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Chap.

It is none of y^e least objections against Freewill & selfepower w^ch is urged by some, y^t it seemes to be a thing exempt from y^e Divine Jurisdiction & from ^\Gods/ Omnipotence it selfe. For according to y^e Common Hypothesis in w^ch Freewill is made essentiall to Raconall Creatures in all states, & y^e Essence of Freewill is supposed to consist in ^\such an/active indifferency & self=determinacon, as implyes a Contradiction for it to be necessarily determined by any thing w^tsoever without it, & therefore ^\{illeg}/ by God himselfe; It doth not only follow from hence w^t some Philosoph^rs & Christians have asserted y^t God cannot know beforehand w^t any Freewilled Being will doe but y^t w^ch seems s far more absurd, y^t he can not act any thing at all upon y^e Wills of them, all y^t he can doe being onely to hinder, such externall {illeg} of their wills as must be done by outward strength \&/ power or els to annihilate them & dispossesse them \quite/ of their Beings, but at \their existing &/ being supposed y^t they are, y^e inward determinac~on of their wills is a thing noe way subject to y^e Divine Omnipotensey neither can he contribute any thing y^e least, to incline their wills rather one way than another.

This is a doctrine w^ch seems to be owned by some late Assertors of Freewill, And though y^e first founders of y^e Stoicall Sect, utterly destroy'd y^e thing, allowing noe other Liberty to Man than such a Spontaneity as is in Brutes, yet some of y^e Latter Stoicks as they departed from them herein, so they are supposed to ^\/ have run into this extremity, as to have asserted such a Freewill as was invincible to God him selfe, there is one passage \out/ of Arrians Epictetus before {illeg} Cited ^\y^tsounds/ to this purpose, \&/ such also is y^t in y^e first Chap: of y^e 1.^st Book declare such secrets (this is supposed to be spoken by some y^e have \{illeg}/ power over us) I will not decline them for this is absolutely in my own power; But then I will bind thee, Canst thou bind thee? thou canst onely bind my armes or Leggs, for Jupiter but as to my will Jupiter himselfe is not able to \{illeg}/ conquer y^t.

Now as this is very strange to exempt anything in y^e world from y^e Divine Omnipotence So this Doctrine wilbe unavoidably attended with this inconvenience, y^t if all y^e freewilled Beings in y^e world, Angells & Men should be supposed to determine their wills to ^\Sin & Wickednes/ evill & to continue there in God himselfe by h w^ch is a thing possible, God himself according to this Hypothesis must onely stand by & look on

but he could noe way hinder this ruine & miscarriage of his Whole Creac~on, all y^t he could doe could onely be to annihilate it, & then Create another world of Angells & Men & try whether it would have better {illeg} or noe & so toties quoties. It seems also plainly to be repugnant to y^e ^\Religious/ Phænomena, I mean y^e Common Notions & instincts of Mankind ^\{illeg} it/ for nothing is more naturall ^\{illeg}/ nor more essentiall to Religion, then for them ^\{illeg}/ to invoke & implore y^e divine Assistance in order to Vertue & a Good Life, w^ch would be nonsense according to this Hypothesis, & there are some ranting Passages in Seneca to this purpose, as if it were simple to aka Good Mind of God |A| which is onely in a Mans own power to bestow upon himselfe, So y^t he is not at all beholding to God for it any otherwise than in y^t he bestowed such a power upon ^\him/ it. Nay all Pray^rs & Supplicac~ons to y^e Deity, for such externall thinges, as were to be brought to passe by y^e Intercec~on of Humane Wills, would be altogether vaine ^\idle/ & frustraneous.

|3| Wherefore wee must needs declare here against this Hypothesis of Freewill as false & spurious in w^ch there are these three Errors or mistakes at once ^\couched &/ Complicated together, first y^t Freewill is an Infinite selfpower, y^t can with y^e same case at any Time in a Mom.\t/ convert it selfe to y^e highest degree of Vertue & lowest degree of vice whereas there is noe such power as this possible in nature neither would such an infinite selfe flexibility be any selfe power at all. ^\but meer ^\languid/ Flaccidity/ Secondly y^t nothing can possibly be done to incline a Freewilled Being y^e least {illeg} one way ^\more/ than another without destroying its Liberty, & therefore y^t all Motives (or Reasons & Considerac~ons, y^t can be Ꝑpounded or suggested signify nothing at all, to such a Being, as if Freewilled Beings were things Ꝑfectly cut off from all naturality, loose & unhinged from all their own Good. Lastly y^t God with ^\by/ his Omnipotence can in noe Case w^tsoever break in upon Free willed Beings to over rule them stop them or Countermand them, not so much as to Ꝑmote at any way to promote there good or happinesse & to keep y^e - whole Creac~on from sinking & decaying & perfectly \or totally/ degenerating into all vice & wickednesse.

It is very true indeed y^t it implyes a Contradiction for a Being at y^e same time to be necessarily determined by somthing without it & yet freely & Contingently to determine it selfe from within. Morover it is plainly Contradictious for God to necessitate any Being to Sin not onely because, y^e Will of God is y^e Rule of Vertue & morality w^ch it <72> \w^ch yet/ has an immutable & Essentiall Will in \of his/ him y^t \and/ himselfe cannot {illeg} \contradict/ but also because w^tsoever is done by outward necessity cannot be sin, nor blameworthy, but it is an Error to think ^\that Freewilled Beings/ a person essentially such in all their actings, & soe independently upon God, as y^t God Himselfe, cannot break in upon them, nor discerne y^m {illeg} y^t exercise of Freewill in them, w^ch when he doth, they will \could/ for y^t Time be neither lyable to Blame or Commendac~on; for such Inclinac~ons & Determinacons as they were wholly passive to, It cannot be doubted but y^t all Creatures are in Gods hand as y^e Clay is in y^e \Potters/ hands of y^e Potter formakeble by him into any Shape & passive to any - impressions y^t he will please· to make upon them. All actions & Inclinac~ons are either intrinsically Good & such as y^t y^e absence thereof \of them/ cannot be without Sin or ^\else/ intrinsically Evill or els \lastly/ such as may be, or not be, without sin Now Gods Power consider'd absolutely (without respect to his Wisdome & Goodnesse) extending to all thinges w^ch doe not imply a Contradiction to be done, doth \cannot but/ extend to ^\y^e Ꝑduction & so/ all these in his Creatures \at least materially considered/ for it doth not imply a Contradiction & \for/ another {illeg} Wherefore as to y^e former of these three, it cannot be doubted but y^t God by his Omnipotence could in a mom^t convert a Devill into An Angell if it were agreable to his Wisdome, thus miraculously to interpose & disturb y^e Course of nature, for why might not hee, y^t could create an Angell in a state of Holynesse, be able also to translate or Metamorphose, y^t is Destr a Devill into an Angell, y^t is destroy y^t vitious Habit in him, & infuse a vertuous Disposition upon him, in w^ch Change y^e Metamorphosed Devil or Angell; would deserve noe Commendac~on ^\for it/ e Contributing noe activity of its own to \it/ y^e Change

And for Adiaphorous Dispositions or Actions if there were a necessity for y^e {illeg}\full/filling of any P^rdiction or y^e accomplishm^t of any great designe of Providence, noe d^bt but God could take as it were our wills ^\as it were/ into his own hand, as Ꝑhaps he may sometimes ^\do/ y^e hearts of Kings ^\& Princes/ w^ch have y^e greatest influence upon Humane affaires & turn them as y^e Rivers of waters w^ch way he pleaseth, & for And for vitious Dispositions & actions there is noe more power required to them neither is there any more reason, why Gods Omnipotence could not extend to them also; \A/ but onely <73> onely because his Omnipotence is manag'd by his Goodnesse to w^ch it is contradictious for him so to doe ^\{illeg}/ it being y^e worke of an abad Abaddon a Marrer or Destroyer, & not of a Good Creatour {illeg} ^\to spoile any of his Creatures & as it were to vnmake them &/ Thought he may use y^e wickednesse of Men ^\allso/ for good ends of his own & Judicially hardne as being \some/ in there wickednesse w by withholding y^t Assistance ^\in some {illeg}/ w^ch is necessary for their recovery. \I say/ Though it imply a Contradiction for any thing to be necessarily determin'd by God & yet contingently to determine it selfe at y^e same time, yet it implyes noe Contradiction, for Freewilled Beings to be passive to Divine Determinac~ons \to prepossession to/ it being essentiall to Creatures as such y^t they may be any way \to be/. Passive to y^e Deity It is not essentiall to Freewilled Beings alwayes to determine themselves freely \willingly/ Nay it is possible for \them/ Freewilled Beings to have y^e exercise of y^t Faculty of Freewill ^\aswell as their Reason itselfe/ totally Suspended in them, for a while; and as it were consopited - For it is plaine there is noe more active use of Freewill & selfe power in Infants than of Reason, nor much if any in adult Ꝑsons when \in/ a Sleep and very little in dow^\ne/right Fools & Madmen, wherefore it is plaine \manifest/ y^t Humane Souls are capable of y^e variety & differ^t degrees of Life, For as they may be exalted to y^t high\er/ participac~on of y^e Divine nature So they may also become sink down even to brutishnesse itselfe, & become y^e most pitifull & despicable thinges, even like y^e Beast y^t perish; Wherefore \And/ though y^t Pythagoricall Opinion of y^e transmigrac~on of Humane Souls into fe{illeg}ine Bodyes be justly to be exploded vpon other grounds, yet we cannot say it is impossible, for y^e Divine power to deprive a Man of all exercise of y^t Faculty of Freewill as well as of reason & to make him continue for many Ages in noe better State than y^t was of his \our/ infancy or in noe higher degree of Life than we now {illeg} \or in what {illeg} we are asleep where/ a third part of our time in sleep ^\in y^e silling of Dreames A/ Wee Mortales are lyable to become almost w^tsoever God \will/ please to make us who yet will never ^\make vs soe \{illeg}/ without o^r own fault, nay/ being any to this low ebb of an irreversable insensibility of all difference of Good & Evill & an utter losse of all Morall Selfe power (w^ch is a state of brutishnesse, \&/ y^e ^\very/ ruine & decay of y^r Manly nature though never so much subtilty of Logic^\all Reason/ still remaine) till they ^\haue/ justly profited both by a long abuse of Them {illeg} fate may attend them God onely knowes

Now from these p^rmisses we cannot but conclude, but y^t God by his power may whensoever it is agreable to his wisdome {illeg}metamorphose humane souls from vice to vertue, as in y^e Case before menc~oned if there could ever happen such an vniversall Ruine & Decay of Rationall Creatures, as y^t by y^e abuse of y^t Freewill they should generally miscarry why a might not appeare in this Case wee doe not know. Wherefore we are far from denying a possibility of an irresistable Grace to be exercis'd by God and such an Election as is noe way conseq^t upon our Faith & Conversion in order of nature but Antecedent to it.

But ^it is neither agreable to Scripture nor sound Reason for us to think y^t none are recovered or saved without such an irresistable Grace and p^rventive Election as this is, y^t is y^t none become Good but by absolute fatality for ^\then/ it will follow from thence y^t all y^t are wicked are irresistably & fatally soe too. For as God doth not forcibly & miraculously make any Man vicious y^t is brutish & Ignorant (though it is not beyond his power soe to doe) because it is ^\repugnant to his/ essentiall to his Goodnesse & holynesse so neith^r doth he miraculously & irresistably make all Men Holy & Vertuous bec~ it is repugnant to his wisdome so to doe, some acc^t whereof we shall endeavour to give afterward in a peculiar Chap: |And according to that Hypothesis all Holines & Righteousnes would be a True & Proper Miracle|

Now here lyes another grand Objection against Liberty of Will & self-power, y^t whereas y^e Assertors of it have set up y^t Hypothesis a for this very Reason y^t they might thereby salve y^e Phænomenon of Sin & free God from all Imputac~on of Blame in it they doe not consider how they doe in y^e Mean time rob God of all y^e Glory of vertue & Righteousnesse not attributing \denying/ y^e Causality \of that/ thereof unto him ^\allso/ for if Men by their own freewill & selfepower (whereby they have a Dominion & Lordship of over their actions) are y^e proper Causes of Evill then they must needs be soe \y^e Causes/ of Good too. & be their own Saviours & Authors of their own happinesse.

But wee shall now undertake to shew y^t as the Hypothesis of Freewill is necessary to be admitted to make Sin & Vice somthing, y^t is reall Evills in nature & to free God from y^e imputac~on of it, so it cannot at all be charged with this Inconvenience, y^t it wipes God of \all/ y^e Glory of Mens Righteousnesse & Salvac~on & derives y^e Causality of it wholly upon themselves. |And if wee can really effect this & make it clearly appeare y^t| as y^e Hypothesis of Freewill free <75> from God from y^e imputacion of Sin & Evill & Conseq^tly of Mens damnation, so it no way robbs him of y^e Glory of Mens Salvac~on then we shall have removed one of y^e greatest p^rjudices y^t is against this Doctrine

Now to make this out we shall first lay our foundac~on here y^t Mankind are more by their own default in a Lapsed Vitiated & Depraved state by meanes whereof the strength of their Freewill & selfepower \is very much impaired/ as to true Righteousnesse, w^ch though it be called by very differ^t names whereof some are in more Credit than others, {illeg} somtime Morall Good Morality & Honesty & Vertue w^ch are not commonly in so gr^t repute, somtime Holynesse Godlinesse Divinity & y^e Divine Life & nature yet I ta w^ch Expressions sound higher yet I take them all to be one & y^e same thing. So y^t we doe not now stand upon Even ground, but are under gr^t disadvantage & therefore stand in need of some other Divine Assistance to recover & repair this our lapsed state. Nay y^e ruine y^t we are under is soe gr^t as y^t we must be regenerated & quite made over anew & transformed into a new Life differ^t from y^t w^ch wee are now \first/ possessed with, before we can be truly either Holy or happy.

And we must observe here, y^t this was y^e great & fundamentall Erro^r of Pelagius y^t he denyed Mankind to beleive in a vitious state, but asserted y^t Men as God made them at first had noe determinac~on to Morality one way than \or/ another upon them neither Vertuous nor Vicious Dispositions; but as Aristotle supposed y^t y^e Mind of Man in respect of Truth was in it selfe but Rasa Tabula, an Empty Table Book or White paper y^t had nothing at all written in it but receive all its Notions by being afterwards scribled upon by Object without, So Pelagius supposed as Aristot & his follow^rs did y^t Man as God & nature brought him into this world was a Perfect Blank as to Vertue or Vice & indiffer^t to either, till afterward by his own Free will & acc~ons he contracted a Customary Inclinac~on towards one \way/ or other, for so saith ^\And so indeed/ Aristotle ^\in his Ethicks/ as Men are not borne Archytects nor Musitians or Lutonists but onely by playing upon y^e Lute often acquire such a Habit \in their fingers/ of moving y^e Strings so or soe, So y^e Case is ^\y^e same/ for vertue or Vice ^\The same Pelagius held/ y^t those ^\things/ are thinges \are/ of after acquisition, by action & Habit, for these are his own words Omne Bonum et Malum quo vel laudabiles vel Vituperabiles sumus non nobissum oritur sed agitur a nobis (a paces enim utrius non pleni nascimur, et ut sine virtute, ita sine vitio nassimur; at ante Actionem & priæ Voluntatis id solum in Homine est quod Deus Condidit, And againe \So Juliane his Follower/ nullum est de Natura Conditione peccatum, sed L: A: in natura Hominum Ꝑseverat. And againe naturam Humanam in excedijs nascenti esse innocentiæ deus Locupatam

Who also would endeavour to demonstrate y^t it must needs {illeg} after this manner, Etiamsi Diabolus creavit Homines nullâ suà culpa mali essent, et Ideo jam nec Mali essent quia esse quisquam nisi quod natus est non potest nec ab Ea justum est aliquid amplius flagitare quam potest If one should suppose y^e Devill to have made Men, y^t they would not have been Evill by their own fault & therefore neth^r will not blame-worthy at all since noe Man can be otherwise then w^t he is made to be neither is it just to require of Sin more than by nature he can bee: |X|

Neither was this all Pelagius his Errour in w^ch he hath y^e Consent of Aristotle & some other Heathen Philosoph^rs, but also he ventur'd to assert somthing further contrary to Aristotle himselfe & all other|s| Antient Philosoph^rs y^t Freewill or y^e Power y^t Men have to Morall Good is not at all impaired by Sin or Vitious Actions but as if it were Essentially indivisible & could never be more or lesse in a Man was a like both in Vitious & in Vertuous Ꝑsons thus Julian his follower speaks for Him peccantes non \ad/ Abritrij Libertatem sed Conscientiam Justitiæ Ꝑ diderunt Librū autem Arbitrū et post peccatum tam plenum est quam fuit antepeccata, and againe Nos dicinius peccato Hominis non natura statum mutari sed meriti qualitatem: i:e: et in peccante hanc esse Lib~ij Arb~ij naturam Ꝑ quā potest a peccato definere quæ fuit in Eo ut possit a Justitia devi|B|are; \B/ w^ch Assertion is not onely contrary to Aristotle, but plainly repugnant, & y^e to all sense & Experience & y^e Common Notions of all Mankind y^t by Vitious Habits y^e power or strength to Morall Good is proporc~onably weakned & impaired. And \But/ I observe y^t of late Times Many Men are ^\renderd/ something ^\more/ inclinable to this grosse Pelagian Errour meerly from a false Notion or Definition of L A: y^t it essentially consists in such a power \Liberty/ of Contrariety, y^t is, to Good or Evill y^t one is ^\allwayes/ equally inclined & indiffer^t to one to one or other of them; In w^ch respect they take it to bee ^\such/ a thing as can never receive Magior~ et Mino~ any intenc~on or remission Those falsely y^t conceived y^t both y^e Liberty & strength of Freewill consists in such an indifferency to those opposites Morall Good & Evill whereas its strenght is onely to Good & then it is in its ἀκμὴ or vigorous strength when it is soe fixed in Good - Morall Habits, & it is in y^e Lowest degree of Languor & weakenesse, when it is fixedly & stupidly confirmed in Evill Habits, the possibility of Converting to Evill being really nothing but y^e weaknesse of y^t power called L: A: or <77> or Freewill, wherefore an Equilibriousness 'twixt Vertue & vice is not y^e Power of Freewill nor Essentiall to it but a Certaine middle state of it in such as are neither way Vitious nor Vertuous. But an Infinite selfe flexibility & Power of turning ourselves in a Mom^t to y^e Highest Vertue & \or/ y^e Lowest Vice is noe Power nor any thing possible in nature noe more than it can be a power to be infinitely weak & strong at y^e same Time

Nothing is more plaine in Philosophy than y^t y^e strength of Freewilled Beings as to Morall Good & Evill as diminishable & increaseable & therefore y^t by com~itting of Evill actions it must needs bee Ꝑporconably impaired according to y^e frequency & kind of them But y^t noe Raconall Creature can be made by God in Ꝑfectly neutrall & Oudeterous state to Morall Good & Evill so y^t \as if/ Morality did not \did not/ belong to a Man as a Man & according to his make noe more than to be a ^\good or bad/ Lutinist or Grammarian ^\did/ but y^t both of them are meerly adventitious, & acquisitious affections or Denominac~ons coming in upon \Habits/ Actions we have demonstrated before; & therefore y^t all Rac~onall Beings must be created by God πῶς διακεί μενοι somways or other affected towards Morality The τὸ μέσον of y^e Soul y^e Redoubled selfe active Life of y^e Soul must needs have some certaine propensity \Respect/ or other in it towards y^t higher Divine & y^t Lower selfish Instinct of \selfish/ Life

And that in Men as they are borne Vertue hath not naturally a P^redominancy in them though we sh^ld set aside y^e Scripture & w^t it speakes of Adams fate & y^e Redemption made by Christ is sufficiently evident by y^e Common Phænomena of Humane Life. And therefore y^e Lapse of Humane Souls was an Hypothesis admitted by y^e best of y^e Heathen Philosophers, though they could not give y^t acc^t of it as \y^t/ wee doe \can/ from Adams fall.

Now this being granted y^t in Men as born into y^e world y^e power of ^\their/ Freewill is not equilibrious to Good & Evill but y^t they are lapsed & sunk lower under y^e Law of their Members p^redominating over them, it is necessary y^t there sh^ld be some further Assistance of Divine Grace to help them towards their recovery for otherwise they must needs be acknowledged to be under either an absolute impossibility or at least so great a difficulty of Recovery y^t it would be a thousand to one whether they w^ld

they would ever emerge againe. And who can make make any d^bt but y^t when a Man is deeply sunk into vitious Habits if Providence sh^ld doe nothing at all towards his change & recovery ^\nothing to direct him in it/ but let him injoy y^e gratificac~on of all his Lusts & Appetites without any Comptroul disturbance or inconvenience, he still enjoying \possessing/ Ꝑfect Habits & having all thinges according to his own mind, but he would continue in this sensuall Life to all Eternity. |X|

Wherefore we affirme y^t Man being now by his own default plunged into such a state of degeneracy & Imbecility to Morall Good y^t God doth not utterly leave him to himselfe in this Condic~on without affording him any help or assistance & standby onely & look on as utterly abandoning him whilst he \him to/ Ꝑish in this State but casts a very compassionate eye upon him & doth many wayes extend his Grace towards Him in order to his recovery to a state of true happinesse. And first though we could not challenge any thing from God in a way of debt when wee had Pvoked & disobliged yet he publikely declared to all in y^e Gosple his readinesse to be reconciled \to all/ through his Son who hath made a Ꝑpitiatory Sacrifice for them as it were earnestly beseeching them to lay a side all Jealousies & distrusts of him & to close with his offered pardon upon y^e termes w^ch he had Ꝑposed w^ch is unfeigned endeavo\r/ of amendm^t according to y^t power w^ch they have Ꝑmising them a fresh additionall supply & y^e more to invite them hereto neither doth he {illeg} \onely/ help y^e defect of their Ignorance by y^e outward Instruction of a written word, but also quicken & stimulate them ^\Actively/ by hopes of the most glorious rewards on y^e one hand & feares and \of/ y^e most dismall punishm^ts on the other, these to be differ^tly dispensed at a publicke & solemne Day of Judgm^t when All shalbe made to appeare before y^e Gr^t Tribunall. Which Gosple Provision & De|i|claracon \spensation/ is ^\in itselfe/ a most powerfull Engine to worke upon all y^e naturall powers \Faculties/ in Men & to rowz them up & awaken them. And therefore this is often called in scripture by y^e name of Grace.

Secondly not to insist upon y^t wise Contrivance & Constitucon of thinges y^t God hath framed both within a Mans ^\selfe/ wheth^r there is somthing y^t allwayes checks him for \& controlls/ wickednesse, & many Animall Passions ^\w^ch/ themselves are Provocac~ous & Spurrs to Virtue but also in y^e Œconomy of y^e ^\whole/ world ^\without/ where <79> where Vice & Wickednesse how much ^\soever/ pursued {illeg} is alwayes disgracefull & Vertue resplend^t & Honourable because \But/ all these thinges may be thought to belong to nature though Nature it selfe is Grace as I shall shew afterward; and \wherefore/ I say, not to insist upon this, God is not wanting by speciall & peculiar Providen^ce to contribute to y^e Recovery of lapsed souls, according to their severall circumstances, though it be \& though/ in a way fully agreable to their own Liberty of acting & without offering violence to y^t Free Principle in them yet powerfully & effectually to in order to their Good of ^\they correspōdētly/ put forth any readinesse to comply with y^e same? Wee did before observe out of Plato y^t Man hath not y^e Soul\le/ Goverm^t of himselfe by his own Freewill, but y^t God & Opportunity governe y^e most of all Humane affaires. Neither is this true of Civill things onely but also of Morall, for y^e greatest part of us is nature & y^e least selfe activity. So y^t y^e Disposing of outward Providentiall Circumstances will have a gr^t \ sway &/ influence upon y^e altering of our Morall Dispositions, & may Contribute very much either to Cacillate; or impede & obstructe y^e improvem^t of y^e mind. Counsells exhortations ^\Providētiall/ Opportunities, affliction & castigations, cōtribute reasonable matter, to \have no small influence vpon/ o^r Morall Determinations - To think y^t y^e Faculty of Freewill is such an Indifferēcy in y^t noth circūstances without vs haue any force at all vpō vs, is a great mistake. One of the Christian fathers calls a happy change & performation of Life made the gift of a feauer as if had not providence visited him opportunely with such a Castigation he the person had ^\probably/ continued as he was before And sant Paul himselfe that great Herold & Trumpeter of Grace was conuerted by means of \an/ extreordinary prouidence, w^ch though it was not without somthing of miracle, yet for ought wee know \it/ was without any irresistable force uppon his will, as therfore he did euer after throughout his whole life deseruedly acknowledge, \& admire/ that speceall grace of God by w^ch he was conuerted & made a hearty \sincere/ Christian |X Apostle|

But thirdly this is not all. For grace and prouidence doth not content itselfe to act soe remotely ^\onely/ but it makes closer \neerer/ approches to & ^\closer/ assaults uppon y^e faith or \Fort &/ garrison of mans heart it beseigeth it, by inward motions and suggestions, {illeg} \{illeg} Cogitations/ ations Inclinations and attractions for as y^e Contrary <80> powers are busy in this kind to worke uppon mans phansys & imaginations and raise seuerall Scens of thoughts to y^m to allure and draw forth seuerall \unclean/ lusts from them soe it can not be doubted but God and those blessed Genij aboue those inuisable wat\c/hmen are actiue and uigilant in this kind to counterworth them there being as Plato somwhere speaks a perpetuall war in y^e world betwixt the inuisable powers belonging to \of/ two seuerall kingdoms y^e one of Light & y^e other of darknes each one endeauoring to enlarge their teritories and encrease their parties \*/ [but y^e artifice of diuine prouidence hath soe framed the contriuance and contexture of all things that y^e worser things should not preuaile \{illeg}/ but that vertue may be triumphant & wickednes be kept under in the world] [ the whole Heaven and air is full of good and bad spirits and there is an immortall war betwixt them and therfore wee haue need to haue infinite caution but the Gods and Dæmons are our Assistants for wee are the possesciendi of the Gods and Dæmons] soe that unles wee be wanting to ourselues diuine grace and prouidence will not \never/ be wanting to us

Now this diuine grace of inward assistance afforded to y^e Souls and minds of men, is not single but manyfold for there is both preuenting ^\or exciting/ grace that is before hand with us and anticipates ^\y^e endeavours &/ the free principle in us w^ch if complied withall is seconded with further subsequent grace of inward corroboration, \&/ illumination ^\& Abstractiō/ and at last all is crowned with compleating confirming grace, without w^ch Soules can not be sure \{illeg}/ of their station in heauen itselfe but would be obnoxious to those Platonicall whirling correlations \Revolutions/ All free willed Creatures being in themselues lubricous and slippery, and therefore \Insomuch y^t/ many of the Angels themselues bringing \y^t/ not their principality \but/ lost their own ^\heavēly/ habitations; but of this completing & confirming grace wee speake more else where

Wherefore some divine grace doth both preuentiously begin \& excite/ and perfectually \concomitantly/ assist & carry on & astly \Vltimately/ consummate the worke of mans ^\Conversio~ &/ saluation ^\for his saluatio~ is partly but his Conversiō to God & Rightousness/ mans will & selfe power w^ch is taken along with it acting but a smale part herein; in the intermedious {illeg} wee may well conclude with the pious and learned Origen <81> that mans freewill & selfe actiuity doth contribute ^\uery/ much {illeg} attainment of the true good thro that diuine grace & power. This is the least that can be said \we haue to say/ in this busnes, that mans freewill and selfepower doth but contribute but a uery litle towards the bettering of our \his/ minds and y^t diuine prouidence & grace has by far, the greater influence & Causality ^\{illeg}/ for afterward wee shall ascend to a higher Climax and show y^t indeed all y^e proper Causality \it is wholly and/ therefore entirely to be de\a/scribed to God and Grace. But for y^e present let us call it as here it is, y^t there is somthing don by y^e will & actiuity w^ch God by nature has bestowne uppon man and \but yet/ y^t God by Grace doth y^e greater part. This is more largely declared by the fore mencioned Origen after this manner Pag 99 the true good of rationall Beings doth not wholly depend on his \their/ own proarresis Will or Election as som Philosophers asserted, but consists mixtly of that and by y^e diuine power & Grace conspiring, for there is not only need of both these, to witt, of man's freewill and Gods conspiring Grace, or man (w^ch is not in the power of our will) to make a man Good holy & uertuous but alsoe to make ^\him/ that is good to perseuere therin for he y^t hath attaned to y^e greatest perfection in Rightuousnes would presently fall into ruin and decay if he should be puffed up with a conceit herof and arrogating y^e cause herof to himselfe and if he should not ascribe the Glory of it to him who has contributed exceedingly much more towards y^e acquisition & possesion then his owne will did By w^ch it appears \seems/ that this learned and pious Father is mostly censured by some as proleptically {illeg} \a Pelagian by Prolepsis,/ for as to inward Grace and diuine \spirituall/ assistance Pelagius {illeg} \to/ y^e last would not acknowledge \it/ to be necessary but only \vsefull &/ profitable, Moreover he rightly concluds from these premises y^t therfore the whole success of our spirituall improuement is allways to be as thankfully ascribed to y^e diuine power and Grace and in this sence \to think/ of the Apostle is to be understood \it is/ not of him y^t willeth nor of him y^t runneth but of God That showeth mercy. pag 100 not as if God did shew mercy without our willing & running & \as/ if man did not at all cooperate but the because our willing & running is nothing at all in comparishon of y^e Grace of God then to mans \own/ willing & running The same Author in his compars the forementioned place of Sa\t/ Paul's with two other places of Scripture The on y^t in the 127 psalme except y^e Lord build the house they labo^ur in uaine y^t build it except y^e Lord keeps the Keep y^e Watchmen watcheth but in vaine from whence it cannot be inferred y^t the Carpenter or workman did nothing at all but y^t without Gods {illeg} <82> all our endeavours in these externall things of Life, are \is/ insignificant and {illeg} the other passage is y^t of S^t Paul himselfe the 1 of Corinth 3 I haue planted Apollo watered but God gaue the encrease soe then nether is he y^t planteth any thing nor he that watereth but God y^t giueth y^e encrease It is plaine y^t euen in these naturall things as in building & planting or keeping a City that is beseiged by enemies though it can not be denyed but y^t mans Industry & endeauor is used in all yet the good success is by all ascribed according to y^e instincts of nature unto God and much more ought thus to be in Spiritualls where God doth doe much more and mans will and endeauor far les Cum bonos at utrium fructas ad perfectam maturitatem {illeg} reget nemo pie et concenienter dicet quod fructus istos Agricola ferit sed a Deo fatebitur præscitos ita et eam nostra perfectio non quidem nobis cessantibus et aliosis efficetur nec tamen consumatio eius nobis sed Deo qui est prima et præcipua causa operis adscribetur Sic cum maris superauserit marina discrimina quam uis multo Labore nautar et omni nauticiteartir opere impense et Gubernatoris studio at industria adhibitus res agatur, uentorum quo aspirantibus fluctibus et astyrium signes diligenter notatis, si tamen nauis undis et fluctibus fatigatur\a/ ad portum salua perpenit, nemo sani sensus nisi misericordiæ Dei salutem navis ascribet Sed ne ipse quidem nauta uel Gubernatorandit duire ego saluam nauem sed totum ad Dei misericordian refert non quod senseat \sentiat/ re nihil ad saluandum nauem ver|l| artus adhibuisa uel Laboris sed quoniam sensit a se quidem laborem salutem {illeg} Deo præstitam naui \So/ when a Ship is tossed by a storme of|at| Sea, though y^e marinars use much labour to preserue it and Steere it sofly, and the chief Pilate imploy all his art and industry to y^e same purpose diligently obseruing both y^e motion of y^e winds and alsoe of the Starres if the Ship at last though \shattred &/ wearied with ^\long/ contesting with y^e winds and billows ariue safe to y^e mercy of God nether will y^e chiefe Pilate dare to arrogate it to himselfe and say I haue saued the Ship wholy by \my/ own art and endeauour but will refer it to y^e diuine Goodness, not y^t he contributed nothing at all by his art and industry thervnto but y^t \becaus/ notwithstanding his pains that deliuerance was owing to y^e diuine mercy and Goodness but y^t this without Gods prouidence and Goodness might haue proued vtterly unsuccessfull. Now if the case be soe in these ordinarys things of humane life, y^t \notwithstanding o^r Endeavours the successe is attributed to/ in Good succesion our endeauours doe not derogate at all from Gods mercy & prouidence much but \more/ in Spirituall things where God acts more immediately \notwithstanding o^r small Activity y^e {illeg} is to be/ doth y^e activity of mans will derogate from divine Grace \ascribed to Divine God & Divine/ everything {illeg} ought to be ascribed intirely to God

Now from this Hypothesis of mans will contributing something of its own activity but divine grace challenging \for/ the greatest part of y^t w^ch is don in the inward par change of mens mind, towards good it seems y^t God deals with mankind somthing on y^t manner as Parents doe often with their Children {illeg} ^\y^t will/ let them haue somthing in their own Custody as their own, but \yet/ not set much as to make them which forget y^mselues and thinke them^\selves/ independent In those of whom they receiued it, and to whome they ^are \owe/ their Being but ^\will/ scope them in continuall ^\need &/ expectations of new voluntary ^\supplied/ superadditions, that they may not grow insolent but haue about becomes {illeg}& thankfullnes & subiection. Thus wee haue all by nature some small tallent of selfe actiuity, bestowed uppon us, wherby wee can contribute somthing ^\little/ to our own Good, but this is soe inconsiderable in itselfe that without continuall ^\new/ Superadditions ^\of Order/ it would proue alltogether uneffectuall, God \{illeg}/ keep\ing farre/ the greater part in his own hand {illeg} to make us know ourselues & y^e dependance uppon him w^ch he {illeg} \{illeg}/ wisely dispenseth to us according to our Correspondent Compliances with his grace and improuements of what wee haue |A|receiued \A/ And that this is noe bigoticall conceit of Religionists only but a reall truth agreeable to y^e Catholicke sence of ^\and {illeg}/ nature of all mankind appears from hence that all men are led by inward instinct rogare bonam mentem ^\a Deo/ to implore the diuine Assistance for the bettering of their minds ^\& for strength ag^st Tentations/ and it is obseruable that those who ^\are/ supposed to asserted such a freewill or Liberty in man as is inaimable to God himselfe, and w^ch he could noe way act uppon {illeg} ^\give their suffringe herunto for so/ Epectetus in Arrian Contradicting his own Hypothesis aduiseth all men in all their inward agonys and Conflicts with temptations to betake themselues {illeg} \for/ refuge to the diuine assistance & earnestly to implore the same as conceiuing they might receiue much benefit therby. Pag 213 when thou {illeg} portunatly assaulted by thine own ungouernable phansys see y^t thou stoutly resists them & suffer not thy selfe to be snatcht away will then Consider y^t this is a matter of noe small Concernment whether thou yeilds or not but a thing of the greatest moment of all it is a dispute Concerning a kingdom concerning Liberty tranquillity & ataraxy and now thinke of God and earnestly call uppon him as thy helper and assister {illeg} solelicitude and uehemency of mind, then y^e Marriners ^\vp to call/ call uppon Castor & Pollux in a Storm & tempest ^\at sea/ for what more dangerious storme or tempest is there then that w^ch ariseth from strong phansies uiolently baring down \opposing/ person

Now that men doe naturally inuoke the Deity and implore his assistance for these strenthing of their minds against the Assaults of temptations is a plaine argument y^t according to y^e sence of nature mans free will is in it selfe insufficeant and stands in need of an aduentitious {illeg} assistance of diuine grace

But to thinke as some doe \y^t/ an inward will must be totally excluded as to any actiuity of indeauour whatsoeuer ^\towards God/ and y^t all must be don uppon \him/ by an irresistable force & ther can be noe grace without this nor can God haue glory of mans Conuersion & Saluation, otherwise This is \seems to me but/ but a rude and Rusticall conceit ^\of a Deity/ & \and allso/ far from the truth, and as for in absolute fatality & irresistable necessity there can nether be uertue nor piety, there being nothing but Gods own acting and what could ^\not/ be possibly otherwise then it is, and therfore noe foundation for blame or Commendation in y^e Creature. Moreouer they that will needs exe haue all men to be saued & made good by an irresistable Goodnesse forc'd uppon them, they must needs determine alsoe y^t all men are \shall are be/ damned by an irresistable wickednes w^ch they could noe|t| way auoyd, that is, y^t ether they had a wicked Nature or else were made wicked by diuine fate. To assert either of w^ch is all one as to say, that they had noe wickednes at all in them, but were \are/ damned merly by will & power without Justice, and y^t y^e Deity is such a Being whoe glorys in nothing else but in an arbitrary distribution of happines and misery uppon his Creaturs in fondly loueing \doting upō/ the Persons of some, and keeping \vp/ all feauours & delights \praises/ uppon them as \w^ch/ they can possibly receiue & {illeg} \most/ partially Hating others and tormenting them \ex beneplicito/ to all Eternity. Lastly if all Vertue be by irresistable fate or necessity and not freely exerted from any inward principle by \then/ that being in w^ch it is then it can neuer call it ^\a perfection of/ its own it being only a thing clapt uppon it, \w^ch is as Passive/ noe more then the banks can call y^e water its \their/ own that \glides/ runs throw it ^\between them/ nether could God haue \receve/ any hearty Loue or deuoute affection from his Creaturs all theire Diety being a more forcing|ed| ^\& violent/ and or artificial thing, Where as in truth God desires from his Creatues somthing y^t is \inwardly/ y^mselues; y^t freely & naturally floes from them when uitally springs from in themselues \& is \actively/ uitall in them/ As he would {illeg} haue y^m decked with ornaments of their own and to haue an inward \innate/ {illeg} and not to be drest up wholy with ascititious ^\& borrowed/ things & \or/ to be daubd ouer with paint & Varnish.

Wherefore the thing w^ch providence is allways endeauoring \after/ it ^\gently/ to prolicite ^\allure/ and draw forth the free principle in man y^t it may ^\from/ with in it selfe actiuely display y^t Life ^\of its own/ w^ch it at once Vertue Piety & Happines. All y^e \/Methods of providence tends to this, and all things are most artificially contriued by it in order to this end, nether doth God think himselfe glorified any otherwise by his Creaturs then when himselfe & Vertue are thus freely and Heartally loued and earnestly \panted/ pursued after \by them/ from an inward ^\vnstraind &/ and unforced principle |A| of their owne: \A/ But it is a most {illeg} ^\& cyclopicall/ conceit of the Deity by w^ch it is much wronged to thinke y^t it Seeks to glorify itselfe Cyclopically only by power & thunderbolts, \or by meer ^\irrationall/ Will & arbitrary favour/ and by engrossing all Activity w^th its own hands it no so doing all itself and not suffering any thing else \to act besides/ All w^ch is but an indigāt & snarking desire of Glory vnworthy of y^e Deity.

But y^e worst Ꝑjudice of all in this kind is this y^t \some/ they cannot think any thing to be Grace to them unlesse it were partially bestowed on them. & y^e greatest part of Mankind \be/ as partially excluded from it, \y^e former/ That there is noe Grace shewed to themselves unlesse there be cruelty exprest to others w^ch whereas this is nothing but a narrow self-love of their own y^t would make them monopolize y^e Divine favour, from whence also is y^t concept w^chthey have of y^e Deity y^t it cannot think it selfe free otherwise than by an irrac~onall Arbitrary self Will & if it be ty'd up by any Goodnesse Wisdome & Equity.

But now because Any thing besides absolute & irresistible fate ^\partially determining salvatiō to some few & absolutely excluding all y^e Possibility of it/ is commonly branded by some by y^e name of Pelagianisme Wee shall here briefly shew also y^t this is a great mistake, And to this purpose Wee must a little unravel Church Antiquity First therefore Wee shall observe y^t before Pelagius started up it was y^e generally received Doctrine of y^e Antient Chatholick Xtian Church & S^t. Augustin himself ^\consenting/ that Ꝑdestinac~on to Glory & Elecc~on was by Ꝑscience & foreknowledge of Mens Faith & Repentance \XA/ In Origens Philocalia This is y^e title of y^e 25^t Chapt: , That Ꝑdestinac~on out of foreknowledge doth not destroy freewill In w^ch it is asserted . That Ꝑdestinac~on is not y^e Cause of Justificac~on & Gloryficac~on, but foreknowledge is before Ꝑdestinac~on according to y^t of y^e Scripture whom he foreknew them he also Ꝑdestinated; neith to be conformable to y^e Image of |B| his form, \B/ Neither did {illeg} from Origen as some Ꝑtend as if he had infected those y^t followed after him therew^th Nor did those y^t followed after Pelagius receive this Doctrine wholly from him For to spare Ꝑticular quotac~ons here y^e Late Authour of y^e Pelagian History pronounceth universally Græci patrei sempre Patrum Latinorum verò Illi qui ante Au~stinum vixerunt dicere solent eos esse Ꝑdestinatos ad vitam, quos Deos pie recteꝗ vivere Ꝑvidet sive ut alij loquunt quos Ꝑvidetare {illeg} And Prosper Himselfe who so much opposed Pelagianisme pœnè omnium Parinvenitur et una Sententia qua Ꝑpositum et Ꝑdestinac~onuem Dei, ut ab hoc Deus alios vasa honoris, alios vasa Contumeliæ fecerit, quia finem {illeg} Ꝑviderit & sub ipso Gratia adjutario, qua futurus esset voluntate et actione Ꝑsuivit

From w^ch last words ^\of Prosper we may observe y^t/ they did not understand by P^rescience a foreknowledg of what Men ould doe only by y^e strength of nature without any assistance of Divine Grace; but of y^e (w^ch was y^e Doctrine of Pelagius) but of w^t they would doe in complyance both with ^\both/ y^e Ꝑventing & subsequent Grace of God. And all, both before & after Pelagius did determine, y^t none should be damned because they could not obey God but onely because they would not, & y^e most Zealous Opposers of Pelagius themselves {illeg} an Anathema upon \those that/ those y^t any held y^t any one was Ꝑdestinated to Evill: Wherefore they all asserted Divine Grace not by way of exclusion of L: A: but in consistency with y^e same. But when they ^\St Austin/ determined y^t Men were not saved meerly according to Merits there meaning was, onely this, y^t they were not saved by y^e Merit of what they did onely from y^e strength of nature w^thout y^e Assistance of Divine Grace. So y^t they had either noe Grace at all; or els noe other than w^t was first merited by y^e worke of meer Nature wherefore all y^e Difference betwixt y^e Orthodox & ^\the/ Pelagians \was/ Whether may a Man by his naturall Power of Freewill without any ^\inward/ assistance of Divine Grace anteced^t thereunto c~ld merit & Lowre to himselfe {illeg}all Salvac~on, & S^t Austin himselfe (though somtime in his heat of Opposition against y^e Pelagians) he seem'd to be transported further than y^e rest & to have held a singular Opinion of his own y^t so \seems/ hardly reconcileable with any Power of Freewill, yet he often {illeg} & contradicts it agen, & by all means endeavours to decline y^e Odium of destroying L: A:

And whereas it was very obvious here to object y^t we plainly see by experience, y^t all Men have not y^e same advantages, by Divine Providence afforded to them in order to their Repentance & Amendm^t y^t others have having not y^e meanes of Grace alike afforded them nor Oppertunity & length of time w^ch therefore should seem to be referred to some Absolute and Anteced^t Ꝑdestinac~on the Antient Fathers often declared y^t though this is a certaine unsearchable Depth w^ch Humane Wit can never fadom yet wee must beleive y^t all these thinges are ordered & dispensed in away of Justice likewise, & not according to absolute Will & purpose & therefore are to be referred ad occulta Divinæ Justitiæ to y^e Secrets of Divine Justice. Though indeed it is well known y^t Origen & his followers following y^e Platonists here did Venture to assert y^e προιπ{illeg} of the Soul meerly to solve this Phænomenon.

But there is one thing y^t may be alledged against w^t wee have asserted y^t all y^e Antients before Pelagius made Election & Ꝑdestinac~on to be subseq^t decrees of God, after foreknowledge & not anteced^t & absolute That S^t Austin doth so often {illeg} ^\excitate/ y^t Opinion of Pelagius y^t Grace was bestowed according to Merits & Condemne it as Hereticall as otherwise he could not have done if all y^e Antient Fathers had been of y^e same Ꝑsuasion but to this wee answer, y^t that w^ch he condemned as Pelagian & Hereticall was w^t y^e Antients never asserted y^t without any Ꝑventing Grace at all a Man by his Freewill & naturall powers might Merit & deserve y^e Grace of God, And thus S^t Austin himselfe explaines it Hoc quippe ita dicunt Pelagiani velut Homo a seipse sine adjutorio Dei habeat Ꝑpositum bonum studiumꝗ virtutio quo merito precedente dignis sit adjuvari Dei Gratia sue sequente, And againe Meritu ante Gratiam et ideo Contra Gratiam defendentes priores voluntare Deo en L: A: et retribuatur ijs Gratia Ꝑ Ꝑmio. In opposition to w^ch Doctrine S^t Austin thus opposeth Hominis propositu~ bonum adjuveat quidem subsequens Gratia sed nec ipsum esset nisi Ꝑcederet Gratia. That is there is not onely a Grace of God subseq^t to Mans Freewill, but also there is Ꝑventing & Exciting Grace w^ch Pelagius denyed to be acknowledged w^ch y^e Antient Fathers asserted & Pelagius denyed

Indeed I think it out of Question y^t S^t Austin himselfe after he had been engaged in y^e Pelagian Contest did change his opinion from a Ꝑvisionall Ꝑdestinac~on (w^ch he held before) to an absolute one, though somtimes he Contradicts againe himself in his latter writings but however this was but his private opinion w^ch zealous Opposers of Pelagianisme rejected, others \&/ would neith^r affirme nor deny, but thought it noe way necessary to be asserted.

By all this it appears y^t Orthodox Antiquity & y^e Assertors of Grace against Pelagius did not altogether banish Freewill & introduce a fatall Necessity of Every mans being either said or damn'd, frustra blasphemas, sit et ignorantiam Auribus nigeris s^th S^t Hierom Nec L~bru~ Arbitru~ condemni{illeg} damnetur Ille qui damnat. Nay S^t Austin himselfe in his latter writinge often endeavours to salve L: A: & reconcile it with his Hypothesis Grace & Ꝑdestinac~on.

Having given an acc^t now shew'd, y^t all y^e Antients did assert a Complicac~on of Divine Grace & Freewill together, I shal onely add here, y^t though L: A: contribute some little thing yet it|this| doth not follow from thence derogate any thing at all from God For as much as Freewill it selfe is in some sense a Divine Grace & it is very weak to think y^t nothing is to be ascribed to God but w^t is afterward cast in upon us by way of Superaddition to w^t wee had received from God by nature, & as if we could chalenge all y^e rest to our selves And ought not to acc^t it Gods whereas in him wee live & move & have our being all our Naturall Powers, w^tsoever is Good in y^e whole universe is Gods & not y^e Creatu^res & there is nothing y^t can truly be asserted unto us but onely sin & Errour y^t is y^e wrong use of our own Free power. In y^e right use of this power when it acts according as it was intended by God & nature God is justly entitled to y^e Causality of those effects but when wee employ it otherwise than anie should doe y^e {illeg}Carriage of it is onely to be ascribed to <89> to ourselves Nay there is much more Glory due to God y^t he would endue us with such a Power & Dominion over our selves & Actions than if himself had acted all thinges necessary in us more Glory of his power for to be able to make selfe active & selfe-powerfull Beings is Greater power than to make nothing but Machins & Neurospasts & much more Glory of his Goodnesse y^t he would Ꝑmit us to possesse somthing as our own & would capacitate us also to receive prayse & Commendac~ons for our own Actions {illeg}ry this to his Creatures And therefore it is plaine y^t some Men are here \but/ Childishly afraid \affrighted {illeg}/ bugbeares w^ch indeed Ꝑceed onely from \reasō of/ a superstitious fear of y^e Deity.

But all y^t we have said hitherto is yet short of y^e maine businesse & y^t w^ch is y^e very bottom of this controversy betwixt y^e Pelagians & y^e Orthodox in this point (w^ch is indeed a Controversy of noe small moment) is still behind. For y^e Pelagian Sp^t supposes y^t Righteousnesse is nothing els but a conformity of externall actions to an Outward & written Law, arbitrarily made, or els a customary Ꝑpensity of doing some externall acc~ons, acquired by frequency of acting like to y^t ^\Habits of/ of singing & dancing & such other Habits, And \like, w^ch {illeg}/ Aristotle \seems {illeg} to Favour./ often approaches very neer to this apꝐhension. And many Men are prone to have this slight opinion both of Religion & Morality, & to content themselves with such a slight shallow & superficiall (nay I may also say) carnall piety & vertue, as y^t w^ch is y^e onely true & reall; ^\concluding/ All other being concludes to be meerly phantasticall & Enthusiasticall. And therefore noe wonder if these doe soe highly extoll Freewill & y^e Power of nature It being soe Evident y^t wee have a naturall Power & Command over our outward Man & Actions These Men conceit y^t y^e Divine Lawes & Lawes of Religion, are \but {illeg}/ but just like to Civil Lawes, & y^t there is noe difference at all between them, save onely in this, y^t y^e one are made by Men & y^e other by God, whereas indeed y^e one contents itselfe onely with outward Actions, there being nothing els Cognizable in foro Humano, but y^e Eternall Law of God & Nature is given to y^e mans will itself & requires a certaine inward \Life &/ Disposition of Life \& Life/ Wherefore y^e Scripture Oracles plainly tell us, nay Truth it self speakes it silently in our Souls, y^t to Man in this lapsed State, ^\y^t/ in order to y^t Life w^ch is clearly {illeg} & <90> & Divine ^\& {illeg} In order to True Righteousnes/ there is need of novâ Genitura, a new Creac~on & & generac~on of y^e Soul, a new life, Sp^t & Nature to be together in it; & indeed in this lyes a great part of y^e Mystery of Christianity, y^t Wee ought not to acquiesce in our own Righteousness done by y^e power of Freewill & strength of Nature, in our unregenerate state, but seek after another Divine Righteousnesse, w^ch is y^e Righteousnesse of God by Faith, A Righteousnesse of Gods own working in us, whilst we desparing of our own Ability & removing all ^\{illeg}/ dependance upon y^e same, beleive in y^e Divine Power & Goodnesse & expect to receive it from thence onely. Wherefore wee doe say agen; y^t y^e Law of Gods everlasting Righteousnesse y^e Norma & Mensura of it, is not meerly & \an/ outward Letter commanding externall act^^ions y^t are in every Mans own power ^\to do/ it is not meer Will & Words, but it is a Light\fe/ Sp^t of & Nature. & as y^e Scripture often tells us y^e Life Sp^t & Nature of God Himselfe, acting upon & Communicating ^\itselfe/ to Rationall Creatures. Let those w^ch are Strangers to this Righteousnesse & y^e uncircumcised in heart, laugh never soe much at a Righteousnesse infused, y^t is, in their Language, in powered & Graces inspired y^t is as they phrase ^\it/ in-blown, & think y^t this Derision is a sufficient confutac~on of all Christianity, yet Wisdome wilbe justifyed by her Children, & y^e Sonnes of wisdome will ever Justify this Truth of Christianity, y^t y^e inspirac~on of y^e most high giveth both understanding & Righteousnesse & y^t true Vertue & Piety though it be no Fanatick nor Frantick Enthusiasme yet as some of y^e Heathens Philosoph^rs themselves {illeg} \apprehended is to be ascribed/ θειᾳ τινὶ επιπνοῖᾳ to a Certaine Divine afflac~on & Instinct

Neither indeed is any thing more plaine if we consult Reason & our own inward Sense then this y^t it must be soe, For Freewill & selfepower doth not make any thing but alwayes turne itself to somthing or other y^t is, where there are divers Congruities w^ch cause a distraction in y^e Soul, thereby this power y^e Soul is able to turne it selfe {illeg} to one of other Freewill neither makes Righteousnesse nor wickednesse but in wicked Men y^e Soul turnes & determine it selfe wholly, to those Lower & Easy Congruities of nature, of Animall Lust & Selfish Desires, & as we said before wicked Men are as well inspired by a Certaine lower Mundane Sp\t/ of y^e Animall Life & nature As Good Men are by y^t Higher Sp^t of y^e Divine Life & Nature And when y^e word Enthusiasme is taken as com̄only it is in a {illeg} Sense it Ꝑperly <91> it may Ꝑperly be attributed to y^e former of these though not to y^e Latter, It ^\That/ being a Blind Irrac~onall & Dark Impulse when Men are carryed away Captive by y^e worser principle in them but y^e other being {illeg} & Gentle instinct y^t is accompanied with y^e Clearest Light & Serenity, it being ^\{illeg}/ a Diviner thing than Reason as Aristotle himselfe & other Philosop^rs have observed {illeg} λογου θειατιγον The Soul of Man hangs as it were betwixt two Loadstones God & y^e World y^e Divine Life & Sp^t above or y^e Lower Sp^t of y^e World The Animall Selfish Nature And though it hold indeed a \some/ Power of turning it selfe to either ^\by degrees/ yet it properly makes neither of them; y^e Magick of y^e Lower Nature makes one thing by attracting & falscinating Souls under it, but y^t Divine Magick or attraction if it may be so called (for y^t \Magick/ was A Good Name \Religious Word/ at first among y^e Persians) makes y^e other.

All y^t A Man can doe by his own Freewill & selfepower is onely to use some Conatus or Endeavour; to y^t turne himselfe towards y^t τὸ ἐν {illeg}ῖν θεῖον & τὸ {illeg} τῷ παντὶ θεῖον That Divine Principle y^t is in our selves & \is/ in y^e whole world \vniverse/, y^t is to God himselfe who is more properly seated & ought more to be sought \for/ in fundo Anima {illeg} of in y^e inmost bottome of our own Soul then in y^e Highest heavens & there to be lookt for without us.

Nay this power of y^e Soul doth rather consist in some endeavours of turning itselfe from y^e Lower & Sinful Life of Corrupt Nature by denying to obey y^e Dictates of it to gratify its Importunities & make Ꝑposion for it it extends \{illeg}/Ꝑperly onely to Mortificac~on \onely/ y^e killing of y^e Life of y^e Old Man is onely starving of it, & \or/ refusing to feed it; & then as Ꝑpared Matter \{illeg}/ {illeg} Life \&/ Forme; y^t Divine Life seiseth upon it & enters into it For y^e Soul must needs be alwayes under one Life or {illeg}this lower Life {illeg} is, as it were broken & \{illeg}/ abated in it & thus reduced as it were into a Chaos, then doth y^e Sp^t of Divine Life seise upon it & hatch it into Forme & Pulchritude

All y^t Wee spake of before was onely this turning or Conversion of y^e Soul from y^e lower Life of Sinfull Nature in w^ch as wee have shewed also Mans Freewill doth not doe all ^\{illeg}/ but y^e least part of it & That Triple \Divine Grace/ Ꝑventing & exciting corroborating & Ꝑmoting, confirming & Compleating, doe justly challenge\ing/ for y^e greatest share in it

Whereas if Freewill had done all here, It had done but little; nothing y^t it could prove it selfe in, For \as/ when a Man lying in a darke cold Cave by degrees crawls out of it & comes ^\vp/ into y^e Light & warmth of y^e Sun & feels his heat \cōfortable Rayes/ reflected round ab^t him, hee will have little Cause to attribute y^t cheering & reviving Comfort of warmth & Lighth w^ch he now \feels/ receives to himselfe & not to y^e Son from whence it comes. The Morall reformac~on of Mens souls as y^e Philosoph^r defin'd it is but the Circumduction of y^e Soul out of y^t Dark Cave & stupifying Cave where it could see nothing but shadows of thinges to y^e true Light & Life as to y^e\a/ Certaine Sun, and Our Saviour himself defined it to bee but y^e opening of y^e Eyes & y^e turning of y^e Soul from Darknesse into Light & from y^e power of Satan into God Wee have All by Nature as it were our backs \turned vpō/ towards y^e Sun of Righteousnesse & All y^t Wee have to doe or candoe is onely to turne our selves ab^t towards it & to open o^r eyes y^t wee may at once receive y^e Light & \see/ Warmth of it; And therefore Wee cannot ascribe either of these to our selves, but onely to God from whom they flow. And \But/ soe long as wee think to quicken & enliven our selves with our own activity & y^e power of our own Freewill & to enlighten ourselves, or to see by our own Eyes ^\o^r own Nat. wit & Reason, still/ continuing in y^t Dark Cave Wee doe deceive our selves & wee shall never come neither to y^e Light nor to y^e Life of God

All y^e Activity y^t Wee have is only of Converting or turning our selves to It or rather of turning our selves from it ^\y^e Contrary to it/ in w^ch Divine Grace \allso/ chalenges y^e greatest part, but we are passive to this Light & Life of God acting upon us. And all truly holy & sp^ll actions y^t are done by y^e Soul are done by Vertue of y^t Divine life & Sp^t acting in it & therefore cannot possibly be attributed to Mans Freewill. And this is y^t very thing w^ch Pious Antiquity was soe zealous to assert, y^t All Holy affections pious Inclinac~ons & Spirituall Actions were not to be attributed to Man Freewill but to Christ & y^e Divine Sp^t in Him, w^ch yet is not so to be understood as if Man were to bee wholly sluggish & could contribute nothing towards y^e Ꝑmoting or turning it \him/ self towards y^t Divine Principle, as some fondly conclude, but y^t all y^t wee can doe in this kind cannot entitle y^e least to y^e Causality of y^e thing it selfe w^ch is only Gods, noe more than y^e opening of our Eylids against y^e Sun cann <93> can make; y^e Light ^\to be/ ours: there are Many naturall actions in w^ch we contribute somthing anteced^tly & by way of Ꝑparac~on to nature & yet y^e Effect it selfe is not ^\at all/ ascribed to us, but to God & Nature onely; though Man labours in plowing of y^e Ground & sowing of y^e Seed, yet it is y^e Sp^t ^\or Plastick Power/ of nature y^e forms y^e Grace & God y^t gives y^e encrease; in y^e Generac~on of Animals ^\one Animall/ is but ministerially subservient to nature in y^e Ꝑduction of another; for he y^t Generates doth not make y^e Life & Soul of y^t that is begotten Nay he doth not organize y^e Matter neither but it is y^e Sp^t of Nature or its plastick & Spermatick power y^t doth one, & y^e other y^t is y^e New Soul comes into y^e Ꝑpared Matter wee know ^\not/ how \nor whence/. So all y^t Man can doe by his Freewill y^t must be here also assisted by Grace) is onely somthing Antecedanious & Ꝑparatory for y^e Divine Form ^\& life/ to enter in & seise. it is nothing but its y^e turning of it selfe by degrees from y^e Contrary Life & then y^t w^ch is y^e Life of all lives y^t ever enters into & actes upon Rac~onall Souls when it is not exluded, seiseth upon it.

But it must not be concluded from hence y^t Righteousnesse is a foreigne thing clapt upon y^e Soul, or A thing supernaturall in this Sense as if it were really Ꝑternaturall & \or/ Contrary to y^e true Nature of y^e inward Man, w^ch as we have said is grounded upon God himselfe, or is y^e|^t| same Immateriall Heaven in which God dwells, ^e very Heathens them selves Ꝑceiving y^t there was a Great Cognac~on betwixt y^e Soul purged from w^t was Heterogeneous & Aliene to it & God Himselfe. So y^t Grace is neither a Violent & forced thing nor yet meerly Artificiall because it is to be ascribed wholly to God, For it is nothing but y^e Soul, w^ch was before estranged from God, naturalizd againe to him; & reunited to its true Sourse & Originall All y^t outcry w^ch is made against nature is to bee understood onely of Corrupt & Apo vitiated and Apostatized Nature, not ^|Mani{illeg}ically| of Mans nature as God at first made him \it/, w^ch was to be Conjoyned w^th y^e Divinity & acted by it.

Neither should it be inferred from w^t wee have said y^t that Divine Life which is Grace & Righteousnesse is altogether arbitrary for then it would follow from thence also y^t it were to noe purpose for us to use any endeavours to turne our selves towards it <94>

N. 5^th. This is y^t w^ch y^e Antients were wont to call τῶν ἐν τ{illeg} ἐξουσια \των/ προ ομινοις \ἀντι{illeg}/ A Power of doing opposites. A self determining being is y^t w^ch is loose & not determined to w^t it doth, by \any/ Anteced^t naturall necessity; \{illeg}/ & therefore is capable of uncertainty & some variety of Acting \and hath/ & there is something of ^\vncertain/ Contingency more of lesse in \it/ y^e Actions of it Aristotle Speaking of y^e Motion of loving Creatures ^\as such & a distinct {illeg}/ w^ch in some sense are αυτοκίνητα, or selfe moving, writes after this manner ἄλογον το μὶαν κὶνποῖν κινεῖσθε μόνον ὁ φ'ἀυτῶν οιγε ιαυτὰ ἑαυτὰ κινοῦσιν, It is absurd to suppose y^t such thinges as move themselves should alwayes move one way ὀι ἐπ' ἀυτῶ το ἄναφερ{illeg} τωπυρὶ δῦλον ὅτι κὰι τὸ κάτω, ἐί του βαδιζειν ἀίτιόν τι ἀυτῷ κὰι {illeg} βαδιξειν. If fire had a power to determine its own power \motion/ upward then it is manifest y^t it could determine its moc~on downward also & that w^ch is a|n| \Actiō/ Cause of walking may also be a Cause of not walking. And so it ^\these things all Animals/ will in some sense have ἐξουσίαν τῶν ἀντικοιμίνων a power of {illeg} opposites \or cōtraryes/ y^t is either of Contrarys or COntradictorys but But this is much more true of Freewilled Beings for though Brutes are Capable of variety of Action according as their inward Appetites (w^ch are Changable) determine them) or doe not alwayes act one way as inanimate things doe yet they are ^\thought to be/ necessitated by Phansy & Appetite in such \like/ Cases alwayes to doe w^t they doe \alike 1/ So y^t such outward objects being put & such inward Appetites, they cannot doe otherwise, than they doe But Freewilled Beings have a more interior selfepower \so/ y^t y^e same outward objects being put, & y^e same Animal Appetites or Inclinac~ons w^thin, & they may possibly act differently, and therefore it may be better s^d of them οτι δ{illeg}ντας ου πράιτουσι πράξαι τὸ ἀντικείμένον, that they have a power of doing y^e Contrary to w^t they doe, doe. For they can τῶν ἀυτῶν περι εξῶτων ὅτε μὲν ὅυτως ὅτι δὲ ἀλλωι ἐνεργειν i. e. in y^e very same Cases & Circumstances somtimes act one way & sometimes another. they are not alwayes necessarily determind by outward objects ^\& y^e Impulses therefrom/ Their own Animall Inclinac~ons. The Doctrine of Zeno & y^e old Stoicks who denyed Freewill as thus described, by an Antient Peripatetick \167/ That wee are Master of Nothing but are alwayes follow y^e Circumstant thinges yeilding \vpō plea/ to them & being overcome by them, & doe w^t wee doe, because it is necessary for us soe to doe, & we cannot doe otherwise

It being impossible for us such things being circumstant, or in such Causes, to doe otherwise then wee doe, because \we cannot/ it is impossible for us to resist resist y^e circumstant thinges or to \nor/ act otherwise than they encline us, /or act vpon vs.\

But y^e Contrary to all this is y^t w^ch was maintained by y^e Antient opposers of y^e Stoicall Doctrine y^t wee are Masters of somthing, & doe not alwayes soe follow y^e circumstant thinges, being {illeg} them, as y^t wee could not possibly doe otherwise than wee doe; but y^t is possible for it, wⁿ y^e same Thinges are circumstant (i e) in y^e same cases & circumstances somtimes to act one way & sometimes another. Wee being able to resist both y^e outward objects & our own Animall Affecc~ons & \soe/ to determine ourselves.

And if y^e now vulgarly received Definition of a Freewilled Agents y^t it|they| is|are| such as Positus omnibus ad agendum requisitis potest agere et non agere be taken in noe other sense than that before menc~oned namely that it is such a thing as τῶν ἀυτῶν περι εστώτων ὃτι μὲν ὃυταν ὅτεμὶν ἂλλωι ἐνεργεῖν διωατας, y^t in y^e same Case & circumstances it may possibly act differently sometimes one way & sometimes another then there is noe Exception to be made against it, but according to y^e Common Acceptac~on of it there are these 2 mistakes \included/ in it First y^t in ev^y acc~on of Mans Life one \he/ is ^\alike/ equally indifferent to doe or not doe, to act this or y^t till y^t very mom^t y^e he is determined. Secondly y^t y^e Practicall Judgm^t it selfe is made to be one of y^e requisites of Action & y^t a Free Agent is indifferent to act \ether/ according to it or not ^\against it/ Besides w^ch there is another Grand Errour also w^ch y^e Assertors of this Doctrine are Guilty of w^ch wee shall insist upon afterward y^t this loose uncertainty of Acting in freewilled Beings is \{illeg}/ a pure Ꝑfecc~on and that y^e Ꝑfectiō of Freewill doth consist in a loose Indifferēt selfdeterminatiō any way.

Some Latter Authors exp describe this selfe determining power after this manner y^t it is y^t whereby a Free Agent|s| can ad vim et Motum Causæ a quâ fuerat primum impulsat aliquid adjecere, et impetum, quem aliunde non acceperat, addere, can contribute & cast in somthing of its own to y^e impulsive causes & mom\ts/ of Reason, y^t sway \encline/ this way & that way, to turne y^e sowles, and superad this \a certain/ force of its own w^ch it had not rec^d from any thing els, & ^\of/ w^ch there is noe other Cause to be taught for besides itselfe. \but it was originall to {illeg}/ Hence is y^t notable difference assigned betwixt Man & other Living Creatures . That whereas all other Creatures follow y^e Curcumstant causes w^thout & are \passively/ determined by them it is otherwise in man whoe Essence consisteth in having a principle & Cause of action w^thin himselfe <97> & not being necessarily determined by circumstant thinges w^thout him. thē {illeg} to y^e Impulsive causes of actiō

Now Man having a selfe determining power of his acc~ons there is oftentimes noe other cause to be required \or {illeg}/ why he doth this rather than another thing \that/ but onely by himself. And otherwise he c^ld not be lyable to blame & Commendac~on. Pag: 166: As wee doe not ask a Reason why Earth & other heavy Bodys descend Ꝑpendicularly according to y^e Laws of Gravity; or for w^t reason \why/ Brute Animals doe w^t they doe according to y^e Instincts of nature Every one of these thinges being framed by nature to act as they doe So neither concerning thinges done by us \men/ uncertainly somtimes one way & somtimes another (wⁿ y^e same thinges are \were/ circumstant) ought there to be any other Cause required besides y^e Man himselfe this being ^\essentiall to man to haue/ a Cause & principle |B| in Man to have acc~ons done by him \B/ ^\& to determine himselfe/ Which yet is not to bee understood uniu~sally, for our own Nature & y^e lawes of y^e universe doe circumscribe us within circumscribe us certaine bounds & limits but wee have a certaine Compasse ^\left/ w^thin w^ch we may be s^d to be \have it/ in n~ra potestate \&/ to determine ourselvs to this or y^t.

Now it is very observable here y^t a Freewilled Being is not onely s^d to be ἀρχη καὶ ἀιτία A principle & Cause of action ^\& to determin himselfe/ in s doubtfull Cases & where Nature was puzled & distracted till y^e very doing of y^e Acc~ons, but also whereafter consultac~on & deliberac~on all d~bt & distracc~on was removed & wee were \where we/ clearly {illeg} \perceved/ y^t this ought to bee done & not y^e other because though Consulting & Deliberating Reason in themselves bee ^\belong to Nature be/ necessary, & not free in w^ch Sense I conceive y^t of y^e old Stoicks to be true, μεκατῶτας σκέυ εα{illeg} τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐῖνας y^t there is no such thing ^\Freewill in/ as consultac~on & Ratiocinac~on considerd in of\them/self|es|, yet it was in our power to consult or deliberate more or or lesse, & so use a Greater & lesser intenc~on in it & therefore y^t determinac~on of acc~on w^ch did result from a full & Mature Consultac~on may wel be s^d to have bin ἐφ' ἡμῖν in our own power, & be imputed to ourselves |+| as y^e Cause of it. \+/ As though a Sword doe necessarily cut & slash, yet y^e acc~on w^ch A man doth by it either in murdering \killing/ an innocent or slaying an Enemy \{illeg} Murderer/, & Traytour is to be imputed to y^e Doer of it because it was sin his own power so to use \it/ or not; Wherefore y^t is true of y^e Greek Peripatetick

Ὅ δια τὸν γινόμενον πὰρ' ἀντῷ ἐν τῷ βουλέν εοδας ουλλόγισμον ιομ κατα θ εμενοί τινι ἀυτὸι' αυτῷ τῶ φ{illeg}καταθέσεως ἄιτιος He y^t by Ratiocinac~on & Collection move by himselfe in consultac~on doth assent to any thing & assent to \resolve vpō/ any designe, is to himselfe y^e Cause of y^t Resoluc~on & may be s^d to have determined himselfe thereto. And for y^e same Reason it is y^t Men are not onely blamed for Errour & false Opinions wⁿ they assent to things not cleerly comp^rehended, but also commanded for knowledge Wisdome & true Opinions, because though Knowledge & understanding be necessary yet |y^e| more or lesse improvem^t of their understanding is in Ꝑtly to bee attributed to their own selfepower

N. 6^th In y^e selfe determinac~on of outward Acc~ons there is not onely Θελησις but also κρίσις not onely Will or Command of Acc~on but also practicall Judgm^t included & both these κρίσις & θέλησις ^\pract/ Judgment & Will (strictly taken) concurre together to make up y^t w^ch Aristotle calls προαίρεσις or Elecc~on, & therefore both alike (if they be not rather really one & y^e same thing) Ꝑperly belong to y^e Soul redoubled upon itselfe & selfeactive. &c vide A. L.

N. 7^th It is true y^t this power of selfe determinac~on is in it selfe much a Greater Ꝑfecc~on than y^t of Brutes w^ch are supposed to be confined to nat~rll Appetites & Instincts w^ch are alwayes \particularly/ necesssarily determined to one, & have noe Amplitude at all in them. \For/ the selfedetermining Power supposeth an higher Elevac~on of Life whereby a Being frees itselfe somthing by it selfe, loose & released, & hath a Larger scope & Prospect before it a greater Amplitude of Acting & exerciseth more Power activity & Liberty in determining its own actions & governing it selfe: ^\thē being {illeg} determined by Objects/ As it is much a Greater Good or Perfecc~on for any Brute Animall to be at Liberty, to goe up & & down & frisk ab^t in a Pasture, or for a man to be able to walk \vpō his own legs/ up & down whethersoev^r \hither & thither/ he pleaseth, then to be a stupid Foetus or Embryo in y^e Mothers womb, or to be alwayes carryed up & down in y^e Mothers \Nurses/ Arms & Lap, & to be fed by another.

Yet notwithstanding this is not soe to bee understood as if y^e Ꝑfecc~on of this Facultie of Freewill did consist in an indiffer^t contingent temerarious selfe determinac~on w^th to one thing rather than another without reason ie: the considerac~on of Good as y^e Measure of it w^ch seemes to be y^e Common & most rec~d Opinion concerning Freewill

As if y^e Glory, Perfecc~on, & Libertie of it did consist in a Blind irrac~onall, selfe determinac~on & in not being bound or ty'ed to any Reason of Good to determine \{illeg}/ it one way rather than another Insomuch y^t Many conceve of Liberty & Happinesse as \to be/ one & y^e \self/ same thing w^th such a Freewill as this, & y^t there is noe greater Ꝑfecc~on in God himselfe then such a Freewill and \{illeg}/ Liberty together w^th infinite power to enable him to doe any thing indifferently soe ^\y^t he can/ not {illeg} any inconvenience thereby & y^t it is onely weaknesse & Imbecility in Creatures, y^t disables them from y^e use & exercise of this Faculty w^ch otherwise would be their greatest happiness & Liberty.

But if ind Blind indiffer^t Determinac~on as such be a pure perfecc~on & y^e Essence of y^t Facultie of Freewill consist in it, then it is plaine y^t there cannot be any Sin or Morall Evill in any determinac~ons of Freewill \{illeg}/ there being nothing in nature to put a difference & to make one selfedeterminac~on to be evill ^\whē/ another \is/ Good. Wherefore it is most agreable to this Doctrine to assert y^t there is nothing φύσις good or Evil Just or unjust honest or dishonest, but y^t these things are wholly made by externall Arbitrary Lawes & therefore there being nothing Superiour to God to impose Lawes upon him |A| there can be noe difference of Good or Evill to him. \A/

Now as it is plainly absurd to count that as Liberty & Perfecc~on or indeed to make it a nat~rll power or facultie for a Man to be indifferently inclined to doe himselfe either Good or hurt to avoid paine & misery or to expose him selfe to it, to save his life or destroy it, to feed upon wholsome \food/ meat or drink poyson & y^e like For any one will confesse y^t it were much better to bee an Infant carryed up & down in a nurses armes y^t w^lld doe nothing hurtfull to it than to have such a liberty as this is w^ch is in none but Mad Frantick Persons. So if there be any φύσις any Nature of Morall Good it is impossible y^t this should be a perfecc~on, or indeed a nat~rll Power to be indiffer^t to determine itselfe to any thing \{illeg}/ dishonesty & Morall Evill being as Contrary to y^e inward vitality of Rac~onall beings as Poyson is to y^e nat~rll Life of Animalls

All naturall Power as such tends to Good for Good is y^e Measure of Power as such & to be able to doe evill or hurt ones self is Impotency & neither Power nor Liberty \but {illeg}/ τον ειτιι ἀξιυῖ τὸτε εῖνας τι ἐλευθιρον ξίαν περι φύσιν πράττει. It is absurd to think y^t any Being doth then exercise a Ꝑfective Liberty or indeed any true Power wⁿ it actes contrary to its own nature or hath it selfe And never any Oracle was more true than this τὸ ελέυθερον καὶ τὸ ἐπ ἀυται ξαπῖται τῖ ἀγουθσ Γάγιν. To be at liberty & ones own disposall is desired for noe other Reason then for y^e sake of Good

Wherefore though to have a large scope & Amplitude of acting in order to ones own Good be a power Liberty & Perfec~con, yet y^t same εξνοτάτῶν ἀντικειμένον as it is commonly taken y^e Power of doing Contrarys & Contradictories in all Cases indiffer^tly but especially y^e Power of doing Good or Evill is noe nat~rll Power or Perfecc~on but a mixture of Power ^\{illeg}/ Perfection & ImꝐfection both together. \or rather y^e {illeg} Power of Freewill/ Freewill as a faculty of y^e humane soul is intended by God & Nature onely for Good & wⁿsoever it acts contrary thereunto it is not ꝐꝐly y^e Power & Perfection, but y^e Abuse of y^e Power as shalbe shewed afterward

But it wilbe readily objected here y^t of L: A: ^\if it be demanded here How then can be any Conting^t Vncertainty in y^e {illeg} of \Freewill if it// be onely a Power to Good & a Larger Scope or Amplitude of Ꝑmoting y^e same, ^but so yⁿ \as/ y^t wⁿ variety is Ꝑposed to its choice it is by its nature determined to y^e best then Contingent selfe determinac~on wilbe quite taken away & have noe place at all.

To w^ch \this/ wee reply y^t y^e Mystery & Intrigue of this whole businesse lyes in this, y^t L: A: is not a Pure Perfection but a Power or Faculty belonging to imꝐfect Beings w^ch hath a Mixture of Perfection & imꝐfection to it. All such Beings as are not essentially Good & wise but onely by Ꝑticipac~on have a certaine Power over themselves whereby they can intend themselves both in a way of Considerac~on & \{illeg}/ Solitac~on \&/ Consultac~on in order to y^e finding out of w^t is best & also of vigorous Exertion Resoluc~on & Strength to adhere to y^e same & resist y^e Importunity of other Passions & Appetites irrac~onally urging another \a cōtrary/ way & accordingly as they doe more or lesse intend & Exert themselves So they doe differently & uncertainly determine their outward acc~ons, to this or that, better |A| or worse - \A/ But this Faculty is bestowed vpō vs by G. & Nature to their End - that we may be it it Promote ourselves to Good & Preserve o\r/selves in y^e same -

|+| Wherefore this is now to be added \+/ to y^e Descripsion of L: A: y^t it is such a power or facultie in y^e Soul reduplicated upon it selfe as whereby it hath not onely an higher Elecac~on of Life above Ꝑticular Phansys & Large comp^rehensiveness of all its congruities & Capacities, but also a Power to intend and exert it selfe in order to y^e Ꝑmoting of it selfe in \to/ Good & Ꝑserving itselfe in y^e same. Now \And/ as there is a double Good y^t wee are Capable of either y^e Animall & Private Good of selfish utility to w^ch inferiour Reason is y^e Director & or y^t univ~sall & unselfish Good of {illeg} or y^e Divine Life w^ch y^t w^ch directs to is called Superiour Reason, accordingly there may be two different Species of L: A: The one Animall w^ch is an Elevac~on above Ꝑticular Phansys & Appetites by a Part having \by/ a Participac~on of y^t inferiour Reason w^ch is a more Com^rehensive witt Subtility & Sagacity con <101> concerning y^e interest of y^e Animall Life together w^th a Power of \{illeg}/ intending an exerting itselfe more or lesse in y^e use of this inferiour Reason & in Complyance w^th y^e same. And y^t there is such a Lower Species of Freewill is plaine from hence y^t Men often blame themselves for being carryed \away/ by y^e importunity of some Ꝑticular appetites & Passions to \A/ act contrary to y^e reason of their own Utility. \A/ The second is Free will Morall w^ch is an Elevac~on above y^e whole Animall Life; by y^e Participac~on of Superiour Reason or y^e Instinct of Honesty w^ch is y^e same thing y^t y^e Platonists call y^e τὸ ἀγαθοειδὲς or y^e Boniform Principle in y^e Soul: ie. a sense of Good Superiour to all Private Principles in y^e Soul: ie: a sense of Good Superiour to all Private selfish considerac~on together w^th a Power of intending & exerting itself by Selfe active Conatus\ion/ toward this Higher Diviner Principle: Now this Elevac~on y^t wee here speak of ^\in both kinds/ above Ꝑticular Appetites & y^e An whole Animall Life is properly seated in y^e τὸ μέρον or middle Power of y^e Soul, w^ch is y^e τὸ ἡγεμονουν or Ruling Principle in it, & w^ch comp^reends both y^e Higher & y^e Lower, (For Freewilled Beings are essentially neither one nor t'other;) w^ch τὸ μέρον middle thing is properly called wee our selves, & as it is selfe-comp^rehensive soe it hath a power of acting upon itselfe of intending & exerting itselfe more or lesse; of w^ch difference ^\whrof/ there is noe other Cause to be assigned besides itselfe: & therefore a Power of determining its own acc~ons & of soe Governing & ordering itselfe as y^t Blame & Commendac~on may ^\differently/ belong to it, Wherefore I say y^t y^e Genericall Nature of L: A: is not A ἀδιαφορία Dull & lank Indifferency but power over ones selfe whereby one is as it were in ones own hand, Ἀυτεξουσιότης Sui potestas or Selfe-power.

It is y^e priviledge of y^e Deity y^t it is essentially its own Ꝑfecc~on Goodnesse & wisdome immutable & unalterable ^\vndiminishable & vnexegatable/ that it hath noe laborious Conatus or endeavour after any thing noe active exertion of it selfe w^th paines & difficulty, it doth never d~btfully consult or deliberate concerning any thing & is never to seek w^t to doe, & Is alwayes its utmost possibility w^tsoever it can bee; It doth not graspe after its own fleeting & fugitive Being but w^th easie Ꝑfect security enjoy itselfe, \{illeg}/ there being noe variac~on or shadow of change in it. but \in/ all other Beings below God & above Brutes are the Case is otherwise; for they have y^e Good & Ꝑfection of their own Being not by necessary Being \Nature/ but by selfe active Exertion & Conac~on; & therefore ^\{illeg}/ they are Capable both of encrease & Diminuc~on of their own Good & happinesse as they doe more or lesse intend or exert themselves. Whereas there is a higher & a Lower a Better & a worse Principle in y^e nature of all Freewilled Beings