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Chap.

It is none of the least objections against Freewill & selfepower wch is urged by some, that it seemes to be a thing exempt from the Divine Jurisdiction & from ^Gods Omnipotence it selfe. For according to the Common Hypothesis in wch Freewill is made essentiall to Raconall Creatures in all states, & the Essence of Freewill is supposed to consist in ^such anactive indifferency & self=determinacon, as implyes a Contradiction for it to be necessarily determined by any thing wtsoever without it, & therefore ^{illeg} by God himselfe; It doth not only follow from hence wt some Philosophrs & Christians have asserted that God cannot know beforehand wt any Freewilled Being will doe but that wch seems far more absurd, that he can not act any thing at all upon the Wills of them, all that he can doe being onely to hinder, such externall {illeg} of their wills as must be done by outward strength & power or els to annihilate them & dispossesse them quite of their Beings, but their existing & being supposed , the inward determinac~on of their wills is a thing noe way subject to the Divine Omnipotensey neither can he contribute any thing the least, to incline their wills rather one way than another.

This is a doctrine wch seems to be owned by some late Assertors of Freewill, And though the first founders of the Stoicall Sect, utterly destroy'd the thing, allowing noe other Liberty to Man than such a Spontaneity as is in Brutes, yet some of the Latter Stoicks as they departed from them herein, so they are supposed to ^ have run into this extremity, to have asserted such a Freewill as was invincible to God him selfe, there is one passage out of Arrians Epictetus before Cited ^thatsounds to this purpose, & such also is that in the first Chap: of the 1.st Book declare secrets (this is supposed to be spoken by some {illeg} power ) I will not decline them for this is absolutely in my own power; But then I will bind thee, Canst thou bind thee? thou canst onely bind my armes or Leggs, but as to my will Jupiter himselfe is not able to {illeg} conquer that.

Now as this is very strange to exempt anything in the world from the Divine Omnipotence So this Doctrine wilbe unavoidably attended with this inconvenience, that if all the freewilled Beings in the world, Angells & Men should be supposed to determine their wills to ^Sin & Wickednes & to continue there in wch is a thing possible, God himself according to this Hypothesis must onely stand by & look on

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but he could noe way hinder this ruine & miscarriage of his Whole Creac~on, all that he could doe could onely be to annihilate it, & then Create another world of Angells & Men & try whether it would have better {illeg} or noe & so toties quoties. It seems also plainly to be repugnant to the ^Religious Phænomena, I mean the Common Notions & instincts of Mankind ^{illeg} it for nothing is more naturall ^{illeg} nor more essentiall to Religion, then to invoke & implore the divine Assistance in order to Vertue & a Good Life, wch would be nonsense according to this Hypothesis, & there are some ranting Passages in Seneca to this purpose, Nay all Prayrs & Supplicac~ons to the Deity, for such externall thinges, as were to be brought to passe by the Intercec~on of Humane Wills, would be altogether vaine ^idle & frustraneous.

3 Wherefore wee must needs declare here against this Hypothesis of Freewill as false & spurious in wch there are these three Errors or mistakes at once ^couched & Complicated together, first that Freewill is an Infinite selfpower, that can with the same case at any Time in a Mom.t convert it selfe to the highest degree of Vertue & lowest degree of vice whereas there is noe such power as this possible in nature neither would such an infinite selfe flexibility be any selfe power at all. ^but meer ^languid Flaccidity Secondly that nothing can possibly be done to incline a Freewilled Being the least one way ^more than another without destroying its Liberty, & therefore that all Motives (or Reasons & Considerac~ons, that can be Ꝑpounded or suggested signify nothing at all, to such a Being, as if Freewilled Beings were things Ꝑfectly cut off from all naturality, loose & unhinged from all their own Good. Lastly that God with ^by his Omnipotence can in noe Case wtsoever break in upon Free willed Beings to over rule them stop them or Countermand them, not so much as at any way to promote there good or happinesse & to keep the - whole Creac~on from sinking & decaying or totally degenerating into all vice & wickednesse.

It is very true indeed that it implyes a Contradiction for a Being at the same time to be necessarily determined by somthing without it & yet freely & Contingently to determine it selfe from within. Morover it is plainly Contradictious for God to necessitate any Being to Sin not onely because, the Will of God is the Rule of Vertue & morality wch it <72> wch yet has an immutable & Essentiall Will of his him and himselfe cannot contradict but also because wtsoever is done by outward necessity cannot be sin, nor blameworthy, but it is an Error to think ^that Freewilled Beings a person essentially such in all their actings, & soe independently upon God, as that God Himselfe, cannot break in upon them, nor {illeg} that exercise of Freewill in them, wch when he doth, they could for that Time be neither lyable to Blame or Commendac~on; for such Inclinac~ons & Determinacons as they were wholly passive to, It cannot be doubted but that all Creatures are in Gods hand as the Clay is in the Potters formable by him into any Shape & passive to any - impressions that he will please· to make upon them. All actions & Inclinac~ons are either intrinsically Good & such as that the absence of them cannot be without Sin or ^else intrinsically Evill or lastly such as may be, or not be, without sin Now Gods Power consider'd absolutely (without respect to his Wisdome & Goodnesse) extending to all thinges wch doe not imply a Contradiction to be done, cannot but extend to ^the Ꝑduction & so all these in his Creatures at least materially considered Wherefore as to the former of these three, it cannot be doubted but that God by his Omnipotence could in a momt convert a Devill into An Angell if it were agreable to his Wisdome, thus miraculously to interpose & disturb the Course of nature, for why might not hee, that could create an Angell in a state of Holynesse, be able also to translate or Metamorphose, a Devill into an Angell, that is destroy that vitious Habit in him, & infuse a vertuous Disposition upon him, in wch Change the Metamorphosed Devil or Angell; would deserve noe Commendac~on ^for it e Contributing noe activity of its own to it

And for Adiaphorous Dispositions or Actions if there were a necessity for the fullfilling of any Prdiction or the accomplishmt of any great designe of Providence, noe dbt but God could take our wills ^as it were into his own hand, as Ꝑhaps he may sometimes ^do the hearts of Kings ^& Princes wch have the greatest influence upon Humane affaires & turn them as the Rivers of waters wch way he pleaseth, And for vitious Dispositions & actions there is noe more power required to them neither is there any more reason, why Gods Omnipotence could not extend to them also; A but onely <73> onely because his Omnipotence is manag'd by his Goodnesse to wch it is contradictious for him so to ^{illeg} it being the worke of an Abaddon a Marrer or Destroyer, & not of a Good Creatour ^to spoile any of his Creatures & as it were to vnmake them & Thought he may use the wickednesse of Men ^allso for good ends of his own & Judicially hardne some in there wickednesse by withholding that Assistance ^in some {illeg} wch is necessary for their recovery. I say Though it imply a Contradiction for any thing to be necessarily determin'd by God & contingently to determine it selfe at the same time, yet it implyes noe Contradiction, for Freewilled Beings to be passive to Divine Determinac~ons to prepossession to it being essentiall to Creatures as such to be. Passive to the Deity It is not essentiall to Freewilled Beings alwayes to determine themselves free willingly Nay it is possible for them to have the exercise of that Faculty of Freewill ^aswell as their Reason itselfe totally Suspended in them, for a while; and as it were consopited - For it is plaine there is noe more active use of Freewill & selfe power in Infants than of Reason, nor much if any in adult Ꝑsons when in a Sleep and very little in dow^neright Fools & Madmen, wherefore it is manifest that Humane Souls are capable of the variety & differt degrees of Life, For as they may be exalted to that higher participac~on of the Divine nature So they may also sink down even to brutishnesse itselfe, & become the most pitifull & despicable thinges, even like the Beast that perish; And though that Pythagoricall Opinion of the transmigrac~on of Humane Souls into fe{illeg}ine Bodyes be justly to be exploded vpon other grounds, yet we cannot say it is impossible, for the Divine power to deprive a Man of all exercise of that Faculty of Freewill as well as of reason & to make him continue for many Ages in noe better State than that was of our infancy or or in what we are asleep where a third part of our time in sleep ^in the silling of Dreames A Wee Mortales are lyable to become almost wtsoever God will please to make us who yet will never ^make vs {illeg} without or own fault, nay being any to this low ebb of an irreversable insensibility of all difference of Good & Evill & an utter losse of all Morall Selfe power (wch is , & the ^very ruine & decay of their Manly nature though never so much subtilty of Logic^all Reason still remaine) till they ^haue justly profited both by a long abuse of Them {illeg} fate may attend them God onely knowes

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Now from these prmisses we cannot but conclude, but that God by his power may whensoever it is agreable to his wisdome {illeg}metamorphose humane souls from vice to vertue, as in the Case before menc~oned if there could ever happen such an vniversall Ruine & Decay of Rationall Creatures, as that by the abuse of that Freewill they should generally miscarry why a might not appeare wee doe not know. Wherefore we are far from denying a possibility of an irresistable Grace to be exercis'd by God and such an Election as is noe way conseqt upon our Faith & Conversion in order of nature but Antecedent to it.

But it is neither agreable to Scripture nor sound Reason for us to think that none are recovered or saved without such an irresistable Grace and prventive Election as this is, that is that none become Good but by absolute fatality for ^then it will follow from thence that all that are wicked are irresistably & fatally soe too. For as God doth not forcibly & miraculously make any Man vicious that is brutish & Ignorant (though it is not beyond his power soe to doe) because it is ^repugnant to his essentiall Goodnesse & holynesse so neithr doth he miraculously & irresistably make all Men Holy & Vertuous bec~ it is repugnant to his wisdome so to doe, some acct whereof we shall endeavour to give afterward in a peculiar Chap: And according to that Hypothesis all Holines & Righteousnes would be a True & Proper Miracle

Now here lyes another grand Objection against Liberty of Will & self-power, that whereas the Assertors of it have set up that Hypothesis for this very Reason that they might thereby salve the Phænomenon of Sin & free God from all Imputac~on of Blame in it they doe not consider how they doe in the Mean time rob God of all the Glory of vertue & Righteousnesse denying the Causality of that him ^allso for if Men by their own freewill & selfepower (whereby they have a Dominion & Lordship of over their actions) are the proper Causes of Evill then they must needs be the Causes of Good too. & be their own Saviours & Authors of their own happinesse.

But wee shall now undertake to shew that as the Hypothesis of Freewill is necessary to be admitted to make Sin & Vice somthing, that is reall Evills in nature & to free God from the imputac~on of it, so it cannot at all be charged with this Inconvenience, that it wipes God of all the Glory of Mens Righteousnesse & Salvac~on & derives the Causality of it wholly upon themselves. And if wee can really effect this & make it clearly appeare that as the Hypothesis of Freewill free <75> from God from the imputacion of Sin & Evill & Conseqtly of Mens damnation, so it no way robbs him of the Glory of Mens Salvac~on then we shall have removed one of the greatest prjudices that is against this Doctrine

Now to make this out we shall first lay our foundac~on here that Mankind are more by their own default in a Lapsed Vitiated & Depraved state by meanes whereof the strength of their Freewill & selfepower is very much impaired as to true Righteousnesse, wch though it be called by very differt names whereof some are in more Credit than others, somtime Morall Good Morality & Honesty & Vertue wch are not commonly in so grt repute, somtime Holynesse Godlinesse Divinity & the Divine Life & nature wch Expressions sound higher yet I take them all to be one & the same thing. So that we doe not now stand upon Even ground, but are under grt disadvantage & therefore stand in need of some other Divine Assistance to recover & repair this our lapsed state. Nay the ruine that we are under is soe grt as that we must be regenerated & quite made over anew & transformed into a new Life differt from that wch wee are first possessed with, before we can be truly either Holy or happy.

And we must observe here, that this was the great & fundamentall Error of Pelagius that he denyed Mankind to beleive in a vitious state, but asserted that Men as God made them at first had noe determinac~on to Morality one way or another upon them neither Vertuous nor Vicious Dispositions; but as Aristotle supposed that the Mind of Man in respect of Truth was in it selfe but Rasa Tabula, an Empty Table Book or White paper that had nothing at all written in it but receive all its Notions by being afterwards scribled upon by Object without, So Pelagius supposed that Man as God & nature brought him into this world was a Perfect Blank as to Vertue or Vice & indiffert to either, till afterward by his own Free will & acc~ons he contracted a Customary Inclinac~on one way or other, ^And so indeed Aristotle ^in his Ethicks as Men are not borne Musitians or Lutonists but onely by playing upon the Lute often acquire such a Habit in their fingers of moving the Strings so or soe, So the Case is ^the same for vertue or Vice ^ Pelagius held that those ^ thinges are of after acquisition, by action & Habit, for these are his own words Omne Bonum et Malum quo vel laudabiles vel Vituperabiles sumus non nobissum oritur sed agitur a nobis (a paces enim utriusque non pleni nascimur, et ut sine virtute, ita sine vitio nassimur; atque ante Actionem & priæ Voluntatis id solum in Homine est quod Deus Condidit, So Juliane his Follower nullum est de Natura Conditione peccatum, sed L: A: in natura Hominum Ꝑseverat. And againe naturam Humanam in excedijs nascenti esse innocentiæ deus Locupatam

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Who also would endeavour to demonstrate that it must needs {illeg} after this manner, Etiamsi Diabolus creavit Homines nullâ suà culpa mali essent, et Ideo jam nec Mali essent quia esse quisquam nisi quod natus est non potest nec ab Ea justum est aliquid amplius flagitare quam potest If one should suppose the Devill to have made Men, that they would not have been Evill by their own fault & therefore not blame-worthy at all since noe Man can be otherwise then wt he is made to be neither is it just to require of Sin more than by nature he can bee: X

Neither was this all Pelagius his Errour in wch he hath the Consent of Aristotle & some other Heathen Philosophrs, but also he ventur'd to assert somthing further contrary to Aristotle himselfe & all others that Freewill or the Power that Men have to Morall Good is not at all impaired by Sin or Vitious Actions but as if it were Essentially indivisible & could never be more or lesse in a Man was a like both in Vitious & in Vertuous Ꝑsons thus Julian his follower speaks for Him peccantes non Abritrij Libertatem sed Conscientiam Justitiæ Ꝑ diderunt Librū autem Arbitrū et post peccatum tam plenum est quam fuit antepeccata, and againe Nos dicinius peccato Hominis non natura statum mutari sed meriti qualitatem: i:e: et in peccante hanc esse Lib~ij Arb~ij naturam Ꝑ quā potest a peccato definere quæ fuit in Eo ut possit a Justitia deviBare; B wch Assertion is not onely contrary to Aristotle, but plainly repugnant, to all sense & Experience & the Common Notions of all Mankind that by Vitious Habits the power or strength to Morall Good is proporc~onably weakned & impaired. But I observe that of late Times Many Men are ^renderd something ^more inclinable to this grosse Pelagian Errour meerly from a false Notion or Definition of L A: that it essentially consists in such a Liberty of Contrariety, that is, to Good or Evill that one is ^allwayes equally inclined & indiffert to one or other of them; In wch respect they take it to bee ^such a thing as can never receive Magior~ et Mino~ any intenc~on or remission Those falsely that conceived that both the Liberty & strength of Freewill consists in such an indifferency to those opposites Morall Good & Evill whereas its strenght is onely to Good & then it is in its ἀκμὴ or vigor when it is fixed in Good - Morall Habits, & it is in the Lowest degree of Languor & weakenesse, when it is fixedly & stupidly confirmed in Evill Habits, the possibility of Converting to Evill being really nothing but the weaknesse of that power called L: A: or <77> or Freewill, wherefore an Equilibriousness 'twixt Vertue & vice is not the Power of Freewill nor Essentiall to it but a Certaine middle state of it in such as are neither way Vitious nor Vertuous. But an Infinite selfe flexibility & Power of turning ourselves in a Momt to the Highest Vertue & or the Lowest Vice is noe Power nor any thing possible in nature noe more than it can be a power to be infinitely weak & strong at the same Time

Nothing is more plaine in Philosophy than that the strength of Freewilled Beings as to Morall Good & Evill as diminishable & increaseable & therefore that by com~itting of Evill actions it must needs bee Ꝑporconably impaired according to the frequency & kind of them But that noe Raconall Creature can be made by God in Ꝑfectly neutrall & Oudeterous state to Morall Good & Evill as if Morality did not belong to a Man as a Man & according to his make noe more than to be a ^good or bad Lutinist or Grammarian ^did but that both of them are meerly adventitious, & acquisitious affections or Denominac~ons coming in upon Habits Actions we have demonstrated before; & therefore that all Rac~onall Beings must be created by God πῶς διακεί μενοι somways or other affected towards Morality The τὸ μέσον of the Soul the Redoubled selfe active Life of the Soul must needs have some certaine Respect or other in it towards that higher Divine & that Lower Instinct of selfish Life

And that in Men as they are borne Vertue hath not naturally a Predominancy in them though we shld set aside the Scripture & wt it speakes of Adams fate & the Redemption made by Christ is sufficiently evident by the Common Phænomena of Humane Life. And therefore the Lapse of Humane Souls was an Hypothesis admitted by the best of the Heathen Philosophers, though they could not give that acct of it that wee can from Adams fall.

Now this being granted that in Men as born into the world the power of ^their Freewill is not equilibrious to Good & Evill but that they are lapsed & sunk lower under the Law of their Members predominating over them, it is necessary that there shld be some further Assistance of Divine Grace to help them towards their recovery for otherwise they must needs be acknowledged to be under either an absolute impossibility or at least so great a difficulty of Recovery that it would be a thousand to one whether they wld

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they would ever emerge againe. And who can make make any dbt but that when a Man is deeply sunk into vitious Habits if Providence shld doe nothing at all towards his change & recovery ^nothing to direct him in it but let him injoy the gratificac~on of all his Lusts & Appetites without any Comptroul disturbance or inconvenience, he still possessing Ꝑfect Habits & having all thinges according to his own mind, but he would continue in this sensuall Life to all Eternity. X

Wherefore we affirme that Man being now by his own default plunged into such a state of degeneracy & Imbecility to Morall Good that God doth not utterly leave him to himselfe in this Condic~on without affording him any help or assistance & standby onely & look on as utterly abandoning him him to Ꝑish in this State but casts a very compassionate eye upon him & doth many wayes extend his Grace towards Him in order to his recovery to a state of true happinesse. And first though we could not challenge any thing from God in a way of debt when wee had Pvoked & disobliged yet he publikely declared in the Gosple his readinesse to be reconciled to all through his Son who hath made a Ꝑpitiatory Sacrifice for them as it were earnestly beseeching them to lay a side all Jealousies & distrusts of him & to close with his offered pardon upon the termes wch he had Ꝑposed wch is unfeigned endeavor of amendmt according to that power wch they have Ꝑmising them a fresh additionall supply neither doth he onely help the defect of their Ignorance by the outward Instruction of a written word, but also quicken & stimulate them ^Actively by hopes of the most glorious rewards on the one hand & feares of the most dismall punishmts on the other, these to be differtly dispensed at a publicke & solemne Day of Judgmt when All shalbe made to appeare before the Grt Tribunall. Which Gosple Provision & Di spensation is ^in itselfe a most powerfull Engine to worke upon all the naturall Faculties in Men & to rowz them up & awaken them. And therefore this is often called in scripture by the name of Grace.

Secondly not to insist upon that wise Contrivance & Constitucon of thinges that God hath framed both within a Mans ^selfe whethr there is somthing that allwayes checks & controlls wickednesse, & many Animall Passions ^wch themselves are Provocac~ous & Spurrs to Virtue but also in the Œconomy of the ^whole world ^without where <79> where Vice & Wickednesse how much ^soever pursued is alwayes disgracefull & Vertue resplendt & Honourable because But all these thinges may be thought to belong to nature though Nature it selfe is Grace as I shall shew afterward; wherefore I say, not to insist upon this, God is not wanting by speciall & peculiar Providence to contribute to the Recovery of lapsed souls, according to their severall circumstances, & though in a way fully agreable to their own Liberty of acting & without offering violence to that Free Principle in them yet powerfully & effectually in order to their Good of ^they correspōdētly comply with the same? Wee did before observe out of Plato that Man hath not the Sole Govermt of himselfe by his own Freewill, but that God & Opportunity governe the most of all Humane affaires. Neither is this true of Civill things onely but also of Morall, for the greatest part of us is nature & the least selfe activity. So that the Disposing of outward Providentiall Circumstances will have a grt sway & influence upon the altering of our Morall Dispositions, & may Contribute very much either to Cacillate; or impede & obstructe the improvemt of the mind. Counsells exhortations ^Providētiall Opportunities, affliction & castigations, have no small influence vpon or Morall Determinations - To think that the Faculty of Freewill is such an Indifferēcy in that no circūstances without vs haue any force at all vpō vs, is a great mistake. One of the Christian fathers calls a happy change & performation of Life made the gift of a feauer as if had not providence visited opportunely with such a Castigation the person had ^probably continued as he was before And sant Paul himselfe that great Herold & Trumpeter of Grace was conuerted by means of an extreordinary prouidence, wch though it was not without somthing of miracle, yet for ought wee know it was without any irresistable force uppon his will, as therfore he did euer after throughout his whole life deseruedly acknowledge, & admire that speceall grace of God by wch he was conuerted & made a sincere Christian X Apostle

But thirdly this is not all. For grace and prouidence doth not content itselfe to act soe remotely ^onely but it makes neerer approches to & ^closer assaults uppon the Fort & garrison of mans heart it beseigeth it, by inward motions and suggestions, {illeg} Cogitations Inclinations and attractions for as the Contrary <80> powers are busy in this kind to worke uppon mans phansys & imaginations and raise seuerall Scens of thoughts to them to allure and draw forth seuerall unclean lusts from them soe it can not be doubted but God and those blessed Genij aboue those inuisable watchmen are actiue and uigilant in this kind to counterworth them there being a perpetuall war in the world betwixt the inuisable powers of two seuerall kingdoms the one of Light & the other of darknes each one endeauoring to enlarge their teritories and encrease their parties * [but the artifice of diuine prouidence hath soe framed the contriuance and contexture of all things that the worser things should not preuaile {illeg} but that vertue may be triumphant & wickednes be kept under in the world] [ the whole Heaven and air is full of good and bad spirits and there is an immortall war betwixt them and therfore wee haue need to haue infinite caution but the Gods and Dæmons are our Assistants for wee are the possesciendi of the Gods and Dæmons] soe that unles wee be wanting to ourselues diuine grace and prouidence will never be wanting to us

Now this diuine grace of inward assistance afforded to the Souls and minds of men, is not single but manyfold for there is both preuenting ^or exciting grace that is before hand with us and anticipates ^the endeavours & the free principle in us wch if complied withall is seconded with further subsequent grace of inward corroboration, & illumination ^& Abstractiō and at last all is crowned with compleating confirming grace, without wch Soules can not be {illeg} of their station in heauen itselfe but would be obnoxious to those Platonicall whirling Revolutions All free willed Creatures being in themselues lubricous and slippery, Insomuch that many of the Angels themselues that not their principality but lost their ^heavēly habitations; but of this completing & confirming grace wee speake more else where

Wherefore some divine grace doth both preuentiously begin & excite and concomitantly assist & carry on & Vltimately consummate the worke of mans ^Conversio~ & saluation ^for his saluatio~ is partly but his Conversiō to God & Rightousness mans will & selfe power wch is taken along with it acting but a smale part herein; in the intermedious {illeg} wee may well conclude with the pious and learned Origen <81> that mans freewill & selfe actiuity doth contribute ^uery much {illeg} attainment of the true good thro that diuine grace & power. This is the least that we haue to say in this busnes, that mans freewill and selfepower doth contribute but a uery litle towards the bettering of his minds and that diuine prouidence & grace has by far, the greater influence & Causality ^{illeg} for afterward wee shall ascend to a higher Climax and show that indeed it is wholly and entirely to be ascribed to God . But for the present let us call it as here it is, that there is somthing don by the will & actiuity wch God by nature has bestowne uppon man but yet that God by Grace doth the greater part. This is more largely declared by the fore mencioned Origen after this manner Pag 99 the true good of rationall Beings doth not wholly depend on their own proarresis Will or Election as som Philosophers asserted, but consists mixtly of that and the diuine power & Grace conspiring, for there is not only need of both these, to witt, of man's freewill and Gods conspiring Grace, (wch is not in the power of our will) to make a man Good holy & uertuous but alsoe to make ^him that is good to perseuere therin for he that hath attaned to the greatest perfection in Rightuousnes would presently fall into ruin and decay if he should be puffed up with a conceit herof and arrogating the cause herof to himselfe and if he should not ascribe the Glory of it to him who has contributed exceedingly much more towards the acquisition & possesion then his owne will did By wch it seems that this learned and pious Father is mostly censured by some as a Pelagian by Prolepsis, for as to inward Grace and spirituall assistance Pelagius to the last would not acknowledge it to be necessary but only vsefull & profitable, Moreover he rightly concluds from these premises that therfore the whole success of our spirituall improuement is allways to be thankfully ascribed to the diuine power and Grace and in this sence to think of the Apostle is to be understood it is not of him that willeth nor of him that runneth but of God That showeth mercy. pag 100 not as if God did shew mercy without our willing & running & as if man did not at all cooperate but because our willing & running is nothing at all in comparishon of the Grace of God then to mans own willing & running The same Author in his compars the forementioned place of Sat Paul's with two other places of Scripture The on that in the 127 psalme except the Lord build the house they labour in uaine that build it except the Lord keeps the Keep the Watchmen watcheth but in vaine from whence it cannot be inferred that the Carpenter or workman did nothing at all but that without Gods {illeg} <82> all our endeavours in these externall things of Life, is insignificant and {illeg} the other passage is that of St Paul himselfe the 1 of Corinth 3 I haue planted Apollo watered but God gaue the encrease soe then nether is he that planteth any thing nor he that watereth but God that giueth the encrease euen in these naturall things as in building & planting or keeping a City that is beseiged by enemies though it can not be denyed but that mans Industry & endeauor is used yet the good success is by all ascribed according to the instincts of nature unto God and much more ought thus to be in Spiritualls where God doth doe much more and mans will and endeauor far les Sic cum maris superauserit marina discrimina quam uis multo Labore nautar et omni nauticiteartir opere impense et Gubernatoris studio atque industria adhibitus res agatur, uentorum quoque aspirantibus fluctibus et astyrium signes diligenter notatis, si tamen nauis undis et fluctibus fatigata ad portum salua perpenit, nemo sani sensus nisi misericordiæ Dei salutem navis ascribet Sed ne ipse quidem nauta uel Gubernatorandit duire ego saluam nauem sed totum ad Dei misericordian refert non quod sentiat re nihil ad saluandum nauem vel artus adhibuisa uel Laboris sed quoniam sensit a se quidem laborem salutem {illeg} Deo præstitam naui So when a Ship is tossed by a storme at Sea, though the marinars use much labour to preserue it and Steere it sofly, and the chief Pilate imploy all his art and industry to the same purpose diligently obseruing both the motion of the winds and alsoe of the Starres if the Ship at last shattred & wearied with ^long contesting with the winds and billows ariue safe to the mercy of God nether will the chiefe Pilate dare to arrogate it to himselfe and say I haue saued the Ship wholy by my own art and endeauour but will refer it to the diuine Goodness, not that he contributed nothing at all by his art and industry thervnto but that becaus but that this without Gods prouidence and Goodness might haue proued vtterly unsuccessfull. Now if the case be soe in these ordinarys things of humane life, that notwithstanding or Endeavours the successe is attributed to our endeauours Gods mercy & prouidence much more in Spirituall things where God acts more immediately notwithstanding or small Activity the {illeg} is to be divine Grace ascribed to God & Divine

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Now from this Hypothesis of mans will contributing something of its own activity but divine grace challenging for the greatest part of that wch is don in the inward change of mens mind, towards good it seems that God deals with mankind somthing on that manner as Parents doe often with their Children {illeg} ^that will let them haue somthing in their own Custody as their own, but yet not set much as to make them forget themselues and thinke them^selves independent In those of whom they receiued it, and to whome they ^ owe their Being but ^will scope them in continuall ^need & expectation of new voluntary ^supplied superadditions, that they may not grow insolent but . Thus wee haue all by nature some small tallent of selfe actiuity, bestowed uppon us, wherby wee can contribute som ^little to our own Good, but this is soe inconsiderable in itselfe that without continuall ^new Superadditions ^of Order it would proue alltogether uneffectuall, God {illeg} keeping farre the greater part in his own hand to make us know ourselues & the dependance uppon him wch he {illeg} wisely dispenseth to us according to our Correspondent Compliances with his grace and improuements of what wee haue Areceiued A And that this is noe bigoticall conceit of Religionists only but a reall truth agreeable to the Catholicke sence of ^and {illeg} nature all mankind appears from hence that all men are led by inward instinct rogare bonam mentem ^a Deo to implore the diuine Assistance for the bettering of their minds ^& for strength agst Tentations and it is obseruable that those who ^are supposed to asserted such a freewill or Liberty in man as is inaimable to God himselfe, and wch he could noe way act uppon ^give their suffringe herunto for so Epectetus in Arrian Contradicting his own Hypothesis aduiseth men in all their inward agonys and Conflicts with temptations to betake themselues for refuge to the diuine assistance & earnestly to implore the same as conceiuing they might receiue much benefit therby. Pag 213 when thou {illeg} portunatly assaulted by thine own ungouernable phansys see that thou stoutly resists them & suffer not thy selfe to be snatcht away will then Consider that this is a matter of noe small Concernment whether thou yeilds or not but a thing of the greatest moment of all it is a dispute Concerning a kingdom concerning Liberty tranquillity & ataraxy and now thinke of God and earnestly call uppon him as thy helper and assister {illeg} solelicitude and uehemency of mind, then the Marriners ^vp to call call uppon Castor & Pollux in a & tempest ^at sea for what more dangerious storme or tempest is there then that wch ariseth from strong phansies uiolently opposing person

Now that men doe naturally inuoke the Deity and implore his assistance for these strenthing of their minds against the Assaults of temptations is a plaine argument that according to the sence of nature mans free will is in it selfe insufficeant and stands in need of an aduentitious assistance of diuine grace

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But to thinke as some doe that inward will must be totally excluded as to any actiuity of indeauour whatsoeuer ^towards God and that all must be don uppon him by an irresistable force & ther can be noe grace without this nor God haue glory of mans Conuersion & Saluation, This seems to me but but a rude and Rusticall conceit ^of a Deity & allso far from the truth, and as for in absolute fatality & irresistable necessity there can nether be uertue nor piety, there being nothing but Gods own acting and what could ^not be possibly otherwise then it is, and therfore noe foundation for blame or Commendation in the Creature. Moreouer they that will needs haue all to be saued & made good by an irresistable Goodnesse forc'd uppon them, they must determine alsoe that all shall be damned by an irresistable wickednes wch they could not auoyd, that is, that ether they had a wicked Nature or else were made wicked by diuine fate. To assert either of wch is all one as to say, that they had noe wickednes at all in them, but are damned merly by will & power without Justice, and that the Deity is such a Being whoe glorys in nothing else but in an arbitrary distribution of happines and misery uppon his Creaturs fondly doting upō the Persons of some, and keeping vp all fauours & praises uppon them wch they can possibly receiue & most partially Hating others and tormenting them ex beneplicito to all Eternity. Lastly if all Vertue be by irresistable fate or necessity and not freely exerted from any inward principle then that being in wch it is can neuer call it ^a perfection of its own it being only a thing clapt uppon it, wch is as Passive noe more then the banks can call the water their own that glides runs it ^between them nether could God receve any hearty Loue or deuoute affection from his Creaturs all theire Diety being forced ^& violent or artificial thing, Where as in truth God desires from his Creatues somthing that is inwardly themselues; that freely & naturally floes from them & is actively uitall in them As he would {illeg} haue them decked with ornaments of their own and haue an inward innate {illeg} and not to be drest up wholy with ascititious ^& borrowed things or to be daubd ouer with paint & Varnish.

Wherefore the thing wch providence is allways endeauoring after it ^gently to prolicite ^allure and draw forth the free principle in man that it may ^from with in it selfe actiuely display that Life ^of its own wch it at once Vertue Piety & Happines. All the Methods of providence tends to this, and all things are most artificially contriued by it in order to this end, nether doth God think himselfe glorified any otherwise by his Creaturs then when himselfe & Vertue are thus freely and Heartally loued and earnestly panted pursued after by them from an inward ^vnstraind & and unforced principle A of their owne: A But it is a {illeg} ^& cyclopicall conceit of the Deity to thinke that it Seeks to glorify itselfe only by power & thunderbolts, or by meer ^irrationall Will & arbitrary favour and by engrossing all Activity wth its own hands doing all itself and not suffering any thing else to act besides All wch is but an indigāt & snarking desire of Glory vnworthy of the Deity.

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But the worst Ꝑjudice of all in this kind is this that some cannot think any thing to be Grace to them unlesse it were partially bestowed on them. & the greatest part of Mankind be as partially excluded from it, the former That there is noe Grace shewed to themselves unlesse there be cruelty exprest to others wch whereas this is nothing but a narrow self-love of their own that would make them monopolize the Divine favour, from whence also is that concept wchthey have of the Deity that it cannot think it selfe free otherwise than by an irrac~onall Arbitrary self Will & if it be ty'd up by any Goodnesse Wisdome & Equity.

But now because Any thing besides absolute & irresistible fate ^partially determining salvatiō to some few & absolutely excluding all the Possibility of it is commonly branded by some by the name of Pelagianisme Wee shall here briefly shew also that this is a great mistake, And to this purpose Wee must a little unravel Church Antiquity First therefore Wee shall observe that before Pelagius started up it was the generally received Doctrine of the Antient Chatholick Xtian Church & St. Augustin himself ^consenting that Ꝑdestinac~on to Glory & Elecc~on was by Ꝑscience & foreknowledge of Mens Faith & Repentance XA In Origens Philocalia This is the title of the 25t Chapt: , That Ꝑdestinac~on out of foreknowledge doth not destroy freewill In wch it is asserted . That Ꝑdestinac~on is not the Cause of Justificac~on & Gloryficac~on, but foreknowledge is before Ꝑdestinac~on according to that of the Scripture whom he foreknew them he also Ꝑdestinated; to be conformable to the Image of B his form, B And Prosper Himselfe who so much opposed Pelagianisme pœnè omnium Parinvenitur et una Sententia qua Ꝑpositum et Ꝑdestinac~onuem Dei, ut ab hoc Deus alios vasa honoris, alios vasa Contumeliæ fecerit, quia finem {illeg} Ꝑviderit & sub ipso Gratia adjutario, qua futurus esset voluntate et actione Ꝑsuivit

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From wch last words ^of Prosper we may observe that they did not understand by Prescience a foreknowledg of what Men ould doe only by the strength of nature without any assistance of Divine Grace; (wch was the Doctrine of Pelagius) but of wt they would doe in complyance both with ^both the Ꝑventing & subsequent Grace of God. wherefore all the Difference betwixt the Orthodox & ^the Pelagians was Whether a Man by his naturall Power of Freewill without any ^inward assistance of Divine Grace antecedt thereunto c~ld merit & Lowre to himselfe {illeg}all Salvac~on, & St Austin himselfe (though somtime in his heat of Opposition against the Pelagians) he seem'd to be transported further than the rest & to have held a singular Opinion of his own that seems hardly reconcileable with any Power of Freewill, yet he contradicts it agen, & by all means endeavours to decline the Odium of destroying L: A:

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And whereas it was very obvious here to object that we plainly see by experience, that all Men have not the same advantages, by Divine Providence afforded to them in order to their Repentance & Amendmt that others have having not the meanes of Grace alike afforded them nor Oppertunity & length of time wch therefore should seem to be referred to some Absolute and Antecedt Ꝑdestinac~on the Antient Fathers often declared that though this is a certaine unsearchable Depth wch Humane Wit can never fadom yet wee must beleive that all these thinges are ordered & dispensed in away of Justice likewise, & not according to absolute Will & purpose & therefore are to be referred ad occulta Divinæ Justitiæ to the Secrets of Divine Justice. Though indeed it is well known that Origen & his followers following the Platonists here did Venture to assert the προιπ{illeg} of the Soul meerly to solve this Phænomenon.

But there is one thing that may be alledged against wt wee have asserted that all the Antients before Pelagius made Election & Ꝑdestinac~on to be subseqt decrees of God, after foreknowledge & not antecedt & absolute That St Austin doth so often ^excitate that Opinion of Pelagius that Grace was bestowed according to Merits & Condemne it as Hereticall as otherwise he could not have done if all the Antient Fathers had been of the same Ꝑsuasion but to this wee answer, that that wch he condemned as Pelagian & Hereticall was wt the Antients never asserted that without any Ꝑventing Grace at all a Man by his Freewill & naturall powers might Merit & deserve the Grace of God, And thus St Austin himselfe explaines it Hoc quippe ita dicunt Pelagiani velut Homo a seipse sine adjutorio Dei habeat Ꝑpositum bonum studiumꝗ virtutio quo merito precedente dignis sit adjuvari Dei Gratia sue sequente, And againe Meritu ante Gratiam et ideo Contra Gratiam defendentes priores voluntare Deo en L: A: et retribuatur ijs Gratia Ꝑ Ꝑmio. In opposition to wch Doctrine St Austin thus opposeth Hominis propositu~ bonum adjuveat quidem subsequens Gratia sed nec ipsum esset nisi Ꝑcederet Gratia. That is there is not onely a Grace of God subseqt to Mans Freewill, but also there is Ꝑventing & Exciting Grace to be acknowledged wch the Antient Fathers asserted & Pelagius denyed

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Indeed I think it out of Question that St Austin himselfe after he had been engaged in the Pelagian Contest did change his opinion from a Ꝑvisionall Ꝑdestinac~on (wch he held before) to an absolute one, though somtimes he Contradicts againe himself in his latter writings but however this was but his private opinion wch zealous Opposers of Pelagianisme rejected, others & would neithr affirme nor deny, but thought it noe way necessary to be asserted.

By all this it appears that Orthodox Antiquity & the Assertors of Grace against Pelagius did not altogether banish Freewill & introduce a fatall Necessity of Every mans being either said or damn'd, frustra blasphemas, sit et ignorantiam Auribus nigeris sth St Hierom Nec L~bru~ Arbitru~ condemni{illeg} damnetur Ille qui damnat. Nay St Austin himselfe in his latter writinge often endeavours to salve L: A: & reconcile it with Grace & Ꝑdestinac~on.

Having now shew'd, that all the Antients did assert a Complicac~on of Divine Grace & Freewill together, I shal onely add here, that though L: A: contribute some little thing yet this doth not derogate any thing at all from God For as much as Freewill it selfe is in some sense a Divine Grace & it is very weak to think that nothing is to be ascribed to God but wt is afterward cast in upon us by way of Superaddition to wt wee had received from God by nature, & as if we could chalenge all the rest to our selves And ought not to acct it Gods whereas in him wee live & move & have our being all our Naturall Powers, wtsoever is Good in the whole universe is Gods & not the Creatures & there is nothing that can truly be asserted unto us but onely sin & Errour that is the wrong use of our own Free power. In the right use of this power when it acts according as it was intended by God & nature God is justly entitled to the Causality of those effects but when wee employ it otherwise than anie should doe the {illeg}Carriage of it is onely to be ascribed to <89> to ourselves Nay there is much more Glory due to God that he would endue us with such a Power & Dominion over our selves & Actions than if himself had acted all thinges necessary in us more Glory of his power for to be able to make selfe active & selfe-powerfull Beings is Greater power than to make nothing but Machins & Neurospasts & much more Glory of his Goodnesse that he would Ꝑmit us to possesse somthing as our own & would capacitate us also to receive prayse & Commendac~ons for our own Actions {illeg}ry this to his Creatures And therefore it is plaine that some Men are here but Childishly affrighted {illeg} bugbeares reasō of a superstitious fear of the Deity.

But all that we have said hitherto is yet short of the maine businesse & that wch is the very bottom of this controversy betwixt the Pelagians & the Orthodox in this point (wch is indeed a Controversy of noe small moment) is still behind. For the Pelagian Spt supposes that Righteousnesse is nothing els but a conformity of actions to an Outward & written Law, arbitrarily made, or els a customary Ꝑpensity of doing some externall acc~ons, acquired by frequency of acting like to that ^Habits of of singing & dancing & such like, wch {illeg} Aristotle seems {illeg} to Favour. And many Men are prone to have this slight opinion both of Religion & Morality, & to content themselves with such a shallow & superficiall (nay I may also say) carnall piety & vertue, as the onely true & reall; ^concluding All other being to be meerly phantasticall & Enthusiasticall. And therefore noe wonder if these doe soe highly extoll Freewill & the Power of nature It being soe Evident that wee have a naturall Power & Command over our outward Man & Actions These Men conceit that the Divine Lawes & Lawes of Religion, are but {illeg} but just like to Civil Lawes, & that there is noe difference at all between them, save onely in this, that the one are made by Men & the other by God, whereas indeed the one contents itselfe onely with outward Actions, there being nothing els Cognizable in foro Humano, but the Eternall Law of God & Nature is given to the will itself & requires a certaine inward Life & Disposition & Life Wherefore the Scripture Oracles plainly tell us, nay Truth it self speakes it silently in our Souls, that to Man in this lapsed State, ^that in order & <90> ^ In order to True Righteousnes there is need of novâ Genitura, a new Creac~on & & generac~on of the Soul, a new life, Spt & Nature to be together in it; & indeed in this lyes a great part of the Mystery of Christianity, that Wee ought not to acquiesce in our own Righteousness done by the power of Freewill & strength of Nature, in our unregenerate state, but seek after another Divine Righteousnesse, wch is the Righteousnesse of God by Faith, A Righteousnesse of Gods own working in us, whilst we desparing of our own Ability & removing all ^{illeg} dependance upon the same, beleive in the Divine Power & Goodnesse & expect to receive it from thence onely. Wherefore wee doe say agen; that the Law of Gods everlasting Righteousnesse the Norma & Mensura of it, is not meerly an outward Letter commanding externall act^ions that are in every Mans own power ^to do it is not meer Will & Words, but it is a Life Spt & Nature. & as the Scripture often tells us the Life Spt & Nature of God Himselfe, acting upon & Communicating ^itselfe to Rationall Creatures. Let those wch are Strangers to this Righteousnesse & uncircumcised in heart, laugh never soe much at a Righteousnesse infused, that is, in their Language, in powered & Graces inspired that is as they phrase ^it in-blown, & think that this Derision is a sufficient confutac~on of all Christianity, yet Wisdome wilbe justifyed by her Children, & the Sonnes of wisdome will ever Justify this Truth of Christianity, that the inspirac~on of the most high giveth both understanding & Righteousnesse & that true Vertue & Piety though it be no Fanatick nor Frantick Enthusiasme yet as some of the Heathens Philosophrs themselves apprehended is to be ascribed θειᾳ τινὶ επιπνοῖᾳ to a Certaine Divine afflac~on & Instinct

Neither indeed is any thing more plaine if we consult Reason & our own inward Sense then this that it must be soe, For Freewill & selfepower doth not make any thing but alwayes turne itself to somthing or other that is, where there are divers Congruities wch cause a distraction in the Soul, thereby this power the Soul is able to turne it selfe {illeg} to one of other Freewill neither makes Righteousnesse nor wickednesse but in wicked Men the Soul turnes & determine it selfe wholly, to those Lower & Easy Congruities of nature, of Animall Lust & Selfish Desires, & as we said before wicked Men are as well inspired by a Certaine lower Mundane Spt of the Animall Life & nature As Good Men are by that Higher Spt of the Divine Life & Nature And when the word Enthusiasme is taken as com̄only it is in a {illeg} Sense it Ꝑperly <91> it may Ꝑperly be attributed to the former of these though not to the Latter, ^That being a Blind Irrac~onall & Dark Impulse when Men are carryed away Captive by the worser principle in them but the other {illeg} & Gentle instinct that is accompanied with the Clearest Light & Serenity, it being ^{illeg} a Diviner thing than Reason as Aristotle himselfe & other Philosoprs have observed λογου θειατιγον The Soul of Man hangs as it were betwixt two Loadstones God & the World the Divine Life & Spt above or the Lower Spt of the World The Animall Selfish Nature And though it hold indeed some Power of turning it selfe to either ^by degrees yet it properly makes neither of them; the Magick of the Lower Nature makes one thing by attracting & falscinating Souls under it, but that Divine Magick or attraction if it may be so called (for Magick was A Religious Word at first among the Persians) makes the other.

All that A Man can doe by his own Freewill & selfepower is onely to use some Conatus or Endeavour; to turne himselfe towards that τὸ ἐν {illeg}ῖν θεῖον & τὸ {illeg} τῷ παντὶ θεῖον That Divine Principle that is in our selves & is in the whole world vniverse, that is to God himselfe who is more properly seated & ought more to be sought for in fundo Anima {illeg} in the inmost bottome of our own Soul then in the Highest heavens & there to be lookt for without us.

Nay this power of the Soul doth rather consist in some endeavours of turning itselfe from the Lower & Sinful Life of Corrupt Nature by denying to obey the Dictates of it to gratify its Importunities & make Ꝑposion for it it extends {illeg}Ꝑperly to Mortificac~on onely the killing of the Life of the Old Man is onely starving of it, & or refusing to feed it; & then as Ꝑpared Matter {illeg} {illeg} Life & Forme; that Divine Life seiseth upon it & enters into it For the Soul must needs be alwayes under one Life or {illeg}this lower Life is, as it were broken & {illeg} abated in it & thus reduced as it were into a Chaos, then doth the Spt of Divine Life seise upon it & hatch it into Forme & Pulchritude

All that Wee spake of before was onely this turning or Conversion of the Soul from the lower Life of Sinfull Nature in wch as wee have shewed also Mans Freewill doth not doe all ^{illeg} but the least part of it & That Triple Divine Grace Ꝑventing & exciting corroborating & Ꝑmoting, confirming & Compleating, justly challenging for the greatest share in it

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Whereas if Freewill had done all here, It had done but little; nothing that it could prove it selfe in, For as when a Man lying in a darke cold Cave by degrees crawls out of it & comes ^vp into the Light & warmth of the Sun & feels his cōfortable Rayes reflected round abt him, hee will have little Cause to attribute that cheering & reviving Comfort of warmth & Lighth wch he now feels receives to himselfe & not to the Son from whence it comes. The Morall reformac~on of Mens souls as the Philosophr defin'd it is but the Circumduction of the Soul out of that Dark & stupifying Cave where it could see nothing but shadows of thinges to the true Light & Life as to a Certaine Sun, and Our Saviour himself defined it to bee but the opening of the Eyes & the turning of the Soul from Darknesse into Light & from the power of Satan into God Wee have All by Nature as it were our backs turned vpō towards the Sun of Righteousnesse & All that Wee have to doe or candoe is onely to turne our selves abt towards it & to open or eyes that wee may at once receive the Light & Warmth of it; And therefore Wee cannot ascribe either of these to our selves, but onely to God from whom they flow. But soe long as wee think to quicken & enliven our selves with our own activity & the power of our own Freewill & to enlighten ourselves, or to see by our own Eyes ^or own Nat. wit & Reason, still continuing in that Dark Cave Wee doe deceive our selves & wee shall never come neither to the Light nor the Life of God

All the Activity that Wee have is only of Converting or turning our selves to It or rather of turning our selves from ^the Contrary to it in wch Divine Grace allso chalenges the greatest part, but we are passive to this Light & Life of God acting upon us. And all truly holy & spll actions that are done by the Soul are done by Vertue of that Divine life & Spt acting in it & therefore cannot possibly be attributed to Mans Freewill. And this is that very thing wch Pious Antiquity was soe zealous to assert, that All Holy affections pious Inclinac~ons & Spirituall Actions were not to be attributed to Man Freewill but to Christ & the Divine Spt in Him, wch yet is not so to be understood as if Man were to bee wholly sluggish & could contribute nothing towards the Ꝑmoting or turning him self to that Divine Principle, as some fondly conclude, but that all that wee can doe in this kind cannot entitle the least to the Causality of the thing it selfe wch is only Gods, noe more than the opening of our Eylids against the Sun cann <93> can make; the Light ^to be ours: there are Many naturall actions in wch we contribute somthing antecedtly & by way of Ꝑparac~on to nature & yet the Effect it selfe is not ^at all ascribed to us, but to God & Nature onely; though Man labours in plowing of the Ground & sowing of the Seed, yet it is the Spt ^or Plastick Power of nature the forms the Grace & God that gives the encrease; in the Generac~on of Animals ^one Animall is but ministerially subservient to nature in the Ꝑduction of another; for he that Generates doth not make the Life & Soul of that that is begotten Nay he doth not organize the Matter neither but it is the Spt of Nature or its plastick & Spermatick power that doth one, & the other that is the New Soul comes into the Ꝑpared Matter wee know ^not how nor whence. So all that Man can doe by his Freewill that must be here also assisted by Grace) is onely somthing Antecedanious & Ꝑparatory for the Divine Form ^& life to enter in & seise. nothing but the turning of it selfe by degrees from the Contrary Life & then that wch is the Life of all lives that ever enters into & actes upon Rac~onall Souls when it is not exluded, seiseth upon it.

But it must not be concluded from hence that Righteousnesse is a foreigne thing clapt upon the Soul, or A thing supernaturall in this Sense as if it were really Ꝑternaturall or Contrary to the true Nature of the inward Man, wch as we have said is grounded upon God himselfe, or is that Immateriall Heaven in which God dwells, e very Heathens them selves Ꝑceiving that there was a Great Cognac~on betwixt the Soul purged from wt was Heterogeneous & Aliene to it & God Himselfe. So that Grace is neither a Violent & forced thing nor yet meerly Artificiall because it is to be ascribed wholly to God, For it is nothing but the Soul, wch was before estranged from God, naturalizd againe to him; & reunited to its true Sourse & Originall All that outcry wch is made against nature is to bee understood onely of Corrupt vitiated and Apostatized Nature, not ^Mani{illeg}ically of Mans nature as God at first made it, wch was to be Conjoyned wth the Divinity & acted by it.

Neither should it be inferred from wt wee have said that that Divine Life which is Grace & Righteousnesse is altogether arbitrary for then it would follow from thence also that it were to noe purpose for us to use any endeavours to turne our selves towards it <94>

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N. 5th. This is that wch the Antients were wont to call ἐξουσια των προ ομινοις ἀντι{illeg} A Power of doing opposites. A self determining being is that wch is not determined by any Antecedt naturall necessity; {illeg} & therefore is capable of some variety of Acting and hath some ^vncertain Contingency more of lesse in it Aristotle Speaking of the Motion of loving Creatures ^as such wch in some sense are αυτοκίνητα, or selfe moving, writes after this manner ἄλογον το μὶαν κὶνποῖν κινεῖσθε μόνον ὁ φ'ἀυτῶν οιγε ιαυτὰ ἑαυτὰ κινοῦσιν, It is absurd to suppose that such thinges as move themselves should alwayes move one way ὀι ἐπ' ἀυτῶ το ἄναφερ{illeg} τωπυρὶ δῦλον ὅτι κὰι τὸ κάτω, ἐί του βαδιζειν ἀίτιόν τι ἀυτῷ κὰι {illeg} βαδιξειν. If fire had a power to determine its own motion upward then it is manifest that it could determine its moc~on downward also & that wch is an Actiō Cause of walking may also be a Cause of not walking. And so ^ all Animals will in some sense have ἐξουσίαν τῶν ἀντικοιμίνων a power of opposites or cōtraryes that is either of Contrarys or COntradictorys But this is much more true of Freewilled Beings for though Brutes are Capable of variety of Action according as their inward Appetites (wch are Changable) determine them) or doe not alwayes act one way as inanimate things doe yet they are ^thought to be necessitated by Phansy & Appetite in like Cases alwayes to doe alike 1 So that such outward objects being put & such inward Appetites, they cannot doe otherwise, than they doe But Freewilled Beings have a more interior selfepower so that the same outward objects being put, & the same Animal Appetites or Inclinac~ons wthin, & they may possibly act differently, and therefore it may be better sd of them οτι δ{illeg}ντας ου πράιτουσι πράξαι τὸ ἀντικείμένον, that they have a power of doing the Contrary to wt they doe, doe. For they can τῶν ἀυτῶν περι εξῶτων ὅτε μὲν ὅυτως ὅτι δὲ ἀλλωι ἐνεργειν i. e. in the very same Cases & Circumstances somtimes act one way & sometimes another. they are not alwayes necessarily determind by outward objects ^& the Impulses therefrom Their own Animall Inclinac~ons. The Doctrine of Zeno & the old Stoicks who denyed Freewill as thus described, by an Antient Peripatetick 167 That wee are Master of Nothing but alwayes follow the Circumstant thinges yeilding vpō plea to them & being overcome by them, & doe wt wee doe, because it is necessary for us soe to doe, & we cannot doe otherwise

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It being impossible for us such things being circumstant, or in such Causes, to doe otherwise then wee doe, because we cannot resist the circumstant thinges nor act otherwise than they encline us, or act vpon vs.

But the Contrary to all this is that wch was maintained by the Antient opposers of the Stoicall Doctrine that wee are Masters of somthing, & doe not alwayes soe follow the circumstant thinges, being {illeg} them, as that wee could not possibly doe otherwise than wee doe; but that is possible for it, wn the same Thinges are circumstant (i e) in the same cases & circumstances somtimes to act one way & sometimes another. Wee being able to resist both the outward objects & our own Animall Affecc~ons & soe to determine ourselves.

And if the now vulgarly received Definition of a Freewilled Agents that they are such as Positus omnibus ad agendum requisitis potest agere et non agere be taken in noe other sense than that before menc~oned namely that it is such a thing as τῶν ἀυτῶν περι εστώτων ὃτι μὲν ὃυταν ὅτεμὶν ἂλλωι ἐνεργεῖν διωατας, that in the same Case & circumstances it may possibly act differently sometimes one way & sometimes another then there is noe Exception to be made against it, but according to the Common Acceptac~on of it there are these 2 mistakes included in it First that in evy acc~on of Mans Life he is ^alike equally indifferent to doe or not doe, to act this or that till that very momt the he is determined. Secondly that the Practicall Judgmt it selfe is made to be one of the requisites of Action & that a Free Agent is indifferent to act ether according to it or ^against it Besides wch there is another Grand Errour also wch the Assertors of this Doctrine are Guilty of wch wee shall insist upon afterward that this loose uncertainty of Acting in freewilled Beings is {illeg} a pure Ꝑfecc~on and that the Ꝑfectiō of Freewill doth consist in a loose Indifferēt selfdeterminatiō any way.

Some Latter Authors describe this selfe determining power after this manner that it is that whereby Free Agents can ad vim et Motum Causæ a quâ fuerat impulsat aliquid adjecere, et impetum, quem aliunde non acceperat, addere, contribute & cast in somthing of its own to the impulsive causes & momts of Reason, that encline this way & that way, to turne the sowles, and superad a certain force of its own wch it had not recd from any thing els, & ^of . but it was originall to Hence is that notable difference assigned betwixt Man & other Living Creatures . That whereas all other Creatures follow the Curcumstant causes wthout & are passively determined by them it is otherwise in man whoe Essence consisteth in having a principle & Cause of action wthin himselfe <97> & not being necessarily determined by circumstant thinges wthout him. thē {illeg} to the Impulsive causes of actiō

Now Man having a selfe determining power of his acc~ons noe other cause to be required or {illeg} why he doth this rather than another thing that but onely himself. And otherwise he cld not be lyable to blame & Commendac~on. Pag: 166: As wee doe not ask a Reason why Earth & other heavy Bodys descend Ꝑpendicularly according to the Laws of Gravity; or why Brute Animals doe wt they doe according to the Instincts of nature Every one of these thinges being framed by nature to act as they doe So neither concerning thinges done by men uncertainly somtimes one way & somtimes another (wn the same thinges were circumstant) ought there to be any other Cause required besides the Man himselfe this being ^essentiall to man to haue a Cause & principle B acc~ons done by him B ^& to determine himselfe Which yet is not to bee understood uniu~sally, for our own Nature & the lawes of the universe doe circumscribe us within certaine bounds & limits but wee have a certaine Compasse ^left wthin wch we may be sd to have it in n~ra potestate & to determine ourselvs to this or that.

Now it is very observable here that a Freewilled Being is not onely sd to be ἀρχη καὶ ἀιτία A principle & Cause of action ^& to determin himselfe in doubtfull Cases & where Nature was puzled & distracted till the very doing of the Acc~ons, but also whereafter consultac~on & deliberac~on all d~bt & distracc~on was removed & where we clearly perceved that this ought to bee done & not the other because though Consulting & Deliberating Reason in themselves bee ^belong to Nature be necessary, & not free in wch Sense I conceive that of the old Stoicks to be true, μεκατῶτας σκέυ εα{illeg} τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐῖνας that there is no such thing ^Freewill in as consultac~on & Ratiocinac~on considerd in themselfes, yet it was in our power to consult or deliberate more or or lesse, & so use a Greater & lesser intenc~on in it & therefore that determinac~on of acc~on wch did result from a full & Mature Consultac~on may wel be sd to have bin ἐφ' ἡμῖν in our own power, & be imputed to ourselves + as the Cause of it. + As though a Sword doe necessarily cut & slash, yet the acc~on wch A man doth by it either in murdering killing an innocent or slaying an , & Traytour is to be imputed to the Doer of it because it was sin his own power so to use it or not; Wherefore that is true of the Greek Peripatetick

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Ὅ δια τὸν γινόμενον πὰρ' ἀντῷ ἐν τῷ βουλέν εοδας ουλλόγισμον ιομ κατα θ εμενοί τινι ἀυτὸι' αυτῷ τῶ φ{illeg}καταθέσεως ἄιτιος He that by Ratiocinac~on & Collection move by himselfe in consultac~on doth assent to any thing & resolve vpō any designe, is to himselfe the Cause of that Resoluc~on & may be sd to have determined himselfe thereto. And for the same Reason it is that Men are not onely blamed for Errour & false Opinions wn they assent to things not cleerly comprehended, but also commanded for knowledge Wisdome & true Opinions, because though Knowledge & understanding be necessary yet the more or lesse improvemt of their understanding is Ꝑtly to bee attributed to their own selfepower

N. 6th In the selfe determinac~on of outward Acc~ons there is not onely Θελησις but also κρίσις not onely Will or Command of Acc~on but also practicall Judgmt included & both these κρίσις & θέλησις ^pract Judgment & Will (strictly taken) concurre together to make up that wch Aristotle calls προαίρεσις or Elecc~on, & therefore both alike (if they be not rather really one & the same thing) Ꝑperly belong to the Soul redoubled upon itselfe & selfeactive. &c vide A. L.

N. 7th It is true that this power of selfe determinac~on is in it selfe much a Greater Ꝑfecc~on than that of Brutes wch are supposed to be confined to nat~rll Appetites & Instincts wch are alwayes particularly necesssarily determined to one, & have noe Amplitude at all in them. For the selfedetermining Power supposeth an higher Elevac~on of Life whereby a Being frees itselfe somthing by it selfe, loose & released, & hath a Larger scope & Prospect before it a greater Amplitude of Acting & exerciseth more Power activity & Liberty in determining its own actions & governing it selfe: ^thē being {illeg} determined by Objects As it is much a Greater Good or Perfecc~on for any Brute Animall to be at Liberty, to goe up & & down & frisk abt in a Pasture, or for a man to be able to walk vpō his own legs hither & thither he pleaseth, then to be a stupid Foetus or Embryo in the Mothers womb, or to be alwayes carryed up & down in the Nurses Arms & Lap, & to be fed by another.

Yet notwithstanding this is not soe to bee understood as if the Ꝑfecc~on of this Facultie of Freewill did consist in an indiffert contingent temerarious selfe determinac~on to one thing rather than another without reason ie: the considerac~on of Good as the Measure of it wch seemes to be the Common & most rec~d Opinion concerning Freewill

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As if the Glory, Perfecc~on, & Libertie of it did consist in a Blind irrac~onall, selfe determinac~on & in not being bound or ty'ed to any Reason of Good to {illeg} it one way rather than another Insomuch that Many conceve of Liberty & Happinesse to be one & the self same thing wth such a Freewill as this, & that there is noe greater Ꝑfecc~on in God himselfe then such a Freewill and {illeg} Liberty together wth infinite power to enable him to doe any thing indifferently soe ^that he can not {illeg} any inconvenience thereby & that it is onely weaknesse & Imbecility in Creatures, that disables them from the use & exercise of this Faculty wch otherwise would be their greatest happiness & Liberty.

But if Blind indiffert Determinac~on as such be a pure perfecc~on & the Essence of that Facultie of Freewill consist in it, then it is plaine that there cannot be any Sin or Morall Evill in any determinac~ons of Freewill {illeg} there being nothing in nature to put a difference & to make one selfedeterminac~on to be evill ^whē another is Good. Wherefore it is most agreable to this Doctrine to assert that there is nothing φύσις good or Evil Just or unjust honest or dishonest, but that these things are wholly made by externall Arbitrary Lawes & therefore there being no Superiour to God to impose Lawes upon him A there can be noe difference of Good or Evill to him. A

Now as it is plainly absurd to count that as Liberty & Perfecc~on or indeed to make it a nat~rll power or facultie for a Man to be indifferently inclined to doe himselfe either Good or hurt to avoid paine & misery or to expose him selfe to it, to save his life or destroy it, to feed upon wholsome food or drink poyson & the like For any one will confesse that it were much better to bee an Infant carryed up & down in a nurses armes that wlld doe nothing hurtfull to it than to have such a liberty as this is wch is in none but Mad Frantick Persons. So if there be any φύσις any Nature of Morall Good it is impossible that this should be a perfecc~on, or indeed a nat~rll Power to be indiffert to determine itselfe to any thing {illeg} dishonesty & Morall Evill being as Contrary to the inward vitality of Rac~onall beings as Poyson is to the nat~rll Life of Animalls

All naturall Power as such tends to Good for Good is the Measure of Power & to be able to doe evill or hurt ones self & neither Power nor Liberty but {illeg} τον ειτιι ἀξιυῖ τὸτε εῖνας τι ἐλευθιρον ξίαν περι φύσιν πράττει. It is absurd to think that any Being doth then exercise a Ꝑfective Liberty or indeed any true Power wn it actes contrary to its own nature or hath it selfe And never any Oracle was more true than this τὸ ελέυθερον καὶ τὸ ἐπ ἀυται ξαπῖται τῖ ἀγουθσ Γάγιν. To be at liberty & ones own disposall is desired for noe other Reason then for the sake of Good

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Wherefore though to have a large scope & Amplitude of acting in order to ones own Good be a power Liberty & Perfec~con, yet that same εξνοτάτῶν ἀντικειμένον as it is commonly taken the Power of doing Contrarys & Contradictories in all Cases indiffertly but especially the Power of doing Good or Evill is noe nat~rll Power or Perfecc~on but a mixture of Power ^{illeg} Perfection & ImꝐfection both together. or rather the {illeg} Power of Freewill Freewill as a faculty of the soul is intended by God & Nature onely for Good & wnsoever it acts contrary thereunto it is not ꝐꝐly the Power & Perfection, but the Abuse of the Power as shalbe shewed afterward

But ^if it be demanded here How then can be any Contingt Vncertainty in the {illeg} of Freewill if it be onely a Power to Good & a Larger Scope or Amplitude of Ꝑmoting the same, but so as that wn variety is Ꝑposed to its choice it is by its nature determined to the best selfe

To this wee reply that the Mystery & Intrigue of this whole businesse lyes in this, that L: A: is not a Pure Perfection but a Power or Faculty belonging to imꝐfect Beings wch hath a Mixture of imꝐfection to it. All such Beings as are not essentially Good & wise but onely by Ꝑticipac~on have a certaine Power over themselves whereby they can intend themselves both in a way of Considerac~on & {illeg} & Consultac~on in order to the finding out of wt is best & also of vigorous Exertion Resoluc~on & Strength to adhere to the same & resist the Importunity of other Passions & Appetites irrac~onally urging a cōtrary way & accordingly as they doe more or lesse intend & Exert themselves So they doe differently & uncertainly determine their outward acc~ons, to this or that, better A or worse - A But this Faculty is bestowed vpō vs by G. & Nature to their End - that we may be it it Promote ourselves to Good & Preserve orselves in the same -

+ Wherefore this is now to be added + to the Descripsion of L: A: that it is such a power or facultie in the Soul reduplicated upon it selfe as whereby it hath not onely an higher Elecac~on of Life above Ꝑticular Phansys & Large comprehensiveness of all its congruities & Capacities, but also a Power to intend and exert it selfe in order to the Ꝑmoting of it selfe to Good & Ꝑserving itselfe in the same. And as there is a double Good that wee are Capable of either the Animall & Private Good of selfish utility to wch inferiour Reason is the Director & or that univ~sall & unselfish Good of {illeg} or the Divine Life wch that wch directs to is called Superiour Reason, accordingly there may be two different Species of L: A: The one Animall wch is an Elevac~on above Ꝑticular Phansys & Appetites by by a Participac~on of that inferiour Reason wch is a more Comrehensive witt Subtility & Sagacity con <101> concerning the interest of the Animall Life together wth a Power of {illeg} intending an exerting itselfe more or lesse in the use of this inferiour Reason & in Complyance wth the same. And that there is such a Lower Species of Freewill is plaine from hence that Men often blame themselves for being carryed away by the importunity of some Ꝑticular appetites & Passions to A act contrary to the reason of their own Utility. A The second is Free will Morall wch is an Elevac~on above the whole Animall Life; by the Participac~on of Superiour Reason or the Instinct of Honesty wch is the same thing that the Platonists call the τὸ ἀγαθοειδὲς or the Boniform Principle in the Soul: ie. a sense of Good Superiour to all Private Principles in the Soul: ie: a sense of Good Superiour to all Private selfish considerac~on together wth a Power of intending & exerting itself by Selfe active Conatusion toward this Higher Diviner Principle: Now this Elevac~on that wee here speak of ^in both kinds above Ꝑticular Appetites & the whole Animall Life is properly seated in the τὸ μέρον or middle Power of the Soul, wch is the τὸ ἡγεμονουν or Ruling Principle in it, & wch compreends both the Higher & the Lower, (For Freewilled Beings are essentially neither one nor t'other;) wch τὸ μέρον middle thing is properly called wee our selves, & as it is selfe-comprehensive soe it hath a power of acting upon itselfe of intending & exerting itselfe more or lesse; of difference ^whrof there is noe other Cause to be assigned besides itselfe: & therefore a Power of determining its own acc~ons & of soe Governing & ordering itselfe as that Blame & Commendac~on may ^differently belong to it, Wherefore I say that the Genericall Nature of L: A: is not A ἀδιαφορία Dull & lank Indifferency but power over ones selfe whereby one is as it were in ones own hand, Ἀυτεξουσιότης Sui potestas or Selfe-power.

It is the priviledge of the Deity that it is essentially its own Ꝑfecc~on Goodnesse & wisdome immutable & unalterable ^vndiminishable & vnexegatable that it hath noe laborious Conatus or endeavour after any thing noe active exertion of it selfe wth paines & difficulty, it doth never d~btfully consult or deliberate concerning any thing & is never to seek wt to doe, & Is alwayes its utmost possibility wtsoever it can bee; It doth not graspe after its fleeting & fugitive Being but wth easie Ꝑfect security enjoy , {illeg} there being noe variac~on or shadow of change in it. but in all other Beings below God & above Brutes the Case is otherwise; for they have the Good & Ꝑfection of their own Being not by necessary Nature but by selfe active Exertion & Conac~on; & therefore ^{illeg} they are Capable both of encrease & Diminuc~on of their own Good & happinesse as they doe more or lesse intend or exert themselves. Whereas there is a higher & a Lower a Better & a worse Principle in the nature of all Freewilled Beings

Cite as: Ralph Cudworth, A Discourse concerning Liberty and Necessity: Phase 1 Part 4 (complete text) [British Library Additional MS 4981] (c.1658-c.1663), http://www.cambridge-platonism.divinity.cam.ac.uk/view/texts/normalised/CudworthBLAddMS4981, accessed 2020-10-21.