hath, but are meer swinges & impetuosityes of Nature. By our own inward sense we are conscious to ourselves yt these things invade us & obtrude ymselves upon us & yt they are so far frō having any governmt of yt higher principle in us Wherefore concerning these Hormæ, Appetites & Passions yt in ye \a/ late Book de Homine yt may in some sense be acknowledg'd to be true Neꝗ appetitus noster, neꝗ fuga nostra causa est quare hoc vel illud cupimus vel fugimus h. e. non ideo potuimus quia volumus, nec fugimus quia nobimus sed quia tū appetitio tum aversio ab ipsis rebus cupitis vel exosis generata est, sequiturꝗ necessario præconceptum jucunditatis molestiæꝗ ab ipsis objectis adfuturæ, Quid enim - <48> An esurimus, cæteraꝗ naturæ necessaria appetimus quia volumus? An fines sitis et Cupidinas voluntariæ suntl appetentibus agere quidem libero esse potest ipsum autem appetere non potest Not as if this were true in ye Authors sense yt all these Animall Appetites (wch ^\{illeg}/ he calls Volitions) are nothing else but meer corporeall passion from ye objects wthout a locall motions mechanically produced For we have shewd before yt in bodily sense itself & therefore much more in all APpetites & Passions there is something besides ye Activity of ye objects wthout or locall moc~on frō ym upō us, neither is sensitive conception ye meer action of ye thing conceived & ye passion of ye Conceiver there being in it besides ye local mocon from wthout to wch ye Sentient is but passive, Fancy, appearance, perception wch is a moc~on of another kind & such not a locall moc~on or translac~on frō place to place as this Author ridiculously conceits all Cogitac~on to be; but a moc~on of a different kind, a motion yt ariseth frō wthin ye sentient itself wch implies it not to be Body but incorporeall Substance. But because these - mocons do necessarily arise upon occasion of ye corporiall moc~ons made upō externall Bodyes & because they cannot bound measure & moderate our\them/selves therefore we are no thought to be ^\so much to be/ ye cause of ym ourselves as Nature i in us; Wherefore it being supposd yt Bruits have no other principle of Action in ym yn such particular Appetites & Hormetick Inclinac~ons wch are as it were by nature obtruded on ym it seems consequent hereupon yt though they may be sd often to have a liberty to do wt they have an appetite unto, wn there is no externall impedimt to hinder ym, yet they cannot be sd to have a liberty over their Appetites ymselves nor a Power of determining their own Actions wch is yt wch is com̄only meant by Liberum Arbitrium & they cannot properly be sd to be ye cause of their own Actions as men are so as to deserve Blame or Com̄endac~on, for wt they do, it being not so much ymselves yt act as nature yt acts in ym.

Wherefore Freewilled Beings are not only elevated above ye condicon of meer corporeall Machins wch ye also ye lowest Cogitative Beings are but they have also a higher Autokinesy & self-activity in ym, yn yt of Brutish sense or Appetite, they being certain loosned & released things yt feel ymselves to be something by ymselves, able to wield & turn ymselves, to govern & dispose ymselves & their own Actions Wch is a certain higher emersion of Life above dull Bruitish fancy & appetite ye latter whereof may be resembled to a straight line yt is allway running outwards & forwards wthout any Flexive turning in upon itself but ye former to a reflected line or circle it being a certain Life yt doth as it were return ^\into/ rebound & reeche upon itself ye former is a shallow superficiall Life, but ye latter such a Life as hath a certain inward & profundity in it, A Freewilled Being is not single but double, present wth itself, wthin itself & superiour to itself, acting upon itself, govourning & com̄anding itself & holding itself as it were in its own hand, it is a thing emancipated & manumitted from natures servitude & becomes sui Juris something of itself, its own {illeg} & at his own disposall yt can act by & frō itself & is in a - peculiar sense αρχὴ καὶ ἀιτία πράξεων a principle & cause of Action in ye world so yt Acting & ye consequences of it are imparted to it as ye cause of it All inanimate Beings \Bodies/ are plainly nothing else but severall Limbs or members of nature yt have no Activity at all in ymselves for though some attribute Life to ye whole corporeall Vniverse & would not have it to be a <49> Cadaverous thing or dead Mechanism yet it is only one com̄on plastick Life wch is supposed by ym to act & form ye whole corporeall Vniverse so as yt all ye particular parts of it taken by ymselves are notwthstanding utterly devoid of any activity And Bruits - though they have a certain Life of their own not only plasticall but sensitive whereby they are conscious to ymselves of their - own moc~on yet they are not quite released from natures Bondage & servitude, they have not such an emersion of Life in ym whereby they can feel ymselves something of ymselves, comprehend ymselves, {illeg}ield & turn ymselves, but are as it were in a state of pupillage in a state of \vnder Natures/ Gardianship wch do not act any thing by ymselves, nor are accomptable for what they do, but nature is only accomptable for their Actions. These differ frō Freewill'd beings in a manner as ye Zoophyta or plant Animals differ from other living Creatures yt have liberty to move up & down wheresoever they please for though ye former seem to have some sense & Vitality yet they continue fast rooted in ye earth & cannot remove from ye place where they are fixed & it is generally conceivd yt Bruit Animalls though elevated above ye condicen of Machins so yt they can exert bodyly moc~on from ym yet they are in a manner fastned to their - Mother nature as ye Plant Animalls to ye Earth being not Masters of their own Activity {illeg} or else they may be resembled to humane \Foetus/ Embrios in ye Mothers womb who though they have some sense of their own yet they live as it were by ye Life of ye mothers with whom they are continued & wth whose passions they sympathize The Embrio in ye womb tyed by ye Navell strings to ye Mother is for yt time accompted but part or piece of ye Mother but after it hath broken loose out of those dark cloisters & ye bands wherewth it was tyed to ye womb are cut in pieces it is no longer part of ye Mother but something by itself So Bruits are like Embrios living in nature{illeg} womb or lap & those particular Appetites & Inclinac~ons yt they have in ym may be sd in some sense to be rather Natures Activity yn their own, but Freewilled Beings are like Infants brought forth into ye world & broken loose frō ye dark & narrow cloisters of their Mother Nature having their Navell strings cut, freed from ye narrownesse & bondage of Natures \{illeg}/ Activity & now something of ymselves & at their own dispose & therefore differ as much from Bruits \as/ a young Lamb|kin| or Kind yt wantonly sports frisking up & down in a pasture differs frō itself wn it was a young Foetus or Embrio tyed \vp/ in ye dark womb. Freewilld Beings are like adult Persons brought out of ye state of Pupillage from under Natures Tuition & Guardianship in wch they could not do any act of their own yt was valid in Law or might justly be accompted theirs & manumitted into a state of Liberty & put under their own Governm\t/ Actors by ymselves & their own men κάριοι πράξεων Masters of their own Actions not servants to Nature ^\& {illeg}/ but Free -


For ye better explicating of wch Faculty we found it necessary to decline ye vulgar Psicology wch first divides ye soul into sensitive & raconal & yn in ye rationall makes only those two Facultyes of Vnderstanding & - Will This Hypothesis being not only insufficient to solve ye Phænomenon of ye τὸ ἐφ' ἡμιν but also many other Phænomna of ye soul for according to this Psicology ye or ruling Principle in ye Soul must either be a necessary Vnderstanding necessarily determining all Volition or else a perfectly blind & fortuitous Will must Ꝑside in it governing ye Vnderstanding itself in it \&/ its exercise obiect & intention & determining all actions alike ie. ye governour of ye whole man must be given to a blind & fortuitous thing wherefore in stead of yt Psicology {illeg} this other Hypothesis of distributing \{illeg}/ ye Whole Soul & its Powers ^\are distributed/ into the dichotomy first of simple & necessary nature under wch are comprehended severall Faculties higher or lower ^\{illeg}/ & yn of reduplicate self-activity For there being in ye humane soul different Congruities higher & lower & a multiplicity of Capacities & Powers, {illeg} besides superiour & inferiour Reason & ye speculative Vnderstanding many particular Appetites & Passions in ye Animall yt nature yt often clash wth one another there must of necessity be in ye Soul one com̄on Focus or course in wch all these lines will \may/ meet, some one thing in wch all this diversity is recollected & knit up together, something yt is conscious of all ye cogitative Powers of ye Soul (for ye Plastick & Plantick\all/ ones (if there be any such) belong not to his Cognizance) of all Congruities & Capacities higher & lower, wch same thing will also wield, guide & steer ye whole Soul - having ye govournmt & managemt of it in its own hand; arbitrate all difference & determine all strife & discord in it. Now this can be no other yn ye whole Soul reduplicated upon itself, wch being as it were wthin itself, comꝐhending itself & holding itself in its own hand hath a sui potestas a Power over it self & can determine & turn itself this way & yt way This is ye head summity & top in all those Beeings yt are - called Freewilled, yt is, Self-powerfull, this is yt wch holds ye whole frame & Machin of ye Soul (if I may so call it) cohere together & makes it move & act coherently & consistently & therefore wn this is relaxated or consopited into a langour (as it seems to be in sleep) all ye other strings of ye Soul play'd upon wthout it makes no musick or harmony but thoughts prove absurdly \in/cohærent wth one another. This is ye Arbitrator of all differences ye Vmpire of all Controversies & yt where ye ultimate defusion of all things is made This is yt where our Personality is seated, it is ye ἀυτὸ ἐκαστοι in everyone yt wch is properly called we ourselves, for there are many things in us yt are ours but are not We ^\orselves/ We have in us Animall Appetites & lower inclinac~ons as also dictates of Honessty & Conscience but we - are neither this nor yt, otherwise yn as by this self=active Power of ye Soul we determine ourselves \to {illeg}/ yt wch is concocted into ye Soul reduplicated self=comprehensive & selfpowerfull, & yt wch by this we form ourselves into, is our very selves & nothing else whatsoever morall disposition is lodged here denominates ye whole man to be such This determines all ye passive Capability of every mans nature & makes him to be wt he is This precides in forms & actuates ye whole Soul & all other things in it <51> are but {illeg} to it This is ye whole Soul so collected & knit up together into itself hanging lite & loose, hovering & suspense acting upon itself & determining itself being nimbly self=flexible - this way & yt way.

But to speak more particularly of it there are two properties - chiefly to be taken notice off in it Firstly yt it is self comprehensive

|A| 2\ly/ yt is self=active & self=powerfull |+| first I say it is self=comprehensive, yt is, it is conscious of ye severall Congruities in ye Soul - higher & lower, yt of particular ^\Animall/ Appetites of inferiour Reason & of ye τὸ θειον ye divine principlle in us as also of ye superiority of ye one ro ye \of these one an/ other, conscious of its own power of putting forth & intending itself more or lesse, of \{illeg}/ {illeg} & turning ye whole Soul of determin|^|ing Assents & actions |^| & lastly conscious of its own \volition &/ Action & consequently ^|hath| hereupon a gratefull or ungratefull sense wthin itself is \being/ either pleased, or |B| displeased, satisfied or dissatisfied wthin itself |B| This is yt interiour Faculty of ye Soul commonly called συνειδησις or Conscience in wch ye Soul knowes wth itself, i.e. takes notice of all yt is wthin itself & of its owne Actions & also judging \allso/ thereupon inwardly either blaming or approving itself, \accusing or excusing/ There is indeed some kind thing of Consciousnesse more or lesse in all Cogitations, yt is, sense ^\in all/ Energies of ye Soul above ye Plastick Powers & therefore some conclude ye essence of Cogitation to consist in Consciousnesse but this is ^\another thing it is not that Consciousnes/ one peculiar Power or Faculty of ye Soul most inward to it whereby it reflects upon \on/ its volitions & Actions This is ye Conscience is ye com̄on sense of ye whole Soul neither ought it to be restrained to religious or Morall things only, but it is a generall or universall Power & therefore as there are two degrees of Liberum arbitrium in - us according to ye twofold \degrees of/ good of \in/ our Nature Animall & Morall so besides ye Morall Conscience there is an Animall & Civill Conscience ^\aswell as a Morall/ for συνειδησις Conscience & Self=comprehension is a power yt pervades ye whole Soul belonging to yt wch is ye head & top of it.

Secondly besides Self=comprehension & self=consciousness it is self=active & self=powerfull wch consists chiefly in two things first a Power yt ye Soul hath over its whole self of puting forth, intending or exerting itself more or lesse, wch is \its/ a Power ^\yt is {illeg}/ over ye passive Capability of its own nature, its Power of actuating its own Possibility, wch is exerercised severall wayes first in self=recollection & self=attention 2ly in \Particular/ Considerac~on whether speculatives or Practicall ye latter of wch former of wch is com̄only called Contemplac~on, ye latter deliberac~on 3ly in exerting a vigorous force for ye suppressing ye lower Inclinac~ons & promoting ye Soul towards ye higher Principle & lastly in executive Activity In all these ye Soul ^\Redoubled &/ self=comprehensive hath a Power over itself to intend actuate & put forth itself more or lesse

Another \further/ Branch of this self=active Power is consequent upon ye former, \& yt is/ of determining ye Assents <52> in ye Volitions \yt Exercise of Cogitatio~/ & ye Actions of ye whole man ||by means wherof ye soul is not a Servant to its own Actions but ^ master over them -

|A| This Power yt ye Soul as self=comprehensive self=intending & self=exerting itself more or lesse hath of determining ye exercise of ye Understanding, & all ye Actions of Life is yt wch is com̄only called Will concerning ye moc~on whereof there are severall different Apprehensions for some call all Appetites & spontaneous Inclinac~ons wtsoever by ye name of Will according to whom to act freely & to act spontaneously is one & ye same |tho| Others would restrain ye name of Will only to ye last prevaling Appetite yt is wn there is an Alternac~on of App different Appetites & Desires struggling together, or Hopes & Feares yt wch is strongest & therefore Ꝑvalent over ye rest they call by ye name of Will Others will have yt wch is called Will to be such an Affection as is ye ^\Necessary/ result of ^|Necessary| Reason & necessary Vnderstanding yt as Hormæ & Appetites depend upon Fancy in Bruits (wch latter seems to be in order of Nature before ye other) so they say Will is a Rac~onall Appetite & Inclinac~on i.e. a ne|B|cecessary result from a necessary Vnderstanding |B| What \Now these {illeg}/ the words Reason & Vnderstanding are equivocall as was before showed they sometimes signified|ing| nothing but ye dictate of Honesty & if Will were allwayes ye result of this Reason then there could be no - dishonest & sinfull Volic~on, there could be no Voluntary act agst Conscience & Honesty, (for this \which/ is superiour Reason) sometimes by Reason & Vnderstanding is meant ye Logicall discursive Power, speculating & deliberating inferring a Conclusions from certain Ꝑmises & if yt affection & inclinac~on to Action yt necessarily results from hence be ye only true moc~on of Will ^\it would follow from Hence yt/ yn we could not Willingly rac~oncinate, speculate or liberate concerning this or yt whereas ye sense of yt is gon all is acknowledged to be true wch ye Scholastick writers expresse in these termes, yt ye Vnderstanding is determin'd by ye Will both to its exercise & object, we being sensibe wthin ourselves of a certaine Free=power yt we have over our Cogitac~ons whereby we can determine ourselves to speculate & deliberate more or lesse concerning this or yt, Now yt Will yt exercises such an Imperium over ye Vnderstanding as to place to as to its exercise upon its particular objects cannot well be thought to be ye consequent of yt Vnderstanding itself, but something else in ye Soul yt is more generall & comprehensive yn ye whole Now all these severall \Inward/ Apprehensions concerning Will \alike/ tend to this yt there is no Faculty of self=power in us & nether \liberty/, but necessary spontaniety in humane Actions; for if there be no other Will in us {illeg} Necessary spontaniety whether consisting frō {illeg} \it will be nothing but a {illeg} Necessary/ Reason & ye Vnderstanding it is plain yt there can be to such Power \thing/ in us as Power over ourselves or Actions, no internall selfflexibility but ye whole Soul must be as stiff & unwieldy as any senslesse <53> corporeall Machin But ye true noc~on of Will is this yt it is ye whole Soul reduplicated & self=comprehensive, conscious of all its Congruities higher & lower, its Power & Capacities yt can actuate & intend itself more or lesse & wield & turn all ye Powers of ye Soul & determining its own Cogitations & actions

And this is ye τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν {illeg} yt wch hath ye Principatus in ye Soul, ye ruling or swaying Principle. This word ἡγεμονικὸν \& ye Notiō of it/ was first introducd by ye Stoicks who were but bad Phylosophers & had \did/ not well \& clearly/ setled their own noc~ons, And we observe yt there hath been an equivocac~on in ye use of this word \aswell/ amongst ye Antients as well as Moderns For some by ye τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν understand yt wch ought to rule or bear sway in us wch is yt right Reason \or superior Reas/ yt is taken for ye same thing as Honesty Again it may be taken for yt wch doth actually sway or bear rule ^\& bear sway/ in us & in this sense I conceive it ought to be taken wn it is made a controversy wt is ye τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν of ye Soul ye τὸ κυριῦον ye Principatus & ye Principl|a|le Animæ for all these words are used by ye Antients, not wt ought to rule for yt is a thing out of Question but wt ^\kind of thing in vs/ it is yt doth actually rule & sway in us to wch all actions are to be imputed & therefore bad as well as Good, yt by wch ye whole man ^\de facto/ is govourned & this I take to be yt wch ye Stoicks really intended by yt wch they call ye τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν wch Plotinus & all other Greeks avoiding all |yt| ambiguity of ye other word chose rather to call ye τὸ ἡγεμονουν, yt wch doth renum potiri in ye Soul, actually rule & sway But ye Stoicks as I sd was bad Phylosophers & therefore gave but a confused definic~on of it as Diogenes in Zeno tells us P. 202 yt ye ruling & principall part of ye Soul or ye Regale Animæ is yt in wch ye Phantasies & Appetites are made & from whence Reason is sent forth wch is seated in ye heart & as Plutarch interprets ye Stoicks call ye highest part of ye Stoi Soul ye ἡγεμονικὸν yt wch amongst other things makes assents for as we shall show afterwards ye judging Power belongs to it |X|as well as ye willing \X/ Wherefore we affirm yt ye τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν or rather ye τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν \{illeg} & ye τὸ κυριῶον/ ye actually swaying Power ovr ye whole Soul is yt wch we have described


ye Soul reduplicated self=comprehensive & self=active wch Stoicks made to be a distinct Power by itself yt wch can stir up & turn itself this way or yt way & make itself wt it will

But there is one thing yt belongeth to this ἡγεμονικὸν of ye Soul ^\yt is not com̄only takē notice of/ yt it doth not only will & com̄and Action, but also judge assent & opine & yt not only in practicalls but also in Theoreticalls for judgmt doth not belong to ye perceiving Power in us there being often false judgmts & Nature or n̄rall perception can never erre, but it is we ourselves yt erre & wt this ἡμεῖς or we ourselves is hath been sufficiently declared The perception of ye Vnderstanding is something in us or of ours but it is not properly we ourselves but Judgmt is ye act of ye whole Soul yt wch is self=comprehensive & self=active & nothing passes thorow ye whole Soul but it hath a stroke here, it must have something done correspondently to it in yt wch is properly we ourselves, \or els it {illeg} it comes to nothing/ ye n̄rall Vnderstanding can only perceive or not=perceive, it is capable of nothing but either Knowledge or Ignorance, Error & false Judgmt is a thing of our - own wch ourselves cas superadde & cast in over & above to something of Nature in us This perhaps will be more easily granted in - such things as we have no clear Ꝑcepc~ons of either way - but our n̄rall Vnderstandings is doubtfull conc~ning ym yt we \casually/ attending to some Ꝑbability either on one side or other may determine our own assent \this or/ yt way, but in ^\ether/ thing clearly Ꝑceived & wch there can be no doubt off as com̄on Noc~ons it might seem yt there is no other judgmt of ym but only Concepc~on & Intellection But ye case is otherwise for we being not essentially Knowledge but something wch Ꝑtakes of Knowledge & Vnderstanding are by this meanes liable to this duplicity of having Judgmt & Assent besides ye bare Ꝑception & Intellection whereas there is no such thing in yt wch is Ꝑfectly wise & knowing \or Intellect/ or Mind & Knowledge itself. I say Soules yt have but a participac~on of νους or Intellect in ym have besides their imꝐfect knowing Power a Judging & Assenting Power also, wch belongs to yt wch comprehends ye whole Soul, nay there is hardly any thing wch we do so clearly Vnderstand as yt we may not \ether/ upon this considerac~on yt we have often found our selves deceived in such things as we did seem to have clearly understood, or from a surmise yt it is possible our Faculties may be made false though we cannot judge it to be absolutely false yet we may suspend our assent to it But though we do necessarily assent to ye truth of some com̄on noc~ons as yt ye same thing cannot be & not be wn we attend to - <55> nothing else wch may cause a doubt or schepsis, yet it doth not - follow from hence yt this Judgmt considerd former|al|ly as such doth therefore belong to ye necessary Vnderstanding because - we do in like manner necessarily will & nill some things The - Willing Power itself is not perfectly indifferent to all things any more yn ye \as shall be shewed/ Judging Power for \but/ both of ym alike are sometimes necessary, neither indeed can there be any n̄rall Power ^\or active Faculty/ yt is universally indifferent to all things in ye whole world & hath no propension at all any more yn there can be a Being wthout any determinated Nature Now as there is some Good such yt (to speak according to vulgar language) ye Will cannot choose but imbrace & sence Evill such as yt it cannot choose but shun & avoid in like manner there are some Truths so clearly perceived by ye n̄rall & necessary Vnderstanding as yt ye Soul redoubled & self=comprehensive cannot choose but assent to ye same so long as it attends only to ye evidence of ye thing in itself & takes notice of no other reason or considerac~on yt might tend to weaken yt assent or to beget a schepticall suspense in it as in other things where - there is a mixture of Good & Evill together of Congruity & Discongruity we have a latitude & liberty of Willing or not Willing so in doutfull cases & ^in such ^\things/ as we have not clear & distinct Conceptions of their Truth or Falshood there we do uncertainly Judge & assent one way or other attending to some Ꝑbability yt is on either side ^\consistently/ extending ourselves therein further yn necessary nature & beyond clear perception & therefore frequently changing our opinions & Judgmts & from hence Error ariseth But though Error do often attend \{illeg}/ ye exercise of this Autexousious Judging Power in speculative things beyond clear Ꝑception & whereof we have not Mathematicall Evidence yet notwthstanding ye Faculty is good in itself & it is highly necessary yt in such Beings as we are whose Knowledge is unꝐfect & wch have an absolute certainty but of so very few things there should be such a Judgmt \Power/ of extending our Assent & Judgmt beyond our Vnderstanding Not yt temerarious Judging or assenting to any thing indifferently as true or false is any n̄rall Power or Ꝑfectiō any more ^\thē thē/ temerarious indifferent & irrac~onal Willing is Mor yt this opining Power should so busily & pragmatically interpose itself in every thing where there is no need of determining our assent either way no consequence of Life depending thereupon as it doth in some Persons who though they scarcly knew, yt is, clearly Ꝑceive any thing at all, it will judge & determine every thing in ye whole Vniverse thereby most frequently erring & never thinking true but by chance For there are many speculative Opinions upon wch huge moments of Life depend & yet very few if any in ye whole world have any Mathematicall certainty either way in wch notwthstanding imꝐtiall Reason discovers greater Ꝑbabilities one way yn another & it is much more agreeable to ye interest of Vertue & morality to hold one way yn another here it is a true naturall Power wch ye Soul hath of determining its assent & Judgmt beyond its Vnderstanding as for example to ye existence of a God or Providence; ye Immortality of ye Soul & future rewards & Punishments <56> for by this meanes ^\we \nature/ make|s| there is/ a supplement \made/ to ye imꝐfection of our nature & ye defectienesse of our Knowledge & this is yt noble Power of Faith wch |yt| in ye holy Oracles are \is/ so highly extolled, wch is ye really extending our Assents beyond clear Reason & evident comprehensions & there because there is something autexousious in it therefore Men are often blamed for ye want of it, though indeed we are blamed also for speculative errors many times upon another accōpt because yt things are such as yt by ^\duly/ intending our Vnderstanding in a way of study considerac~on & meditation we might have arrived to a clear Knowledge & comprehension of ye Truth of thē

But if ye judging, opining & assenting Power ^\as to ye truth & falshood/ of speculative things properly belong not to simple nature in us but to we ourselves or to ye Soul reduplicated or self=comprehensive wch often acts contingently, yn much more doth it in things Practicall i.e. concerning ye Good & Evill of things & wt is to be done or not done in Ꝑticular cases of Life, for it would be very strange if ye same thing in us should not judge yt willeth, but one thing in us should practically judge & another thing will & yt yt willeth should be indifferent to follow yt yt Judgeth & this should be ye Liberty & Perfection of a man not to be necessarily determined by his own last practicall Judgmt & to will wthout any Judgmt at all of wt one \he/ willeth.

Good in generall is such a thing as yt \though it be most talkt of of any thing in ye world yet/ few men know any thing at all of it clearly & certainly for whereas ye chief Good ought to be ye measure of all other Goods, there hath not been more controversy nor uncertainty of Judgmt ^\about of any thing/ in ye whole world yn it & Aristotle tells us yt mankind have but ὁιον μάντομά τι a certain raticinac~on of it, Wherefore vitall Instinct & \or/ ye instinct of morality is yt wch we are \owe/ much more guided \to here/ by here yn any logicall or mathematicall Reason, but there being two different vitall Instincts in us higher & lower Animall & divine ye determinac~on of our Judgmt & Will to this or yt is an autexousious thing, it is not necessary nature & Vnderstanding yt determines us either way, but ye τὸ μίσον or middle things in ye Soul ye Soul comprehensive of all \its/ congruities higher & lower ^\partic. ye / & by a certain inward sense distinguishing betwixt ym^\i.e. between & / wch \and/ being self=powerfull doth judgingly & willingly determine itself to either, either, promoting itself to ye higher or sinking down to ye lower. Wherefore yt of Aristotle is here most true yt we are ἄιτιον πῶς τῆς φαντασίας we are in a manner ye causes of ye Phantasies & appearances of Good & τὸ φαινομενον ἀγαθὸν καὶ βέλτιρον ye seeming Good & Best is not a thing \altogether/ imposd upon us by necessary nature & which we are wholy passive to, but we ourselves contribute something \{illeg}/ towards it nature begins & proposes variety to our choice exhibiting ye Phantasies of two different Goods ^\ & inchoately/ but having given us a certain Power over ye passive capability of our nature leaves us to act hereupon, & to determine <57> {illeg} Phantasy of Good to ourselves accordingly as we exert ourselves more or lesse & so to compose ye strife to end ye competition or distinction of nature this way or yt way But in these colluctations & disputes between ye higher & lower parts of ye Soul as they are determinedly called, there is much wavering of ye judging Power many {illeg} alternations & reciprocac~ons of incompleat practicall Judgments ^\this way & that way/ before ye determination & ye issue at last is according as ye soul more or lesse exerting itself doth ^\at last finally & {illeg}/ hasten & acquiesce ^\{illeg} reson/ this way or yt way we are not here passively determined to Good \to Good/ by a necessitating Light ^\necessitating this/ for yn \{illeg}/ there would have been no laborious conatous in it, but by a self=exerted force Nature is ^\here/ distracted between two different Lights, ye Light of two vitall Instincts, higher & lower, & logicall Reason hath little to do here but as we exercise yt Power wch God & Nature hath given us over our own passive Capability & exert ourselves more or lesse so is ye victory decided either way.

Here may all by frequent judging & acting contract a certain habituall Light or disposition to Judge this way or yt way in Morall things - i.e. either a true or a false light, For yt Ꝑticular actions do by little & little contribute every one of ym something towards habits of Judging & \afterward/ willing is evident; ye|The| Soul reduplicated & self=powerful tutcheth every thing as it were wth pitchy fingers, every \fore/action leaving behind it a ^\little clammy/ disposition to - ye same again wch by many reiterated & repeated Actions growes up at lenghth into ye strength of a \Con/firm|ed| habit.

Now because this Judging Power in morall things is \in/ Ꝑtly autexousious there we are exhorted by ye wisest & gravest Phylosophers to take great care of this \it/ & to watch over it continually & to govourn it aright i|I|t is a passage allready \before/ quoted \out of/ by Antoninus &c reverence the opining i.e. the assenting & Judging Power ^\concerning Good & Evill/ for all lies in this, yt this Hegemonicon or ruling Power \Principle/ entertain no opinion yt is disagreeable to nature & ye right frame of a rationall Animall This is yt Power wch is called \by others/ το χρηστικον ταις φαντασίους yt wch can differently use ye \lower/ Phantasies \{illeg}/ yt we have of things according to ye lower Animall Life & y|e|ither yield to ym or master ym & bear up itself ag\st/ ym, & to this purpose Epictetus exhorts \vs/ so much to take heed \look to/ of our ^\{illeg} dogmata/ dogmata as not being things necessarily obtruded upon us but wch we have some Power over.

In like manner as to Actions concerning only ye Animall Life & our own private Vtility, yt wch Judgeth is not ye necessary Vnderstanding only & clear Knowledge, for yn we should never determine our Judgmt in doubtfull cases; but it is something wch extends itself further yn certain Knowledge It is plain yt we make different Judgmts of - things as we intend ourselves more or lesse in considerac~on & deliberation he yt \vpon ye first/ as soon as he takes notice of a specious capability of Reason, for something to be done will presently determine <58> rashly ^\his Assent/ thereunto, will vsually \for ye most part/ act otherwise yn of suspending his Assent at first, he use mature deliberac~on before he resolve. Wherefore here is one contingency of our Judgm\ts/ arising from more or lesse deliberating wch is ἐφ' ἑμῖν in our own Power & belongs to ye Soul as self=comprehensive & self active Another contingent uncertainty there is next wn there seems to be equall probabilities on both sides in wch case we do venturously & stocastically & not wthout contingency determine our Judgment to this or yt. Judgmt in us is not ye result of & conclusion of ye necessary Vnderstanding for yn all Judgmts in life would be certain Knowledges of wt was best to be done ^\But/ The practicall Judging it over in us is\ments in vs in vs are/ much of ye same nature w\th/ forensick Judgm\ts/ decisions of Right ye Interpretac~ons of Law & Determinac~ons of Controversies made in courts of Judicature, wch is \are/ not allwayes ye same thing wth Law & Justice itself because there may be false Judgmts & \w/rong decrees made & yet they must allwayes have some specious probability, or pretence of Law & Justice, wherefore they are conjecturall determinac~ons yt have a mixture of Law & \all/ arbitrarinesse together whch whether right or wrong must bear sway in ye respective Comon=wealth till contrary Judgmts reverse ym. The Lawes wn obscure or defective must be applyed, interpreted & reked out by ye living & speaking Judge in particular cases ^\because Justice itselfe cannot governe/ This in yt little com~on=wealth of mans soul ye n̄rall Vnderstanding & certaine Knowledge is ye Law of Justice & Rule by wch it should be govourned in its Actions but this being to us imꝐfect & not extending itself thorowly to all Cases ye Soul as self=comprehensive & self=powerfull is ye Lex loquens ye living Judge & Interpreter wch ^\in doubtfull/ venturously & stocastically ^\not without some {illeg}/ concludes in - doubtfull cases whose decisions notwthstanding allwayes bear sway; till they be reversed by others, contrary thereunty This Judging Power {illeg} {illeg} certain \further {illeg} Imperfect/ Knowledge & in doubtfull cases adds some thing of - {illeg} its own to ye moments of Reason & impulsive causes of Action or ye evidence of things yt appear on either side & so turns ye scale thereby supplying ye defect of naturall Knowledge & Vnderstanding by its self=determining Power; in like manner as ye living forensick Judge supplies ye defect of ye dead Law & of infallible but silent Justice in Cities & Bodies Politick And this resemblance also holds good in another regard yt as ye forensick is Judge ^\or {illeg} Aribtrator/ is corruptible & bribable by partiall regards & private Interests, so - likewise is this Hegemonick, this ruling & Judging Power in ye Soul obnoxious to ye same Infirmity, Lust & Appetites often preventing & \uitiating &/ Ꝑverting its Judgmt agst ye dictate of suꝐiour & inferiour - Reason ^\{illeg}/.

This Hegemonick \Arbitriū/ of ye Soul is not only Judging but Willing it is not one thing in us yt Judgeth & another thing yt wills wthout Judging but they belong to one & ye same, nay ye conclusive practicall Judgmt seems to be but one & \really/ ye same thing wth ye volition as if they were <58A> two inadæquate conceptions of ye same \one/ thing & ye difference in ym were not Rei but Rationis only or if they be distinguishable they are inseperable from one another, & both together make up yt wch Aristotle calls or Election wch includes ye last practicall Judgmt in it But we must speak something more here concerning ye nature of Will wch will also {illeg} ^\wherby we shall further/ illustrate ^\allso/ ye nature of Judgmt It is confessed by most Asserters of Free=will, yt ye Will is not free to every thing, but yt it acteth in some things necessarily & in other things as free or having a Power over its own Actions, for wch cause Scholastick writers distinguish between Voluntas ut Natura & Voluntas ut Liberum Arbitrium so yt Will & Free=will are not to be accompted termes equipollent to one another Wherefore we say yt ye Soul as self=comprehensive & self=active is not a thing utterly devoid of all naturality & necessity or \{illeg}/ a thing wch hath not other nature yn to be in a perfect Indifferency to all things for this is a thing more unintelligible & impossible yn yt materia prima in Phisiologis, wch is defined \sd/ to be nec quid, nec quale, nec quantum, since a passive Indifferency may be more easily conceived yn an active As it is com̄only sd yt all moc~on is made upon something yt all moc~on is made upon something yt is im̄ovable so this movable & vertible principle of Free=will must needs have something firm to stand upon it must have some \fixed/ hinges fixed to turn upon it - must be founded upō something yt is n̄rall & necessary The Will must needs have pondus aliquod a certain weight or biasse in it to incline it to moc~on No man chooseth meerly yt he may choose & for no other Reason, nor Wills meerly yt he may Will nor doth meerly yt he may do - but choosing, Willing & Doing are allwayes for ye sake of some Good both ye beginning & End of all motion & action is something yt is not moved but standeth unfixed Wch Consideration may serve also by ye way to remove an objection yt may be made against our former Doctrine yt Judging ^\doth/ cannot belong to ye Vnderstanding as necessary nature but to ye Soul as reduplicated & self=active, because it will \seem to/ follow from thence yt therefore we may Judge what we will in every case, For it is not so much as true of or Will in this sense yt it wills wt it wills ^ in every case ^\& because it wills/ or yt it hath nothing to incline it to will any thing nor to determine it to wt it wills but only its will or yt it wills for no other cause but yt it may will

What therefore is yt to wit ye Will is by nature necessarily determin'd unto wch therefore it is not under ye Dominion of it as they com̄only speak or ^\{illeg}/ wch ye slipperinesse of ye Will cannot make it|self| uncertain to And here some Phylosophers \& Theologers/ determine yt besides Good in Generall wch is ye formally Reason of all Appetibility ye Will is allwayes necessary to ye sum̄um Bonum but yt it is its Ꝑfection to be free, & contingent to all other inferiour Goods wtsoever |Now| because it is evident by experience yt ye Will is not necessary to ye Bonum Honestatis ye Good of Honesty or vertue for otherwise there could be no such thing as Sin or Vice therefore these Theologers boldly conclude yt Vertue is not ye chief Good of Rationall Beings, but yt this is only desired by Accident for ye sake of Animall Pleasure & Jucundity wch is ye {illeg} <59> of all Goods nay they adde yt sensuall & carnall Pleasure is a greater Good, yn yt of Vertue & according to order of Nature is to be desir'd before it Ipsum Bonum quod Honestū dicitur quodq; rationis superioris objectum est not appetitur ab homine pari et æquali amoris gradu cum bono delectabili sed tanquam medium solum quo ad delectabilis illius Boni primi fruitionem pervenitur Amatur enim eo tantum fine ut Bonum delectabile tanquam prœmium Amoris ^\per illud/ obtineatur, quod ipsum certissimū atq; infallibile signum est sum̄um hominis Bonum esse non posse quia sum̄um est quod omnia appelunt propter se & propter quod omnia alia appeluntur Wch Author doth not here mean yt ye Pleasure of Vertue is ye highest Good but yt Animall Pleasure distinct from it as he explains himself Deletectatio quæ ex Virtutis actione percipitur ^\per se/ non est tale Bonum in quo anima hominis acquiescit & Delectatio quæ ex Virtute et honesti studio existit postponenda est, naturæ ordine, delectationi quæ ex voluptatum carnalium commercio est Right Epicurean Doctrine if it be not worse yn his as some would perswade us who have of late defended Epicurus as if his meaning was yt wch \the/ Pleasure of Vertue & tranquillity of Mind arising from thence was ye chiefest of all Goods. But Torquatus in Tully & other of ye antients Instructe us \vs/ yt Epicurus did not acknowledg any other Pleasures of ye Mind yn such as did some way arise from ye Pleasures of ye Body present, future or past But we have before proved yt ye Good of Honesty & Morall Rectitude wch in Schripture language is is ye highest & most soveraign Good of all Intellectuall Beings & yt Pleasure of it wch some will needs distinguish from it \ye thing itself/ & place Happinesse in it & not in ye thing itself as Aristotle observeth is no adventitious Appendix to it distinct from it but meerly ye sense & fruition of ye thing itself Wch if it be true yn it must be granted yt ye Sum̄um Bonum is such a thing as ys though we cannot Ꝑperly say yt ye Will hath a freedom & Liberty to it as if this were a perfection to be a Lord over it yet it is so loose towards it as yt it may degenerate & be alienated from it & instead thereof court some faint & weak shadowes of it. This seeming to be an imperfection yt belongs to all freewilled Beings & perhaps to all intellectuall Creatures wtsoever yt they are alienable from ye highest Good as Origen hath determined yt there is no Being im̄utably Good & Wise & absolutely impeccable in his own nature but God alone, all other things being - not good by nature but by participacon only & therefore by Freewill or self=active exertion And here by ye way we may observe yt this is no small sign yt men are now under a lapsed state yt they are sunk into so deep an oblivion of their true sum̄um Bonum as to think yt Honesty is a Good only κατὰ συμβέβικος to use Aristotles language & no otherwise desireable yn for ye sake of some sensuall Pleasure yt will be annexed to it as a reward yt is, yt happinesse consisteth only in ye Animall Life For this \wch/ is supposed by a late Author to be a principle so necessary as yt ye true nature of Free=will cannot be explain'd wthout it But it might be ye same argumt be demonstrated yt Animall Delight & Pleasure is not ye highest Good because ye greatest bodily torments together wth Death consequent thereupon are often <60> submitted to for ye sake of Honesty as a greater Good, wn inconsistent wth & though some Xtians are apt to think yt this \it/ is never done but only for ye avoiding of greater & eternall torments & ye obtaining of eternall sensuall Pleasures after this life yet ye stories of Heathen times shew'd higher examples of bodily pains & Death being - submitted to & contemned in comparison wth ye beauty & excellency of Vertue it being not hard \difficult/ to fing amongst ym such as have really born witnesse to yt proverbiall ^\speech/ truth amongst ym mentioned by Aristotle yt it is better to die honestly yn to live dishonestly & yt yt it is better to suffer & till \iniury/ yn to do it.

But if ye will be not n̄rall & necessary to ye highest Good yn it seems it is not necessary to any thing yn it can have no firm Land to stand upon but will be like ye floating Winds wandering wthout End Nay rather there can be no such thing as Will at all, no desire nor - motion if there be no certain mark or scope to be aimed at, no - fixed centre to rest upon, to wch therefore we reply yt Goodnesse in generall or confusedly apprehended under ye notion of Congruity \is yt/ wch all n̄rall as well as voluntary \& Free/ is carried out towards & Discongruity in generall wch it hath a n̄rall aversac~on from no Will wtsoever whether of God or Creatures hath such a freedom as to imbrace Evill as Evill or refuse Good as Good, hence perfect Felicity conceive crudely & grosely as \generally concord/ a complexion of all congruities belonging to humane nature must meeds be wished for by all, but ye pieces & members of it wherof it is made up being consider'd singly & apart there being something of Discongruity sometimes in ye best of ym appearing to our multifarious, mutable, allwayes uneasy & fastidious nature we being not allwayes in ourselves alike to yt wch is alike in itself, it is not impossible but yt we may reject it, but wnsoever extremities of bodyly Evill as Torment & Pain are proposed so as yt there is nether ye least appearance any Good of Honesty attained thereby nor any other Animall Good present or future to ourselves or relations, no good of Fame or glory or pride of showing our Liberty, here ye aversac~on of ye will would be as necessary as ye descent of a Stone downwards In like manner bodily good things as freedom from Sicknesse, Pain Poverty or disgrace wn there is no appearance of any Good to accrue from ym are necessarily willed & desired & many such Instances occurre in humane Life in wch Animall Congruity having no mixture of other or Morall Discongruity takes away ye Contingency of acting Besides yt factitious or artificiall nature of Habits to wch ye Will is liable unto both good & bad do for ye time so much determine it as yt it is easy to know wthout ye spirit of divinac~on wt men will certainly do in such & such cases


And as we contribute more or lesse of our own self=active Power as we more or lesse exert ourselves so do we ourselves make this or yt seem to be better to us The same temptac~on to a pleasant or profitable dishonest Action propounded to ye same Ꝑson at several times hath not allwayes ye same success because though yt be alike to - him yet he is not ye same & alike to it, he is sometimes more vigorously exerted as to Morall Good & yn he rejects it for Evill sometimes more supine & languidly remisse & yn he closeth wth it as most congruous to him & ye Good of Pleasure & Profit seems to be a greater Good yn ye Good of Honesty The same person also may at severall times be under different habits ye one vitious ye other vertuous whereby his judging Power will be differently determined to to accompt Pleasure & Profitt much a greater Good yn Honesty & again to preferre Honesty infinitely before it, so yt wn vertuous he will necessarily reject such a temptation \{illeg}circumstance/, wch being vitious he did necessarily before close wthall, but these different habits arising & being contracted to ourselves by a different use of our own self=power ye different ^\at severall times/ is a thin not ^\{illeg}/ from necessary nature obtruded upon us but a thing |wt| we are ye causes of |it| to ourselves It is not necessary as some suppose in order to ye asserting of L. A. to maintain yt ye Will is n̄rally indifferent to a greater or lesser Good wch is indeed all one as to make it Indifferent to Good \itself/ f|F|or though it be granted ye Will is necessarily determin'd to ye greater apparent ^\Good/ yet ye last - apparent Good is not so necessary|ly| but we contribute something of - our own towards it wch we are not necessarily determin'd to neither is any other cause of it to be required besides ourselves ye Soul hath an originall self=power in it wch is exercisd antecedently to all Volitions, whereby it can more or lesse intend itself in a way of Considerac~on & vigorous exertion & accordingly determine our selves to this or yt as best For nothing is more plain yn yt one thing may seem best wn we do not sufficiently deliberate & another thing wch we do, so yt ye difference is from ourselves, so as men do more or lesse exert \intend/ ymselves to Morall Good as they are in a more or lesse exerted temper so will Honesty or Lust & Pleasure be \preferred/ judged to be ye best ye essence of Free=will chiefly consisteth in yt originall Power wch ye Soul as self=comprehensive hath over itself ye Power of actuating its own passive capability more or lesse by reason whereof ye very self=same things become different to us, wch intending or exerting ourselves more or lesse is not necessarily determind by any antecedent causes motivies of Reason or Appearances of Good but there is allwayes something of it \but/ in our own hand|s| of whose different exercise & determinac~on |A| there is no cause assignable yn|but| ourselves In all Volitions there is - something of Nature acting necessarily determining as to Good <62> & ye greater Good ^\we being never able to go out of some Naturall Congruity or other/ this is, yt by wch this Free=power is circumscribed & there is something of our own wch we are in a manner κύριοι or Masters of, ye power of actuating our own possibilities yt is of |A| intending or exerting ourselves more or lesse, \& determing a Capability/ A

To conclude therefore we shall observe where ye higher & lower Good conspire where lower Appetites superiour & inferiour \& Superior/ Reason agree where Pleasure self=preservac~on & Honesty clearly dictate one & ye same thing & where more or lesse consideracon will not alter ye case, here ye Actions of men in their wits are equall uniform & necessarily & it might be certainly \{illeg}/ known wt they would do \in such sense/ but in all other cases where more or lesse intention of ourselves \will not alter/, there there is great uncertainty & contingency, \All/ Volitions are neither also \b/ necessary as some would have ym nor also \all so/ contingent as others, but there is a certain mixture of both \together/ in ym as there is in ourselves who are partly necessary nature, partly self=activity par something yt we are κύριοι ^\Masters/ of & something yt we are not.

\This must come in before Pag:/ We have now declared wt is ye τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν & ye τὸ κυριῶον yt yt swayes ye whole Soul yt |is| in us, yt Judgeth, willeth & determineth all Actions It is true indeed yt if our Vnderstandings were infinitely perfect comprehending all thing infallibly yn there - would be no repugnance but such a necessary Vnderstanding should be ye Hegemonick in us & determine all Action, but our Vnderstandings being so imperfect yt can but think of one thing at once if they should be necessarily determind to every thing they think of & could never intend ymselves more or lesse nothing can be more absurd yn to make ym ye Hegemonick & ye ruling Power in us wch acting ymselves necessarily must necessarily determine all Volition & Action For besides yt most of ye Action of Life will be yn taken away it being not conceivable how a necessary Vnderstanding where itself is doubtfull & hath not certaine Knowledge of wt is best should necessarily cause any Volition this way or yt way & we have certain Knowledge but of very little I say besides this if such an imperfect necessary Vnderstanding necessarily determining all Volitions were ye Hegemonick of ye Soul yn it is plain yt we could have no self=recollective Power in us our Thoughts & Cogitac~ons would not be our own, \There would be nothing {illeg}/ we could not be our own men or have any Govournmt of ourselves being not able to intend ourselves or our Actions more or lesse, we could use no self=exertive conation \or {illeg}/ we could \st/ not set ourselves to any thing nor put forth ourselves moreor-lesse, we could not put forth our own activity, there could be no - striving nor laborious contention after Vertue & Knowledge, we - should find no diffculty wthin ourselves because all would be necessary & nothing could be more or lesse yn it is, we could have no Power over Purposes & resolutions, we should not be wthin ourselves but be meer outsides only, there could be no Lucta or contention <63> betwixt ye superiour & inferiour part of ye Soul, there could not be such disagreemt wth ourselves as is in Persons continent & Incontinent wch |yt| are in a middle betwixt Temperance & IntemꝐance for asmuch as there would be no duplicitis in us, all would be necessary nature & none would be reduplicate self=activity


Writers concerning this Argumt whether Ancient or Modern have taken notice of nothing in L. A. but only ye self=determinacon of Volitions in ye Actions of Life or ye Contingency of Volic~ons ymselves & yt Power yt we have over ym but they have not observed yt wch is ye principall ^\thing/ in it, yt more interiour power wch ye Soul hath first over itself - before its power over Volitions & Acc~ons wch is its Power over its own - possibility & passive capability to actuate it more or lesse, its power of intending it self more or lesse in recollection, self=excitac~on, self=attention speculac~on & deliberac~on as also of vigorous exertion of force & strength to suppresse ye lower Inclinac~ons & to promote itself towards ye higher principles from whence ye Contingency of Freewill in Volic~ons & Actions doth ^\chiefly/ arise Wherefore ye Antients was wont to define L. A. no otherwise yn thus to be a power of doing Contraries or Contradictories in wch no doubt they included all yt wch ye Moderns expressed more anxiously & nicely in this bipertipe manner a Power of Contrarietie & Contradiction & it must needs be granted there is such a thing as this in free Agents Aristotle speaking of ye motions of Animalls as such, wch in some sense are αυτοκινητα or self=moving writes after this manner if a thing move itself - it is absurd to suppose that they should allwayes move one way If it were in ye power of Fire to move itself upward yn it is manifest yt it could move it self downward also & yt wch is to itself a cause of walking may also be a cause of not=walking Wherefore in this sense all Animalls may be sd to have ἐξουσίαν των αντικριμενων a power of Contraries & Contradictories notwthstanding wch they are not αρχη καὶ ἀιτία πραξεων ye principle & cause of Action as Freewill'd Beings ꝐꝐly so \called/ are neither are the consequences of Action so imputed to ym as yt they receive Blame or Com̄endacon for ye same, though Bruits are self=moving in one sense yt they are not moved as Machins & Neurospasts but they have certain inward vitall principles of moc~on Fancy Appetite & Horæ, |&| though they do not allwayes act one way as Inanimate things do, yet they have not any inward self=flexibility of their own but are necessitated by Fancy & Appetite in like cases allwayes to do alike, as being alike hungry & having meat before ym allwayes to eat, but Freewilled Beings have a more inward power of Contrarietie & Contradiction in their Actions so yt ye same objects being put wthout & ye same Animall Appetites & Inclinac~ons wthin they may possibly act differently in wch sense it is sd of ym by ye Antients yt they have a power of doing ye contrary to wt they do & they explained it further after this manner yt yt ye same things <66> being circumstant they could act sometimes one way & sometimes another And ye Antient Stoicks who denyed ye τὸ ἐφ' ἡμιν stated ye point in this manner That we are Masters of nothing but allwayes follow ye circumstāt things allwayes yielding to ym & consenting wth ym & do wt we do because we must of necessity do these things & no other it being impossible for us such things being circunstant to do otherwise yn we do because we are not able to resist ye circunstant things, by wch it is evident yt St Austin & other of ye Antients were very much mistakē concerning ye first Stoicks wn they affirmed ym to assert Liberty of Will because as Alex Aphrodiciensis tells us they did assert ye names of Freewill & Contingency wn they destroyd ye thing but ye contrary to all this is yt wch was maintained by ye Antient \first/ Opposers of this Stoicall fate necessity yt nature & fate do not merely act in us but yt we are something of ourselves & Masters of something & we do not allwayes so follow ye circumstant things being overcomd by ym as yt we could not possibly do - otherwise at any time yn we do, but yt ye same things being circunstant in ye same cases & circumstances & wn we have ye same Animall Inclinac~ons we may be able sometimes to act one way & sometimes another they being able to resist both ye outward objects & their inward Animall Affections

And if modern writers concerning Liberty of Will had kept close to this definic~on of ye Antients ^\though reaching not to try Nature/ they had \not/ been {illeg}reprehensible |&| if they would understand yt of theirs positis omnibus ad agendum reuqisitis posse agere vel non=agere in no other sense yn ys of ye Antients before menc~ond yt ye same thing being circunstant they might sometimes act one way sometimes another they could not be found faulty ^\wth/ but they generally declaring their sense otherwise so |as| yt by their Omnia ad agendum requisita they do not only mean παντα περιεστῶτα All circunstant things being put yt might incline to Action but also all internall things wtsoever besides ye Action itself, all motives & Reasons & inward exertions \& Practicall Judgment/ yt still & yt still notwthstanding all this ye Will remains equally indifferent to chuse this or ye contrary as if this was ye great Ꝑfection of Freewill to be irrationally & fortuitously determin'd any way, here they have both quite mistaken ye thing & ye \{illeg}/ sense of ye Antients \{illeg}/ For it is most true wt they asserted yt wn all outward objects & Circumstances are put ye same Animall Inclinacons, Free-willed Agents may possibly act differently because they can more or lesse intend yt power yt they have over their own - passive Capability they can consider speculate & consult more or lesse & therefore wn they consider more \they/ discover reason to determine ymselves otherwise yn they should wn they had considerd lesse they might sometimes be more watchfull & circumspect yn at others sometimes exert ymselves <67> more vigorously towards ye higher Principle of superiour & Inferiour reason & strive more agst their lower inclinac~ons at other times according to wch differences arising wholy from wthin ymselves their Volic~ons & Actions in ye same cases might be much diversified So yt ye Antients did warily & cautiously enough expresse ymselves but ye Moderns defining Liberty of will by \{illeg}/ perfect Indifferency after all things put besides ye Volic~on itself & so after ye very last practicall Judgmt wch they make to belong to another Faculty of Vnderstanding blindly, irrac~onally & fortuitously determining itself have clearly missed ye true notion of it And some Neotericks have been sensible hereof who therefore declining yt vulgar definition of Free will of active Indifferency of all things put yt ought to be put besides ye Volic~on itself - have more cautiously expressd ymselves thus \more/ agreeably to ye Antients & to ye Truth yt a Free Agent is yt yt can ad vim et motum causæ àquâ fuerat impulsus aliquid adjicere et impetum, quem aliunde non acceperat addere, can contribute something of its own to ye impulsive causes & Reasons of Action, & adde some force & moment of its own wch it had not receivd of \frō/ any thing else; i.e. a Free Agent is such wch is not meerly passive to objects wthout him & to nature & a necessary imꝐfect understanding in him but wch can adde something of its own more or lesse to all these by his self=intending & self=exerting Power To wch purpose is yt of of AP. Aphrodiciensis, yt Man is a principle & cause of these Actions yt are done by him & this is to be a Man to have a Principle of doing so & so wthin himself, & \a)/ this is to be a Sphere or Globe to roll & tumble down a declivity wherefore all other Animalls beside Man ^\altogether/ follow ye outward|ly| & besetting & circumstant causes but man doth not because his essence consists in this in having a principle & cause of Action wthin himself & therefore not being necessarily determind to follow ye circumstant things about him as being - meerly passive to ym {illeg} ^\Our selfe/ determinac~on of our volitions consists in this yt we are not meerly passive in ym but can adde \some/ more form or impetus of our own more or lesse to wt we suffer from wthout & to necessary nature in us & accordingly diversifie ye same And of this wch is ꝐꝐly our own wch we superadde there is no other cause to be inquired after but every Ꝑticular Free=Agent himself P. 83 ως γαρ ουσι τουμεν for as we do not seek any other cause for wch heavy Bodies are carried downwards or for wch a Bruit Animall doth wt it doth acting according to Appetite for as much as every one of these things contributes ye ^\a/ cause to these Acti things frō ymselves having such a Nature in it so neither is there any other cause to be requird of those things wch are done by a man sometimes one way, sometimes another besides ye Man himself for this is to be a Man to be ye <68> ye cause & principle of these things wch are done by him Wch yet must be understood wth moderac~on not as if things circunstāt wthout us & our own nature in us did act nothing at all upon us & did not contribute any thing at all so much as to incline us one way or other, but for yn all Councell & Instruction, Reason & Considerac~on & deliberac~on itself would signify nothing at all but yt we have a certain active power of our own wch as it is exerted more or lesse upon yt wch is Nature in us will much diversifie our actions & of ^\ye exercise of/ this wch is properly our own Activity no other cause is to be inquired but ourselves

The Life of Freewilled Beings consist in a kind of continuall self=exertion more or lesse either in a way of Considerac~on or vigorous self=promoting force or executive activity & Contingency whereof lies in ye very foundac~on of our Being & ye uncertainty of it is yt only Indifferency wch is essentiall to Freewilled Beings for a constant ^\Indifferency/ Inclinac~on of Will Inclinac~on & purpose to every thing cannot be essentiall to any perceptive Being but belongs to ym only in doubtfull cases where Nature is distracted or ye Vnderstanding Ꝑceives equall moments of Reason both wayes. But we are not only conceived to determine our own Actions & to be ourselves ἀρχὴ καὶ αιτία ye principle & cause of ym in such cases but also whereafter the exerc~on of ourselves after Consultacon & deliberac~on all doubtfullnesse is remooved because though ye reason of Consultac~on & deliverac~on be in itself necessary in wch sense yt of ye Antient Stoicks may be allowed to be true yt there is no selfpower in ye reason of Consultation yet we had a Power over ourselves to consult & deliberate more or lesse & to use a greater or lesser Intention in it & therefore yt Volition wch doth result at length from clear \& necessary/ Knowledge from after long consultac~on may well be sd to be ἐφ' ἡμῖν in our own power & be imputed to ourselves as ye cause of it because Consultacon was not ye necessary cause of yt so much Consultac~on as Aristotle hath observed but it was ^\contingently/ determined by an immediate self=power, as, for example, though a Sword doth necessarily cut & slash wn there is force put to it yet ye Action wch a Man doth by it in fighting a duell is to be imputed to ye Doer of it because it was in his power to use it so or not This ye Aphridiciensick Phylosopher hath observed rightly He yt by reason of ratiocinate collection made by himself in consultac~on doth assent to any thing or resolve will any action & resolve upon any design is to himself ye cause of yt Assent Volition & resoluc~on because he should not have done it if he had not consulted so much And hence it is yt Men are commended for Knowledge & Wisedome because though Knowledge & Vnderstanding be necessary in itself yet ye more or lesse improvmt of our Vnderstanding by diligence in meditation & study is to be imputed to their own self=power -


This Power of self=determinac~on is com̄only cryed up as one \of ye/ great^\est/ perfection|s| yt any perceptive Being is capable of & it is indeed a great Priviledg yt men have comparativly wth Bruites yt they are not Senses \{illeg}/ to Objects & Nature & led by necessary Appetites to wtsoever they do but have a power of Judging as to their own Actions & determining their own Volitions, yet it is far from being a pure perfection it being only ye perfection of ImꝐfect Beings & in respect of yt higher {illeg} of Being yt must be some where in ye world yt is im̄utable Good Ꝑfectly Knowing & wise & whose operac~on is his Essence, it is an imꝐfect thing for self=determinac~on in Judgmts & Assents is de\fect/ facto \of/ Wisdom & Knowledge & where Knowledge|ing| is absolutely Ꝑfect there is no Judging Assenting |+| & Opining distinct from it \+/ A Being infinitely wise doth never consult & deliberate what to do nor after deliberac~on venturously & stocastically trembling & doubtfully determine itself A Being ^\cōpleatly/ perfectly Good doth never use any self=exerted Conac~on laborious striving & endeavouring for this is from defect of Power & Strength Free=willed Beings are such as are continually su|p|ring & pursuing after their own perfection & wthout a continuall exertion & renovac~on of ymselves they will \sink/ decline & sink {illeg} ^\degenerate {illeg}/ of ye Antients speaking of this Power of Contrariety wn in ye very same Circumstances, a Being is as it were |in|different to do this or ye Contrary quite removes this Power from God as speaking - much Imperfection Power & Liberty in God is not so to be conceived as to be indifferent to Contraries & Contradictories but God Power & Liberty is ye Power of im̄utable Goodnesse & Wisedome wch is most of all Power wn it doth not depart from being one for to be able to do Contraries is neither Power nor Liberty but Infirmity & Inability of adhering allwayes to the best, this ^\contingent self{illeg}/ ye Power of Contraries & Contradictories in ye same case, is such \that/ Power as if \to/ wch Peccability or a possibility of sinning, is an essentiall property & an inseparable appendix for though Freewilled Beings may be so fixed in a state of Good as yt there may be a certainty they shall never fall - from it yet this is not from ymselves but from divine Grace as shall be showed afterwards for defectibility is an imperfection yt necesarily cleaves to all reduplicate autexousious Beings

For ye right Vnderstanding ye nature of Freewilled Beings it must be diligently observed wt we have before declared yt they are compounded of two things & yt they are Ꝑtly nature & Ꝑtly self=activity They yt take away all Liberty of Humane Actions make all in us to be necessary Nature & many others who assert Freewill would make us to be all self=activity whereas in truth we are ^\neither solely but/ a mixture of both together If we were all self=activity & nothing but Contingent indifferency in Acting as some suppose yn objects occasions, n̄rall Appetites & Inclinations <70> motives & Reasons exhortacons & Ꝑswasions Councell & Advice would signify nothing at all & could have no force upon us If Contingent Indifferency were ye essence of Freewilld Beings yn that {illeg} would be no parts of nature or ye Vniverse, he yt would have ^\this is to make/ ye a thing lose from nature & ye whole Vniverse a thing wch hath no Ausæ or handles in it for God \himself/ to lay hold on so yt he cannot any way promote their Good wthout ye destruction of their very n̄re nay indeed their highest Good would be no better \Other/ yn this \to be/ in being loose to God & all things, an absolute things by itself, this being fancyed ^\by those Philos/ to be ye very thing in wch Godship ^\chiefly/ consisteth But there is no such infinite Liberty & self=flexibility as this possibly in nature \so farre is it frō being/ much lesse will ye highest power Ꝑ ye highest power & perfective Liberty yt a Being should be able wth infinite Indifferency to turn itself to all things in ye whole world or wtsoever it was capable of for perfect power & Liberty is nothing but perfect Goodnesse, But \Freewilld Beings/ we are not all self=activity but one half of ym vis nature, \Nature hath a great share in vs/ object, Appetites, Naturall Inclinac~ons Councells Reasons & Ꝑsuasions have a great force upon ym. Nature also circumscribes ym wthin a certain compasse of Good or Congruity wch they can never go out off wn yey act most loosly & at random, most arbitrarily & irrationally making their Will their only Law, yn they \alwayes/ pursue an appearance of Good here in dominion, Liberty absolutenesse & indipency, they can never will for Wills sake only wthout respect to any Good, nay they are yn most of all captivated under bruitish Lust & Appetite wn they think ymselves so perfectly free

But we are not all nature, but we |X| are partly self=activity & something of our own \X/ Nature doth but prelude in us & \thē/ we ourselves ^\come in to and/ conclude & determine & \we/ are a cause & - principle of Action \allso/ so yt Nature concludes nothing in us wthout ourselves Though outward things be not accompted in our own power - yet we having some power over ourselves & ourselves being - something we are also wth nature & providence causes of something there, & contribute \{illeg}/ to a difference of Events & successes by exerting ourselves more or lesse in a way of prudence, cauc~on & circumspection, diligence & activity, but for those internall things wch are not subject to outward casualty though nature acts here |A|also yet it can conclude lesse wthout ourselves |A| we do not affirm yt here we are Ꝑfectly in our own hands as if Grace & providence did do nothing here we are a certain mixt thing \made up/ of our own selfactivity & ye conspiring divine Power Providence & Grace And because things are not done here wholy wthout our own self=activity therefore we may be sd \to/ form & frame ourselves into wt we are ^\& to be selfmade either way/ P. 105. Those things are proper to a rac~onall Soul, it sees itself, it forms & frames itself & makes itself such as it will & itself reaps & injoyes ye fruit yt it beares to wch purpose was yt also before alledged <71> where this is properly referred to ye Hegemonick or ruling power in ye Soul ye Hegemonick is yt wch can recollect stir up & excite itself yt can turn itself & can make it self to be such as it will & can make things yt happen to seem to itself wt it will ^\wch yet is not so to be vnderstood as if it had {illeg}/ not any but hath an absolute despotick Power over its inward Morall Affections & dispositions ^\to Good/ but yt by laborious self=exertion conac~on & - striving it can by little & little adde something to itself & so make a further Ꝑgresse to Good As it is said to be ye cause also of its own evill by its self=neglect & not=exerting yt Power wch it hath wch latter is solely to be imputed to itself but not ye former This is yt wch is ye cause of its own Good & hurt & there is nothing else in ye whole world to wch his own Evill is to be imputed as ye cause of it but only this Autexousy or self=power & in this consists ye formality of Sin This is yt yt settles itself into habits Good & Evill begits in itself an habituall disposition of Judging so & so in Morall things wch is ye Criterion & ye hegemonick of ye Soul. i.e. ye Soul as reduplicated self=comprehensive & self=active is ye & & ye Judging Power, Inward sense & eye of ye Soul wch being \may/ by itself |be| wrought into different habituall Dispositions so as to be able to Judge well or ill in Morall things as ye Eye of ye Body may be either clear so as to Judge aright of Colours or else ill=affected & vitiated to see every thing in a wrong colour wch similitude our Saviour make use of to ye same purpose to show yt ye κριτήριον of ye Soul may be in like manner vitiated wth an ill tincture so as to Judge wrongly of morall things whose very Light in ym is sd to be Darknesse wch {illeg} these Heathen Phylosophers yt had any Wit in ym have taken notice off & Aristotle himself who was far from canting often observes - P. 553 This thing is evident from matters of sense for ye same thing cannot seeem sweet to one & bitter to another unlesse ye organes of sense & Criticall Power be corrupted & vitiated wherefore ye true measure of Tast is ye Pallat of those yt are in health & not \of/ ye others, ye case is ye very same concerning Morall things - Good & Evill Honest & Dishonest \i.e./ yt some men {illeg} are are vitiated & depraved as to their Pallat, their sense & Criticall Power of these things & therefore these are not ye true measure of Good & Evill but ye other yt he declares in his Ethicks yt <72> A good man is ye measure, of wt is to be done or not done, he also tells us elsewhere yt yt wickednesse corrupts ye Principles of ye mind Others tell us yt this Criticall Power of ye Soul in ye Knowledge of speculative things may be likewise variously affected \hindred or promoted/ from mens Life \Purificatiō disposes mē to ye knowledge of ye best things/

Every particular Action in wch Morality is concernd leaves something behind it after it is gone it begets some little disposic~on & Inclinacon in ye Soul to Judge & will ye same again wch being repeated receiving many such new \like/ additions frō repeated Action grows up by degrees & by little & little into a confirm|A| ed Habit \A/ Wch Habits whether Good or Bad \A/ are notie of ym absolutely unalterable so long as ye faculty of self=power remains, ye soul still keeping its self=changing Power so long as L. A. remains in it ye exercise whereof \of wch Faculty/ cannot be allwayes sd to be essentiall to a man there being a ligac~on of it ^\not only/ in sleep but also in Infancy so yt it cannot be denyed but yt ye divine power may possibly reduce Free & Raconall Creatures into such a state as yt their Life for Ages together might not differ from yt of dreaming, nor be much advanced above ye Condicon of Inf Bruits Infants & Embrios; but whether there be ever any such sad providence as this as a Nemesis attending upon humane Souls, for ye abuse of their freewill is best known unto him, who hath contrived & framed those fatall Lawes yt belong to ye Œconomy of Rationall Creatures ^\wch are ye best yt can & for ye good of ye whole/ However those Changes & Revolucons of Freewilld Being from habits of Vertue & Vice are not perhaps so short & swift as some conceive.

Though there be two \species or/ Degrees of L. A. as we have declared, Animall & Morall, yet they being both of ye same kind, & ye former being included & cōprehended in ye Latter, we do not every where scrupulously distinguish between these -

We shall now endeavour to set down ye chief ProꝐties or Powers \Passions/ of this Faculty called L. A. First therefore it is not a Power whose Perfection consisteth in doing any thing indifferently and at random as \this/ conceived to be a liberty, (whereas indeed \it is not)/ there is no such thing) a Power \whose Actings have/ {illeg} {illeg} |no| relac~on to Good or Evill in it, Better or Worse, as if these things were extrinsically clapt upon it ^\onely/ by Lawes or arbitrary religious & Instituc~ons, but it is a Power whose moc~on according to his n̄rall tendency |its Nature| is ^\always toward/ Better or Worse more or lesse Ꝑfections improvmt ^\& advancement/ or imparemt & diminuc~on \&/ it is ye souls actuating & informing itself more or lesse; ye Issue ^\& sum̄e/ whereof is two wayes so as yt the form do \either/ master &|or| overcome ye Matter & subdue it under it\selfe/ or else yt it is as it were \{illeg}/ overcome by matter & informosity; it is a tugging & contesting between |2|Perfection & ImꝐfection Act & inert Passivenesse or dull Potentiality \2/ freewilled Beings are not passive to an equall & necessary Light ^\obtruding itself vpō them &/ allwayes ruling & leading ym on easyly wth out any difficulty or labour of self=conac~on but they have an active Power over their own Light itself so yt they can intend it more or lesse & actuate ye Potentiality of ye Knowing Power they can put forth ymselves more or lesse & promote ymselves towards ye higher principle in their <73> nature or faculty degenerate & decline, they are things yt are accomptable \{illeg}/ for ye managemt of ymselves better or worse ^\{illeg} in their own hand/ are either pleased or displeased wth ymselves for their own actions they either accuse & blame \condemne/ ymselves & are thereupon full of Despondency ^\{illeg}/ suspc~on & mistrust being apt to fear {illeg} or else they approve justifie & congratulate ymselves being full of feare & expectac~on of Good possessed wth inward peace tranquillity & {illeg} they are such things as deserve from yt equity & Justice yt moderates \{illeg}/ ye whole Vniverse either reward or punishmt The different use of this Faculty is yt by wch we one becomes either or better or worse \{illeg}/ yn himself either prevailing over ye imꝐfection of his nature getting ye better of it & mastering it or being worsted & conquered by it, in some it strives for undefiled rewards returning God his own wth increase & Vsury in other it lasily & sluggishly succumbs under ye imꝐfection of its nature \{illeg}/ & lets ye worser - principle \Part/ get ground & prevail, lets ye or non=entity ye defect of its nature prevail over ye Entity & active power of it & sinking down lower & lower into degeneracy \to/ captivate & fetter it in ye {illeg} chaines of darknesse, this gives Being to yt wch is called distributive Justice in ye world wch otherwise could have its object to \display itself/ act upon, it is yt to ye different actings whereof n̄rally belongs Com̄endac~on & Blame, a man is com̄ended for good Actions otherwise yn a good Horse is com̄ended for running ^\swiftly/ or a pen for writing well or a Watch for going rightly, Freewilled Beings are com̄ended or blamed not for their Nature or wt they could not but be, but because they are ye active causes of their own Will or Ill, Culpa & ye malum Culpæ belongs only to this Being ye Evill & Fault of Sin is \can be/ no where else This kind of Being is yt only wch hath a reflexive Judgmt upon his own Actions, it is yt whereby a Being feels itself something by itself & to be so itself as yt it hath a crazy staggering & uncertain hold of itself & its own Perfection, wch is to \be/ maintained by a constant awakened self self=exertion, diligence & Watchfullnesse or otherwise would slip away from it; an imperfect Perfection, these are such Beings as had a possibility in ym of doing otherwise yn they do doe in Bodyes considerd alone by ymselves nothing is possible but wt necessary, here something might have been otherwise yn it is better or worse, here is ambiguous possibity both wayes wthout absolute necessity of nature either way, here uncertain Contingency of being Better or Worse, rowles & tumbles up & down whilst other ^\perceptive/ Beings are either below it by ^\reasō of/ dull stupidity of Nature or else above it by im̄ovable perfection

Freewilled Beings have a higher & a lower principle in ym & they are amphibious thing yt sometimes live in one Element sometimes in another they have a vast - compasse of Capability in ym a scale of many degrees higher & lower ^\in respect of vice & vertue Wisdom & Folly/ they are capable of many degrees \gradations/ of Proficiency or degeneracy & are liable to many alternac~ons of motion upward & downward. There are severall states belonging to ym, for ^\First/ they may either by self=exerted conacon ^\& striving/ at last arrive to a state of Suipotence & self=power a state of Victory & Mastery over their worser part & imꝐfection & so to have an easy <74> govournmt of ymselves in Good ^\For ye End of all striving is some Mastery or Victory./ {illeg} state of Suipotency is ye End for wch ye faculty of Suipotestas or self=power is designed or intended by God & Nature for however some men bost \{illeg}/ of their Faculty of Freewill as if this by itself was an absolute dominion & Mastery over ymselves & - true Liberty yet this is but a doubtfull & ambiguous power by ye right use of wch they may either attain to a state of \true/ Suipotence for \wch is a state of perfectiō/ for Men yn only raign over ymselves wn their highest Good & Perfection reignes or \or else secondly/ by ye neglect & abuse of it \that Power/ as it were by a back=stroke of their Freewill, they may enthrall ymselves in ye greatest bondage & fetter ymselves in a state of ^\perfect/ self=impotency wch is ye lowest state of Freewilled Beings, into wch though by their own Power or rather their Impotence (though \though/ not necessary \but/ & invincible) they sink ymselves yet they cannot raise ymselves meer from thence, to yt higher state & - exaltation of \true/ suipotence meerly by their own power wthout ye assistance of divine power & grace: \& which God will not be behindhand with/ between these two states ye Apogy & Perogy ye Aux. & there are many intermediate degrees of a middle state & yt of different tendency either ^\vpward or downward/ ascending or descending much reciprocac~on & alternac~on, much labour & tugging in ye Ascending motion; In this intermediate space (wch is ye \stage/ case yt Freewilled Beings run in) they have many different affection & - Passions according as either ye Better or Worser prevails in ym - & as they feel ymselves either gaining or loosing, here they are sometimes in a very confounded state, puzzled & distracted ^\condition/ between severall \cōtrary/ Inclinations, often kenning ye better not wthout wishes of arriving at it, & yet at ye same time perceiving \feeling/ ymselves draggd as it were by a certain violence & ponderous pressure of lower principles another way, so as to do yt wch they would not ^\& to act willingly & unwillingly at once/ by wch it appeares yt though men com̄only think yt there is so much Ldship & dominion over ymselves in ys Faculty of Freewill \yet/ yt it is but a mixture of Power & Impotency of strength & weaknesse ^\together/ & yt there is much of Heterokinesy \{illeg}/ mingled wth ye Autokinesy of it in some states; for its \their our/ proper self=motion ^\selfactivity/ is only to Good, to w\ch/ there is much in ym contumaciously refractory wch in some sense is their Heterokinesy ^\{illeg} & Neurospasm/ their being moved by something besides ymye \true & their Good/ selves, or by a contrary Biasse & weight, They yt think Freewill can in all states wth equall ease turn it self to Good as to Evill & yt it can indifferently yt its strength is allway equall & alike & yt it can indifferently nod either way are very much deceived concerning ye nature of it ye steering of this winged chariot of ye Soul in its assent upward is hard & difficult but it easily slides or rather tumbles downward ye mocon of Free will to Good is laborious intenc~on & \self/ exerc~on but its motion to Evill is \selfe/ remission & relaxacon, ye strength vigour & activity of Freewill is only towards ye higher & better Principle but its motion towards ye worser Possi Principle is \by a way of/ nothing but passive langor <75> & sluggish Inactivity or ye perfection ^\of Freewilled Beings/ is only kept up by self=exertion upon ye remission whereof Imperfection & Degeneracy steals upon thē further & further \& unravells all/ ye lower Life of Lusts & Affections needs not \{illeg}/ our \any/ self=exertion ^\{illeg}/ but it obtrudes itself upon us & invades us but ^\as for/ ye higher principle though Nature make some offer of it towards us, yet this will prove alltogether ineffectuall unlesse it be assisted & carryed on by our own self=active exertion vigorous endeavours strivings & contention The lower Principle prevailes upon us by its own activity but nature doth but show us as it were a glimpse of ye higher Good in inviting us & beckoning to us ^\with ye {illeg}/ to put forth our own self=active Conation towards ^\{illeg}/ it & by striving & Contention to win yt prize wch will recompense \all/ our pains & Labour - Facilis descensus Averni Sed revocare gradum superasq; evadere ad auras Hic labor, hoc opus est -

Cite as: Ralph Cudworth, A Discourse concerning Liberty and Necessity: Phase 2 (excerpt: pp. 1-75 of 317) [British Library Additional MS 4980] (c.1658-c.1663),, accessed 2023-12-01.