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1. The Authors Excuse for such Alterations as he has made in this Edition of his Books. 2. The general Scope of this whole Volume. 3. The excellency and necessity of Reason for the maintaining of the truth of Christian Religion. 4. His Apology for interweaving Platonisme and Cartesianisme so frequently into his Writings. 5. Certain Advertisements for the more profitably perusing his Books. 6. Divine Sagacity a Principle antecedaneous to successful Reason in Contemplations of the highest concernment. 7. The abovesaid Principle further illustrated and confirmed out of Aristotle. 8. The Authors Excuse for his omitting in his Antidote, to confute the unconcluding reasons some use for the proof of a God. 9. His Excuse for not adding a Treatise of Superstition to that of Enthusiasme. 10. That it can be no offence to the knowing and ingenuous, that men have a shyness and jealousy against such Truths as they have not been acquainted with. 11. Certain remarkable things concerning Des-Cartes and his Writings. 12. Certain considerations lay'd together which wholly prevent all imaginable Objections against the Extension of a Spirit. 13. The properties and Offices of the Spirit of Nature further cleared and confirmed. A Consectary concerning the Conduct of Souls by the Spirit of Nature. 14. That the ancient Judaical Cabbala did consist of what we now call Platonisme and Cartesianisme, made farther probable from the Lineage of the Pythagorick School. 15. Particular considerations out of Pherecydes, Parmenides and Aristotle, that might move one to believe that the whole Pythagorick Philosophy, as well Physical as Metaphysical, was the ancient Wisedome of the Jews. 16. The unhappy disjunction of the Physical part of the Cabbala from the Metaphysical in Leucippus, Democritus and Epicurus; with the Authors serious endeavour of re-uniting them again. 17. That what he applies to the Text of Moses in his Philosophick Cabbala, he conceives is rational, and is assured that it exquisitely fits the Text, but deliberates further concerning the Truth thereof. 18. The Testimony of several holy Persons that did either plainly assert, or at least had no dislike of, the doctrine of the Souls Præexistence; Clem. Alexand Origenes Adamantius Clemens his Scholar, S. Basil and Gregorie Nazianzen, Synesius Bp of Cyrene, Arnobius, Prudentius, S. Augustine, the Author of the Book of Wisdome, & our blessed Saviour. 19. That there is not the least clashing of Præexistence with the Derivation of Original sin from Adam. 20. That Mathematical certitude in mere Philosophical Speculations needs oblige no mans conscience to make profession of <a2v> them against the good liking of his Superiors. 21. That if the Philosophy which he has applied to Moses is Text be true, it is a real Restauration of the Mosaick Cabbala.


[1]1. THAT these Writings which thou findest bound up in one volume may appear also to be held together in some common consideration, I thought it not amiss to speak something by way of General Preface to them all. And therefore if thy curiosity be forward to enquire what I have done in these new Editions of my Books, I am ready to informe thee, that I have taken the same liberty in this Intellectual or Theoretical Garden of my own planting that men usually take in their Natural ones: which is, To set, or pluck up, to transplant and inoculate, where and what they please. And therefore if I have rased out some things, (which yet are very few) and transposed others, and interserted others, I hope I shall seem injurious to no man in ordering and cultivating this Philosophical Plantation of mine according to mine own humour and liking.

[2]2. But these are smaller matters, and scarce any part of what I was a going to speak. The great Cement that holds these several Discourses together is one main Design, which they joyntly drive at, and which, I think, is confessedly generous and important, namely, The knowledge of God, and therein of true Happiness, so far as Reason can cut her way through those darknesses and difficulties she is incumbred with in this life. Which though they be many and great, yet I should belie the sense of my own success if I should pronounce them insuperable; as also, if I were deprived of that sense, should lose many pleasures and enjoyments of mind which I am now conscious to my self of. Amongst which there is none so considerable as that tacit reflexion within my self, what real service may redound to Religion from these my labours. For what greater satisfaction can there be to a rational Spirit then to find himself able to appeal to the strictest Rules of Reason and Philosophy, if those Doctrines of the Existence of God and the Immortality of the Soul be not true? And what greater Establishment to Religion then to discover these two grand Pillars thereof so firm and stable, even upon those very grounds that our own faculties do naturally assent to as true? Which cannot but conciliate much honour and reverence to the Priesthood, and stop the mouths of shallow and profane Wits, that are so prone to look upon every Priest as either a Fool or an Impostour.

[3]3. Nor would I be thought to restrain the Reasonableness of our Religion to those two main points only, as if the rest were not so too. For I conceive Christian Religion rational throughout, and I think I have proved it to be so in my Mystery of Godliness. Which I must confess was the main, if not the only, scope of my so long and anxious search into Reason and Philosophy, and without which I had proved but a lazy and remiss enquirer into the nature of things. For to heap up a deal of Reading and Notions and Experiments without some such noble and important Design, had but been as I phansied, to make my Mind or Memory a shop of small-wares. But having this so eminent a scope in my view, and taking up that generous resolution of <a3r> Marcus Cicero, Rationem, quo ea me cunque ducet, sequar; I make account I began then to adorn my Function, and amongst other Priestly Habiliments in particular to put on the Λόγον or Rationale, the Sacerdotal Breast-plate, which most justly challenges place in that region which is the seat of the Heart; the simplicity and sincerity of that part being the Root or Well-spring of the soundest and purest Reason. And truly I cannot well imagine what may be the moral account why Aaron's Robes should be such an express Representation of the Universe (ἀπεικόνισμα καὶ μίμημά τι τοῦ κόσμου, as[4] Philo calls it) as in that every Priest should endeavour, according to his opportunity and capacity, to be also as much as he can a Rational man or Philosopher. (For which reason certainly Universities were first erected, and are still continued to this very day.) And Philo himself insinuates something to this purpose. Βούλεται γὰρ τὶν ἀρχιερέα εἰκόνα τοῦ παντὸς ἔχειν ἐμφερῆ, ἵνα ἐκ τῆς συνεχοῦς θέας ἄξιον παρέχῃ τὶν ἴδιον βίον τῆς τῶν ὅλων φύσεως. That the High Priest continually reflecting upon his attire, which represented the Universe, might be re-minded not to doe or speak any thing contrary to the laws thereof, or repugnantly to the Rules of eternal Reason, which is that everlasting High Priest, as Philo[5] elswhere intimates. Δύο γὰρ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἱερὰ θεοῦ. ἓν μὲν ὅ δε ὁ κόσμος, ἐν ᾦ καὶ ἀρχιερεὺις ὁ πρωτόγονος ἀυτοῦ, ο θεῖος λόγος. ἕτερον δὲ ἡ λογικὴ ψυχὴ, ἧς ἱερεὺις ὁ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἄνθροπος. That there are two Temples of God: the one the Universe, in which the First-Born of God, the Divine Logos, or eternal Wisedome, is High Priest; the other the Rational Soul, whose Priest is the true man, that is to say the Intellect, (as Plotinus somewhere speaks) and which is the Image of the Divine Logos, as Clemens has expressed himself.[6] Ἐικὼν μὲν γὰρ θεοῦ λόγος θεῖος καὶ βασιλικὸς, ἄνθρωπος ἀπαθὴς, εἰκὼν δ' εἰκόνος ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς. The Image of God is the Royal and Divine Logos, the impossible Man; but the Image of this Image is the humane Intellect.

So that though the Divine Reason or Logos be that eternal High Priest which in time was to be incarnate, and of which Aaron in his Priestly Robes was but a Type and Figure; yet Man being an Image of him, and every Priest in a more special manner, he is to endeavour the adorning of himself with such accomplishments as are set out by these rich and precious Habiliments of Aaron; amongst which the Rationale had a chief place. For though it belong to that everlasting Logos alone to be the Maker of the world, and to fill out all parts thereof by his presence, and to be in a manner vitally clad therewith; yet through the Goodness of God it may fall to the share of every Christian Priest, to be invested as it were and adorned with the Knowledge of the Laws and Measures of the Creation, and to take notice of the Reasons of Nature of which the eternal Logos is the Maker and Governour. Which is very consonant to what Philo writes of the Figure of the Rationale or Sacerdotal Breast-plate, which he saith was square, ὅτι χρὴ καὶ τὶν τῆς φύσεως λόγον καὶ τὶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου βεβηκέναι πάντῃ, καὶ κατὰ μηδ' ὁτιοῦν κραδαίνεσθαι. Because the reason of Universal Nature and of Man ought to stand firm on all sides, and to be no where vacillant. Which things as they were figured in Aaron, and are fulfilled immensly in Christ, so are they also in their measure to be fulfilled in the Christian Priesthood. For if it were not lawful to offer up the blind or lame under the Law, sure the Priest ought <a3v> to be neither under the Gospel, nor yet the People (so far as is possible) whom he presents to God.

To take away Reason therefore, under what Fanatick pretense soever, is to disrobe the Priest and despoil him of his Breast-plate, and, which is worst of all, to rob Christianity of that special Prerogative it has above all other Religions in the World, namely, That it dares appeal unto Reason. Which as many as understand the true Interest of our Religion will not fail to stick closely to, the contrary betraying it to the unjust suspicion of Falshood, and equallizing it to every vain Imposture. For take away Reason, and all Religions are alike true; as the Light being removed, all things are of one colour. Nay, which is worst of all, that Religion which is the truest will seem the falsest in this superinduced Darkness, it so strictly and positively declaring it self to be the only true. Which will not by any means be allowed, nor can any way be discovered in that Region of Midnight, which makes all things look alike.

[7]4. Which serious and weighty considerations lying before me, urged me with all possible care and vigour to search to the very bottom of things, that my heart might not fail me in the day of Tryall. The result of which Investigation is much of it comprised in this present Volume. Wherein as I have gained no small satisfaction to my self in those grand points I have endeavoured to clear, so I am as desirous that nothing that occurres there may occasion the least dissatisfaction to others. And I think it will be impossible any thing should, if they will be but pleased to take notice of my Design, which is not to Theologize in Philosophy, but to draw an Exoterick Fence or exteriour Fortification about Theologie; That making good those Out-works against all the assaults of the confident Atheist, and his Gigantick batteries raised against the belief of the existence of a God, and of a Reward in the World to come, I might teach him what a man of Vanity and temerity he is, in that he imagines it so feisable a thing, in his unskilful thoughts, to overrun the Holy City and Sanctuary, he being so easily beat off from the walls thereof. And this is the true and genuine meaning of my interweaving of Platonisme and Cartesianisme so frequently as I do into these writings, I making use of these Hypotheses as invincible Bulwarks against the most cunning and most mischievous efforts of Atheism. For I am certain that, taking the Suppositions which I have culled out of those two Philosophies for true, (and let our Adversaries prove them false if they can) there is not any Objection that Atheism can make against the above-named Doctrines, but I can return to it a full and irrefutable Answer.

Whence it is not hopeless, but that as we may put many to flight, so the rest may voluntarily surrender themselves as Prisoners, being carried captive by the power of Reason into a true belief of things for the main; and having all hopes of an After-Impunity intercepted by so clear a conviction of the Soul's Immortality, be engaged to turn real Christians in the plainer points thereof, and be willingly detained in the Outward Court, though by reason of the present Weakness of their sight they may not be as yet fit to enter into the more sacred smoke of the Temple. Wherefore I being so faithfully, and, as I conceive, so usefully taken up in managing these Out-works as I may so call them, I shall not impute it, no not so much as to over-hasty zeal, <a4r> but to mere mishap, if I be pelted behind my back by any shots of Obloquie from any unknown servant of the Sanctuary; and presume that if I receive any hurt, that their smart will be the greatest that did it, when they shall consider they have wounded a true and faithful friend, and even then when he was so busily and watchfully employ'd in facing the common Enemie.

[8]5. If any expect or desire any general Instruction or Preparation for the more profitably perusing of these my Writings, I must profess that I can give none that is peculiar to them, but what will fit all Writings that are writ with Freedome and Reason. And this one Royal Rule I would recommend for all, Not to judge of the truth of any Proposition till we have a setled and determinate apprehension of the terms thereof. Which Law though it be so necessary and indispensable, yet there is none so frequently broken as it: the effect whereof is those many heaps of voluminous writings and inept Oppositions and Controversies that fill the World. Which were impossible to be, if men had not got an habit of fluttering mere words against one another, without taking notice of any determinate sense, and so did fight as it were with so many Hercules clubs made of Pastbord, which causes a great sound but does no execution towards the ending of disputes. For as no man will ever be so extravagant as to affirm that a Triangle is a Quadrangle, or a Square a Circle, having the distinct Ideas of those Figures in his mind: so it would be as impossible for him to pronounce of any thing else falsly and absurdly, if he had as perfect and setled a Notion of the things concerning which he seems to pronounce. But this first and main Principle of wisdome being neglected, it is no wonder that men clash as ridiculously and causelesly as those two Country Clowns, who in their cups had like to have gone to blows, because the one professed himself a Lutheran, the other a Martinist.

I might adde also another Advertisement (which will contribute much towards a greater Compendiousness in Controversies) which I think I have hinted upon occasion elsewhere; namely, That what will prove any thing will prove nothing. Which if it were throughly taken notice of, would not only inable a man to defeat the seeming force of innumerable impertinent assaults, but also keep himself off, if he have any ingenuity in him, from assaulting, or rather disturbing or interrupting, the composure and silence of another mans mind, by the empty noise of such weak and groundless Arguments; I mean such as will infer or maintain Falshood as well as Truth. For all such Arguments ought to be exploded, especially in Philosophie. And I think if this kind of weapon were once out of fashion, contest would soon be at an end, and such a victory follow as all would be gainers by it.

[9]6. But in the third and last place (and which, though it has some considerable influence every where, yet is more peculiarly requisite in perusing writings upon such Subjects as these I treat of) I should commend to them that would successfully philosophize, the belief and endeavour after a certain Principle more noble and inward then Reason it self, and without which Reason will faulter, or at least reach but to mean and frivolous things. I have a sense of something in me while I thus speak, which I must confess is of so retruse a nature that I want a name for it, unless I should adventure to term it Divine Sagacity, which is the first Rise of successful Reason, especi <a4v> ally in matters of great comprehension and moment, and without which a man is as it were in a thick wood, and may make infinite promising attempts, but can find no Out-let into the open Champain, where one may freely look about him every way (the πεδίον τῆς ἀληθεὶας) without the safe conduct of this good Genius.

All Pretenders to Philosophy will indeed be ready to magnifie Reason to the skies, to make it the light of Heaven and the very Oracle of God: but they do not consider that the Oracle of God is not to be heard but in his Holy Temple, that is to say, in a good and holy man, throughly sanctified in Spirit, Soul and body. For there is a sanctity even of Body and Complexion, which the sensually-minded do not so much as dream of. Aaron's Rationale, his Λογον or Oracle of Reason, did it not include in it the Urim and Thummim, Purity and Integrity of the Will and Affections, as well as the Light of the Understanding? Was not that Breast-plate square, not only in reference to the firmness of Ratiocination, as Philo intimates, but also to denote the Evenness and Uprightness of his Spirit that will take upon him to pronounce great Truths, that he must be, as Aristotle somewhere speaks, ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς καὶ τετράγωνος ἄνευ ψόγου. and that not only according to the measure of the City, but of the Sanctuary, not only to a Political degree of vertue, but Cathartical, or rather that which[10] Plotinus places ἐν τῳ κεκαθάρθαι, and implyes a Soul already purged?

Let a man adorn himself as well as he can with the History of Universal Nature represented by the long Sacerdotal Robe, if this Breast-plate with the Urim and Thummim be wanting to him that thus far would act the Priest, he must of necessity fall so far short of approving himself a sound Philosopher, being at least unable to utter any Oracles himself, and but in a bad capacity of receiving them when they are uttered by another. For if this Divine Sagacity be wanting, by reason of the impurity of a mans Spirit, he can neither hit upon a right sent of things himself, nor easily take it, or rightly pursue it, when he is put upon it by another. Which odd Position of mine though it may make them fret and storm that have made the Contempt of Morality one part of their Philosophy, and may think themselves uncivilly dealt with to be pronounced incompetent Judges of such things as they took for granted to be within their own spheare; yet I could not conceal so concerning a Truth, especially it self being not at all unphilosophical.

[11]7. For is it not the saying of that so universally-applauded Aristotle, Κινεῖ γὰρ πῶς πάντα τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν θεῖον, λόγου ευ' ἀρχὴ λόγος, ἀλλά τι κρεῖττον; What Plato, nay what Chrysostome, what Augustine could have spoke more Heavenly language? Scaliger transported at the view of this Text breaks out into this Encomiastick Interrogation,[12] Quid ais, divine vir? Estne in nobis aliquid divinum quod fit præstantius ipsa ratione? An tibi quoque noti fuerunt ipsi radii Spiritus Sancti? &c. And that we may not think that this τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν θεῖον is any part of our selves, it appears both from what goes before and what follows after that it is the very Deity: For he having made this the Question, τίς ἡ τῆς κινήσεως ὐρχὴ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ; What is the Beginning of motion in the Soul? the full Answer follows thus,[13] Δῆλον δὲ ὣσπερ ἐν τῷ ὃλῳ θεὸς, καὶ πᾶν ἐκείνῳ. κινεῖ γὰρ πῶς πὰντα τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν θεῖον. λόγου ευ' ἀρχὴ οὐ λόγος, ἀλλά τι κρεῖτιον. τί ὀῦν ἂν εἴη κρεῖττον καὶ ἐπιστήμης <a5r> πλὴν θεός; It is evident, saith he, that it is, as in the Universe, God himself, and all in him. For it is the same Numen in us that moves all things in some sort or other: And the Beginning of Reason is not Reason, but something which is better: but what can be better then Science but God? The Argument of the chapter is a Question περὶ εὐτυχίας, of good success in affairs, whether it be φύσει, νὸῳ, ἢ ἐπιτροπίᾳ τινί. that is to say, whether it be by Nature, Reason, or by the Procuration of some good Genius, of some δαίμων ἀγαθὸς κυβερνήτης, they are Aristotle's own words; which I cite the rather, because it is the only place that I know wherein there is such express mention of Dæmons: Which yet he does not assert here neither; but upon occasion of this subject his mind swelling higher, rose at last to such a pitch as to utter this so much admired Aphorisme by Jul. Scaliger, namely, That there is something before and better then Reason, whence Reason it self has its rise.

Which though Aristotle mainly appropriates to external Affairs, I must (and may with equal right) transfer also to the Negotiations of the Mind and the success of pure Speculation: Where the ἡ θεία εὐτυχία, as he calls it, is more likely to be continued, and to prove constant, (by reason of the natural cohesion of Truth with an impolluted Soul) then it is in external transactions. This intellectual success therefore is from the Presence of God, who does (κινεῖν πῶς πάντα) move all things in some sort or other, but residing in the undefiled Spirit moves it in the most excellent manner, and endues it with that Divine Sagacity I spoke of, which is a more inward, compendious, and comprehensive Presentation of Truth, ever antecedaneous to that Reason which in Theories of greatest importance approves it self afterwards, upon the exactest examination, to be most solid and perfect every way, and is truly that wisedome which is peculiarly styled the Gift of God, and hardly competible to any but to persons of a pure and unspotted mind. Of so great concernment is it sincerely to endeavour to be holy and good.

[14]8. This is all that I thought fit to preface in a more general way. I will briefly cast an eye also upon the several parts of this present Volume, if any thing halpy occurres that will be requisite for me to either excuse, complete, or any way give light to. As it may be some may conceive it an Omission in my Antidote, in that I have not brought in and confuted the lubricous of unconclusive Arguments which some use to prove the Existence of a Deity. But I think it may not unbeseem one that is faithful to thhe Cause, not to be over-industrious in discovering the weakness of such Arguments as are meant for the engendring in mens minds the belief of that Truth which is of so necessary and vast importance for mankind to be perswaded of. For I charitably surmise that the first inventours of those reasons thought them conclusive, or else they would not have made use of them. Whence it will follow, that they may still have their force with those that are but of the same pitch with their first Proposers. And he that guesseth right and goes on his journey will as certainly come to the place he aimes at, as he that perfectly knows the way. I must confess I have been more free in my censure of Des-Cartes his second and third Argument: but there is the less hurt done, they being not so popular; and besides, it was fit to shew my impartialness, because I have <a5v> with that confidence avouched the solidity of the first. Which the more I considered the more firm I found, nor have to this day met with either man or book that could produce any thing material towards the Confutation of it.

[15]9. What Defect any one may spy in my Treatise of Enthusiasm I cannot so easily presage, nor can secure my self from seeming deficient to him that more resentingly considers the usefulness of that Treatise, in that I have not added another of Superstition. But I have naturally and heedlesly hit upon that judicious advice of the Poet,                Et quæ Desperas tractata nitescerer posse relinque For I must confess I do not look upon that Subject as any thing polishable by my hand, it being an argument fitter for Rhetorick then Philosophy. Besides that I never found my mind low or abject enough to sink into any sense or conceit of that Dispensation, experimentally to find what is at the bottom thereof. I must ingenuously confess that I have a natural touch of Enthusiasme in my Complexion, but such as, I thank God, was ever governable enough, and I have found at length perfectly subduable. In virtue of which victory I know better what is in Enthusiasts then they themselves, and therefore was able to write what I have wrote with life and judgement, and shall, I hope, contribute not a little to the peace and quiet of this Kingdome thereby.

But having had such a motion of God from my very youth, as represented him to me as the most noble and excellent Being that can be, it could never enter into my minde that he was either irritable or propitiable by the omitting or performing of any mean and insignificant services, such as are neither perfective or humane nature, nor the genuine result of that perfection. And therefore I had an early belief that he served God best, that was least envious, worldly or sensual, that delighted most in the common good of the Universe, and had the strongest faith in the bounty and Mercy of God, of which his son Jesus is the most palpable pledge that he could exhibit to the World. Which constant frame of Spirit made me wholly uncapable of the least Tincture of Supersitition. For it is the Ignorance of better things that causes those perplexities and consternations of minde about matters of less moment.

The End of Religion is humane Happiness and Perfection; and he that so serves God as phansying Him to want any thing of his, instead of honouring of him reproaches him. Wherefore Superstition is alwaies accompanied with Ignorance or Hypocrisie. The first, when not knowing what that good and acceptable will of God is, which is to become like unto him (Τιμήοεις τὶν θεὸν ἄριστα ἐὰν τῷ θεῷ τῆν διάνοιαν ὁμοιώσῃς, as Pythagoras taught) they do express their zeal and devotion in such things as neither themselves nor any one else is better for. The second, when the same Trifles are offered up to God, not so much out of ignorance of what is better, as out of a kind of tacit fraud and cunning circumvention, as it were, of God, in making with him, or rather whether he will or no, such an unequal exchange. By which Delusions though they may for a while in some sort pacifie their false hearts and consciences, yet in the mean time they really do but provoke God by these sacrifices of Fools.

This is the summe of what I am able to conceive of this other Disease of <a6r> Superstition, which is by mere collection of Reason, having had no experience therein for the quickening my style or enlarging my thoughts thereupon. But I think I may safely affirm as I have elsewhere, That it is Superstition (if it be not Vain-glory, Interest, or something worse) where men have an over-proportioned zeale for or against such things in Religion as God puts little or no price upon either their performance or omission. Which thing if it were seriously and conscienciously considered, would tend very much to the laying or preventing the usual blusters of Christendome. And there can be no better effect of writing a whole Volume. But I must confess that the success and growth of the Church is an Arcanum that lies more deep in Providence, and rather is a Mystery of life then of external reason. Paul may plant and Apollos may water, but God gives the increase.

[16]10. As for the Letters that follow in the next place, themselves speak the occasion of them. I have superadded that to V. C. as for other reasons, so chiefly for the begetting a better opinion in such as are not so well acquainted with Des-Cartes and his Writings. For it cannot be but that men of very excellent spirits may labour with prejudice against so worthy an Authour by misrepresentation of things. And I must confess that the very newness alone is occasion enough, even to those that are truly ingenuous, to make a stand; that which is strange having something of the face of what is hostile. Whence Hostis and Peregrinus had once the same signification, as Cicero observes. And it is a piece of Rudenesse and Unskilfulnesse in the nature of things and in the perfection of Divine Providence, (who has generally implanted a tenacious adhesion to what has accustomarily been received, that the mind of man might be the safer Receptacle when it lights upon what is best) to conceit that because a Truth is demonstratively evident in it self, that therefore its Opposite shall immediately surrender the Castle. Which consideration with the ingenuous cannot but secure the continuance of unfeigned civility and respect even to the jealous Suspecters or Opposers of new Truths, and make them look upon it as a piece of surprizing Ignorance or Inhumanity to be otherwise affected towards them.

[17]11. What particularly to take notice of in that Letter occurres not to my mind, unless I should applaud the luckiness of my Conjecture concerning Des-Cartes his distorting the true and natural Idea of motion in reference to Galilæo's ill hap, who was so rudely handled for his Hypothesis of the Motion of the Earth by a Councel of Cardinals. To which that he had an eye is now very evident from several of his[18] Letters to Marsennus, of which passages I had no knowledge till within these few days, and my Letter it self was writ before this second volume of Des-Cartes his came out. But in the mean time I cannot but observe the inconvenience this external force and fear does to the commonwealth of Learning, and how many innocent and well-deserving young Wits have been put upon the Rack, as well as Galilæo into prison. For his Imprisonment frighted Des-Cartes into such a distorted description of Motion, that no mans Reason could make good sense of it, nor Modesty permit him to phansy any thin Non-sense in so excellent an Authour.

My main design in my Letter was to clear Cartesius from that giddy and groundless suspicion of Atheism (which surely could not be taken up by any but the more course and vulgar Spirits) which I conceive I have done fully, <a6v> and to the effectual stopping of all such surmises for the future, even in the weakest and most scrupulous suspecters of him. And yet I might have added more even out of his first Volume of Letters, namely,[19] That he did not only believe the existence of God, but also his particular Providence, which he felt and acknowledged in that special impulse and success he had in his Philosophical Studies. Which I less wonder at, he beginning so piously in his youth, and exercising his first style upon that excellent Theme, The fear of the Lord is the beginning of Wisdome, as I was informed by letters from Mr Clerselier at Paris, when he sent me a Catalogue of what Writings Cartesius had left behind him. The notice whereof did not a little please me, it being the very Text upon which my self first common-placed in our Colledge Chappel.

But that which enravishes me the most is, that we both setting out from the same Lists, though taking several wayes, the one travailing in the lower Rode of Democritisme, amidst the thick dust of Atoms and flying particles of Matter, the other tracing it over the high and aiery Hills of Platonisme, in that more thin and subtil Region of Immateriality, meet together notwithstanding at last (and certainly not without a Providence) at the same Goale, namely at the Enterance of the holy Bible, dedicating our joynt labours to the use of glory of the Christian Church, laying at their feet the most true, as we conceive, and the most approvable Philosophical Interpretation of the first Chapters of Genesis as ever was yet offered to the World since the loss of the ancient Judaical Cabbala. Which is not a mere strain of Rhetorick of mine, but a free acknowledgement, or rather serious boast, of Des-Cartes himself in a Letter to a certain friend,[20] where he professes that he had found his own Philosophy even to admiration agreeable to the Text of Moses, above all other Interpretations whatsoever. Which I have abundantly made good in the Defense of my Philosophick Cabbala, and above what Des-Cartes could well perform, unless he had light on the same Key with my self.

[21]12. Concerning my Immortality of the Soul, I shall take notice only of these two Dissatisfactions, which, because they seem main ones to some, though they never did so to me, I shall now bring into view. The first of which is this, That I have admitted a kind of Extension in the nature of a Spirit; the second, That I have not admitted perception in the Spirit of Nature. But as touching the first, I can justly apologize for my self, that Necessity has no Law, and that if they consider the demonstrable evidence of these two Conclusions, 1. That there is a substance immaterial really and specifically distinct from Body, 2. and, That there is no real Entity but what is in some sense extended, it will be impossible for them not to conclude as well as we, That a Spirit is in some sort extended also. Wherefore it is an unskilfully-framed complaint that cavils at the Inference without searching into the strength of the Premisses. I do therefore here appeal to any indifferent Reader, whether I have not Mathematically demonstrated the truth of the First both in my Antidote and my Treatise of the Soul's Immortality.

And shall now for his fuller satisfaction demonstrate the Second more punctually; namely, that neither the Soul nor any thing else can be Totum <b1r> in toto, and totum in qualibet parte, but that this Assertion (as I had once occasion to write to an ingenious friend of mine) is a mere chiming contradiction. Which I proved to him thus: namely, That Totum comprehends all that is of a thing both in a positive sense and (consequently) in a negative, that is to say, If all A be in B, there is nothing left to be in C distant from B. For it is as if one should say, there is nothing of A but what is concluded within B, and yet at the same moment not only something of A, but all A, should be in C also: which is impossible in any singular or individual Essence; and Universals are not Things, but Notions.

To which we may further add, that this Supposition makes that of which it is affirmed as small as the smallest thing conceivable. For if the Total be in every point, it is plain that the amplitude of this Total is no bigger then the point it is in. Which is intolerable applyed to the Deity, and ridiculous in every thing else.

Wherefore it being so Mathematically demonstrable that there is that which is properly called Spirit, and that no Being at all can be totally present in distant points or parts of Matter at once, it does unavoidably follow that a Spirit is in some sort extended.

But you will further urge; If Spirit be extended as well as Body, how shall we conceive Perception more competible to a Spirit then to a Body? To which briefly I answer, that I have already demonstrated that Perception is incompetible to Body, which I challenge any one to doe if he can concerning a Spirit: And demand further of them that phansy a Spirit totally present in every part of Matter, whether they can any better conceive thereby the immediate reason of the power of perception; and aske those that say it is neither as a Mathematical point, nor totally present, nor extended, whether they conceive it any thing more capable thereby of that vital Sympathy and Coactivity that transmits Objects in their exact circumstances to the common Percipient. I dare say, if they will speak what they find, they will not fail to return answer, That they are not at all advantaged for the conceiving of the immediate reason of either simple Perception, or of the above-said vital Sympathy, by any such suppositions.

And therefore in the third place I will take the boldness to advertise them, that the truth of my 9. Axiom, that declares That some powers and properties are immediate to a Subject, had already fully accomplished my Purpose. For there being other properties in Body that intercepted from it the capacity of perceiving, it was necessarily left to some Substance Incorporeal to be the immediate Subject of the power of Perception. For it must be the immediate power of some Subject or other, so far as our Understanding reaches, nor can we find out an adequate cause besides the Subject it self, according to which precisely any thing is perceptive. It is true that we are conscious to our selves that that Being that is perceptive must be very Unitive, and Reason does evidence to us that to be One more then Matter is one (which is one only by juxtaposition of parts)is a necessary requisite of that which is capable of the function of Common-Percipiency, and therefore precedes in nature. But that which is as much one as any thing can be without a contradiction, that is to say, is so much one that it has immediately of its own nature vital Sympathy and coactivity of parts, as I may so <b1v> speak, and perfect indiscerpibility, does not for all this immediately imply a power of perception residing therein, For I conceive every Spirit may be thus Unitive; but I am not assured that every Spirit has Perception, but rather on the contrary that some have not. Wherefore though every thing that is perceptive must be a Spirit, yet every Spirit need not be perceptive. Whence Perception must be an immediate power in that Rank of Spirits that are perceptive; and therefore it must be an argument of no small ἀπαιδευσία or Unskilfulness to ask or expect a reason why it is so.

Nor can we give any account of that vital Onenesse in every Spirit consisting in Sympathy and Coactivity of parts, unless we should alledge that it is very fit, seeing the nature of a Spirit is opposite to that of Matter, that the first and most immediate consequences of their natures should be opposite also; and that therefore, it being here acknowledged that Matter is stupid, or destitute of vital Sympathy and Coactivity, Spirit must be vital, and endued with such like properties: or that, as Matter, which has not that Essential Unity consisting in Indiscerpibility of parts, is also devoid of this vital Oneness; so Spirit, which has this Essential Unity, should consequently be endued with the vital. But this is not altogether according to the severity of the manner of reasoning which I affect; though the argument be in no wise contemptible if we consider the immediate Opposition of the two species, and that it is but the first degree and most immediate emergency of Vitality which we contend for in the comparison.

But I did not care to stand upon such kind of ratiocinations, being well assured that I had already done my business in merely demonstrating that what I assert to belong to Spirit was incompetible to Matter or Body, and that therefore Spirit must be necessarily acknowledged both to be, and to be also the Subject of such powers and properties, namely, of vital Sympathy and Coactivity of parts, and, which is the flower of all, of the Faculty of Perception. And who can question but that they are rightly lodged?

For I think there is none but will acknowledge that there is generally in all men either a confused presage, or more determinate Notion, that that which has this power of Sympathy and Perception is the most subtil and unitive thing that is. Now I dare appeal to any one, if he can conceive any thing more subtil or more unitive then the Essential Notion of a Spirit, as it is immediately counterdistinct to Matter. For can there be any thing more one then what is utterly indiscerpible into parts? or more subtil then what is not only penetrative of Matter, but also of it self, or of things of its own kind? For Spirit will penetrate Spirit, though Matter cannot Matter. Wherefore there being no ἀντιτυπία in a Spirit neither to its own kind nor to any thing else, it is evident that it is the most subtil thing that is, and that therefore the communication of vital Impresses (and all impresses here are vital, though not all Perceptions, nor any of them Motions) is not made by the jogging or crouding of parts, but by Spiritual Sympathy, which is more loose and free from those restrictions that are in the Mechanical laws of Matter.

Of which the natural Consectary is, That to resolve a Phænomenon into Sympathy, is not alwaies to take sanctuary in the Asylum of Fools. For it is the Result of very subtil and operose Demonstration to come to the certain knowledge of the existence of Spiritual Beings; which once granted, their <b2r> nature is such that it is impossible but that any one should confess that they are the proper Subjects of Sympathy and Perception. And therefore to conclude that to be by Sympathy that we can demonstrate not to be by mere Mechanical Powers, is not to shelter a mans self in the common Refuge of Ignorance, but to tell the proximate and immediate cause of a Phænomenon, which is to philosophize to the height.

Briefly therefore to conclude: I having demonstrated with evidence no less then Mathematical, That there are Substances incorporeal, and that all Substance is in some sense extentional, because there is no Substance but is, or at least may be, essentially present to Matter; it will necessarily follow from hence, That Incorporeal Substance is in some sort extended; and consequently, that a Soul or Spirit is capable of no other Unity or Onenesse then what consists in Indiscerpibility and in vital Coactivity and Sympathy of parts; and that therefore, finally, the resolution of such Phænomena as we experience in our selves, or observe in other things, which exceed the mere Mechanical laws of Matter, into this Vital Oneness, wihch consists in Coactivity and Sympathy of parts, is no vain Tautologie, or the mere saying a thing is so because it is so, but a distant Indication of the proper and immediate cause thereof. All which things lay'd together, and seriously considered, will easily prevent whatever Objections any one might otherwise imagine against the Extension of a Spirit.

[22]13. The second Dissatisfaction is touching the Spirit of Nature, in that I have not allowed it the Power of Perception. That there is a Spirit of Nature, that is to say, a substance incorporeal that does interesse it self in the bringing about some more general Phænomena in the World, I think I have demonstrated so evidently that nothing can be more evident in Pphilosophy. Nor can a man doubt but that it is an Universal Principle, if he consider the nature of God and the Divine Fecundity, and the use of this Spirit whereever there is Matter manageable to some serviceable end for the good of the whole Creation; besides those Testimonies of its Omnipresence, if I may so speak, it doing the same things at vast Distances. As for example, It remands down a stone toward the Center of the Earth as well when the Earth is in Aries as in Libra, keeps the Waters from swilling out of the Moon, curbs the matter of the Sun into roundness of figure, which would otherwise be oblong, restrains the crusty parts of a Star from flying apieces into the circumambient Æther, carries along those larger Regions of looser Particles of the third Element, together with the Comets, in their peregrinations from Vortex to Vortex, everywhere directs the magnetick Atoms in their right Rode; besides all the Plastick services it does both in Plants and Animals.

This therefore being a mute copy of the eternal Word (that is, of that Divine Wisdome that is entirely everywhere) is in every part naturally appointed to doe all the best services that Matter is capable of, according to such or such modifications, and according to that Platform of which it is the Transcript, I mean according to the Comprehension and Purpose of those Idea's of things which are in the eternal Intellect of God. Whence it is plain, That there need be no other λόγοι σπερματικοὶ, or Seminal Forms, then this one, which virtually contains all everywhere, and is therefore rightly styled The Universal Spirit of Nature: As also, That this Spirit need not be per <b2v> ceptive it self, it being the natural Transcript of that which is knowing or perceptive, and is the lowest Substantial Activity from the all-wise God, containing in it certain general Modes and Lawes of Nature for the good of the Universe. But the Eye of particular Providence is not therein. Else why does a tyle fall upon the head of him that passes by in the streets, goe he to either Play or Sermon? And how come those bungles in monstrous productions, or those inept and self-thwarting Attempts of this Spirit in certain experiments about the finding out a Vacuum? as I have particularly noted in my Antidote.[23] Wherefore neither Omnipotency nor Omnisciency acts in such cases, but this imperceptive Spirit of Nature. Whose Imperceptiveness is no more Obstacle to her natural and plastical Operations, then the Soul's having no actual Idea of a thing aforehand is an hinderance of her occasional perceptions, as I have already intimated in my [24]Preface to my Treatise of the Soul's Immortality.

[25]Which things well considered and allow'd, that special Office of this Spirit of Nature in conducting of souls in their State of Silence, to actuate prepared Matter, and so to raise Animals into Life, will easily be conceived as becoming an employment as any of the rest, and not at all more difficult. For how much harder is it to apprehend that the Spirit of Nature may direct or carry down a silent Soul, then a dead stone, to their fit and natural abodes? For the liveless Spirit and the dead stone are alike easy to be taken hold upon, the Spirit of Nature penetrating them both alike; and body slipping up and down so easily in this Spirit of the World, as that it cannot be imagined that any Mechanical power, but that only which is truly called Sympathetical, must be the Tye where any hold is taken. Which Tye catches and lets goe, for the direction and transmission of things to their proper places in the several parts of the World for the good of the Whole, according to that Essential Law which is the Form and Being of this Spirit of Nature, the last Ideal or Omniform Efflux from God. Nor is it, as I have already said, any thing more marvelous that a liveless soul should by this imperceptive Spirit of Nature be carried away and conducted to duly-prepared Matter, then that a dead Stone or the sensless Magnetick Particles should be guided thereby. For that whereby the Soul is catched so fast by its particular Body is not the perceptive part thereof, but the plastick or natural; else in a pet she might easily leave the body without either hanging, drowning or stabbing. Why then may not a Spirit, that has subtiler fingers then the finest Matter, I mean the Spirit of Nature, lay hold on that imperceptive part of the Soul, or on the Soul it self, in the state of Silence or Imperception, and by the sympathy and coactivity of its own Essence carry her away to such services as either her self had deserved or the Universe required? All which things though I will not assert as true, yet I dare pronounce them as intelligible as the Union of the Soul with the Body, which experience makes us understand whether we will or no.

[26]14. As for my Conjectura Cabbalistica, I have no new thing to take notice of there, unless what I have added there of anew, which is the Appendix to the Defence of my Philosophick Cabbala. Wherein I think I have cleared that Cabbala of all imaginable Objections of any moment, and amongst other things have plainly proved that not only Platonism, but that which now deserves to be called Cartesianism, for Des-Cartes his so happily recovering of it again into view, was part of the ancient Judaical Cabbala, it being part of Pythagoras his Philosophy which he had (as is abundantly testified out of ancient Writers) from the Jews. I omitted to set down the succession of the Pythagorick School, which yet had not been impertinent to our scope; and therefore I will here make a supply out of Diogenes Laertius, who reckons the Descent thus; Pherecydes, Pythagoras, Telauges, Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno Eleates, Leucippus, Democritus, and then many others, amongst whom were Nausiphanes and Naucydes, and the last of all Epicurus.

This School was called the Italick School; the first of which succession, Pherecydes, is said to have got certain secret Writings from the Phœnicians or Hebrews, as I have already observed out of [27]Heyschius: nor need here repeat those ample Testimonies that prove that Pythagoras, the immediate successour of Pherecydes, had his Philosophy from the Jews; nor how that the Cabbala was kept entire in him and in some of his successours, that is to say, The Physical or Mechanical part was not dissevered from the Theological or Metaphysical, the body from the soul, as it seems to have happened in Leucippus and Democritus, and finally to have grown cadaverous and of an ill savour in Epicurus, and in as many as have insisted in his steps to this very day.

[28]15. But in the mean time I cannot but note that this succession of that School is no small confirmation both that Pythagoras his Philosophy was the ancient Wisdome of the Jews, and especially that the Atomical or Mechanical Philosophy (such, in a manner, and so much as I have applied to Moses his Text) was also part of that Wisedome. It is needlesse here to repeat what I have already noted to make for the discovering that Pythagorisme had relation to the Text of Moses. But besides what I have observed from Pherecydes his mentioning of Ophioneus as the Ring-leader of the Apostate Spirits, the beginning of a Book of his, which Laertius recites, methinks looks like a broken reflexion upon the Beginning of Genesis. Ζεὺς μὲν καὶ χρόνος εἰς ἀεὶ καὶ χθὼνην. χθονὶ δὲ ὄνομα ἐγένετο γῆ, ἐπειδὴ ἀυτῇ Ζεὺς γέρας διδοῖ. Of which the easy English is this, God and Time (I suppose he means Duration) and the Ground were eternally: But the Ground upon God's adorning it was called Earth. Which latter in all likelihood was a glance at the third day's work. But the former part, that affirms the Ground eternal, reflects upon the first. For this χθὼν, which I have translated the Ground, is Hyle, which Plotinus calls ὑποβάθρα and ἡ ἀρχαία φύσις, the Ground or Foundation, and the ancient Nature; Hyle or the Possibility of the external Creation being eternal, which notwithstanding is but a kind of Non-Entity, and yet the lowest Basis of Actual Being. According to which sense is Parmenides also to be understood (the fifth in this Italick succession) in his making the two first Principles Fire and Earth, as appears out of Aristotle.[29] Δύο τὰς ἀρχὰς τίθησι, θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν, οἱον πῦρ καὶ γῆν λέγων. τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν κατὰ τὸ ὂν τὸ θερμὸν τάττευ, θάτερον δὲ κατὰ τὸ μὴ ὄν. Where the learned Stagirite is utterly out in his glosse, as if Parmenides meant by his Fire and Earth nothing but heat and cold, and so made two Accidents the first principles of all things. But by the bye he has lent <b3v> unto us very useful light, in that he witnesseth of Parmenides that he ranked the Earth in the order of Non-entities. For hereby it is manifest that he spoke Symbolically, and understood thereby the same that Pherecydes did by χθὼν, the ancient Hyle. For who would say that this Physical Earth, which is the most gross and palpable Entity in the World, is in the Rank of Non-entities more then Fire or Aire or the like? But Aristotle (though he speak excellent things sometimes) does very often without any victory triumph and trample upon the opinions of the ancient Philosophers, by reason of his ignorance of what Clemens Alexandrinus so expresly instructs us in,[30] Ὅτι ὁ τρόπος παρ' ἀυτοῖς τῆς φιλοσοφίας Ἑβραϊκὸς καὶ αἰνιγματώδης, That their manner of Philosophy was Mosaical and symbolical. And it being so evident that Earth signifies sympbolically with Parmenides, there can be no question but Fire signifies so too, and that it is no other then or Οὐρανὸς, Æther, and answers in signification to Light or Heaven mentioned in the first Day's Creation. Which is Parmenides his Plastical or [31]Demiurgical Principle (which Fire cannot be) as the Earth the Material. Such Indications as these have I[32] produced to prove that the Pythagorick Philosophy has reference to Moses his Text.

And that that Philosophy which Pythagoras had from the Jews was not merely Metaphysical, but also Physical or[33] Mechanical, and of such a nature as the Cartesian, not only the Motion of the Earth, which is the famed opinion of Pythagoras, and which implies a Vortex about the Sun, but also the confessed Atomical Philosophy of Leucippus, Democritus and Epicurus, who are of the Italick line; does more fully evince: Though what they speak of the Vortices are either corrupt notions of that School then decaying, or but brokenly and confusedly set down by the Historian. And yet something I have culled out in the life of Parmenides, that is so perfectly agreeable to the Cartesian Philosophy that nothing can be more, and is indeed the very heart and marrow of it, and in a manner comprehends or takes hold of all. Which is thus expressed by the Interpreter of Laërtius;[34] Solem ipsum frigidum esse & calidum: which is a monstrous saying of Parmenides, unless the meaning be only this, Solem esse vel candentem vel extinctum, alluding to and . Nor can that be true that goes immediately before, that men were generated out of the Sun, but as it is extinct and becomes an Earth or Planet. And Des-Cartes his Philosophy defines thus far, That this Earth out of which man at first was made is of such a nature as if it had been once a Sun, nor dare I define any further.

[35]16. It is therefore very evident to me that the ancient Pythagorick or Judaick Cabbala did consist of what we now call Platonisme and Cartesianisme, the latter being as it were the Body, the other the Soul of that Philosophy; the unappy disjunction of which has been a great evil to both: the Metaphysicians growing vain in spinning out needless and useless subtilties and ridiculous falsities, concerning immaterial Beings, for want of some other easier Object to exercise their Reason upon; and the Atomicall Philosophers becoming over-credulous of the powers of Matter, nay, I may say, too too impious and impudent in exploding the belief of Immaterial Beings, in contemning the Rules and Maximes of Vertue and Morality, and in shamelesly obtruding upon the World their Mechanical Su{illeg}es for necessary <b4r> Demonstrations, when they were undeed down-right Falsities and Impossibilities. And therefore I do not a little please my self in that I have made some progress towards the resuscitating that ancient and venerable Wisedome again to life, and the bringing together, as it were, of the Soul and Body of Moses, fitly investing him or cloathing him with the Covering of his own most sacred Text.

Which though it seemed something an hardy Exploit, and not much unlike the raising from the dead the dislimb'd Hippolytus; yet the consideration of the fate of Æsculapius could not deterre me from so glorious an Enterprise; but my free professing it to have been rather a Design then an Atchievement gave me no small assurance, that I was safe enough sheltered from any Thunder-clap of either mis-directed Zeal or glowing Envy.

[36]17. But yet that I may not dissemble what cannot be conceal'd, that of Platonisme and Cartesianism which I have applied to Moses his Text, is in it self, as I conceive, very rational. And I must further adde, what I dare not conceal nor dissemble, it being for the Interest and safety of Religion for me openly and earnestly to profess it, namely, That what I have applied is exquisitely and unexceptionably fitted to the Text, from the beginning to the end, as I have made good in the Defence of that Cabbala, and in the Appendix thereto. Which is not a voluntary Boast of mine, but a serious profession of the truth, extorted from me out of the great sense I have of that service it does to the Dignity and Authority of the Church. For being perswaded in my own judgement that what I have applied is very consonant to the faculties of humane Understanding, and considering also how far that Philosophy has already got foot in Christendome, and how easily those victories are gained which prove the pleasure and satisfaction of the conquered (and such is Truth to the Soul of Man) as also how hugely disadvantageous it would be to Religion and Theologie to seem to be left so far behind, or to appear to be so opposite to that, which I foresaw might probably become the common Philosophy of the learned; therefore to prevent all contempt and cavil against the Sacredness of Christianity, as holding any thing against the solid truths of approved Reason and Philosophy, I thought it necessary, and an indispensable duty of that Faithfulness I owe to the Christian Church, publickly to declare, That, if any one presume that he has found such points of Cartesianisme or Platonisme as I have applied to the Mosaick letter to be really true upon through examination, I dare confidently pronounce to him, that if they be so, those truths were ever lodged in the Text of Moses, and that no Philosopher has any the least pretence to magnifie himself against Religion and the Church of God, wherein such rich Theories have been ever treasured up, though men have not had, for these many Ages, the leisure or opportunity of unlocking them till now. Which consideration, I think, is of main importance for the stopping the mouths of Atheistical Wits, and conciliating unspeakable Honour and Reverence to Religion and the Church in those who are knowing and ingenuous.

Thus much therefore I must and ought to avouch, That what I have applied is exquisitely fit and applicable to the Text of Moses, and I hope without the breach of Modesty may also adde that it is rational; but it must be the result of a longer deliberation with my self to avouch it is true. For <b4v> I must confess, though I find my self to have got a Key in my hand, whose structure and make is exquisitely fitted to every ward in the lock of this Mosaick Treasury, and which turns easily, locks and unlocks, and I view within, as I conceive, inestimable riches of Knowledge: yet I dare not believe mine own eyes, nor conclude whether it be real Vision or a Dream, not knowing whether this be undoubtedly that ancient golden Key of the Cabbala, or one made of baser alloy. And truly a man Jealousy may well be the more encreased, in that it opens immediately upon those two dazeling Paradoxes of the Motion of the Earth and the Præexistence of the Soul, which is enough to make the hardiest beholder to step back and to strike him into a sudden amazement, in which I confess I stand to this very day. At wich Timidity of mine none can justly wonder that considers how shie the ancient Fathers were of the Globosity of the Earth and the Inhabitation thereof by the Antipodes: which was indeed the opinion of Pythagoras of old, but the certain knowledge of these later Ages.

[37]18. Besides, I must ingenuously confess, I know nothing more nor better to be alledged for the Motion of the Earth and other principal points of Cartesianisme, then what I have comprised in my Letter to V. C. nor any thing more conclusive of the Præexistence of the Soul then what I have produced in my Treatise of her Immortality; which I brought into view (as also whatever else any one shall conceive in my Writings in any measure to deviate from the common Tract) to enlarge the Object of more accurate Judgements; which confers very much to a right decision of what is true. Nor did any thing offer it self to my mind that seemed worth the adding concerning that latter Subject of Præexistence, unless (besides my shewing that it was opinion of all Philosophers that held the Soul immortal, and more particularly of Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero, Authours appointed us by the very Statutes of our University; which is enough to make the Opinion creditable) I had taken also notice how innocent and inoffensive that doctrine was in the more pure and intemerate Ages of the Church.

For I find Clemens Alexandrinus in several places describing it without the least intimation of any dislike thereof,[38] as in the first of his Stromata's, where writing of the Barbarians (whose wisedome he seems to prefer before the Greeks, haply in favour to the Hebrews) he speaks thus, Δῆλοι δέ εἰσιν ὁι βάρβαροι διαφερόντως τιμήσαντες τοὺς ἀυτῶν νομοθέτας τε καὶ διδασκάλους, θεοὺς προςειπόντες. ψυχὰς γὰρ ἀγασδας, κατὰ Πλάτωνα, καταλιπούσας τὸν ὑπερουράνιον τόπον ὑπομεῖναι ἐλθεῖν εἰς τὸν δε τὸν τάρταρον, καὶ σῶμα ἀναλαβούσας τοῦ ον γενέσει κακῶν ἁπάντων μετασκεῖν ὑπολαμβάνουσι, κηδεμόνας τοῦ τοῦ ανθρώπων γένους, αἲ νόμους τε ἔθεσαν, καὶ φιλοσοφίαν ἐκήρυξαν. i. e. It is plain that the Barbarians did in a special manner honour their Law-givers and Instructers, calling them Gods. For they conceive, with Plato, that certain good Souls leaving their celestial mansions did endure the comeing into this Tartarus, and resuming bodies did partake of all the miseries that attend Generation, as having committed to them the care of mankind, to whom they gave Laws and preached Philosophy. Which opinion he is so far from exploding, that he premises in general, before he falls into this Discourse of the Philosophy of the Nations, this admirable comparison: That as the parts of the Universe, though they disagree one <c1r> from another, yet have a peculiar consonancy and agreement to the whole World; οὕτως ἥ τε βάρβαρος ἥ τε Ἑλληνικὴ φιλοσοφια τῶν ἀϊδιον ἀλήθειαν σπαραγμόν τινα τῆς τοῦ Λόγου τοῦ ὄντος ἀεὶ θεολογίας πεποίηται. Ὁ δὲ τὰ διηρημένα συνθεὶς ἆυθις καὶ ἑνοποιήσας τέλειον τὸν λόγον, ἀκινδύνως εὐ ἴοθ' ὅτι κατόψεαι τῶν ἀλήθειαν. So, saith he, the Barbarous and Greek Philosophy have made the eternal Truth a kind of discerption of the Theologie of the Logos that abides for ever, into dispersed parts. But he that puts together what is thus dispersed and brings them under one perfect consideration, know assuredly that this man shall see to the bottom of Truth. Which I was the more willing to rehearse, I seeming to my self to have attempted some such performance as this in my fitting together the scattered Wisdome of the Ancients into one Mosaick Cabbala.

Again in the third Book, where he disputes against the Marcionites, he cites several sayings out of Plato, that either refer to or directly aver the Præexistence of the Soul. As that out of his Phædo, That it is ὁ ἑν ἀποῤῥήτοις λεγόμενος λόγος, ὡς ἔν τινε φρουρᾷ ἐσμεν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, That it is a Traditional Arcanum, that we men in this life are as it were kept in a prison. And he entitles also Heraclitus, Pythagoras, Socrates and Plato at once to this sage saying, Θάνατός ἐστιν ὁκόσα ἐγερθέντες ὁρέομεν, ὁκόσα δὲ ἑυδοντες ὓπνος. But that is most fully to the purpose which he cites out of Philolaus the Pythagorean, Μαρτυρέον ται δὲ καὶ οἱ παλαιοὶ θεολόγοι τε καὶ μάντεις ὡς διά τινας τιμωρίας ἁ ψυχὰ τῷ σώματι συνιζέυκται, καὶ καθάπερ ἐν σώματι τούτῳ τέθαπται. The ancient Divines and Prophets (he means, I suppose, especially those of the Jews,) witness that the Soul is joyn'd to this earthly body in a way of punishment, and that so far forth as she is in this body, she is, as it were, buried. Against which Platonical Opinions Clemens shews not the least disgust, but only blames Marcion for his abusing them to his absurd doctrine of the unlawfulness of Marriage, and complains that he did ungratefully and unskilfully take occasion from Plato of hatching his own strange and perverse Opinions.

And after in the same Book, though he do zealously oppose Julius Cassianus for speaking against those hidden parts of God's own making, in both Male and Female; yet when he mentions his holding the Præexistence of the Soul, Ἡγειτει, saith he, ὁ γενναῖος ὅυτος Πλατωνικώτερον, θείαν ὀ͂υσαν τῆν ψυχὴν ἂνωθεν ἐπιθυμίᾳ θηλυνθεῖσαν δεῦρο ἥκειν εἰς γένεσιν καὶ φθοράν. This[39] notable Spirit, (saith he, meaning Cassianus) does something more expresly Platonize, in saying, That the Soul, a divine Essence and from above, by being effeminated, descends hither into generation and corruption. And again in the same page, when he has produced Cassianus his Opinion concerning the Coats of skins God is said to cloath our first Parents with after their fall, (χιτῶνας δὲ δερματίνους ἡγεῖται ὁ Κασσιανὸς τὰ σώματα) he passes it over only with this dilatory Promise or Threatning (call it which you will) that he will shew that Cassianus was deceived, when he had prepared and perfected his Treatise of the Generation of man, but declines to pronounce it an errour for the present; and if he ever wrote any such Treatise, it is manifest that he did not handle those skins so rudely but that they were transmitted entire to that excellent Disciple of his Origenes Adamantius,[40] that Miracle of the Christian World, if that Description of his life and worth be <c1v> true which we find in Eusebius. For certainly (to say nothing of his stupendious parts and abilities, which his greatest Adversaries will not deny) it will be very hard to example so sincere and zealous an adhesion to the cause of Christ, even to the contempt of death and desire of Martyrdome. Which was no inconsiderate excursion of a juvenile fervour in him, but a permanent faithfulness and fortitude of Spirit; it being usual with that holy man to assist and encourage all the Martyrs, as well those unknown to him as of his acquaintance, openly to accompanie them to their execution, friendly embracing them, and administring to them all the comfort he could, to his frequent hazard of being stoned by the incensed multitude.

It will seem a less matter to take notice of his assiduous reading and meditating on the holy Scripture day and night, and his wholly neglecting the World for the pleasure of divine contemplation and the service of the Church of Christ, his excessive Charity to the indigent, his frequent Fastings and lyings on the ground, his undergoing cold and nakedness, his going bare-foot on the hard stones, his abstinence from wine and singular Temperance in all the pleasures of Nature. Whose great example of an Ascetick life gain'd many disciples to the Church, and bred up and furnished out many undaunted Champions of the Christian Faith, who willingly laid down their lives for the love of the Lord Jesus. Such out of Origen's School were Plutarchus, the two Sereni, Heraclides, Heron, Rhais, and Basilides who receiv'd the Crown of Martyrdome through the intercession of that illustrious Virgin-Martyr Potamiæna. What direfull calamities Origen himself also underwent in the Decian Persecution, what Fetters and Torments of Body, what castings into Prisons and Dungeons, what stretching and racking of limbs, what terrours of fire and burnings, are to be read in the records of the Ecclesiastick History.

These and such like Instances as these will make good the Integrity and Holinesse of this Venerable Father. But I must confess I should be loath to be bound to answer for the truth of all those Opinions that are imputed to him. As, for his making the Sun, Moon and Starres living and intelligent creatures: which shews that he was a better Divine then Naturalist. His affirming that the power of God is finite, and that he made only so many things as did not imply a Contradiction to be managed by his Providence. Which Errour (if it was Origen's) certainly was intended for an Apologie for God's not making the World infinite, and shews that the Reverend Father had a greater solicitude for the Sovereign goodness of God then for his Power. His making the punishment of the Devils and of the Damned not eternal: which yet Jacobus Merlinus quits him of by the Testimony of at least ten several Citations out of his Writings. His saying, That the bodies of men at the Ressurection will be raised in an Orbicular figure: which is expresy against what[41] Methodius declares concerning Origen, namely, that his opinion was, That every one at the Ressurection should appear exactly in his own particular Form or shape, as is rightly observed in the Letter of Resolution, whoever was the Authour thereof; for I profess I know not who is, much less am I the Authour of it my self, as some have groundlesly imagined. His asserting[42] That the Soul of our Saviour was the same that was in Adam: which yet is impossible for him ever to assert, he <c2r> so expresly declaring that the Soul of the Messias never sinned. And lastly, to omit several others, his transmitting the Souls of men into the bodies of brutes: which I question not, and could easily prove, to be falsly fathered as well upon Pythagoras as Origen. But some phansyful followers of both did affix these unhandsome and ridiculous Appendages, thinking every vain addition to be an improvement of those pure doctrines which were anciently delivered to the World. And such was Præexistence in the Church of the Jewes, where no such Fooleries were mixed with it. And if it had so continued amongst the Origenists, certainly it would never have fallen under publick censure: though I dare not lay the blame solely upon them, their malevolent Adversaries taking liberty enough to charge Origen with such things as had no ground at all of report. Such was that formal story of his casting incense on the Altar of an Idol, being put to his choice whether he would yield to that or to the abuse of his body by an Æthiopian. Which is nothing but a[43] mere Romance built upon the greatness of Origen's name and Vertues. Whose repute though it may seem much blemished by that publick Censure in the fifth General Council; yet he that considers that the Particulars of his Condemnation were wholly removed out of the Records of that Council by the same Power that first occasion'd his censure, may easily find what will repair Origen's credit in a great measure without any detriment to the Authority of that grand Convention: For it was their Wrong, not their Fault, that they were misinformed.

S. Basil also and Gregorie Nazianzen,[44] that they were no enemies to the opinion of the Soul's Præexistence, but rather favourers thereof, appears out of the great esteem they had of Origen, and particularly out of that Present that Nazianzen made unto Theodorus Tyaneus, of a Book of Excerptions out of Origen's Writings, compiled by himself and S. Basil, which is styled Ὠριγένους Φιλοκαλία, wherein are several Passages that plainly imply or directly affirm the Præexistence of the Soul.

The next open Assertour of the Soul's Præexistence is Synesius Bishop of Cyrene,[45] who in a Letter to his brother does seriously profess that he cannot accept of that honourable employment offered him, without the liberty of enjoying, nay I may say of professing, certain opinions of his, which had been a long time rooted in him upon duly-considered reason, in the head of which he names this of the Præexistence of the Soul.[46] Ἀμέλει τῆν ψυχὴν ὀυκ ἀξιώσω ποτὲ σώματος ὑστερογενῆ νομίζειν, In good earnest, saith he, I shall never consent that the Soul is of later existence then Body or Matter: and deales so apertly, that he gives directions to his brother to divulge the Letter to the Scholasticks, as he calls them, that so it might be communicated to that reverend Father that offered him the Employment. Which freedome notwithstanding in professing the Opinion was no barre to his Preferment.

To these you may adde the authority also of two Latine Fathers, Arnobius[47] and Prudentius. The former of whom writes thus expresly concerning this point,[48] Nonne Deo omnes debemus hoc ipsum primum quod sumus, quod esse homines dicimur, quod ab eo vel missi, vel lapsi cæcitate, hujus in corporis vinculis continemur? The other thus,[49] in his Hymnus in Exequiis Defunctorum, <c2v> Patet, ecce, fidelibus ampli Via lucida jam Paradisi: Licet & nemus illud adire Homini quod ademerat anguis. Illic, precor, optime Ductor, Famulam tibi præcipe mentem Genitali in sede sacrari, Quam liquerat exul & errans. Which last verse answers exactly to that expression of Synesius in his Hymns, where he calls his Soul φυγὰς ἀλῆτις, for quitting Heaven and wandering into this lower World.

[50]S. Augustine also speaks very favourably of this opinion in his de[51] Libero arbitrio, where he writes thus, Utrùm ante consortium hujus corporis aliâ quâdam vita vixerit animus, magna quæstio est, magnum secretum. And then in[52] another place of the same Treatise, speaking again of the Soul's præexistence, he tells us freely and ingenuously, Si de Deo aliud senserimus quàm est, intentio nostra non in beatitatem sed in vanitatem compellet. De creatura verò siquid aliter quàm sese habet senserium, dummodo no id pro cognito perceptoque teneamus, nullum periculum. And in a third place, in his discussion of that Fourfold Quære, namely, Whether the Souls be propagated, created, sent from God out of some hidden Repository where they did præexist, or fell hither of their own accords, Aut nondum ista quæstio, saith he, à divinorum librorum Catholicis tractatoribus pro merito suæ obscuritatis & perplexitatis evoluta atque illustrata est; aut, si jam factum est, nondum in manus nostras ejusmodi literæ pervenerunt. Whence, methinks, it is very plain that the primæval Ages of the Church had no ill conceit of the opinion of the Soul's Præexistence.

Which may further be evinced by the Book of Wisedome[53], where the Præexistence of the Soul is as conspicuous as the Sun in the firmament, in these words; For I was a witty child and of a good spirit; yea rather being good I came into a body undefiled. Of which there can be no sense without the Soul's præexistence. And a further pledge of the certainty of this interpretation is that most rational conjecture of them that conclude Philo the Jew to be the Authour of this Book, with whom there is not opinion more familiar then that of Præexistence; besides other footsteps of his impression, as that especially concerning Aaron's robe, where he saith,[54] That the whole World was in the long garment, and the Majesty of God upon the Diademe of his head. Which answers exquisitely to what I have produced out of him for the explaining those Sibylline verses I cite in my[55] Appendix to the Defence of my Philosophick Cabbala. Wherefore the Church in those primitive times so well approving of this Book of Wisedome, it argues the inoffensiveness of that opinion so clearly discoverable therein.

And lastly, from that question put to our Saviour himself by his disciples, (Master, who did sin, this man or his Parents, that he was born blind?[56]) and his not at all chastizing them, nor shewing the least dislike of this supposition of Præexistence, vulgarly known then to the Jews, and plainly im <c3r> plyed in the question; I say, a man may fetch a demonstration from hence, That there is no hurt in the Opinion, no poyson nor danger therein, else assuredly our Saviour, having so fit an opportunity, would not have omitted the discovery thereof.

[57]19. And that there is not the least evil or slightest collision or clashing in this Hypothesis with the ordinary and literal sense of the Scripture and universally-acknowledged Canon of Faith, I am as certain as that the clear Aire will not exclude the light of the Sun, but both be comprised in the same space. That which it seems most repugnant to is the derivation of Original sin from Adam. But they that assert the Præexistence of the Soul do not understand the mystery aright, if they suppose not all Souls that come according to natural Order into these Terrestrial Tenements to be in the state of silence first. Which makes them in a manner as if they were not before, and the whole scene of things evidently to begin from Adam. Whose Soul God incoporating into such a Paradisiacall body as did naturally charm his mind into as full a possibility of not falling, as the usual orthodox Theologie supposes Adam to have been in, and designing the same advantage, if he had stood, to be derived upon his Posterity; it is plainly manifest from hence, that his fall was the cause of that which we now call Original sin, that is to say, of that over-proportionated Proneness and almost irresistible Proclivity to what is evil: So far is this Hypothesis of Præexistence from clashing with the derivation of Original sin from Adam.

Nay I will adde further, that what is said in Scripture of the first and second Adam cannot so well be understood as upon the Hypothesis of Præexistence, and of an antecedent lapse of Souls in another state. For I desire any one to consider without prejudice, what so good meaning there can be of those words of S. Paul, where he saies that Adam was the figure of him that was to come[58], that is to say, of Christ, as that the office of Adam was preludious to and Typicall of the office of Christ. Which would be very dilute, if it was only in this, that he was a publick person as he was, but had not in any sense incumbent upon him the care of the Redemption of the Sons of men. Wherefore the office of Adam was to transmit that wholesome and Paradisiacal complexion of body to his Seed, (in such sort as our ordinary Theologie determines thereof) and thereby to be, as it were, the Saviour and Redeemer of his posterity from the ill effects of that former lapse they had fallen into; whence he was exquisitely the figure of him that was to come. But this earthly Adam failing in his office, the Heavenly was surrogated in his roome, who is[59] able to save to the utmost. Which Hypothesis in my mind makes S. Paul and this part of the Mystery of our Religion wonderfully easy and intelligible.

These and such like things as these may be alledged in the behalf of that ancient point of Platonisme, the Præexistence of the Soul.

[60]20. But for mine own part, though I were as certain of the truth of Platonisme and Cartesianisme in all those points of them which I have applied to the Text of Moses in my Philosophick Cabbala as I am of any Mathematical Demonstration; yet I do not find my self bound in conscience to profess my opinion therein any further then is with the good liking or permission of <c3v> my Superiours. For though those Theories were so certain to me, yet I am as certain that Mathematical certitude it self is not absolute, and that God alone is infallible.

But that I may not seem injurious to my self, nor give scandal unto others by this so free profession, I am necessitated to adde, That the Conscience of every holy and sincere Christian is as strictly bound up in matters of Religion plainly and expresly determined by the infallible Oracles of God, as it is free in Philosophical Speculations: And that though, out of love to his own ease, or in a reverential regard to the Authority of the Church, which undoubtedly every ingenuous spirit is sensible of, he may have a great desire to say, profess and doe as they would have him; yet in cases of this kind, where any thing is expected contrary to the plain and express sense of those Divine Writings, he cannot but find himself streightned here, and will certainly be constrained[61] τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ πρεσβύτερα ποιούεσθαι ἢ τὰ τῶν ἀνδρῶν, (as the Lacedæmonians are said to have done, though upon a religious mistake:) or rather he will use that short, but weighty, apologie of the Apostle,[62] Πειθαρχεῖν δεῖ θεῷ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀνθρώποις, That God is to be obeyed rather then men.

These are the Adamantine Laws and Tyes of Religion, against which no man can repine but he must repine against the Being of a God, or against his indispensable Right of being served in the first place, and of binding our consciences to believe and our tongues to profess what truths he has in a miraculous manner communicated to the World upon those Terms. [63]He that denies me before men, him will I deny before my Father which is in Heaven. But in Philosophical Theories, such as the Præexistence of the Soul, the Motion of the Earth, and the like, where God has not required our profession, nor our Eternal Interest is concerned, nor that which dictates is infallible; though we should conceit to our selves a Mathematicall assurance of the Conclusions, yet I must profess, as I said before, that I do not see that any one is conscientiously bound to averre them against the Authority of the Church under which he lives, if they should at any time dislike them, but that he may with a safe conscience compromize with his Superiours, and use their language and phrases concerning such things. For if it was a Vertue in that holy and venerable Law-giver Moses, with such prudence and paternal sweetness to condescend to the Capacity of the Vulgar, as to describe the Creation of the World according to Appearance of things to them; certainly it cannot be a Vice in us, in humble submission and reverence to the Governours of the Church, (let our private judgement be what it will) to receive their definitive modes and phrases of speech in those things where God has not tied us to the contrary.

[64]21. But if Time, that brings on all great things pompously and by degrees, shall at last so universally discover that to be sound Philosophy which I have adventured to apply to the Mosaick Text, as that it will pass as currently and inoffensively as the doctrine of Antipodes does now, which once seemed so monstrous and extravagant to the Christian World; Approbation will hardly be able to keep a mean, but the Theoremes being allowed for true, will be also necessarily acknowledged most lovely and glo <xxvii> rious; nor will there be then wanting, I hope, who on our behalf will appeal to the Jews whether it be not a real Restauration of the Mosaick Cabbala, and whether we so devoutly worship the incarnate Logos for nought, the blessing of sound Reason and a sagacious Spirit being so conspicuously found amongst the Christians, the affectionate Adorers of the Lord Jesus.

[1] The Authours Excuse for such Alterations as he has made in this Edition of his Books.

[2] The general Scope of this whole Volume.

[3] The excellency and necessity of Reason for the maintaining of the truth of Christian Religion.

[4] * Philo de Monarch.

[5] * In his De Somniis.

[6] Stromat. lib. {illeg}

[7] His Apologie for interweaving Platonism and Cartesianism so frequently into his Writings.

[8] Certain Advertisements for the more profitable perusing his Books.

[9] Divine Sagacity a Principle antecedaneous to successful Reason in Contemplations of the highest concernment.

[10] * Ennead. 1. lib. 2.

[11] The abovesaid Principle further ilustrated and confirmed out of Aristotle.

[12] De Subtil. exercit. 307. sect. 25.

[13] Arist. Moral. Eudem. lib. 7. cap. 14.

[14] The Authours Excuse for his omitting in his Antidote, to confute the unconcluding reasons some use for the proof of a God.

[15] His Excuse for not adding a Treatise of Superstition to that of Enthusiasm.

[16] That it can be no offence to the knowing and ingenuous; that men have a shyness and jealousie against such Truths as they have not been acquainted with.

[17] Certain remarkable things concerning Des-Cartes and his Writings.

[18] * Lett. de Mr. Des-Cartes. Tom. 2. lett. 75. 76, 80.

[19] Lett. 114.

[20] Lett. de Mr. Des-Cartes. Tom. 2. Lett. 24.

[21] Certain considerations layd together which wholly prevent all imaginable Objections against the Extension of a Spirit.

[22] The Properties and Offices of the Spirit of Nature further cleared and confirmed.

[23] Book 2. ch. 2. sect. 8.

[24] * See sect. 11.

[25] A Consectary concerning the Conduct of Souls by the Spirit of Nature.

[26] That the ancient Judaical Cabbala did consist of what we now call Platonism and Cartesianism, made farther probable from the Lineage of the Pythagorick School.

[27] * Append. to the Defence of the Philosoph. Cabbala ch. 7. sect. 5.

[28] Particular considerations out of Pherecydes, Parmenides and Aristotle, that might move one to believe that the whole Pythagorick Philosophy, as well Physical as Metaphysical, was the ancient Wisedome of the Jews.

[29] Aristot. Metaphys. lib. 1. c. 5.

[30] Clem. Strom. lib. 1.

[31] * Diog. Laërt. in vita Parmenidis.

[32] * See Append. to the Defence of the Philosophick Cabbala, ch. 7. sect. 5.

[33] * See Append. to the Philos. Cabb. ch. 1. sect. 8.

[34] * See Append. to the Philos. Cabb. ch. 7. sect. 5.

[35] The unhappy disjunction of the Physical part of the Cabbala from the Metaphysical in Leucippus, Democritus and Epicurus; with the Authours serious endeavour of re-uniting them again.

[36] That what he applies to the Text of Moses in his Philosophick Cabbala, he conceives is rational, and is assured that it exquisitely fits the Text, but deliberates further concerning the Truth thereof.

[37] The Testimonie of several holy persons that did either plainly assert, or at least had no dislike of the doctrine of the Soul's Præexistence.

[38] Clemens Alexandrinus.

[39] * And it is no wonder Clemens speaks so well of Cassianus, himself seeming to assert the same Opinion in his Protrept. where speaking of Christ he saith, He did αὖθις εἰς οὐρανοὺς ἀνακαλεῖσθες τοὺς εἰς γῆν ἐῤῥιμμένους.

[40] Origenes Adamantius, Clemens his Scholar.

[41] * See Phot. Bibliothec. Excerpt. 234.

[42] * Phot. Bibliothec. Excerpt. 117.

[43] * See Epitom. Spondan. Ann. 253. sect. 19.

[44] S. Basil and Gregorie Nazianzen.

[45] Synesius Bishop of Cyrene.

[46] * Epist. 105.

[47] Arnobius.

[48] * Advers. gent. lib. 1.

[49] Prudentius.

[50] S. Augustine.

[51] * Lib. 1.

[52] * Lib. 3.

[53] The Authour of the Book of Wisedome. Wisd. 8. 19.

[54] Wisd. 18. 24.

[55] * Chap. 5. sect. 3.

[56] Our blessed Saviour. John 9.

[57] That there is not the least clashing of Præexistence with the Derivation of Original sin from Adam.

[58] Rom. 5. 14.

[59] * Hebr. 7. 25.

[60] That Mathematical certitude in mere Philosophical Speculations need oblige no mans conscience to make profession of them against the good liking of his Superiours.

[61] Herodot. lib. 5. n. 63.

[62] Act. 5. 29.

[63] Matt. 10. 33.

[64] That if the Philosophy which he has applied to Moses his Text be true, it is a real Restauration of the Mosaick Cabbala.

Cite as: Henry More, ‘The Preface General’, from A Collection of Several Philosophical Writings (1662), pp. a2r-xxvii,, accessed 2024-06-13.